Counterterror info-sharing fails

Because both the FBI and DHS have counterterrorism-related missions and a role in gathering and disseminating counterterrorism information, 8 some DHS and FBI officials expressed concerns about potential overlaps in their counterterrorism missions and activities.

Although there is a national-level information sharing strategy, the PMISE determined that its implementation across the information sharing environment has been uneven.

The DHS Intelligence Enterprise is not as effective and valuable to the IC as it could be. For example, there is a lack of unity across the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, problems with I&A staffing levels in the field, issues with the internal intelligence product review and approval processes, and difficulty accessing classified systems and facilities in the field.

DOJ can improve its counterterrorism information sharing efforts by implementing a consolidated internal DOJ strategy and evaluating the continued need and most effective utilization for the USAOs’ AntiTerrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) meetings. In addition, the FBI should spur participation associated with JTTFs and improve its efforts to obtain partners’ input to the process for identifying and prioritizing counterterrorism threats.

Within the ODNI, the Domestic DNI Representative (DDNIR) program is hindered by large geographic regions, as well as the lack of a clear strategic vision and guidance. In addition, the NCTC Domestic Representative program has also struggled to sufficiently cover its regions.

At the state and local level, fusion centers are focused on sustaining operations rather than enhancing capabilities due to unpredictable federal support, including potential reductions in grant funding. Further, varying requirements for state and local security clearances sponsored by federal agencies can impede access to classified systems and facilities.