The US did what was best globally not just for the us.

At 9:26 p.m. on 24 June 1950 Truman, who was vacationing in Independence, Missouri, received a telephone call from Acheson informing him that DPRK forces had staged a full-scale military invasion of the ROK. They agreed that the president would not return until the next day and the State Department would proceed with plans to refer the matter to the United Nations. This latter decision was entirely consistent with past American policy. US Department of the Army contingency plans provided for such action in the unlikely event of a DPRK assault. In his Press Club speech, Acheson also stated that if open military aggression occurred beyond the US “defensive perimeter”, “the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations”.Footnote2 Truman and Acheson were in complete agreement that the United States should provide assistance to the ROK only under the auspices of the United Nations.Footnote3 A desire to avoid the direct and unilateral application of US military power explains in part the administration’s decision to request action at the Security Council. Truman believed that United Nations support for the ROK would bolster morale in the ROK and greatly improve the ability for local self-defense. Abundant evidence exists supporting the conclusion that Truman, from the start of conflict, viewed the Korean War from a global perspective, making frequent references to the necessity of preventing the collapse of the United Nations and avoiding a new world war (Leffler Citation1992, 361; Hamby Citation1995, 535–37; Stueck Citation1995, 43–44). As for the ROK itself, the United States had to intervene to uphold its global credibility and prestige because along with the United Nations, it had sponsored creation of the ROK (Stueck Citation1981, 186; Ferrell Citation1983, 115; MacDonald Citation1986, 30). Truman and his advisors were convinced that the Soviet Union had ordered the DPRK’s attack, but initially feared that its purpose was to divert US attention prior to a military assault in Europe. They certainly never considered that the North Koreans might have their own reasons for using military means to reunite their nation. Soviet documents have provided unequivocal evidence that the DPRK, contrary to its continuing denials, was responsible for launching a long-planned invasion. During 1949, Stalin consistently had refused to approve Kim Il Sung’s persistent requests to authorize an attack on the ROK. He believed that the DPRK still lacked military superiority over the ROK. That fall, however, the Communist victory in China placed pressure on the Soviet leader to show support for the same outcome in Korea. In January 1950, Stalin in fact discussed Kim Il Sung’s plans with him personally in Moscow, but he was not ready to give final consent. At that time, he did authorize a major expansion of DPRK’s military capabilities. When they met again in April, Kim Il Sung persuaded Stalin that military victory would be quick and easy, largely because of support from southern guerrillas and an expected popular uprising against Rhee’s regime. Stalin still feared US military intervention, advising Kim Il Sung that he could stage his invasion only if China’s Mao Zedong approved. In May, Kim went to Beijing to gain Chinese consent. Significantly, Mao Zedong also voiced concern that the United States would act to defend the ROK, but he gave his reluctant approval as well (Matray Citation2002a, 39–48). Reports from the ROK immediately following the attack cast serious doubts on whether the United States could limit its involvement in the conflict. John J. Muccio, US ambassador to the ROK, cabled Washington that “the North Koreans are engaged in an all-out offensive to subjugate South Korea”. “Future course of hostilities”, he sternly warned, “may depend largely on whether [the] US will or will not give adequate assistance”. General Douglas MacArthur, the US occupation commander in Japan, also emphasized that the situation was grave and might require American military intervention when he requested authorization to send more supplies to the ROK.Footnote4 In Moscow, US diplomatic representatives were more vehement in urging Washington to adopt a decisive course of action. The Embassy staff members insisted that “this aggressive DPRK military move … represents clear-cut Soviet challenge which in our considered opinion US should answer firmly and swiftly as it constitutes direct threat to our leadership of free world against Soviet Communist imperialism”. Any delay, the cable warned, only would hasten the collapse of the ROK and encourage Stalin to embark on similar adventures elsewhere. If the United States acted quickly and with resolve, however, Moscow might forsake further aggressive action.Footnote5 Despite such advice, US policymakers emphasized restraint on the morning of 25 June in searching for an appropriate response to the crisis. For example, the State Department formulated a list of policy alternatives that included such limited options as sending the ROK all essential equipment and permitting American advisors to remain with the ROK army. If necessary, the United States would utilize naval and air power to establish a protective zone around the ROK capital at Seoul for the evacuation of American personnel. If the ROK’s survival demanded drastic action, the United States might deploy ground forces to “Stabilize [sic] the combat situation including if feasible the restoration of original boundaries at 38 degrees parallel”. Significantly, the State Department recommended that MacArthur immediately dispatch a survey team to the ROK to determine the minimum amount of assistance required to enable the ROK to defend itself without weakening the security of Japan.Footnote6 That evening, Truman, having returned to Washington, discussed these recommendations with his top advisors at Blair House, where he was living while the White House was undergoing renovation. During dinner, those present agreed quickly that the DPRK’s attack was equivalent to Hitlerite aggression, and that appeasement was not a viable alternative. But many also voiced concern that if the Communists were unable to subdue the South Koreans, the Soviet Union or China might enter the conflict. All those leaders present expressed the hope that the ROK could defend itself without drastic American assistance.Footnote7 After dinner, Acheson summarized the State Department’s recommendations. He suggested, in addition, that Truman order the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait to prevent an attack on either Taiwan or the Chinese mainland. General Omar N. Bradley, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), immediately supported State’s proposals. The United States, he stressed, had to draw a line against Soviet expansionism sometime and Korea “was as good an occasion … as anywhere else”. But Bradley advocated only the use of American air and naval power to halt the DPRK’s advance. He opposed deploying American ground forces in Korea because he did not believe that Moscow wanted war with the United States. Naval Chief of Staff Admiral Forrest Sherman joined Bradley in stressing the importance of avoiding a complete commitment of US power. He favored an increase of American advisory personnel in the ROK and reliance on air power to delay the Communist advance. Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt S. Vandenberg then reminded his colleagues that, while a limited approach was feasible, the United States was not prepared to counteract Soviet military power if Stalin chose to enter the conflict. Frank Pace, Francis Matthews, and Thomas Finletter, the secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force respectively, all agreed that, in the absence of Soviet military intervention, US air power was sufficient to preserve the ROK’s survival. Truman’s civilian advisors all stressed the need for some kind of prompt action but were unanimous in opposition to the use of combat troops as wellFootnote8 Such advice only reinforced Truman’s inclination to adopt a restrained approach in his initial response to the Korean crisis. He decided to approve the shipment of all necessary supplies to the ROK, the dispatch of a survey team to Seoul, and the transfer of the Seventh Fleet from the Philippines to Japan. He also instructed the Air Force to prepare plans for the destruction of all Soviet air bases in Asia; the State and Defense Departments would formulate contingency plans for responding to the next probable location of Soviet aggression. The president ordered his advisors to stress that the United States was acting under the authority of the United Nations and would limit its military involvement to protection of American evacuation from the ROK.Footnote9 Truman and his advisors manifested a clear reluctance to take extreme action in the immediate hours after the DPRK assault. Although they perceived in the invasion a Soviet design for world conquest, they sought to counter the threat through relying on limited means. Such a reaction was hardly surprising, since the main thrust of US postwar policy was restraint. Washington would commit its naval and air power alone, thus avoiding the momentous step of dispatching combat troops (Figure 1)Footnote10 However, Truman’s determination that the DPRK’s attack replicated Axis aggression during the 1930s meant he would not allow the conquest of the ROK. If the DPRK threatened to overrun the peninsula, global assumptions would demand a near complete commitment of US power and prestige in the struggle to ensure the survival of the ROK. Figure 1. President Harry S. Truman at home in Independence, Missouri, on Christmas Eve (Source: NARA & DVIDS Public Domain Archive. https://nara.getarchive.net/media/president-harry-s-truman-at-home-on-christmas-eve-861a07). Figure 1. President Harry S. Truman at home in Independence, Missouri, on Christmas Eve (Source: NARA & DVIDS Public Domain Archive. https://nara.getarchive.net/media/president-harry-s-truman-at-home-on-christmas-eve-861a07). Display full size At this first Blair House meeting, Truman also affirmed the State Department’s action earlier that day to refer the Korean crisis to the UN Security Council, which had resulted in passage of a resolution calling for a ceasefire and DPRK withdrawal. Despite this show of concern, ROK forces were unable to halt the advance of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and the battlefield situation continued to deteriorate. On the night of 26 June, Truman convened a second meeting at Blair House. Acheson again opened the discussion and recommended the removal of all restrictions on the use of naval and air power in Korea. The president approved the proposal immediately but emphasized that American operations would not extend north of the 38th parallel (Figure 2). The secretary of state then raised the issue of Taiwan. Truman now decided that the Seventh Fleet should move into the Taiwan Strait. After a brief discussion of future policy at the United Nations, US Army Chief of Staff Collins summarized the battlefield situation in Korea. The ROK, he pessimistically reported, was on the verge of complete collapse. Acheson argued that if Korean efforts at self-defense failed, the United States had to intervene more directly. Truman declared, somewhat vaguely, that “we must do everything we can for the Korean situation for the United Nations”. Bradley and General J. Lawton Collins, the US Army Chief of Staff, assuming that Truman had just indicated willingness to commit combat ground forces, reminded him that such a decision would entail the need for full mobilization. In response, both Truman and Acheson voiced the hope that the United States still could avoid this drastic stepFootnote11 Figure 2. President Truman orders support for the ROK. (Source: Communities Digital News. https://bonniekgoodman.medium.com/otd-in-history-june-27-1950-president-truman-orders-american-troops-to-fight-in-the-korean-war-14a2fc0fd599). Figure 2. President Truman orders support for the ROK. (Source: Communities Digital News. https://bonniekgoodman.medium.com/otd-in-history-june-27-1950-president-truman-orders-american-troops-to-fight-in-the-korean-war-14a2fc0fd599). Display full size Some writers have claimed that by then, Truman had decided to dispatch US combat forces to Korea. They point, for example, to his decisions at the second Blair House meeting that the United States, to demonstrate its resolve, would strengthen its forces in the Philippines and provide more aid to the French to fight the Communists in Indochina (Lowe Citation1986, 162; Kaufman Citation1986, 30). Yet Truman also stated emphatically that “I don’t want war”. His decisions at the second Blair House meeting in truth represented only a minor change in tactics.