Private Property upholds an “Imperium of Capital” which makes systematically makes social hierarchies, inequality, and alienation inevitable

Despite seemingly endless understandings of property, Marx’s consideration must be emphasised because, instead of providing a conceptualising definition, he perceives property in a unique fashion which enables explaining both property in general as well as its specific modes of existence. While for Hegel, thinking about an object means appropriating it, making it something immediate mine (Hegel, 2013, p. 47, Supplement §4), in reality, thinking does not exhaust, nor suffice to grasp, nor to make use of, nor to control a concrete object (Gegenstand). The notion of property is often defined a priori, but as stated elsewhere (Hermeto, 2020b), precisely because it is a social relation, it always has distinctive historical determinations and cultural aspects, preventing an aprioristic definition. Marx’s interpretation can be grasped not only by his private property critique but also by the manner in which he interchangeably refers to property and property relations by using yet another concept. Despite noticing that this element appears in the Grundrisse, Peter Drahos curiously disregards its centrality because it is one among many interpretations of what property is (Drahos, 2016, p. 113). Already in the Introduction of the Grundrisse, Marx emphasises: “Every production is the appropriation of nature from the part of an individual within and by means of a determined society. In this sense, it is a tautology to say that property (appropriation) is a condition of production” (Marx, 1983a, p. 23). Thus, Eigentum and Aneignung appear to be synonymous. This intercalation opens a very relevant pathway to the understanding of property among the many interpretations because property as a concept expresses particular forms of appropriation. Whether common or private, physical or intellectual, analogously, being legitimated by fear, violence, common goals (cultural and social values), or by the abstract right, etc., the form of appropriation of the means of doing necessarily reflects the social property relations emerging from particular social relations of production. “The capitalist mode of appropriation arising from the capitalist mode of production” is “hence the capitalist private property” (Marx, 1962, p. 791). Therefore, appropriation perfectly encompasses these differences, and when Marx speaks of property relations, its historical and process character becomes clear and, therefore, cannot be aprioristically confined in a rigid definition (Marx, 1962, 1983b).

As pointed out by Drahos, Morris R. Cohen unveils the character of power of private property over others (Drahos, 2016). Nonetheless, a deeper understanding may be called for. Theory often merely justifies certain social relations instead of explaining them. It is no different with private property. Property acquires an arbitrary existence under theoretical veils, thus hiding its true social practice. Private property, “as opposed to social, collective property, exists only where the means of labour and the external conditions of labour belong to private individuals” (Marx, 1962, p. 789), representing, therefore, the divorce between the unity of labourer and the means of labour (Marx & Engels, 1962, p. 131); such property relations represent an estrangement among people (the producer/labourer and society), between the individual (worker) and his [their] vital sensual activity (the act of production), between the worker and the product of his [their] labour, and finally between the individual worker and himself [themself](Marx, 1968, pp. 454, 515, 517f). Marxian estrangement is consequently not just an economic phenomenon, but it impacts the totality of the human self and social relations. It affects both body and psyche (mind), individual and family, society and nature. The social impact of the estrangement derived from private property relations culminates in social disintegration, powerfully synthesised in the concept of anomy (Durkheim, 1952, p. 350).

Maintaining this situation requires some counter-measures so that these social impacts and pains can be numbed in order to be sustained and reproduced. For now, it should suffice to highlight that commodity fetishism, irrationalism, and the spectacle are some fundamental enablers which are constantly weighted against the concrete struggles of people.2 Thus, this process of reification, the commodification of the human being into the labour commodity, expresses the imperium of capital (social dominance of capitalist private property of the means of production) over workers; as this condition historically emerged, namely, capitalism (see infra), then the capitalist—as the “embodiment of capital” (Marx, 1962, p. 320)—extends his [their] dominium over the labour commodity. Evoking the notions of imperium and dominium, of course, refers to Cohen’s elucidation of property and sovereignty, which has the merit of understanding that “the primary effect of property on a large scale is to limit freedom” because, as it excludes people from guaranteeing their existential subsistence, “it rather compels people to part with their freedom” (Cohen, 1927, p. 18f).3 Furthermore, what constitutes a socio-economic desire, with private property, becomes decoupled from what is privately strived to become a compulsion to obtain individual profits. Intellectual properties are used to exclude competition from entering capitalist markets; planned obsolescence becomes another mechanism to secure profits to the detriment of social productivity; and marketing changes, controls and imposes behaviour by convincing one to buy what one does not need—even if lacking money by debt creation (Hudson, 2015). Not only that, Cohen emphasises the “inherent sources of waste in a regime of private enterprise and free competition”, in which eliminating competitors enriches the few but disenfranchises the many (Cohen, 1927, p. 20). However, Cohen’s critique falls short in light of how he conceives property. Contrary to its historical forms, property is assumed as a right derived from the legal term property (Cohen, 1927, p. 11f). Its corollaries are twofold. First, the power of capital emanates not from particular social property relations but rather property rights (or legal relations), which “confer sovereign power on our captains of industry and even more so on our captains of finance” (Cohen, 1927, p. 29); second, assuming what needs to be explained has the “advantage” of building a solution as idealist, as the idealist genesis of the formulated problem.

Adam Smith plainly understood the necessary conflict emanating from private property relations. “Wherever there is a great property, there is great inequality. For one very rich man [person], there must be at least five hundred poor, and the affluence of the few supposes the indigence of the many. The affluence of the rich excites the indignation of the poor”; hence, only the existence of a government can prevent civil insubordination (Smith, 2012, p. 709). The capitalist needs the state’s support to sustain his despotic rule. Smith, nevertheless, does not see a relation of exploitation but one of racial superiority within the process of natural subordination. Race virtue and the domination of the mind presuppose such superiority. “The first of those causes or circumstances, is the superiority of personal qualifications, of strength, beauty, and agility of body; of wisdom and virtue; of prudence, justice, fortitude, and moderation of mind” (Smith, 2012, p. 710). It is thus the relationship of a superior body and mind that enables the attainment of superiority and authority. In Cohen, nevertheless, the control capital has over the social capitalist political system is framed upside-down; hence, instead of capital using its power to influence politics and legislation, political and legal regulation also have the power to impose limits on capital—namely, social private property relations of the means of production (Cohen, 1927, p. 23ff).