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US NFU would incite a domino affect of nuclear proliferation

Taehwa Hong 1/26/2022, [(Hong holds a B.A. in International Relations from Stanford University and an MPhil in Politics and International Studies from the University of Cambridge.) Hong, T. (2022, January 26). The case against the No first use policy. The Stanford Review. https://stanfordreview.org/the-case-against-the-no-first-use-policy/]

A NFU declaration by the United States would embolden US allies to pursue their own nuclear armament. If one country does somehow develop nuclear weapons, it would certainly not be the last one to do so. A domino of nuclear proliferation would kickstart across different regions. A South Korean nuclear program would lead to Japan and Taiwan pursuing their own, which would in turn provoke China into an additional build-up. Watching the developments in East Asia, Saudi Arabia might quickly “import” nuclear weapons from Pakistan. And the contagious nuclear arms race would continue. This would mark the end of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime as we know it. China and North Korea have already declared NFU. Beijing declared NFU in 1964, when it first developed nuclear weapons. North Korea made the announcement during the 7th Party Congress in 2016. What kind of moral satisfaction is the Biden administration hoping to get out of NFU, when it’s clear that their pledges don’t amount to much? Perhaps President Biden is wondering why the US does not declare NFU when even China and North Korea already have. Think again. Pyongyang’s NFU pledge is virtually as trustworthy as its pledge to denuclearize. Even if the North Koreans do not actually launch nuclear missiles in a war, it could seek to leverage a nuclear-loaded Intercontinental Ballistic Missile targeting the US mainland into eliciting Washington’s concessions. In that scenario, what good is NFU? China declared NFU in 1964 because it did not want to enter an unwinnable nuclear arms race. Over the last few years, Beijing has repeatedly blackmailed the US, Japan, and Australia with a “nuclear response” to their “provocations.” Most importantly, China has been aggrandizing and modernizing its nuclear arsenal. It would be naive to believe these efforts are purely to stock up second-strike capabilities, and not for a more credible first-strike threat. President Biden declared that “America is Back” after four years of Trump. However, US credibility was severely dented this summer as a result of the Afghanistan withdrawal, which the administration justified by citing the pivot to Asia. NFU was surely not the recalibration US allies imagined when receiving that reasoning. The increasingly likely prospect of two-front conflicts in Taiwan and Ukraine are undermining confidence in US-led collective security. If President Biden truly wishes to reconsolidate US global leadership and focus on issues of utmost importance, he should reject the allure of No First Use or Sole Purpose. Perhaps Washington could learn from former British Prime Minister Theresa May’s response when asked in the Parliament if she would be willing to authorize a nuclear strike that could “kill tens of millions of innocent lives:

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