Solves for congressional and political scrutiny.
Black and Owens 10 [Ryan C.; Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University and a faculty affiliate with the MSU College of Law with research focusing on U.S. Supreme Court decision making; and Ryan J.; Professor of Political Science and Affiliate Faculty in University of Wisconsin Law School and Honorary Fellow in the Institute for Legal Studies; 3/11/2010; "Congressional Constraints and Tactical Supreme Court Maneuvers: Calling for the Views of the United States Solicitor General"; University of Wisconsin Madison Department of Political Science, Michigan State University Department of Political Science, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1568387 ;] s.low
Do justices likewise employ strategic tactical maneuvers to overcome congressional constraints? After all, Congress theoretically has a number of tools it can use to influence the Court, tools justices must consider when rendering decisions that might offend legislative sensibilities. Recent scholarship addressing the Court in a separation of powers context is decidedly mixed, however, with the weight of studies finding little to no evidence that justices modify their behavior due to potential SOP constraints (Segal 1997; Sala and Spriggs 2004; Spriggs and Hansford 2001). Still, there are theoretical reasons to believe that legislative preferences may influence justices. Therefore, we must look beyond existing approaches.
The approach we take here is to examine whether majority coalition justices positioned ideologically between Congress and the president seek to ensure that they can rely on the president’s veto in an ensuing battle with Congress. Justices can compel the Solicitor General (SG)—the lawyer for the United States and an executive branch official—to participate in a case in which she is not already involved. Our theory is that justices will Call for the Views of the Solicitor General (CVSG) to determine how willing the president will be to battle Congress over the Court’s decision.
Our findings support our theory. Justices, of course, call the SG to participate in cases for legal reasons, such as to clear up legal uncertainty and help ascertain the current state of law in the federal appellate courts—original findings in their own right. Just as importantly, however, they also call the SG to participate so as to gain information that will aid them in determining whether the president will use his veto to protect the Court’s decision against attempts by Congress to override it. Justices are between 44% and 56% more likely to CVSG when they require the president’s veto to support their decision in the face of an expected congressional override. These results are consistent across a host of alternative models of legislative decision making as well as other various modeling specifications.