The alternative is “economic provisioning”----replacing rational economics with irrational feminist economics

However, equally problematic is the way in which notions of the economic and the economy find expression. These emergent forms of 294 Feminist Theory 4(3) discourse on crime and the economy still largely present themselves as wedded to notions of the economic as business. The economic emerges as business-oriented activity for profit and gain versus loss, benefits versus costs. Economic activity emerges as business-oriented activity, trading, buying and selling according to the demand and supply mechanisms of the market. The market, in turn, is itself an environment, place or space defined according to similar criteria. Despite detailed efforts to delineate ‘the market’ as something additional to a simple mechanism occupying a space where goods and services are traded, Taylor and Ruggiero nevertheless largely accept a traditional definition of the economic as narrowly defined by orthodox mainstream economists. In effect, they remain largely uncritical of this particular economic focus within their broader conception of the market and import it as given. One feminist perspective may be to attempt to incorporate the missing feminist issues – the add-women-and-stir variety. A second may be to stick with the emerging analyses of crime as embedded in markets and perhaps make it compatible with feminist economic concepts. A further feminist perspective may be more radical. It may argue that the emergent forms of discourse on crime and markets are too wedded to notions of the marketas-the-economic-as-business and that altogether different economic concepts – feminist economic concepts – ought to be adopted as wholesale replacement versions of the notion of the economic. The economic and rational choice In this context it is worth examining the economic as specifically linked to the notion of rational choice. The ways in which rational choice has been articulated and developed within criminology indicates the manner in which the notion of the ‘economic’ has been popularly incorporated into criminology. The rational choice perspective generally focuses upon both the opportunities to commit crimes and offenders’ choice to commit them. The ‘choice’ that offenders make is deemed ‘rational’ in that the offender engages in a form of ‘cost benefit analysis’. This type of analysis is therefore essentially an economic one. It entails calculating and weighing up the risks of detection, capture and punishment, on the one hand, against the material rewards, benefits and satisfactions to be reaped from seizing the opportunity to commit the crime, on the other. In this way the offenders are always assumed to be acting rationally, seeking to benefit themselves by their criminal behaviour. It is widely acknowledged that the spur to the recent incarnations of classical ideas in criminology derives from the work of Cornish and Clarke in 1986. Their version of the rational choice perspective suggests that offenders act ‘in terms of a limited or bounded rationality’ (Hopkins-Burke, 2001: 44). The rational choice model has been applied to a range of different offences in the search for situational crime prevention measures. In the 1980s research addressed offenders’ motivations and the costs and benefits of robbery (Walsh, 1986). Shoplifting (Carroll and Weaver in Cornish and Clarke, 1986), burglary (Bennett and Wright, 1984) and opium addiction Davies: Is economic crime a man’s game? 295 (Bennett, 1986) were among the particular offences examined. This early phase of application clearly saw the rational choice model as more applicable to crime for gain or property crimes than to ‘expressive crime’. The contemporary variant of the rational choice model has become somewhat less economically determined and routine activities theory claims to apply to both personal and property crimes. Thus in the 1990s, routine activity theory, pioneered by Felson (1994), expresses concerns about how ‘the press of circumstances shapes individual acts (rational choice)’ (Pease, 2000). Both of these perspectives – rational choice and routine activity – have inspired strategies for crime control; in particular situational crime prevention research and policies. In this respect the legacy and influence of ‘economic rationality’ in general endures. The brand of criminology that has been most widely embraced in Home Office and policy-making circles in the last decade or so has been that associated with the perspectives (rational choice and routine activity) and crime control strategies (situational crime prevention) derived from a fundamentally classical view of human nature wherein offenders are free, rational and make choices. There are several problems with this wholesale adoption of the rational choice model and the rational actor model within criminology. The model incorporated within criminology is little changed from that originating within the mainstream of the discipline of economics. The rational choice perspective represents the enduring way in which economics has permeated criminology. There are widespread criticisms of the core analytical assumptions of rational choice perspectives; namely its primary focus on the individual and individual responsibility, as well as its assumptions about choice. Wider forces and issues that may influence decisions, such as morality, conformity, social organization and inequality, including race, ethnicity, gender and class tend to be largely ignored. In effect, as Taylor puts it, individuals are viewed as ‘identical “calculators” ’ (Taylor, 1999a). Despite ongoing critiques of rational choice perspectives in their crude and more refined representations, they endure and exert considerable impact upon criminological debates as well as influencing public policy. I would argue that this method of incorporating the economic within criminology and this demonstration of interdisciplinarianism is unsuitable for feminist criminology, economics and feminist theorizing generally. Adopting the rational choice model of economic activity is selecting a particular and inappropriate type of economic analysis. Such a selective and unitary model, which excludes whole areas of legitimate economic activity that are important for women in particular (e.g. homeworking, domestic labour, childcare, unpaid work and so on), leads to an only partial understanding of economic life. Similarly, if legitimate economic activities are excluded, so too are the illegitimate and unofficial or extra-legal activities that both men and women engage in. By introducing a feminist economist’s critique of the rational choice model that dominates their discipline, I hope, finally, to demonstrate and convince readers that the whole notion of the economic within criminology deserves (feminist) critique. 