Theoretical simulations of ethical choices do not make us more ethical—backed up by empirical studies—Ritual teaches us to be more ethical people which outweighs their offense.

Wang’s second argument for the unity of knowing and acting is that merely verbal assent is insufficient to demonstrate knowledge: “One cannot say that he knows filial piety or brotherly respect simply because he knows how to say something filial or brotherly. Knowing pain offers another good example. One must have experienced pain oneself in order to know pain. Similarly, one must have experienced cold oneself in order to know cold, and one must have experienced hunger oneself in order to know hunger.”108 To understand the important epistemological and linguistic point Wang is making here, consider a variation on a classic example from Western philosophy. Imagine a hypothetical individual, “Mary,” who is forced to perceive the world through a black and white television monitor. She becomes a brilliant neuroscientist specializing in vision, and eventually knows everything there is to know about the physics and neurology of color experiences. However, suppose she is finally released from her bondage to the black and white television monitor and can go and see the world as it is. Now she will learn something new. She will finally know what phenomenal colors are like. Previously, Mary knew more about color experiences than anyone else, but she did not know what phenomenal colors are.109 Similarly, Wang says, you might know a lot about pain, hunger, feeling cold, and goodness, but you do not know pain, hunger, feeling cold, or goodness itself unless you have the right experience. One significant difference between Wang’s example and that of Mary is that color experiences are not intrinsically motivating. It does seem plausible, though, that some experiences (among them pain) are intrinsically motivating. Wang’s disciple objects that we talk about knowing and acting separately, and that this verbal distinction is valuable because it reflects the fact that there are two distinct aspects to moral cultivation. Wang acknowledges that it can be useful for practical purposes to verbally distinguish between knowing and acting: there is a type of person in the world who foolishly acts upon impulse without engaging in the slightest thought or reflection. Because they always act blindly and recklessly, it is necessary to talk to them about knowing. There is also a type of person who is vague and irresolute; they engage in speculation while suspended in a vacuum and are unwilling to apply themselves to any concrete actions. Because they only grope at shadows and grab at echoes, it is necessary to talk to them about acting.110 However, Wang argues that verbally distinguishing “knowing” and “acting” is consistent with recognizing that they are two aspects of one unified activity: “I have said that knowing is the intent of acting and that acting is the work of knowing and that knowing is the beginning of acting and acting is the completion of knowing. Once one understands this, then if one talks about knowing [the idea of] acting is already present, or if one talks about acting, [the idea] of knowing is already present.”111 We might say that knowing and acting are like the concave and the convex sides of a curved line: conceptually but not metaphysically distinguishable. Reviewing Wang’s arguments, we can see why David S. Nivison remarked, “There are pages in Wang, sometimes, that could almost make acceptable brief notes in contemporary philosophy journals like Analysis.”112 However, it is important to recognize that Wang’s point is not purely theoretical. What he is concerned about is the phenomenon of people who separate knowing and acting into two distinct tasks to perform and think that one must first know and only then can one act. They say, “Now, I will perform the task of knowing, by studying and learning. Once I have attained real knowledge, I then will pursue the task of acting.” And so, till the end of their days, they never act, and till the end of their days, they never know. This is not a minor malady, nor did it arrive just yesterday. My current teaching regarding the unity of knowing and acting is a medicine directed precisely at this disease.113 Wang has in mind the followers of Zhu Xi, but his point has contemporary relevance. Eric Schwitzgebel has done empirical research on the relationship between studying or teaching ethics and actual ethical behavior. He acknowledges that the data is limited, but so far he has been unable to find any positive correlation between the theoretical study of ethics and being ethical.114 Wang would argue that this proves his point: the abstract and theoretical study of ethics will not make you a better person. However, Wang would insist that what is wrong with Western ethics is not that it tries to make humans better people, but that it does not try in the right ways. If we have any interest in our courses in ethics and political philosophy making a difference, it is worth looking at what else thinkers like Mengzi, the Buddhists, Zhu Xi, and Wang Yangming have to say on this topic. Just to give a teaser: Confucians stress that, to provide a foundation for ethical development, it is the responsibility of government to make sure that the people’s basic physical needs are met (for food, for freedom from fear, and for the possibility for communal life), that everyone gets an education that both teaches them basic skills and socializes them to be benevolent and have integrity, and that everyone who can benefit from advanced education has the opportunity to receive it (regardless of social class). Regarding the structure of ethical education, Confucius himself says, “If you learn without thinking about what you have learned, you will be lost. If you think without learning, however, you will fall into danger.”115 As Philip J. Ivanhoe notes, later Confucians agree with this saying, but argue vociferously about the relative emphasis to give to learning from classic texts and teachers as opposed to thinking independently. 116 As you might guess, philosophers with a discovery model of cultivation like Wang Yangming tend to emphasize thinking, while those with a reformation model like Xunzi put more emphasis on learning. Contemporary US philosophers will probably have the most difficulty in accepting two additional aspects of Chinese ethical education. (But perhaps these are the sine qua non for genuine ethical transformation?) First, Chinese philosophers think that practical activities—including meditation, communal ritual activities, and even what we might describe today as “work-study”—have as much of a role to play as intellectual ones in learning ethics. In addition, it is considered crucial to keep in mind that the ultimate point of studying ethics is to be a better person and transform society, not just to theorize.