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2022 CNDI Affirmative

Aff - Cyber Intel - CNDI 2022

Aff - Cyber Intel - CNDI 2022.docx

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Cyber Info Aff
1AC
1ac – Cyber War
Cyberattacks are increasing now – the frequency and severity are threatening NATO operations and infrastructure.
Maigre ’22 (Merle Maigre is a Non-resident Senior Fellow with CEPA's Transatlantic Leadership Program and CEPA's Digital Innovation Initiative, as well as the Senior Cyber Security Expert at Estonia’s e-Governance Academy, a non-profit that helps governments go digital. “NATO’s Role in Global Cyber Security,” April 2022, German Marshall Fund of the United States at Harvard University, https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/Maigre%20-%20NATO%20-%20Geopolitics%20-%20Cyber%20-%20final.pdf)-mikee
Malicious cyber activity has increased substantially over the past years while the world has kept turning amid the omnipresent pandemic and now war in Ukraine. States, non-state actors, and criminal groups compete and are increasingly weaponizing sensitive information and infiltrating other countries’ networks to steal data, seed misinformation, or disrupt critical infrastructure. The coronavirus pandemic further complicated the cyber-threat landscape. In March 2020, attempts to mitigate the spread of the coronavirus led to social distancing measures, travel restrictions, and remote work. In a short span of time, IT security professionals had to respond to the challenges of working from home, such as enterprise data movements when employees accessed cloud-based apps via their home internet, corporate software, videoconferencing, and file sharing.11ENISA: European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, The Year in Review. ENISA Threat Landscape from January 2019 to April 2020, 2020. Even if hardware and software solutions were in place to secure the organization’s data, there were often no established policies to help employees wade through the jungle of threats and vulnerabilities they faced when moving their workplace out of the traditional office environment.22NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Recent Cyber Events: Considerations for Military and National Security Decision Makers, No. 10, May 2021.¶ According to the FireEye Mandiant Special Report: M-Trends 2021, the top five most targeted industries in 2020 were business and professional services, retail and hospitality, finance, healthcare, and high technology. The main methods used were extortion, ransom demands, payment card theft, and illicit transfers. Direct financial gain was the likely motive for 36% of intrusions, and an additional 2% of intrusions were likely perpetrated to resell access. In 2021, data theft remained an important mission objective for threat actors; in 32% of intrusions, adversaries stole data.33Fire Eye Mandiant Services, Special Report, M-Trends 2021, pp. 17-19.Currently, highly organized, technically proficient criminal syndicates comprise the most significant cyber threat to allies. These groups try to steal data or extort money through ransomware. In 2021, prominent ransomware attacks struck Colonial Pipeline, the operator of the largest fuel pipeline on the East Coast of the United States; JBS, the largest meat processing company in North America; and Coop, a major supermarket chain in Sweden. Healthcare was also targeted—in May of the same year, the entire health service system of Ireland was disrupted for weeks, and over the spring and summer, dozens of hospitals in Europe and the United States were locked out of life-critical systems by ransomware attacks.44Ciaran Martin, “Cyber Criminals Will Cause Physical Harm,” Wired, February 2, 2022 Another set of threats comes in the form of belligerent state actors that seek to steal sensitive data for espionage. In December 2020, Russian intelligence services infiltrated the digital systems run by US tech firm SolarWinds and inserted malware into its code. During the company’s next software update, the virus was inadvertently spread to about 18,000 clients, including large corporations, the Pentagon, the State Department, Homeland Security, the Treasury, and other US government agencies. The hack went undetected for months before the victims discovered vast amounts of their data had been stolen.55Jack Stubbs, Raphael Satter, and Joseph Menn, “US Homeland Security, thousands of businesses scramble after suspected Russian hack,” December 14, 2020. There are also politically motivated cyberattacks mandated by states that interfere in democratic processes and political discourse. In September 2020, the internal email system of Norway’s parliament was hacked.66Catalin Cimpanu, “Finland says hackers accessed MPs’ email accounts,” ZDNet, December 28, 2020. Ine Eriksen Søreide, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, underlined the significance of the attack by calling it an important cyber incident that affected the “most important democratic institution” of the country.77BBC, “Norway blames Russia for cyberattack on parliament,” October 13, 2020. Norwegian authorities later identified Russia as the actor responsible for the attack, marking the first time that Norwegian authorities had made a political attribution to such an attack.