Cyberwar will never occur and the only decider of success in warfare is kinetic attack.

What does this disaster in Ukraine tell us about the efficacy of cyber? In the ongoing cyberwar between Ukraine and Russia, the latter has demonstrated some success. Apart from the temporary freezing of the electrical grid in 2015, information warfare, the use of propaganda, and cyberattacks on end-user devices to support police actions were useful in Ukraine during the Maidan Revolution and later the annexation of Crimea. Russia successfully conducted an effective “public diplomacy,” i.e., pro- paganda war, when it seized control over its former territory in the Crimea, and this was crucial for maintaining domestic public acceptance of the claimed but as yet unrecognized transfer of sovereignty. In addition, Russian attempts to penetrate Ukrainian government computing systems has not xiv The United States supplies its own telecommunications network for military purposes. A low Earth orbit (LEO) is an orbit around Earth with a period of 128 minutes or less (making at least 11.25 orbits per day) and an eccentricity less than 0.25. Each satellite is approximately 2,000 km from the Earth. For comparison of different satellite systems, see EOS, “EOS Data Analytics,” https://eos.com/ blog/types-of-satellites/. xv Starlink uses 10.7-12.7 GHz and 37.5-42.5 GHz for the transmission of data from satellites to the customer’s terminal on the ground. Separate frequencies are used for communication from satellites to ground-based gateways that connect to the Internet, from ground back up to the satellites, and two channels for telemetry. Edward Roche and Michael Blaine 140 stopped the escalation of violence.38 Thorough monitoring of Ukrainian communications, including social media, has continued to provide intel- ligence, but for what benefit? The electrical system is damaged but functional. 39 Yet in spite of these successes, cyber has not killed a single soldier. It has not given Russia even a single meter of territory, nor has it prevented the Ukrainians from continuing doggedly to pursue the fight. Influencing a pop- ulation through cyber-based information operations or disabling cybernetic infrastructure is ephemeral. Systems can be restored, and public opinion can be fickle. Ultimately, bombing of infrastructure is far simpler than sophisticated cyberattacks. In comparison to the attacks on the electrical grid in 2015, which required extensive preparation and weeks of monitoring even after penetration of the cybersecurity barriers, kinetic attacks are standardized, immediate, and longer-lasting in their effects. Accordingly, over time, Russian tactics changed from attempting to influence public opinion in Ukraine simply to the physical destruction anti-Russian forces. The militaries of both the United States and Russia bought into the incendiary hype, promising a Revolution in Military Affairs—from massive investments building cyberwar technologies to specialized institutions to support them. In a hot war, these promised benefits have failed to materi- alize. The diplomatic signaling from the warning attacks launched against Ukraine’s power system and data processing centers did nothing to stop the rush to war. Cyber has produced little more than a lukewarm sideshow, at best incidental. Cyber is missing in action. The humanitarian disaster in Ukraine is not the result of cyber but of the ground war—the artillery, the bombing, the grinding up and destruction of soldiers and other human lives and critical infrastructure that will ultimately determine the outcome.