“Truth-testing”, “Rationality”, and “Logic” cannot be separated from the a priori status of moral metaphysics to epistemology—means you evaluate our impacts first and reject their framework offense.

For most contemporary Confucians and traditional Song-Ming Confucians (SongMing Rujia 宋明儒家), Confucianism is more than Confucian studies. They believe that Confucian teaching is a kind of practical wisdom and transcendental truth which cannot be understood by any empirical, logical, or objective method. Here, the term “truth” is not used by contemporary Confucians as a semantic concept with propositional value. Instead, it means the real or noumenal reality in their moral metaphysics. The term “transcendental” is not used by them in the Kantian sense in the first Critique of Kant’s trilogy. For them, “transcendental truth” is the truth of the transcendent entity in terms of its ontological status and of the trans-empirical characteristic in terms of its epistemic status. In addition to treating truth as a metaphysical entity, Mou Zongsan also thinks that, in contrast to the so-called “extensional truth” in Western philosophy and science, the truth in Chinese philosophy is a kind of “intensional truth” as claimed by Bertrand Russell (Mou 1985: 5).3 Based on these two kinds of truth, he stresses that there is a kind of essential difference between Chinese philosophy (including the three teachings: Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism) and Western philosophy in the sense that they are incomparable or incommensurable to each other. He believes that the spiritual essence of Chinese philosophy can only be accessed by a special kind of moral metaphysics which is essentially different from the Western speculative one, and that the wisdom or truth of the spiritual essence can only be obtained or grasped by a special kind of intellectual intuition or transcendental refection as described in their moral metaphysics. (Mou 1983: 31, 336, 347, 356) Most contemporary Confucians think that their ultimate concern or noumenal reality is not an object of empirical investigation or logical analysis. So, it cannot be known by the cognitive mind; it is only obtained or grasped by a transcendental mind (in terms of a kind of non-sensible and non-cognitive experience) which can be described as intellectual intuition (for Mou Zongsan), absolute consciousness (for Tang Junyi) or liangzhi 良知 (the originally endowed knowing/dominating power) (as explained by most contemporary Confucians). Based on this assumption (of course they do not regard this as an assumption or hypothesis), they believe that only through a long effort at cultivation or moral practice can their ultimate concern or noumenal reality, which is both transcendent (not transcendental in the Kantian sense) and immanent, be grasped by us. In terms of its transcendence, it is the Way of Heaven (tiandao 天道) (the natural daoti 道體 as an ontological entity) or the Heavenly Pattern (tianli 天理) (the natural liti 理體 as an ontological entity); in terms of its immanence, it is the transcendental or non-empirical benxin 本心 (original heart-mind) in humans or tianming zhi xing 天命之性 (endowed nature or essence from heaven) of everything in the cosmos. To use Mou’s slogan, it is: “the unity [in terms of token-identity] of the tiandao (the transcendent dao of heaven) and xingming (the moral order or decree in human nature)” (tiandao xingming xiang guantong 天道性命相貫通) or “the penetration of tiandao and xinxing (the original mind as essence) into oneness” (tiandao xinxing tong er wei yi 天道心性通而為一) (Mou 1968: Chapter One “Synthetic Introduction”). In treating tian as tokenidentical with xin, Mou uses the term “ziyi” 自一 (identical) to describe their relation (Mou 1968: 86). I think Mou’s idea is similar to Cheng Hao’s 程顥. To use Cheng’s words, “Only xin is (token-identical with) tian; to exhaust xin is to know xing; and to know xing is to know (the dao of) tian. It cannot be sought outside” (只 心便是天, 盡之便知性, 知性便知天, 更不可外求) (Cheng and Cheng n.d.: 20).4 Since nothing known by the empirical and analytical mind is both transcendent and immanent, this ultimate concern or noumenal reality must be understood as transcending our rational or analytical thinking. So, analytic language is unable to express this reality. Instead, Mou suggests to use a kind of “non-discursive language” or “language without distinctions” (fei fenbie shuo 非分別說) to do the job (Mou 1983: 347, 369). Moreover, Mou thinks when we use language to express the ultimate concern or noumenal reality, all expressions may be helpful to approach it to some extent but never attain it in itself. It is because its truth is ineffable. It goes beyond all languages. Basically, this transcendentalist view is an appeal to the first-person authority in terms of the non-cognitive mind’s private access to noumenal reality or transcendental truth. The so-called “non-sensible or transcendental experience” of juedui