296 Feminist Theory 4(3) A decade ago Ferber and Nelson opened up the debate about feminist economics in their edited collection Beyond Economic Man: Feminist Theory and Economics. Ferber and Nelson’s argument was that economics should be known as ‘the study of the basis of human material welfare’ (1993: 145) and that economics should be concerned with all the necessities and conveniences that sustain and improve life. This should be the proper subject matter of the field of economics – the phenomenon of the production and redistribution of goods and services (1993: 165). Hence they argue for a refocusing on the ‘provisioning’ of human life (1993: 135). The editors claim that economic provisioning makes economics a more fully human or gender-friendly science than if it were to remain exclusively concerned with goods and services traded in the market. It is suggested that this concept of ‘economic provisioning’ addresses the social reality that women’s economic position differs from the economic reality faced by men. Hence economic provisioning is held out as a way forward, away from an inadequate definition of economic activity. The concept of economic provisioning is offered as a simple alternative within economics. The more developed argument of the volume lies in its critique of the dominant and traditional focal point within economics. Ferber and Nelson challenge the traditional and dominant presentation and application of neo-classical economics. In essence, they take issue with the way in which rational choice theory and the market have variously come to define what economics is all about. They suggest that economic analysis tends to be dominated by assumptions of free individual choice, where individual human action is governed by rational action in the search for optimum rewards and maximum gains. Choice theory has become equal to economic theory. At the macro level this translates, as already noted, into a simplistic preoccupation with the market where goods and services are traded. This feminist critique of economics is a persuasive one and could be superimposed upon the emerging literature on crime and markets, as discussed earlier in the article. However, within that literature a feminist influence and contribution remains largely invisible. Most feminist positions have some measure of disagreement with the assumption that we all make choices in a process of rational optimization (Ferber and Nelson, 1993: 61). Women do not easily or comfortably fit into such disembodied views of how society operates. Women are more likely to identify themselves through family relations than as separate, detached and emotionally disconnected from others. As Ferber and Nelson (1993) conclude, if notions of rational choice are to survive and be useful to feminist economists, different conceptions of rationality are likely to be required (Ferber and Nelson, 1993: 164). Conclusion This article has been inspired by my attempts to explore female offending for economic gain and the ensuing problems of defining the economic crimes of women. It has raised many more problematic issues for Davies: Is economic crime a man’s game? 297 criminology and other disciplines than it has satisfied. My original starting point has led to a much more fundamental concern about the uses by criminologists and others of the notion of economic crime and the dilemma of what is ‘economic’. Thus the article has illustrated the problematics of economic classifications and definitions in criminology and mounted an argument that suggests the whole notion of the economic, within and outside criminology, demands feminist critique. There is much to be said for trying to benefit from the lessons already learned in another discipline, and to bring a feminist economist’s influence to bear on how the economic is incorporated into criminology may be one such lesson. If economic categorizations and concepts are to survive as descriptive and analytical devices within criminology and more generally, then feminist economists and feminist theory demands different conceptions of rationality. Some feminist theorizing has questioned what actually constitutes rational knowledge (Walklate, 2003: 37). Allowing a feminist economist’s influence to combine with versions of rationality that are concerned with a more contextual form of reasoning, as suggested by feminist writers Gilligan (1998), Harding (1991) and, within criminology, Walklate (1995, 2001), may provide a path to a gendering of the economy. Conjoining feminist versions of the ‘economic’ with feminist versions of rationality in criminology may offer a new way of conceptualizing women’s crime in economic terms and women’s crimes for economic gain. Hence refocusing the subject matter of the field of economics on the ‘provisioning’ of human life within an overall assessment of women’s position as regards agency and structure is suggested. Thus, following Walklate, it may be useful to consider if there is any way in which the 19th century dualisms of male/female, rational/irrational and reason/emotion may be transgressed (Walklate, 2003: 38). Hence this article demands a critical review of the tendency to dichotomize women’s agency in respect of offending. More specifically, feminist theorizing ought to take up the challenge of explaining the extent to which women are motivated to do crime more for need than greed.