Plan text in a vacuum – not specifying in the plan means it’s legally ‘domestic’ – plus the infringing activity occurred in the United States since products were sold to US residents

“It is a ‘longstanding principle of American law “that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”’” Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247, 255 (2010). We have repeatedly explained that this principle, which we call the presumption against extraterritoriality, refers to a “presumption against application to conduct in the territory of another sovereign.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U. S. 108, 119 (2013) (citing Morrison, 561 U. S., at 265). In other words, exclusively “‘[f]oreign conduct is generally the domain of foreign law.’” Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U. S. 437, 455 (2007) (alteration omitted). The presumption “serves to avoid the international discord that can result when U. S. law is applied to conduct in foreign countries” and reflects the “‘commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.’” RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U. S. 325, 335–336 (2016). Applying the presumption against extraterritoriality involves “a two-step framework.” Id., at 337. At step one, we determine whether a provision is extraterritorial, and that determination turns on whether “Congress has affirmatively and unmistakably instructed that” the provision at issue should “apply to foreign conduct.” Id., at 335, 337; accord, Kiobel, 569 U. S., at 117 (asking whether Congress “intends federal law to apply to conduct occurring abroad”); Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 3). If Congress has provided an unmistakable instruction that the provision is extraterritorial, then claims alleging exclusively foreign conduct may proceed, subject to “the limits Congress has (or has not) imposed on the statute’s foreign application.” RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 337–338. Step two does not end with identifying statutory focus. We have repeatedly and explicitly held that courts must “identif[y] ‘the statute’s “focus”’ and as[k] whether the conduct relevant to that focus occurred in United States territory.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 5) (emphasis added); accord, e.g., RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 337. Thus, to prove that a claim involves a domestic application of a statute, “plaintiffs must establish that ‘the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States.’” Nestlé, 593 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 3–4) (emphasis added); see, e.g., WesternGeco, 585 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 6–8) (holding that a claim was a domestic application of the Patent Act because the infringing acts—the conduct relevant to the focus of the provisions at issue—were committed in the United States); Morrison, 561 U. S., at 266–267, 271–273 (concluding that a claim was a foreign application of the Securities and Exchange Act because the “purchase-and-sale transactions” at issue occurred outside of the United States).