Counter-Interp: IPR is the production, appropriation and reproduction of knowledge. Only through Marxist Critique can we approach IPR wholistically enough to solve the existential paradox of IPR - isolated legal reforms are insufficient

Being one of the most crucial tools for contemporary social control, as it should become clear throughout the analysis of this book, intellectual property(private) is commonly regarded as something abstract. Sharing this perception, Peter Drahos sees it as “a fragile form of power, for it relies on the acceptance of legal norms and on the efficacy of the enforcement mechanisms that support those norms” (Drahos, 2016, p. 195). He conceives this power as a form of threat power because it relies on the law. “Threat power which is so inextricably linked to law is perhaps the most dangerous kind of power for a society to contemplate creating and facilitating because it derives legitimacy from the law itself” (Drahos, 2016, p. 195). Moreover, this danger often goes unnoticed because the cult of private property in liberal ideologies primarily conceives it as a form of liberty and a prerequisite for freedom. However, describing this does not suffice; it is crucial to explain its existence from the point of its determinations; that is, why has intellectual property(private) been needed in reality?

Intellectual property theorists have thus far broadly failed to relate intellectual property(private) to capitalism. Mistaking cause and effect across the board, these thinkers assume the legal system as if it were the originator of intellectual property(private). This analytical failure is the product of not only limitations imposed by ideological constraints but also theoretical shortcomings that play a major role in limiting the apprehension of social property relations. For example, the lack of differentiation between personal and production property; property and private property; social from privatised appropriation; and the list goes on, as briefly presented below still in this introductory section, before it can be thoroughly discussed along the broader discussion of this book. All this hinders a critical assessment of intellectual appropriation which is merely assumed as a feature established by legal relations, that is, when the legal system is not itself hypostasised and presented as a thing-in-itself, also deprived of ontological dimensions. In most cases, not only intellectual property but also any legal dimension are presented as something merely abstract.

This book neither merely repeats the theoretical assessments of intellectual property theories nor is it constricted within the walls of a singular school of thought. It is evident that the present book is based on immanent critique; however, it seeks to learn from multiple theories and approaches, presenting a rich and multifaceted understanding of the production, appropriation and reproduction of knowledge. Knowledge is consequently not regarded as merely the phenomenological forms of copyright, patent, and trademark. Instead, it gains a twofold representation: a general condition in which humanity has made use of knowledge throughout history to guarantee and assert its own existence, and a particular condition under the capitalist mode of production. The latter, however, is neither homogenous nor fixed. As capitalist relations mutate and evolve, so do property relations and, accordingly, intellectual appropriation.

Contemporary intellectual property will only be thoroughly understood when it achieves full maturity, or rather, only after it has been superseded by a distinguished new form of intellectual property. Leaning on Marx and Marxism to apprehend capitalist legalities neither exhausts the understanding of capitalism nor capitalist categories. Nevertheless, they certainly provide a crucial methodological basis for analysing capitalist relations. On the other hand, the existing literature seems colossal, yet hardly any contains a critique basis of capitalism. Needless to say, critique here means revealing the hidden essence behind the phenomena; furthermore, it means unveiling the limits of the theory and the possibilities of a concrete reality or determined social relations. The choice of being receptive to interdisciplinarity encompasses both merits and demerits. On the one hand, its virtue lies in the fact that it brings more connections, more nuances, more perspectives, and more complexity to the analytical body; therefore, it fosters the establishment of the notion of totality; on the other, it has the disadvantage of not addressing “each point thoroughly, leaving flanks opened to critique and even criticism. Nonetheless, it cannot be accused of lacking depth.

This book does not aim to perform a moral critique. If the reader understands the ongoing analysis in moral terms, either I have failed in my task of representing the immanent critique, or the reader is limitedly interpreting the coming lines through his or her own moral lenses. By the same token, it is essential to distinguish between critique and criticism. While the latter has a negative connotation, or at least the intention of passing judgement, the former intends to provide an examination, an analysis from the standpoint of a dialectical relationship between the dynamic of internal contradictions presented by the object “under investigation as well as between the object of analysis and its relationship with its external spheres of mutual influence. For instance, the immanent critique of intellectual property is not based on a juxtaposition of several theories of law or, conversely, economic theories on the topic. On the contrary, it demands the investigation of its existential conditions. Insofar as the concept of intellectual property does not exhaust an understanding of the matter, intellectual property must be investigated as a social relation that not only emerges historically but also constantly changes its essence, for here, essence is not understood as an intrinsic metaphysical quality but rather as the expression of real social movements. Accordingly, the present immanent critique of intellectual property depicts the existing action of intellectual property in its complexity, nonetheless maintaining the awareness of the limitation, better still, of the ontological impossibility of providing a complete and exhaustive understanding of intellectual property. The reason is twofold: first, intellectual property as a movement, a social relation, is constantly changing; therefore, the current effort is to reveal its tendency within contemporary reality; and second, any theoretical analysis can never exhaust or obtain a comprehensive understanding of objective reality; “if reality and its grasp were to collapse into a single synthesis, then theory would become obsolete, for theory would become reality, and reality would be identical to theory.

As mentioned, intellectual property theories have thus far neglected differentiating between property and appropriation; private and non-private property; property and intellectual property; the totality and isolated parts of property; the tangible and intangible; first and second paradox; general human and capitalist particular dimensions; science before and after capitalism; the abstract right as originator and legitimator; appreciation and destruction of the value of knowledge; premise and result; among other elements. Some of these elements are analysed in isolation in some intellectual property theories; nevertheless, “the necessary scrutiny that understands these elements and their contradictions as interdependent parts of a totality is nowhere to be found.

This book concretises one general and another particular research. On the one hand, it is part of broad research on capitalist relations, which entails multiple interdependent dimensions; on the other, it gives representation to one particular aspect of social relations, namely, intellectual appropriation. Gaining an understanding of something is always simultaneously an individual and social endeavour. One cannot occur without the other. Isolated individuals, if not embedded in the scope of social knowledge, would merely react by means of genetic response to the environment, but even this is too abstract. This because many living beings are not simply conditioned by genetic reactions but also learn from their peers through a process of proto-mimesis. Therefore, assuming isolated, abstract individuals as creators of knowledge is necessarily an ahistorical undertaking. On the other hand, it is equally absurd to consider social knowledge as deprived of individual inputs, transformative actions, and transmission acts. Knowledge arises when individuals, relating to each other, find common ground and establish mutual recognitions of specific things and relations, which consequently become facts or simply objective knowledge.