Creativity is the will to construct knowledge of our sociocultural context via the moral and interpersonal process of ritual—the idea of “novelty” that intellectual property regimes delineate as a priori criteria for ownership disrupts the a priori status of morality in the process of creative production.

Turning to diachronically yi action, such an action is geared toward and exemplifies the Confucian notion of dao (Way). Dao is a multilayered word that assumes multiple meanings in the Analects, such as principles (15:29), truth (15:32), and helping behavior (15:42). Broadly speaking, dao denotes “the way of life inherited from one’s cultural predecessors” (Ames & Rosemont, 1998, p. 45) and the guiding discourse for all (Hansen, 1989). Confucius teaches that exemplary persons “make their plans around the way (dao)” and “are anxious about the way” (Analects 15.32). Underlining human agency, Confucius points out, “It is the person who is able to broaden the way (dao), not the way that broadens the person” (Analects 15.29). To broaden dao is to make one’s inherited tradition one’s own and extend it to one’s cultural successors (Ames & Rosemont, 1998). Dao therefore is the thread that unites the past, present, and future diachronically. A creative person situates the past, present, and future within dao as the normative discourse and unbroken tradition. In choosing a course of action, such a person draws upon the wisdom and resources endowed by one’s cultural predecessors and propagates dao by meaningfully anticipating what is yet to come. An instance of yi that is performed synchronically and diachronically is Confucius’ treatment of a blind musician: The blind Master of Music, Mian, had an interview with Confucius, and, on reading the steps, the Master said, “Here are the steps,” and on reaching the mat, the Master said, “Here is the mat.” When they had all sat down together, the Master informed him of who was present: “So-and-so is here, and so-and-so is there.” When Master of Music Mian had departed, Zizhang asked Confucius, “Is this the way (dao) that one should speak with a blind music master?” Confucius replied, “Indeed, this has been the traditional way of assisting a music master” (Analects, 15.42) Zizhang is prompted to ask Confucius the above question as the latter has gone out of his way to assist the blind musician. Confucius’ action is atypical of hosts at that time, especially for someone of Confucius’ stature. Slingerland (2003) comments that Confucius “puts aside the normal ritual behaviour of a host in order to deftly and respectfully serve as a guide for the blind Music Master, without being overly fussy or condescending” (p. 190). Confucius’ intention and conduct are synchronic as they are predicated on and motivated by shu: he puts himself in the position of the blind musician and conscientiously caters to the latter’s needs and interests. At the same time, diachronic action is present as Confucius realizes and continues the traditional dao of receiving a blind music master; he also models for and passes on to Zizhang the appropriate response in such a circumstance. Having outlined a Confucian interpretation of creativity, it is timely to answer the two questions posed at the start of the paper. For the first question on what we mean by appropriateness in the context of creativity, a Confucian response is that appropriateness, as yi, revolves around perceiving and performing that which is most fitting in a particular situation. Yi provides the socio-cultural framework for individuals to react creatively to concrete circumstances and situational changes. The Confucian notion of creativity as delineated in this essay places an accent on the “dynamic, interpretive process of constructing personal knowledge and understanding within a particular sociocultural context” (Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009, p. 3). What is appropriate or otherwise is not determined by the authority, social conventions, or one’s whims and fancies. This point has been made clear through the earlier examples of Confucius’ judgment of Zhonggong and Mencius’ contention for disregarding the social prohibition of physical contact between men and women. Rather than conforming to the prevailing communal rituals and value system blindly, the standard for appropriate conduct, from a Confucian worldview, rests in li for the purpose of extending dao. As for the second question on the relationship between creativity, morality, and appropriateness, this article has articulated the centrality of morality for creativity in the Confucian traditions. All creative actions should be motivated by shu (empathy) and aimed at broadening dao through li (rituals inherited from the sage-kings). It is noteworthy that the term “morality” in Confucianism is not confined to ethical considerations of what is right or good, as is commonly understood in the Western literature. Rather, Confucian morality is satiated with ethical, psychological, spiritual, metaphysical, and esthetic significance (Ames & Rosemont, 1998; Tan, 2013). Also containing an intrinsic moral import is li. Describing li as “life forms transmitted from generation to generation as repositories of meaning,” Ames and Rosemont (1998) aver that li makes it possible for human beings to internalize shared values, thereby “making the tradition one’s own” (p. 51). Defining creativity as yi places morality at the heart of the thought, intention, and action of a creative person. It is pertinent that East Asians generally see a necessary link between creativity and ethics (Niu & Sternberg, 2002; Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009; Rudowicz & Yue, 2000; Tan, 2016b). Niu and Sternberg (2002) report that making contributions to the society is widely held to be more valuable and acceptable in East Asia than creative endeavors that disrupt societal harmony. There are two major implications from our exploration of a Confucian interpretation of creativity. The first implication is that our conception of creativity extends the existing research on personal creativity by adding moral and interpersonal dimensions to it. On the one hand, a Confucian interpretation of creativity coheres with personal creativity that is “manifested in the intentions and motivation to transform the objective world into original interpretations, coupled with the ability to decide when this is useful and when it is not” (Runco, 1996, p. 4, also see Runco, 2004). The object of personal creativity is new and meaningful encounter or experience that is the product of a mindful choice (Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009; Beghetto & Kaufman, 2007; Niu & Sternberg, 2006; Runco, 1996). Confucian creativity also relies on subjective novelty that points to what is new to the person concerned (“P creativity”); subjective novelty is oppositional to objective novelty that refers to what is new to humanity and history (“H creativity”) (Boden, 2001). Amplifying the concept of subjective novelty, Kaufmann (2004) writes that it refers to “an idea deserves to be described as original if it is novel for the individual who produces it, without necessarily being novel for something as a whole” (p. 156). But a Confucian approach to creativity goes beyond subjective novelty by accentuating the moral and interpersonal dimensions of creativity. The foregoing has already discussed how creativity as yi is essentially ethical and is characterized by shu, li, and dao. Creative acts, it follows, are not purely instances of subjective novelty that are devoid of morality; on the contrary, such acts are evidences of one’s ethical cultivation, concern for others, and contribution to societal harmony. Put simply, Confucian creativity is both “self-regarding” and “other-regarding”. Personalization, authenticity, and interdependence are underscored in Confucianism where an individual’s own values and beliefs are constructed in concert with those of others (Tan, 2018; Tu, 1985). A Confucian interpretation of creativity transcends the traditional construction of creativity that highlights the isolated, creative individuals to one that foregrounds human relationships (Glaveanu, 2015). Such an approach to creativity shifts the pivot from I-paradigm (the individual) and Hparadigm (the genius) to We-paradigm that plays up social exchange and human cooperation (Glaveanu, 2014; Glaveanu, Gillespie & Valsiner, 2014). As elaborated by Glaveanu (2015): Against “centric” models that reduce creativity to intra-psychological variables (e.g., divergent thinking, openness to experience, neurological correlates), the notion of distribution makes it a fundamentally relational and developmental phenomenon. The creative process cannot be represented by the almost instantaneous, mental, and individual moment of “getting the creative idea,” but necessarily engages self—other, symbolic—material, and past—present—future relations that turn it into a social, embodied, and temporal act (p. 167).