zhutixing 絕對主體性 (absolute subjectivity) for Tang or wuxianxin 無限心 (infnite mind) for Mou, which is without the opposition (wudai 無待) of the knower and the known or without the duality of subject and object, is claimed to be a special knowing power which can provide a real justifcation of attaining noumenal reality or transcendental truth. To use Xiong’s words, it is a kind of “tizheng” 體證 (embodied verifcation or justifcation by bodily experience). To use Tu Weiming’s 杜維明 words, it is a kind of “tizhi” 體知 (embodied knowing or knowing by bodily experience). Some contemporary Confucians, such as Tu and his followers, sometimes identify this kind of knowing as knowing how. But, I think, it is not knowing how in the Rylean sense, because knowing how is still empirical and cognitive while this kind of knowing, as described by Mou, is non-empirical and non-cognitive. Most importantly, the appeal to a kind of transcendental experience is not a patent right of contemporary Confucianism; we can fnd a similar appeal in Daoism, Zen Buddhism, Brahmanism, and Western mysticism (even Mou has recognized this kind of knowing as gongfa 共法 (common event/teaching) for Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism). According to Xiong’s new learning of heart-mind, the characteristic of the Confucian teaching or learning is opposite to that of cognitive inquiry in terms of methodology. He asserts that There is a kind of special spirit in Chinese philosophy. It means that the devotion to the learning basically stresses the method of tiren 體認 (embodied recognition). Tiren is [a method] that what is able to know intuitively enters into what is to be known intuitively which are integral and indivisible in one body. The so-called inner and outer, object and subject, sameness and difference, and all kinds of distinguished phenomena and appearances, cannot be obtained. Only because of this, therefore, unlike Western metaphysics, in Chinese philosophy, the reality/substance of the universe is not treated as an external existent object for searching. … After all, [the ultimate] truth is without location, without form. Hence, it cannot be inferred or conjectured by knowledge and cannot be treated as an external existent object. If a philosopher wants to confirm the truth with solidity, the only way is coming back to her own enlightened intuition. (It is also called “zhi” 智.) Only based on the self-understanding and self-acquaintance of this enlightened intuition, an integral and indivisible state without difference between inner and outer, without the divisibility of the knower and the known, can the truth be realized in front of her. Only this can be called “solid confirmation.” As I said before, it means “embodied recognition.” (Xiong 1975: 22) 中國哲學有一種特別精神, 即其為學也, 根本注重體認的方法 體認者, 能覺入所 覺, 渾然一體而不可分, 所謂內外、物我、一異、種種差別相, 都不可得 唯其如此, 故 在中國哲學中, 無有像西洋形而上學, 以宇宙實體當作外界存在的物事, 而推窮之 者… 真理畢竟無方所, 無形體。所以不能用知識去推度, 不能將真理當作外在的物事 看待。哲學家如欲實證真理, 只有返諸自家固有的明覺。(亦名為智。) 即此明覺自 明自了, 渾然內外一如, 而無能所可分時, 方是真理實現在前, 方名實證。前所謂 體認者即是此意. He also claims that Why they [Chinese or Indian philosophers] have justifed understanding (zhenghui證會) or embodied recognition of the real of the noumenal world is that it directly originates from their wise light. In other words, this is a self-evident reason. (This reason is self-evident, so it is called “self-evident reason.”) It is not obtained by sensory experience, nor by inference. Therefore, it transcends knowledge. (Xiong 1975: 24) 他 [中國或印度哲學家] 所以證會或體認到本體世界底真實, 是直接本諸他底明智 之燈。易言之, 這個是自明理。(這個理是自明的, 故曰自明理。) 不倚感官的經驗而 得, 亦不由推論而得。所以, 是超知識的。 Here, my question is: If this kind of knowing or acquaintance is not obtained from external perceptual experience and also not by rational analysis such as logical inference, is it coming from a kind of aesthetic experience or subjective feeling? According to the view of Xiong and most other contemporary Confucians, tiren, zhenghui or tizheng is not aesthetic or subjective in terms of inner sense, though they agree that it is a kind of inner experience without subject and object or knower and known. According to Mou, this acquaintance is a “non-discursive” (fei fenjiede 非分解的) experience, a “concrete manifestation” (juti chengxian 具體呈現) of the original substance (benti 本體) or the original heart-mind (benxin 本心) itself. Hence, it must be intuitive but not aesthetic. Since this metaphysical benti or benxin is not the object of sensory experience, it must be “non-sensible” or “intellectual.” If my understanding is right, Mou’s idea of nijue tizheng 逆覺體證 (embodied verifcation by reversed or refexive intuition), including chaoyue tizheng 超越體證 (transcendental embodied verifcation) and neizai tizheng 內在體證 (inner embodied verifcation), is not a kind of sensible intuition, but an intellectual intuition similar to the Kantian one.5 Xiong believes that this tiren is “what is capable to intuit/ know enters into what is intuited/known” in which inner and outer are integral without