Ceding renewable dominance to China makes great power conflict inevitable and collapses the global western order.

In this sense, access to sustainable energy supplies is essential for China to maintain its economic development and trajectory in the long-term. (Freeman, 2018). In short, if China did not diversify, it would become increasingly dependent upon fossil fuels, and more vulnerable to price fluctuations and supply interruption. From an energy and economic security standpoint, China cannot continue with business as usual (Tan, 2015).

Ideological security – geopolitical dominance

The deepest layer of analysis when it comes to identifying the motives behind China’s energy policy is ideology. In this sense, ideology includes not only the coordinated set of political ideas that permeate the Chinese system but also the long-term vision for the country as established by the Chinese leadership, as seen by both rhetoric and practice. This would be the part of the strategy that is mostly associated in practice with the “master plan” argument – with the idea that China’s “real” intention deep down is to become the global superpower of the century. Geopolitical dominance or control would then be at the core of China’s approach.

A desire for technological dominance

This part of the discussion is complex, especially given the quantity of documents or policies, and the difficulty of distinguishing between what is said and what is done. What appears to be clear is that China’s overall national strategy and has greatly evolved in the last decades, becoming ever more assertive and dominant in the international arena. Although this can be seen in several fields or areas, the one that is particularly important at the time is, as one might expect, technology. At the core of China’s holistic efforts in the energy transition is really the desire for technological superiority in general. Seen from this lens, dominance in renewable energy technologies is just a reflection of this all-encompassing desire – it is just one more board in which to play the game. As a way of example, in 2018, China filed 1.4 million patents – more than any other country in the world (Pitron, 2020, p. 126). Vivian Wu, the Business Development director of an important Chinese rare earths company, overtly stated: “We want to use these metals to become the world leader in technology.” (as cited in Pitron, 2020. p.127).

One typically cited example of the recognition of rare earths’ strategic importance is when Deng Xiaoping, China’s leader after Mao Zedong, famously said as far back as in 1987: “the Middle East has oil, China has rare earths” (as cited in Mabuni, 2023). However, if Chinese leaders had stayed there, China would now dominate the production and exporting of important low valueadded raw materials, and that would be the end of the story. But we know that is not the end of the story. By now, it should be somewhat clear that China wants to become the uncontested leader in renewable energy generation, dominating every segment of the value chain: from the mines of rare earths and other minerals to the algorithms of smart grids, passing through electric vehicles, solar panels and batteries (Gomart, 2021, p. 90). The approach is so holistic that it seems to go beyond merely fighting climate change or securing energy supplies. The mere fact that it covers so many segments should be telling that there is something else going on.

The means used to acquire that technological superiority are also equally telling. The state led strategy includes all kinds of mechanisms, regardless of their relative legality or transparency, to achieve the required innovation capabilities in this process. The “recipe” for this state-directed search for high-tech goes way back. This extract from Pitron (2020) is worth citing in-full:

“The theoretical foundations of China's intellectual emulation were laid in 1976, when Deng Xiaoping broke ranks with Mao's agricultural ambitions to proclaim that, from then on, 'production power lay in the sciences'. Subsequent leaders have perpetuated and deepened this conviction: in 2006 President Hu Jintao state that 'science and technology' form the 'central thread in the development strategy of China'; in 2010, the twelfth FiveYear Plan - a road map tracing the key economic strategies for the 2011-2015 period - identified as priorities seven advanced industries and just as many new-technology horizons; five years later, innovation and technological progress formed the centerpiece of the thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016-2020). Thus, concepts that were never central to China's history had become mantras of the state'.” (Pitron, 2020. p.122)

China in 2050: “strong power” and “global leader”

The 14th 5YP also explicitly emphasizes the desire to become a self-reliant technological and manufacturing powerhouse” which goes in line with initiatives such as Made in China 2025. (Cooper, 2021, para 5.). Furthermore, there is relative consensus that under Xi Jinping, China’s ambition has done nothing but increase, both in tone and in scope. Some of his most recent speeches before the Chinese Communist Party Congress hint at his vision for China. In 2017, he emphasized how the country’s development had entered a “new era”, using that term 36 times in less than 4 hours. He envisioned China as a “basically” modernized socialist country by 2035, and as a “strong power” by 2050 (as cited in Shepherd and Qiu, 2017).

In this speech, he laid out the plan to achieve what he calls the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, a concept he had introduced in 2012. It entails a change in approach to foreign policy, from a ‘low-profile’ attitude to a more assertive behavior. Underlying the approach there is a more comprehensive way of understanding national security, as well as a belief that this is an era of strategic opportunity’ for China (Legarda, 2021).

In this sense, the “goal is to restore China to its former status as a global power by 2049. In Beijing’s eyes, China is not a rising power, but a returning one. The Western-dominated global order is viewed as a historical anomaly that therefore can – and must – be reversed.” (Legarda, 2021. Para 2.). This plan or vision is complex, including important foreign policy and national security targets (such as reunification with Taiwan, for example). However, what seems transparent is that by 2050 China is supposed to be, in Xi Jinping’s words: “a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence” (as cited in Valchev, 2021, para. 19).

The 2022 speech is equally revealing. Regarding energy specifically, this leader mentioned China’s intention to “promote its energy revolution and engage in global climate governance” (Erbach & Jochheim, 2022, p.4). Regarding China’s power more broadly, he emphasized how China’s “international influence, appeal and power to shape the world” had significantly increased in the face of drastic changes in the international arena (as cited in Davidson and Graham-Harrison, 2022).

A desire for international power and geopolitical dominance

Just as the underlying rationale of energy policy could be understood from the broader perspective of technological superiority, the underlying rationale of technological superiority could be understood from the perspective on international power. In other words, China leads in energy technology because it wants to lead in all technology; and China wants to lead in all technology because China wants to be the global leader, period. From this point of view, advancing the energy transition is not just seen as a useful way to fight against climate change or ensure energy and economic security, it is also a strategic opportunity to enhance the country’s geopolitical positioning52. China managed to leverage its geo-economic rise to power by integrating supply chains related to future energy sources, because it “understood already long ago that it would play a central role in other countries' transitions. And it is. The European Union, for instance, is 98 percent dependent on China for rare earths. Needless to say, this puts China in a prime position to redesign the global balance of power.” (Lazard, 2022, 06:02).

Put plainly, you do not invest all of these resources, go out of your way to dominate the materials or the technologies even outside of your territory, and find clever ways to “innovate”, just because you care about climate change, or you want to diversify your energy mix. And you do not put yourself at the center of future energy supply chains – ready to weaponize them when necessary - merely because you want to be a tech player. No. All these factors have their own weight. But deep down, looking at discourse and practice, it is fair to say that China’s policy towards renewable energies is a reflection of an increasingly assertive power searching for ways to advance its strategic and geopolitical positioning in the world.