China is revisionist

By contrast, Chinese revisionism has taken on a global profile, preferring the use of economic and diplomatic means. As the world’s second economic power, China has the economic and financial resources to challenge the supremacy of the United States on the global level. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, despite China’s territorial claims in the East and South Chinese Seas, Beijing implemented a regional ‘good neighbourhood’ policy with most of its South-east Asian neighbours that reflected a traditional Westphalian view of non-intervention, a priority given to national sovereignty and regime security, and a commitment to joint development through trade and investments. At the global level, China pursued economic integration into the Western-led world economy (see its membership in the World Trade Organization) to accomplish its peaceful rise and development policy (2003-13), based on the expansion of its production worldwide and the conquest of market shares (Buzan Citation2010).

Objectives

In this phase, the central goal of the Chinese leadership was to create a peaceful and stable international environment for its development and economic growth by engaging with status quo powers rather than challenging them through war. However, China’s unstoppable economic power and increased maritime military capabilities have fuelled tensions and rivalry with the US and Japan. After three decades, economic growth rates favoured the perception of a gap between China’s economic capabilities and its international position, nurturing Chinese claims to progressively reduce the American presence in Asia and be treated on equal terms as a great power (Okuda Citation2016). The second phase of Chinese foreign policy, inaugurated with the launch of the BRI (2013), aimed to spread Chinese capital in the world and create new structures to promote China’s development through its vast currency reserves and reduce the effects of the 2008 crisis on exports. The BRI has five pillars: policy coordination, infrastructural connectivity, increase in trade, financial integration and cultural exchanges (National Development and Reform Commission Citation2023). At this stage, the Chinese challenge has adopted two strategies to achieve the same goal: to increase Chinese economic power at the global level.

Means

The first strategy was a broad credit structure for developing countries, the second involved creating the AIIB to challenge the influence of the IMF and World Bank, both controlled by the US, and stabilising the Chinese presence in the financial, investment and credit markets. Although this second strategy represents an example of institutional competition, as we have seen, it aimed at achieving economic objectives and prestige as one of the pillars of the BRI. The available data show that, from 2016 to 2020, the AIIB funded over sixty annual BRI projects for an average value of 10 billion dollars per year (European Parliament Citation2022).

Prevalent revisionist strategy

The real meaning of Chinese reformist revisionism is, therefore, Beijing’s need to ensure a peaceful environment to expand its economic power and turn more neighbours into friends, partners and even allies, and to control them through its financial and credit instruments. A gradual increase in the participation of other countries in Chinese financial and credit structures implies a consequent reduction in the American role in the world economy.

To conclude, China’s revisionist trajectory confirms three things: 1) the use of peaceful means to achieve its objectives; 2) the global nature of the economic and financial institutions of Chinese foreign policy; and 3) China’s desire to change the international power hierarchy in its favour. Unlike Russia, China has so far chosen not to accept the risks and consequent uncertainty associated with the possible use of force.

Conclusion

This study has presented a new typology of revisionism, which is composed of six items based on the relationship between four variables: power capabilities, objectives, means and level of action. Moving from the presence of economic and/or military capabilities as an essential factor for the implementation of a revisionist policy, the analysis proposed a theoretical framework to understand and identify present (Russia and China, but also Iran or Turkey) and past forms of revisionism (Nazi Germany) and explain the evolution of different revisionist trajectories (United States). Furthermore, the reference to soft power has made it possible to explain those types of revisionism that go beyond the possession of military and economic capabilities (developing countries).

The analysis has also confirmed that Russia and China currently represent two opposite types of revisionism: Russia expresses a nationalist form of revisionism by choosing the military option at the regional level to recover lost territories, counterbalance the American and European influence in the post-Soviet space and improve its international position; China is a case of reformist revisionism based on a global strategy implemented by economic and diplomatic means to increase its power on a global scale.

In recent times, the Ukrainian war has corroborated the hypothesis that territorial and strategic-military dimensions are not yet obsolete and, indeed, have been put back on the agenda by Putin. The Russian military aggression has marked a clear discontinuity with respect to previous interventions (in terms of the impressive number of civilians and soldiers killed, among other things), which could have a strong impact on the foreign policy of the major powers.

If Russia is defeated, its territorial claims and power/prestige aspirations could be halted, while China could continue on the path it has already taken. On the other hand, a Russian military and diplomatic success could change the international order and demonstrate to other states – dissatisfied or not – and especially China that the military option is a potentially successful strategy. This eventuality could fuel tensions in the East and South China Seas and enable China to intervene in Taiwan to bring it back under its control. Even the effectiveness of the current alliance between Russia and China could be jeopardised by the outcome of the war; the prolongation of a stalemate or an eventual ‘entrapment’ would not benefit Chinese economic interests. Moreover, ever since the beginning of the war, the Biden administration has favoured the stalemate hypothesis to weaken Russia economically and militarily, challenge its leadership politically and separate it from China. In the long run, the effects of international sanctions on the Russian economy could undermine its ability to continue military operations also at the regional level.

In sum, Russia’s elimination from the rank of great powers would mainly benefit the United States, which could aspire to bring back the ‘unipolar moment’ at the expense of China and other rising powers – such as Turkey – that aim to change the status quo to their advantage and counterbalance the American presence in the world. Whatever the outcome of the war, satisfied and dissatisfied powers will continue to confront each other. When they do, any one of them might put forward a revisionist aim.