Empirics prove external pressures like US aggression from foreign countries causes China to attack.

Even if diversion as a tactic is rare—and perhaps unlikely in the future—domestic unrest in China can create incentives to use force for other reasons. Chinese analysts often refer to the idea of “internal troubles, external aggression” (neiyou waihuan) to describe the “century of national humiliation,” a period that began in the mid-nineteenth century when the Qing dynasty’s decline and internal turmoil allowed foreign powers to seize land through “unequal treaties” and establish spheres of influence in the country. Later Chinese leaders have often feared that other countries would similarly seek to profit from China’s weakness, so the government has become sensitive to perceived external challenges or threats in periods of domestic duress. Historically, Chinese leaders have used force in such moments as a way to signal resolve to China’s adversaries, not to divert the public’s attention or increase social cohesion.

In October 1962, for example, China attacked India during the calamity of the Great Leap Forward after India had increased its military presence along the contested border, including in areas across from Tibet where the Chinese government had just suppressed a revolt. According to a senior Chinese general at the time, India strengthened its presence on the border because it saw China as “weak and easily bullied” amid famine, revolt, and tensions with the United States and the Soviet Union. Mao’s goal was not to divert the public’s attention but to stabilize the border by destroying the new Indian positions and correct any perception that China was weak.

China reacted similarly in September 2012, when Japan purchased three of the disputed islands in the group known as the Diaoyu in China and as the Senkaku in Japan. China likened the purchase to “an atomic bomb dropped on China,” launched regular maritime patrols within the territorial seas of the islands to challenge Tokyo’s control, greenlit anti-Japan protests in numerous cities, and froze high-level relations with Japan for several years. At the time, the party was preparing for a contentious, once-in-a-decade transfer of power at the upcoming 18th Party Congress. From Beijing’s perspective, Japan’s move on the islands appeared to be designed to exploit this instability in the highest levels of the leadership, which warranted a tough reaction.

If China’s economic woes get worse, its leaders will probably become more sensitive to perceived external challenges, especially on issues such as Taiwan. Increased pressure on China could easily backfire and motivate Beijing to become more aggressive in order to demonstrate its resolve to other states despite its internal difficulties. In times of domestic unrest, China may lash out, but that reflects the logic of deterrence, not diversion.