NFU doesn’t affect extended deterrence – we help our allies in more ways than just nuclear weapons.
CACNP[A nonpartisan nonprofit dedicated to reducing and eventually eliminating the threats posed by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons through Congressional engagement and public education.; “No First Use: Myths vs. Realities”; NO DATE; https://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/no-first-use/no-first-use-myths-vs-realities/]//araghvn
Reality: Adopting a No First Use policy will not reduce the United States’ commitment to extended deterrence. Extended deterrence is about much more than just nuclear weapons. Forward deployments of U.S. conventional forces paired with strong and unwavering political commitments play the most immediate roles in deterring aggression against the United States and its allies. The United States maintains thousands of troops and hundreds of ships in commands around the world to balance crisis zones and deter aggression. The United States employs advanced conventional capabilities including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance tools and precision-guided weapons in conflicts, but also to help deter potential attacks. The United States’ robust conventional forces are more than sufficient to deter or counter non-nuclear attacks on U.S. allies, and conventional military threats are more credible than threats to use nuclear weapons first. Current and former military officials have emphasized the crucial role that U.S. conventional forces play in projecting power globally and credibly deterring aggression.
The credible U.S. second-strike capability is and will remain a deterrent to nuclear attack, but the threat of nuclear preemption is unnecessary and dangerous. If nuclear-armed adversaries believe that the United States would use nuclear weapons first, they will be incentivized to use their nuclear weapons before a devastating U.S. strike degrades the capability. This dynamic is destabilizing and increases the chance of a nuclear miscalculation.
Maintaining extended deterrence guarantees requires consistent communication and coordination. Any change to U.S. declaratory policy should be made after consultation with allies about why this change is in our collective security interest.