separation. The so-called “nei-wai” 內外 (inner-outer), “wu-wo” 物我 (objectself), “yi-yi” 一異 (sameness-difference), and various phenomena of distinction, cannot be obtained. In sum, it seems to be a kind of mystic experience though it might be grasped by people through a long effort at cultivation or moral practice. In regard to the meaning of “no objectifcation” (wu duixianghua 無對象化) in zizhi zizheng自知自證 (self-knowing and self-justifcation), Mou has given a detailed explanation as follows: This kind of refexive tizheng (guan 觀or zhi 知) is at the virtual level. It can melt into this original mind (benxin 本心) at the very moment and acts as the manifestation of the mind in which there is no real meaning of [opposition of] knower and known (the meaning of [opposition of] subject and object). If simply speaking, this is only the self-knowing of the mind, one cannot fnd any reason to argue against this. For example, in regard to my mind observing mistakes in behavior, I am also able to refexively know it itself as the mind of observation. When it observes, this is the mind’s act of real manifesting (full knowing). [So] I am also able to refexively and directly know that this is the act of observation and full knowing. This refexive knowing is merely the self-function of the mind itself which has the activity of full knowing. [So] eventually, that is still the mind itself which has the activity of; this is not another mind that knows that. It has the light [ming1 明, knowing power] to light [ming2 明, know] things. How can it not know itself being knowing? This is why it knows itself knowing, it is really still itself, still the mind itself which has the activity of full knowing. It does not divide into two minds. Here, there is no real meaning for the distinction between the [knowing] subject and the [known] object. This only has nominal meaning; it is only a gesture. 此種反身的體證 (觀或知) 實是虛層, 當下即可融於此本心而只是此本心之呈現, 並無真實的能所義 (主客體義)。此若簡單地說, 此只是心之自知而已, 並無何可反對 處。此如觀察過失之心, 吾亦可反身知道它是觀察之心。它觀, 這是心實際在呈現 ( 明了) 之活動, 吾亦可反身直接知道這是觀察明了的活動。這個反身的知只是這明了 活動的心之自用於其自己, 結果還是那明了活動的心之自己, 並不是另有一個心來知 它。它有其明能明物, 豈不能明其自己為明耶?是以它明其自己為明, 實仍是它自己, 仍只是這一明了活動之心之自己, 並未歧為二心。此時之能所並無實義, 只有名言上 之意義, 只是一個姿態。 Mou calls this well-rounded idea by the name “refexive soft circle” (fenshen de ruanyuan 反身的軟圓) (Mou 1969: 334). Here, I think Mou’s idea is that: based on “what is to know the other can also know itself,” he believes that he can clearly explain “self-knowing is without the opposition between the knower and the known.” If there is really no opposition, he may think, the ontological process of this kind of nijue 逆覺 (reversed or refexive intuition) cannot be confused with the genetic process of ordinary inner experience or self-consciousness. It is because the former is without temporal priority while the latter is not. Mou agrees that, only relying on tiren or tizheng, it is possible that what has been grasped is an illusion, i.e., a case of playing with light and shadow (wannong guangying 玩弄光景). It is because the tiren of self is only in the abstract state. It only reflects what is called by Hegel as “being’s pure universality itself” (ti zhi chunpubianxing ziji 體之純普遍性自己). In contrast with “being in itself,” it is “being for itself.” Nevertheless, according to Mou, only having the tiren of self which is only in the abstract state, the real being or noumenal reality cannot be ascertained in any concrete case (Mou 1969: 339). So, he thinks that tiren (體認 embodied recognition) by virtue of nijue tizheng (逆覺體證 embodied verification by reversed or reflexive intuition) is not sufficient to access benti (本體 original substance) or benxin (本心 the original heart-mind). This is only the first state obtained in the process of cultivation or moral practice. In order to achieve benti or benxin, he says, one has to enter into the realm of “tiyong xiangji” 體用相即 (the unity of benti or benxin and its function), i.e., the benti or benxin manifested or presented (tixian 體 現) in the concrete action by its function without staying in the abstract state (Mou 1969: 340).6 To reach the fnal state of obtaining dao, benti or truth, Mou puts emphasis on the idea of “tixian,” in addition to tiren. In this regard, Mou quotes some Confucian ideas, such as “jianxing” 踐形 (practice by body), “zuimian angbei” 晬面盎背 (mild of face and honest of back), “yi dao xun shen” 以道徇身 (to comply with dao in body), and “xinuaile fa er zhongjie zhi he” 喜怒哀樂發而中節之和 (the harmony in the expression of delighted, angry, sad, and happy emotions), as the evidence of tixian (Mou 1969: 103). He believes that these are the concrete exhibition or presentation of benti or benxin. For example, he thinks, the cases that “there is an intimate relation [of love] between father and son” (fuzi you qin 父子有親) and “there is an obligation between the monarch and his subjects” (junchen you yi 君臣 有義) are the here and now manifestation or presentation (dangxia chengxian 當下 呈現) of benti or tianli 天理 in various actions