¶ Since the beginning of this year, Ukraine’s government has been hit by a series of cyberattacks that defaced government websites and wiped out the data on some government computers. In mid-January, hackers defaced about 70 Ukrainian websites, including the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Energy, Education, and Science, as well as the State Emergency Service and the Ministry of Digital Transformation, whose e-governance portal gives the Ukrainian public digital access to dozens of government services. The hackers replaced the home pages of about a dozen sites with a threatening message: “be afraid and expect worse.” After a couple of days, however, most of the sites were restored.88Kim Zetter, “What We Know and Don’t Know about the Cyberattacks Against Ukraine,” Substack, January 17, 2022. The international hacktivist collective Anonymous has declared “cyberwar” against Russia’s government, claiming credit for several cyber incidents including distributed denial of service attacks that took down Russian government websites and Russia Today, the state-backed news service.99Monica Buchanan Pitrelli, “Global hacking group Anonymous launches ‘cyber war’ against Russia,” CNBC, March 4, 2022. Around the globe, aging critical infrastructure has long been vulnerable to attack. The most worrying type of cyberattack is sophisticated malware designed by states or state-backed actors that act as “time bombs” in the critical cyber networks of target countries, such as the energy, telecom, and transportation sectors. Around the globe, aging critical infrastructure has long been vulnerable to attack. In 2020, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre issued a warning of Russian attacks on millions of routers, firewalls, and devices used by infrastructure operators and government agencies.1010Alix Pressley, “The ‘cumulative effect’ of ransomware and the lessons for UK national infrastructure,” Intelligent Cio, July 20, 2021. On the day of the Russian invasion, ViaSat, a provider of high-speed satellite broadband services, was hacked along with one of its satellites Ka-Sat, whose users included Ukraine’s armed forces, police, and intelligence service. Destructive wiper malware attacks by Russia against Ukraine included WhisperGate, discovered in January by Microsoft, in Ukraine’s networks that “provide critical executive branch or emergency response functions”;1111Microsoft Security, Destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations, January 15, 2022. HermeticWizard and IsaacWiper,1212ESET Research, IsaacWiper and HermeticWizard: New wiper and worm targeting Ukraine, March 1, 2022. targeting multiple Ukrainian organizations just hours before the Russian invasion began; and CaddyWiper, spotted by researchers at the Slovak internet security company ESET in mid-March.1313ESET Research, CaddyWiper: New wiper malware discovered in Ukraine, March 15, 2022. All of them were designed to wipe or overwrite critical files on infected systems and leave computer hard drives corrupted and unrecoverable. These incidents demonstrate that, in the words of cyber expert and Silverado Policy Accelerator think tank chairman Dmitri Alperovich, “Cyberattacks have become a theater for great-power conflict in which governments and militaries fight in the hybrid ‘gray zone,’ where the boundaries between peace and war are blurred.”1414Dmitri Alperovitch, “How Russia Has Turned Ukraine Into a Cyber-Battlefield,” Foreign Affairs, January 28, 2022. The actors navigate a complex web of ambiguous and deeply interconnected challenges, where cyberattacks are not a separate front, but rather an extension of the conflict. While they can offer some advantages in military operations, cyberattacks also have limitations in feasibility and effect. In the event of military attacks, military objectives can be supported by intelligence-gathering operations, operations aimed at disrupting the opponent’s military, and psychological operations against the opponent’s public.1515Ibid. Nevertheless, sophisticated cyberattacks require a lot of luck, but also skill and time—for example, the 75-minute power outage in 2016 in Kyiv took 31 months to prepare.1616Ciaran Martin, “Cyber Realism in a Time of War,” Lawfare, March 2, 2022. The Russian military exercise Zapad 2021 in September included one of the largest uses of electronic warfare, which has been increasingly on display in eastern Ukraine since 2014 and in Syria since 2015. Roger McDermott, a leading analyst on Russian military developments has described that “Russia’s growing technological advances in EW [electronic warfare] will allow its forces to jam, disrupt, and interfere with NATO communications, radar and other sensor systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other assets.”1717Roger McDermott, “Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities to 2025,” ICDS, September 2017. Russia sees EW as a seamless whole, ranging from kinetic combat operations on the battlefield to missions in cyberspace and the information domain.1818Jonathan Marcus, “Zapad: What can we learn from Russia's latest military exercise?” BBC, September 20, 2017. While there were no public sources confirming any navigation or communications disruption by the Baltic-Polish defense leadership during Zapad 2021, it is nevertheless important that NATO continue to adapt to the evolving cyber-threat landscape.
