Coalition building is the only method --- recognizing women’s voices in the scope of neoliberal voices – we cannot stop until everyone lives with dignity Neacsu 8 Dana holds three jobs: one is full-time, Head of Public Services at Columbia Law School Library, and two are seasonal: Adjunct Professor at Barnard College, and Visiting Professor at Pratt Institute. (“ARTICLE: THE RED BOOKLET ON FEMINIST EQUALITY. INSTEAD OF A MANIFESTO”., 30 Women's Rights L. Rep. 106, Fall 2008, NexisUni via University of Michigan Library System, DOA: 7/13/24)//LFS – LMH

We have accepted that a theory is feminist to the extent that its content is feminist, or that it believes that women are unjustly unequal to men because of the social meaning of their bodies. 273 This section wants to further articulate the argument that legal feminism can preserve its identity if it becomes a feminist critique of equality, of how states ensure human dignity for all their residents. 274

For many of us feminism is no longer a way of thinking confined to persons born female. 275 Moreover, it needs to go beyond concentrating on women's experiences as women see them because such a perspective is too divisive. Today, as Gloria Steinem pointed out, is about coalition-building, not about legitimizing minute perspectives. Of course, feminism has been defined as collective and deeply contextual. 276 For example, a feminist critique of human rights would preserve both characteristics, as it affects how different states can implement substantive human rights within their geographical borders, and such a critique is both collective and contextual. My feminism is one that does not want to stop until all women can live with dignity. 277

Culturally, that may mean different things to different people, but few would deny access to education, healthcare and old age benefits. Criticizing the current implementation of the human rights regime for its lack of care for the disempowered might still be viewed as imperialistic if it imposes some outside content to sovereign populations. But, if such a critique is done from a caring perspective and points out that those populations live in squalor and that their states need to do more for them, then that is at least informative and supportive of the home-bred activists' actions.

 [*162]  No one can deny that feminist-content knowledge has successfully changed the public moral discourse and inspired social action. While the type of action it inspired has always been local, it has been well-defined both geographically - in urban areas, be them countries or regions within a country - and socially - mostly within the middle class, the public moral discourse it has supported has become borderless. Men have been liberated because showing emotions is publicly acceptable. Men can enjoy being less than ferocious. However, neo-liberal globalization has changed the moral vocabulary, too. Today, the right questions demand a newly directed attention - their focus has shifted away from such tribal postmodern identity politics. They have not chosen a direction yet, which leaves room for coalition-building and goal-searching. But coalitions need theories of larger appeal.

Feminism finds itself today in the same position philosophically that it found itself at the beginning of the twentieth century, when the likes of Bertrand Russell, 278 Ludwig Wittgenstein, 279 and Moritz Schlick 280 repositioned philosophy as a method discipline and not a content one - a discipline that needs to analyze, clarify, and elucidate concepts. To the extent that feminism is a response of the Left academe to Marxist rigidity, it cannot continue as a content-based theory unless it accepts its own epistemological and political demise for some of the reasons briefly mentioned below.

Legal feminism has epistemological limits. As a content theory it has always relied either on existing foundational meta-narratives, either modern liberal theories or radical theories, such as Marxism. 281 While it purports to thrive on uncovering the male social mystique, more recently feminism has become a brand of minimal social criticism, such as a feminist critique of corporate law or of intellectual property law. This proves my point that there are feminist methods of criticism, though their adaptability to such diverse topics is worrisome. It also proves my critique of the illusion of moral neutrality 282 and the need to do something about the waning relevance of legal feminism.