Multipolarity good – clinging to a rigid, U.S.-dominated world order is unrealistic in a world where diverse political systems coexist.

New world disorder: This is by now a commonplace of strategic debate. Great power rivalries and conflicts between different social systems are undermining the Western liberal rules-based world order, which had been accompanied by American global hegemony, at least since the end of the Cold War. On this, most agree. Where controversy starts is on the question of what order the world is moving toward, and indeed what order it should be moving toward.

On this question, Germany’s National Security Strategy offers an answer. “The 21st century world is a multipolar world,” says Olaf Scholz’s foreword. By using this phrase, the German chancellor re-emphasizes what he and other members of the German government have often stressed: Germany’s foreign and security policy is based on a model of multipolarity, and this is above all a pragmatic reaction to shifts in power over the past two decades.

This new orientation has been subject to criticism—sometimes harsh criticism—on a number of grounds. These critical perspectives broadly divide into three categories.

Criticism of “Polarity” as a Term and as an Idea

First, the concept of polarity itself has drawn severe criticism within international relations theory. Among other things, this critique suggests that its focus on states neglects the importance of non-state and supranational actors. It has also been suggested that since the idea of polarity derives from the natural sciences, it brings with it a mode of binary thinking, centered on repulsion and attraction. Space does not allow for a comprehensive review of this theoretical debate in this essay. However, in the following, it should be borne in mind that the discussion of multipolarity refers solely to interstate relations; this in no way negates the fact that other patterns of ordering international relations exist outside the realm of states.

Moreover, political discussion of polarity has long since separated from the original scientific context of the term, where the term can be understood literally. Had it not, it would be impossible to speak of more than two poles.

However, the real controversy over polarity in international relations is not to be found in theoretical debates, but rather in political disputes. So, we should first focus our attention on criticisms of the multipolarity model, starting with suggestions that the model itself is unrealistic. According to this view, only two countries have the long-term potential to form poles, and for some time these two powers have been engaged in a conflict with normative-systemic stakes, which is also marked by a struggle for hegemony. These two powers are, of course, the United States, previously the democratic hegemon, and China, its authoritarian challenger. Everyone else must choose to join one side or the other; Germany and Europe, goes this argument, have no alternative but to side with the United States.

From this idea of polarity are derived notions of an inevitably bipolar world order are derived. But for one thing this ignores the considerable differentiation of political systems around the world. Between Norway and North Korea there is a wide range of very distinctively constituted states. Only a minority of these can clearly be assigned to categories of democracy or autocracy. And even states that are unquestionably democratic or autocratic do not necessarily want to be assigned to one or other camp in a bipolar hegemonic conflict. Moreover, the bipolar worldview occludes another reality: Tensions between liberal-democratic and authoritarian-populist social models influence their respective domestic policies, as well as interstate relations. The boundary between illiberal democracy and moderate authoritarianism is fluid and porous, it could be crossed not only in Asia and Africa, but even in Europe and the United States.