Western understandings of political philosophy cannot operate by themselves—democracy is intertwined with morality and metaphysics—only a complete system of ritual propriety can achieve a moral system of governance.

Mou distinguishes Chinese and Western modes of thought and associated models of governance. In politics, the Western mode of analysis meant distinguishing morality and politics, and a focus on developing political institutions which would be efficacious regardless of who occupied them. Hence the focus on rule of law, representation, and checks and balances, a method he terms “analytic.” Chinese philosophy, on the other hand, employed a “synthetic” approach which offered a moral solution to politics.2 The character of government depends on the character of the leader. And so the political goal was “sagely rulers and worthy ministers” (shengjun xianxiang 聖君賢相) (Mou 1988: 184). There were no concepts of political authority, freedom, or equality, and no thought of specifying rights (Mou 1991: 129–130). So the problem in Mou’s view is not that Confucianism is fundamentally antithetical to democratic values, but that the Chinese mode of reasoning was not conducive to developing actual democratic practices. Democracy, he claims, is in fact a natural extension of the ideals present in Confucian political thought (Mou 1991: 122), a view characteristic of New Confucians. Specifically, the ideals Mou refers to are equality, freedom, and respect for the individual as a moral subject. The ideas were there, but not the means to realize them effectively in an institutional structure. Mou discusses the relationship between ethics and politics in terms of the connection between inner sageliness and outer kingliness (neisheng waiwang 內聖外 王), calling democracy “the new outer kingliness.” Mou distinguishes two types of connections: direct (zhitong 直通) and indirect (qutong 曲通). Developing democracy requires an indirect connection (Mou 1991: 55–56). The problem was earlier Confucians attempted to make a direct connection between inner sageliness and outer kingliness, and this is what led to the focus on sagely rulers and wise ministers, not democracy. In politics, the direct connection is between a virtuous leader and moral politics: the belief that a morally good ruler is necessary and sufficient for good government. Indirect connection is “a sudden twisting change, and it is a twist because it has a kind of ‘contrary’ element to it.” Mou gives another clue when he mentions dialectic: “This is not something that logical inference can achieve. Here, we come to understand the necessity of dialectical development.” The dialectical move is called “self-restriction” (ziwo kanxian 自我坎陷) (Mou 1991: 57–58).3 Mou’s own gloss is self-negation (ziwo fouding 自我否定), and this is a common translation (Tang 2002: 328).4 This term also requires some explanation. What Mou means is that the moral reasoning at the foundation of Confucian thought must restrict itself to allow for the development of theoretical or constructive reason so politics can be partly separated from morality. Democracy is not essentially a moral system. People can vote as they choose and are not required to evaluate candidates morally—elections are not limited to the virtuous. Democracy is not essentially a system for choosing virtuous leaders. This is why there can be no direct logical connection between Confucian morality and democracy. In the ideal of sagely rulers and worthy ministers, government is not independent from morality, as the possibility of good government depends on moral rulers and officials. However, traditional Confucian thought had no system to transmit power reliably only to sages and worthies. Only democracy can achieve that (Mou 1991: 59). Realizing morality in politics thus demands moral reason restrict itself so theoretical reason can develop, as only theoretical reason can produce the value-neutral democratic institutions to make this possible (Mou 1991: 59, 136–137). The very requirements of morality demand that morality limit itself. This is not a complete or permanent negation of moral reasoning. Mou cautions against thinking that doing away with morality and depending only on theoretical reasoning can work. In his view, this is the flaw with Western democracy. Once moral reasoning is restricted so theoretical reasoning can develop, the moral element must be restored so both are present (Mou 1988: 38–39; Mou 1991: 58–59, 92). Government cannot rely on institutions alone, as institutions ultimately depend on those who participate in them. This is Mou’s response to liberals who advocated complete Westernization, and his claim for the significance of Chinese thought for the West: each side has its own style of reasoning, but neither is sufficient on its own (Yan 1991: 206). The attempt to completely sever politics from morality cannot work. The dialectical method of the self-restriction of moral reasoning can overcome some of the apparent difficulties of justifying democracy through Confucian thought since this justification is understood to be indirect; however, it remains to determine what in Confucian thought can actually lead to democracy even in an indirect manner. In Mou’s analysis, the fundamental ideas for democracy are equality, autonomy, and the primacy of the moral subject. Democracy is necessary to realize these ideals. Mou derives an idea of equality from Confucian sources. He begins with respect for the life of the individual (Mou 1991: 117–118). What deserves respect is the potential in each person to become a moral individual (Mou 1991: 28). In short, the basis for democracy is the doctrine that human nature is good, originally formulated by Mengzi. While there seems little reason to attribute to Mengzi himself a view that persons as such deserve respect due to their moral potential,5 if one concedes that human nature is good it does seem to imply a certain kind of equality which one could make a case for recognizing politically. This becomes the basis for the democratic ideas that Mou advocates. He argues that democracy is in fact necessary to realize the goal of Confucian morality, to allow each person to realize his or her good nature. However, we must be precise about the kind of necessity this is. It is not logical necessity. There is no logical contradiction in an autocratic government allowing people to realize the goodness of human nature. It simply does not often work out. The necessity Mou talks about is dialectical, or as his follower Lee Minghuei refers to it, practical necessity (Lee 1991: 8). It is a question of what kind of government is most likely to make possible the goal of realizing Confucian morality. Mou and Lee believe democratic government is. Mou’s democracy encompasses fairly standard liberal prescriptions on rights, rule of law, and political participation (elections). Where he begins to depart from liberalism is in his concept of freedom and his associated views on moral development. Furthermore, Mou’s democracy is explicitly metaphysical in character (and this is the source for much of the criticism directed against him). His commitments to a substantive view of human nature and its connection to heavenly pattern (tianli 天 理) are clear. When discussing the political structure, he spends most of his time on law. Though he recognizes the Confucian tradition has generally not endorsed law in favor of the transforming infuence of virtue (Mou 1991: 135), he claims this is no great obstacle. Confucianism does not object to administrative law. Criminal law is a bit more complicated, as Mou recognizes that in Confucianism criminal law is inferior to virtue, and is something to be overcome (Yan 1991: 137).