taken by people who play different roles in their actions (Mou 1969: 6–7). The idea of “tiyong xiangji” is about the unity of benti or benxin and its function. According to Mou, the former is infnite mind or liangzhi (the original knowing/ dominating mental power) which is a kind of intellectual intuition, whereas the latter is the thing-in-itself which is a function of the intellectual intuition both of which are brightly presented in unity (yiti langxian 一體朗現). In other words, for Mou, yong 用is not qiyong 器用 (instrumental function) or xianxiang 現象 (phenomenon) as described by his teacher Xiong and previous Confucians (Mou 1975: 128, 445). It is the thing-in-itself which is realized in the phenomenon by the exhibition of benti or benxin. I think there is a mutual dependence between ti and yong: on the one hand, the realization of yong (thing-in-itself) in the phenomenon depends on the existence of ti (intellectual intuition); on the other hand, the exhibition of ti depends on the realization of yong in phenomenon. It seems that, metaphorically speaking, without the sun, there is no sunshine on the object; without sunshine on the object, there is no the sun. So, there is a circle in tixian. One may ask a question to Mou; that is: if, in the frst state of gongfu, it is possible that what is tiren is an illusion, how can we make sure that what is tixian in the final state of gongfu is not illusive? Just like the case that: if we go in a wrong way in the frst step of the two, how can we make sure that the second step is guaranteed to be a right way to the destination? I think Mou and his followers should answer this question about his practical methodology if this question cannot be explained away. In addition to the practical methodology of tiren and tixian stressed by contemporary Confucians, sometimes they also mention a kind of theoretical method for obtaining dao. To use Tang’s own words, it is the method of “transcendental refection” (chaoyue fanxing fa 超越反省法) (Tang 1961: 191). For example, Xiong says To become a thing, everything is endowed with yiyuan 一元 [oneness]. … Without [yi- ]yuan, things would be what is said in Buddhism as something like illusion. … Now we see that all real things are developed [and thus not illusory]. Based on this, we justify the recognition that all things are produced with the endowment of yiyuan. (Xiong 1993: 91) 凡物, 皆稟受一元, 以成為物。… 物若無元, 便是佛氏所說為如幻的物。…今見一 切實物, 皆是發展的。以此證知, 萬物皆稟受一元而生起。 According to Xiong, simply speaking, “separated from qiankun 乾坤 [dao or the two producing powers of dao], there is nothing” (離乾坤無萬物) (Xiong 1993: 92). It is because “phenomena cannot be established and sciences also cannot be established if benti is insensate and without yong” (如本體是頑空的而沒有用, 即現象 界不能成立, 科學亦不可能) (Xiong 1975: 13). It means that the possibility of phenomena presupposes the existence of yiyuan 一元 (the primordial oneness), dao, or benti. Basically, I think, it is a transcendental argument or transcendental deduction with a premise which presupposes a transcendent entity. Although Mou believes that liangzhi, benxin renti 本心仁體 (the original mind as the substance of benevolence) or zhi de zhijue 智的直覺 (intellectual intuition) is a manifestation or presentation in practice, not a hypothesis in theory, it is confirmed or affirmed by a first-person non-sensible experience, not justified on a rational ground. Here, what is (transcendentally) experienced is a kind of content in this experiencing mind, but it still has not yet been ascertained as something existent before having the experience. In other words, whether it is mind-dependent or mind independent is still a question. Like Song-Ming Confucians, Mou believes that ceyin zhi xin 惻隱之心 (the mind of compassion) is the presentation of a feeling of discomfort (bu’an 不安), but, unlike other Confucians, he thinks that this moral consciousness cannot be “seen as below form (xingerxia 形而下), aesthetic and purely subjective” (看成是形而下的, 感性的, 純主觀的) (Mou 1971: 194). In this regard, to explain the objectivity of benti, Mou also uses a transcendental argument for justifcation. So, he says, “Xing 性 [spiritual essence/nature] is the transcendental ground of moral action” (性是道德行為底超越根據) (Mou 1971: 190), “Xinxing 心性 [the original mind-essence] is the a priori ground of the possibility of moral action” (道德實踐所以可能之先驗根據) (Mou 1968: 8), and “The decision of ‘the ought-ness of existence’ in moral consciousness is a ‘moral decision’. In regard to making a transcendental analysis for moral decision, it is also simultaneously an analysis of existence. This is to expose a ‘moral substance/reality’ to enable the possibility of the moral decision” (道德意識中「存在的應當」之決定 就是一個「道德的決定」。對於道德的決定作一超越的分解, 同時, 亦即是存 在的分解 就是要顯露一「道德的實體」以使此道德的決定為可能) (Mou 1975: 62–63). In other words, the possibility of moral decision or the decision of ‘the ought-ness of existence” presupposes a moral substance/reality. Without the latter, there would be no guarantee for the former.