China is increasing usage of AI in their military – closing the gap with the US

The PLA is actively pursuing AI-enabled systems and autonomous capabilities in its military modernization.36 Across services and for all domains of warfare, it has fielded a growing number of robotic and unmanned systems, as well as advanced missiles with precision guidance, some of which may possess at least limited degrees of autonomy. For instance, the PLA Army (PLAA) has concentrated on military robotics and unmanned ground vehicles, which could be used for logistics.37 The PLA Navy (PLAN) is experimenting with unmanned surface vessels that may operate with some autonomy and is reportedly developing autonomous submarines.38 The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) operates advanced unmanned systems with limited autonomy that could be upgraded to include greater autonomy, while exploring options for manned-unmanned teaming.39 The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) may leverage use cases in remote sensing, targeting, and decision support,40 and its missiles may be augmented to become more “intelligentized” in their capabilities, incorporating higher levels of automation to facilitate operations.41 There are indications that the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) could apply advances in AI to its missions of space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare.42 PLA capabilities and advancements very likely extend well beyond what is known and knowable from open sources. The Chinese defense industry can build upon its apparent strengths in armed drones and advanced missiles to introduce greater autonomy into operations.43 In particular, certain advanced unmanned aerial vehicles could be modified to operate with greater autonomy instead of under remote control.44 Currently, China leads in export of medium altitude long endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).45 PRC UAVs, such as the Wing Loong platform, from the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), and the CH-4, developed by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), are actively marketed for export.46 In fact, CASC has even opened factories for the CH-4 platform in Pakistan, Myanmar, and Saudi Arabia.47 This prominent ranking in arms sales reflects the relative affordability of Chinese drones over American ones, and that the Chinese defense industry has been less constrained in selling to militaries to which their U.S. counterparts have been unable or unwilling to sell.48 Within the PLAAF, the GJ-1 and its successor GJ-2 are used for integrated reconnaissance and precision strike, including in support of joint operations.49 According to its designer, the GJ-2 is “highly intelligentized” and capable of operating autonomously, including in identification of the enemy and judgement of threats.50 Yet an inherent challenge of evaluating progress and capabilities is that the level of autonomy, relative to possibility of remote control, cannot be readily assessed by appearance alone. Moreover, as China strives to close the gap with the United States, its efforts are complicated by persistent bottlenecks in its indigenous defense industrial capabilities.51 While cyber theft and industrial espionage enabled by a range of techniques of tech transfer have enabled and accelerated Chinese military modernization, persistent obstacles and bottlenecks remain, including shortfalls in the technical workforce and engineering experience.52 Chinese leaders are cognizant of critical weaknesses, such as the semiconductors, particularly specialized developments in AI chips, necessary to enable and deploy AI/ML systems, and actively investing to overcome them.