The United States should commit to offshore balancing by XXXX
Johnstone 24 [Christopher B. Johnstone is a senior adviser and Japan Chair at CSIS. Prior to CSIS, Johnstone served as the director of East Asia under President Biden and the director for Japan and Oceanian affairs under President Biden in the National Security Council. Johnstone was also the director of Northeast Asia where he developed strategy for the US-Japan alliance.] 3-21-2024, "China's Evolving Counter Intervention Capabilities and Implications for the United States and Indo-Pacific Allies and Partners", No Publication, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-evolving-counter-intervention-capabilities-and-implications-united-states-and-indo // આયુષTop of Formers31
Sustaining Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific: Next Steps for Allies and Partners
U.S. alliances and minilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific are on increasingly strong footing— but the challenge of sustaining deterrence in the region is growing rapidly as China’s capabilities advance. The challenge is to both run faster and expand cooperation into new areas. Some areas to prioritize include:
Further diversify U.S. military access in the region. Expanding the range of locations from from which S. forces can operate is key to complicating China’s operational planning. This is a politically sensitive area for our allies; particular priorities should be to establish periodic presence for exercises and training in Japan’s islands southwest of Okinawa, and regularly exercising at the new EDCA locations in the Philippines.
Modernize command and control relationships with Japan and Australia. Washington should take steps to transform S. Forces – Japan into a true joint operational command, subordinate to INDOPACOM, to interface with Japan’s new Joint Operations Command. A particular focus should be to build a credible Japanese counterstrike capability, integrated with the U.S. intelligence and targeting architecture. Washington and Canberra should also consider establishing a new alliance coordination mechanism to support the growing number of American personnel operating out of Australian bases.
Promote allied investments in resilience. A particular priority should be to encourage Japanese efforts to strengthen information security and cybersecurity, as well as investments in space capabilities to support redundancy. Japan is considering new legislation to strengthen cyber defenses and create a new security clearance system for issues related to economic security; the United States should encourage expeditious action in these areas.
Build deeper connectivity across alliances. Following the Camp David Summit, the framework for engagement at the strategic level among the United States, Japan, and the ROK is in The next step is to build deeper operational connectivity, by establishing a trilateral contingency planning cell, exchanging liaison officers at commands in Japan and South Korea, and allowing observers at each other’s exercises.
Promote defense industrial cooperation. Japan’s investments in strike capabilities, and Australia’s Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance program, could serve as a foundation for trilateral cooperation in manufacturing critical munitions and Counterhypersonics are another capability area of common interest.