Offshore balancing collapses US ally-partnerships and hegemony

The biggest flaw in their argument involves allied state behavior if this strategy became operative. This approach argues that it exploits the capabilities of regional players in their own neighborhood where they have vital interests in order to preserve stability.  Instead of risking resource overstretch by the extensive investment in building up and posturing U.S. military forces around the globe, Japan, South Korea and our NATO allies would be expected to provide more for their own national and regional security commensurate with their interests.  These major regional powers would police themselves in their interaction with other powers. 

But this assumes that regional powers share our interests and have the will and capacity to stabilize the region.  China’s actions (and Russia’s in the Black Sea or Iran’s in the Persian Gulf) suggest that these assumptions are frail.  Mearsheimer and Walt fail to consider the possibility that such countries will not take advantage or operate against U.S. allies negatively.  Their hope is an illusion belied by the rising level of geopolitical competition of the last several years.  Withdrawal from East Asia and the Pacific or Europe is not likely to have a stabilizing effect on these region.  This produces a very reactive strategy that arguably increases the chances of a war breaking out, for example in Korea or in the South China Sea. 

The fourth problem relates to the law of unintended consequences.  As Dr. Hal Brands has noted, this version of OSB appears to offer numerous benefits at little risk, but in fact, the risks and liabilities including greater nuclear proliferation, are indeed quite significant.   Critical allies like Japan would face a stark choice having to hedge against a lack of commitment from the United States and would need to appease or negotiate a subservient position to Chinese hegemony.  Other scholars have noted this particular fatal flaw in OSB:

In East Asia today, U.S. allies rely on U.S. reassurance to navigate increasingly fraught relationships with a more assertive China precisely because they understand that they will have great trouble balancing Beijing on their own. A significant U.S. retrenchment might therefore tempt these countries to acquiesce to, or bandwagon with, a rising China if they felt that prospects for successful resistance were diminishing as the United States retreated.

A related strategic and operational disadvantage that Mearsheimer and Walt fail to recognize is the presumption that U.S. forces will have the capability to regain access to key regions during crises.  Offshore balancing places our forces back at home, far from future flashpoints.  The further one distances U.S. capabilities from its interests in critical regions of the world, the slower and harder it is to make an effective response. 

Having abandoned Asia or the Middle East, returning after being absent for some time is not a matter of simply sailing back.  Having unburdened ourselves of forward stationed forces and basing, port and airfield infrastructure will be needed to deploy forces at great distances, we should be more realistic about the time and cost involved in generating combat power overseas in the absence of access.  Regaining access and bringing forces to bear will be harder and take longer for future U.S. Presidents under such a strategy. Embedded in OSB is the notion that American credibility, commitment and capabilities can be “surged” at will.  That’s not how the world works.  More likely, our perceived detachment would undercut U.S. crisis management actions and our diplomacy.  Certainly, it would make U.S. policy actions reactive and belated. 

My preferred alternative to OSB was published in Orbis several years ago.  This option, which I deliberately titled “Forward Partnership,” rejects OSB’s assumptions, its reactive character, and reduces the distance it puts between the U.S. and its friends.  This strategy accepts that unilateral action in this century is a bankrupt method and that alliances and multilateral responses are in our interests.  This strategy embraces the need to engage broadly with designated partners and friends to preserve regional stability without extensive forward-stationed forces.  As suggested by the name, this strategy operates forward with alliances and partners to leverage cooperative and preventive actions to preclude conflicts before they occur.  It uses forward-deployed naval power and Special Operations Force assets to generate and sustain preventive actions and promote true partnerships (vice dependencies).  The strategy focuses on critical national interests in the global commons, ensuring access to critical markets and resources, for ourselves and our partners.  Rather than husbanding our forces ashore in California or Norfolk this strategy is forward with our partners, retaining our regional access, our influence, and our interoperability with our friends.  Far better than detachment, this strategy is more reassuring and actually balances.  It also provides a flexible deterrent posture that is able to move where and when needed.  This element, flexible presence without costly stationary posture, is a far better tool for balancing than what Mearsheimer and Walt offer. 

In short, OSB–as presented by academics–is less of a strategy about how to secure U.S. interests more efficiently, and is more of a dodge.  As presented, it is not a strategy that advances our core interests. Overall, this strategic approach cedes the initiative and our national interests to another power until that power, a friend or foe, takes actions that we deem unacceptable. There is something to be said for restricting imperial overstretch and for calibrating U.S. interests with greater discipline, but sacrificing U.S. leadership and contributions to global stability is simply a retreat, and one that is ill-timed. 

If there was a strategy destined to accelerate the unraveling of world order, and the establishment of the United States as accelerator to the demise of global stability, this is it.  Certainly, in the face of rising revisionist powers and constrained resources, we should not ignore the value of collective security.  Surely, as Jakub Grygiel has persuasively argued, we can do more to arm our allies along the frontiers of freedom.  Nor should we shrink from the embattled peripheral countries where allies and partners are particularly vulnerable and where collective defense is needed to stand up to coercive states.