US heg and leadership isn’t key to peace – post-WWII peace wasn’t because of US alone

There are multiple explanations for the absence of great- power war in the post-World War II era, and the mere fact that US dominance coincides with that period of relative peace does not by itself prove that the United States was the cause. Indeed, human beings have been turning away from violence for generations. Skepticism toward organized violence and opposition to warfare dates to the late 1800s and accelerated after World War I.25 The United States has sometimes been at the forefront of these efforts. The Washington Naval Conference, a gathering of the world’s largest naval powers held between 1921 and 1922, for example, reined in the enormous expense of the weapons of mass destruction of that era. In a similar vein, US officials have helped broker an end to conflicts, ranging from the Russo-Japanese War to the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland. And Americans, either as individuals or in an official capacity, have often been recognized as advocates for peace. The Nobel Peace Prize has been awarded to twenty- one Americans.26 But, on other occasions, the United States has engaged in military action that defied, either tacitly or explicitly, the norms of nonviolence enshrined in the United Nations (UN) Charter. Beyond the obvious cases of the wars in Vietnam and Iraq, other major operations, such as the bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999, were carried out without any UN Security Council (UNSC) authorization, while the regime-change operation in Libya in 2011 clearly exceeded the UNSC’s mandate that was limited to halting attacks on civilians. The United States ignored an International Court of Justice ruling regarding its mining of Nicaragua’s harbors in 1986 and has carried out numerous extrajudicial killings over the twenty-years-long Global War on Terrorism.27 But while the United States has sometimes waged war or violated others’ sovereignty, most countries do not exhibit these same impulses. And norms alone cannot explain the decline in organized violence since the end of World War II. Nuclear weapons matter, too. Since the 1960s, when multiple states came into possession of deliverable thermonuclear devices, they and others have been compelled to consider the possibility that a conventional war could escalate into an earth-ending conflagration. By substantially raising the cost of conflict, nuclear weapons have made war less likely. We do not know how much less likely, but few have tested the proposition.28 Deterrence, once thought to be fragile and delicate, might actually be quite robust and durable. States with a reliable nuclear force, one that is not in danger of being incapacitated during a surprise attack, are less fearful of conquest than those who lack such weapons. Indeed, North Korea’s leaders claim that their possession of nuclear weapons has deterred the United States and others from attacking it, whereas Libya’s decision to dismantle its nuclear program in the mid-2000s (admittedly in a very rudimentary state) left it with nothing to deter a US-led regime-change war less than a decade later.29 The increased precision and lethality of conventional weapons, too, could also create an environment less conducive to war, to the extent that these technologies deter would-be aggressors from believing that they can secure major gains at an acceptable cost. And by privileging the defense over the offense, new technologies could act to preserve the relatively peaceful and prosperous status quo—if status quo states, including especially US allies and partners, adapt their defense doctrines accordingly.30 Revisionist powers, including countries which seek to overturn political systems within given states, or disrupt long-established patterns of diplomacy and trade in particular regions, must contend with how these new technologies complicate their ambitions. Other factors, independent of these important technological innovations, must also be considered to explain the key characteristics of the current international order. Since the end of World War II, US leaders have often celebrated the benefits of peace over war. But the trauma of both world wars could have produced a similar result.31 Indeed, scholars have traced the decline of all forms of violence over several centuries, and credit a range of factors, from Montesquieu’s doux commerce (gentle commerce) to a growing appreciation for the rights of others, acquired through literature and the arts. The benefits of peace exceed those of war.32 The norms enshrined in the UN Charter, including respect for the sovereign rights of others, and a prohibition on the use of force except in self-defense, are more widely adhered to than many people realize. The world reacts harshly to those who disobey, and generally does not need to be told to behave by a disapproving Uncle Sam. The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, Saddam Hussein’s attempted annexation of Kuwait, and Vladimir Putin’s seizure of Crimea, all elicited strong international condemnation—and even harsh punishment, ranging from economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation to retaliatory military action. The United States sometimes helps to coordinate international responses to aggression and illegal annexation, but not consistently. The Trump administration, for example, granted de facto recognition of Morocco’s claims to Western Sahara, a decision that the Biden administration has not yet reversed.33 Other illegal annexations that the US government has allowed to stand include Turkey’s seizure of lands in northern Cyprus and Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Golan Heights. But the rest of the world has not followed the US lead. The 31 And, tragically, the United States’ own struggles in the wars that it has initiated over the last quarter century may now serve as an additional and useful warning to others. European Court of Human Rights and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights have both handed down adverse rulings against Turkey, and numerous NGOs and international bodies have criticized Israel’s mistreatment of Palestinians and failure to abide by international law.34 The United States, too, has incurred the ire of global public opinion when it is seen as transgressing essential precepts of the modern rules-based international order. Favorable attitudes toward the United States declined during Trump’s presidency— e.g., 31 percent favorable in France and 26 percent in Germany— but the Pew Research Center found that that was merely an acceleration of a downward-sloping trend going back more than two decades. The previous low point occurred in March 2003 at the onset of the US invasion of Iraq (34 percent in Italy, 31 percent in France, 25 percent in Germany, and a stunning 14 percent favorable rating for the United States in Spain).35 Indeed, it would be hard to exaggerate the harmful effects that the US war in Iraq had on the nation’s international reputation.