Desire is the nexus point of chaos and violence—it is only ritual that is able to nourish desire and contain its destructive potential in order to create social harmony and cooperation, sustaining the creation of meaning and transformation.

Xunzi discusses the origin of rituals, and says that they are meant to nourish desire: From what did rituals arise? I say: human beings are born with desires. If what they desire is not obtained, they cannot but seek for it. If there are no measures and limits on their seeking, then they will inevitably fight with each other. Fighting leads to disorder, disorder leads to destitution. The Ancient Kings disliked such disorder, so they designed rituals and righteousness to make differentiations, so as to nurture people’s desires, and to provide for their seeking. They saw to it that desires never wanted for goods and goods were never exhausted by desires. Desires and goods were sustained by each other and developed. This is the origin of rituals. Thus rituals are nourishment. (Lau 1996, 19.90.3–6; Knoblock 1988–1994, 19.1a–1b) People are born with desires and inevitably they seek the satisfaction of their desires. Without proper measures and limits, this seeking will lead to fighting, disorder and destitution. Rituals were instituted by the ancient kings to prevent this bleak situation. Rituals impose a structure on people’s lives within which desires can safely be satisfied. It is important to note that rituals do not satisfy desires as they naturally arise; rather, rituals nourish desires in such a way that they develop and are expressed in more cultured forms. “Nourishment” 養 (yang) does not merely keep something alive, but, more importantly, helps it grow in a healthy way. Three times Xunzi uses the two characters, “nourish” (yang) and “develop” 長 (zhang), to describe the proper way of watching over an infant (Lau 1996, 10.46.21–22, 11.55.25, 15.73.17; Knoblock 1988–1994, 10.10, 11.12, 15.5). Clearly the right way to care for an infant is to nourish him/her in such a way that the infant grows and develops properly. It is also not a coincidence that in these three passages, Xunzi uses the analogy of watching over an infant to describe the way the Sage-King cares for the people. After elucidating the nature of nourishment, and immediately following the quoted passage on the origin of rituals, Xunzi lists examples of nourishment. One example is how the meat of “pastured and grain-fed animals,” as well as “rice and millet” 芻豢稻梁 (chu huan dao liang) can nourish the mouth (Lau 1996, 19.90.6; Knoblock 1988–1994, 19.1b). At the time of Xunzi, rice, millet and the meat of pastured and grain-fed animals were regarded as high-quality foods. In another passage Xunzi contrasts high-quality foods like the meat of pastured and grain-fed animals, rice and millet with low-quality foods like “beans, coarse greens, dregs and husks” 菽藿糟糠 (shu huo zao kang). Xunzi suggests that low-quality foods represent the chaotic way practiced by the petty person, while high-quality foods represent the rituals and the righteous way propagated by the Sage-King (Lau 1996, 4.15.14–21; Knoblock 1988–1994, 4.10). The same contrast between high and low quality foods is likely intended by Xunzi when he suggests that the meat of pastured and grain-fed animals, rice and millet can nourish the mouth. If such an interpretation is reasonable, that is, if it matters that nourishment is of high quality, then we have a strong piece of evidence that nourishment is more than the simple satisfaction of desire. Rather, genuine nourishment can only be obtained when desire is developed and enhanced and therefore able to be satisfied in cultured forms through rituals. Rituals arise not only from the need to satisfy desires but also from the need to prevent chaos and conflict. Xunzi points out that rituals and right behavior enable people to live a communal life wherein they can protect and assist each other.3 In other words, rituals impose culturally approved limitations on desire so that we can live a civilized life in a harmonious community. It might also be suggested that rituals are constructed through an interpretative understanding of our nature. But what is the justification for one interpretation of our nature over another? And why is the satisfaction of desire through rituals the best way to keep desire under control and allow the community based on rituals to flourish? Xunzi asserts that co-operation is needed to sustain people’s life. This is so because a person cannot be good at every skill and cannot assume all roles by him or herself. If people do not help one another there will be destitution. While co-operation and a communal life are essential, distinctions are also required to maintain proper social order (Lau 1996, 10.42.16–7; Knoblock 1988–1994, 10.1). If we judge only from this passage, we might think that Xunzi is chiefly concerned with the problems of practical life. We might think of distinctions among individuals as simply the principle upon which the distribution of goods in a cooperative society depends. Xunzi would not deny that one important function of distinctions is to organize the distribution of resources among social members; however, it is unlikely that he would take this as the only function of distinctions, and even less would he think that the only purpose of the community is to better fulfill its members’ practical needs. Xunzi uses examples like the affection between father and son and the division between males and females as illustrations of differentiation 辨 (bian) which pertain to distinctions and rituals. Xunzi suggests that in contrast to human beings, animals have parents and offspring, males and females, but not a corresponding differentiation. Differentiation in this human sense is not the same as natural difference. Rather, differentiation represents both the recognition of difference and the understanding of the significance of this difference. The community, as an assembly of people ordered by differentiation and distinctions, is not just a structured group but also a group with intrinsic meaning and significance. What does this mean? Because our nature is originally without a normative framework and has a natural tendency to dominate the heart-mind, we can be led to bad judgments and bad behavior (Lau 1996, 4.15.14–17; Knoblock 1988–1994, 4.10). Consequently our nature might be regarded as bad in a fundamental sense, a sense which goes beyond “badness” that is due to external factors such as a lack of resources. According to Xunzi, even if we have unlimited resources, we could not live a good life if our nature is not transformed. Indeed, Xunzi points out that the inadequacy of resources is not the universal predicament of the world; that comes rather from the harm brought about by chaos and disorder. Xunzi is of the opinion that the natural world does contain enough resources for all people; however, if we do not properly manage these natural resources, and manage the social world as well, we cannot have a prosperous and flourishing life (Lau 1996, 10.44.20–45.14; Knoblock 1988– 1994, 10.8). The same is true of individual human beings. Xunzi once described a person who possessed all the beautiful things of the world but had no enjoyment from them because he did not comply with proper principles and consequently could not have an ordered life (Lau 1996, 22.112.9–16; Knoblock 1988–1994, 22.6d). Proper principles are precisely contained in Confucian rituals. Rituals transform our nature and enable us to live fully as a person. Thus, rituals are not merely a regulating mechanism like traffic regulations which are normative only conditionally and contingently. Rituals are, rather, constitutive norms that structure our life and the selves we are. In Xunzi’s eyes, a community is an assembly of people structured by rituals. It follows, therefore, that community is also constitutive of our life and not merely a better means to satisfy our desires. If I take the community merely as an external means by which to attain my individual ends, then, to better fulfill my ends independent of the community, there would be no reason for me either to enter into or stay within the community. Yet the community, as an assembly with differentiation, could not be merely an external means. Xunzi would suggest that living outside the community is living without differentiation, and thus living like birds and beasts. A life outside the community, if it is possible at all, is fundamentally different from a life within the community. The community does not just better sustain the natural biological life with which we are born; it makes possible and is also constitutive of a new kind of life, a life which is culturally meaningful and individually transformative. Certainly some people live in solitude, but very often they maintain a link, however minimal, with other people and the community, who carry with them the culture and the traditions of the community. Even though they might be physically cut off from the community, mentally and spiritually they are still nurtured by it. What is so important about the community is then not primarily the physical assembly of people, but its embodiment of culture and tradition in the communal life. Differentiation, distinctions and rituals represent precisely Confucian culture and tradition.