Status quo NATO efforts aren’t enough – deterrence, defense, and interoperability are failing because of a lack of coordination.
Blessing ’21 (Dr. Jason Blessing is a Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a returning DAAD Postdoctoral Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns. “Fail-Deadly, Fail-Safe, and Safe-to-Fail: The Strategic Necessity of Resilience in the Cyber Domain,” Chapter 12 in NATO 2030: Towards A New Strategic Concept and Beyond, SAIS Press, 2021, https://www.sais.jhu.edu/sites/default/files/NATO2030AndBeyondAccessibleVersion.pdf)-mikee
There are, however, several dynamics that reveal the limits of the fail-deadly and fail-safe logics underlying NATO’s collective defense initiatives. In short, these strategic logics only apply to a narrow set of threats; they will not apply to the full spectrum of threats presented by the cyber domain. Fail-deadly deterrence is only likely to succeed in preventing state-level adversaries from undertaking resource-intensive cyber operations that reach the threshold of armed conflict with physical, destructive effects and that are quickly attributable.38 Fail-safe defensive measures also face several political and technical challenges, all of which point to a role for cyber resilience. Three main complications limit the applicability of the fail-deadly logics underpinning collective defense efforts in cyberspace. The first is deciding which actors are to be deterred. Compared to traditional warfighting domains, there are relatively low entry costs for conducting operations in the cyber domain.39 As such, both state and non-state actors can target the Alliance. There are also asymmetric operational costs—actors are faced with multiple avenues for potential gains and few risks. This means that it will be near-impossible to change the decision calculus of a malicious actor deploying low-cost, low-risk techniques such as distributed denials of service. Conversely, sophisticated cyber operations that can produce strategic effects equivalent to those of conventional military attacks will have both significant and costly intelligence requirements that can only be borne by state actors. These higher ‘start-up’ costs mean it may be possible to change the decision calculus of actors seeking to conduct highly sophisticated cyber operations. Due to this asymmetry, only state actors undertaking costly cyber operations are likely to be deterred. In all other circumstances, deterrence will be more prone to failure.40 Attribution difficulties present further challenges to the ‘who’ of deterrence. Adversaries with rapidly changing tactics, techniques, and procedures—along with the ability to easily conceal an operation’s origin and perpetrator—can pose hurdles to technical attribution.41 Technical difficulties can weaken deterrent postures by delaying the timeliness of retaliatory punishment. Moreover, the effects of an operation that a defender notices may actually be second- or third-order effects. This can add additional time between attribution and punishment.42 The larger attribution issues, however, are political. NATO lacks common standards or guidance for attributing cyber operations in either a technical or political sense. Indeed, attribution remains a member state prerogative. Not only are the targeted member states responsible for attribution, but those members looking to contribute to collective defense must perform independent attribution assessments, and the political decision for a collective defense response must come from the NAC.43 Reaching a consensus decision to trigger collective defense in response to cyberspace operations is likely to be politically contentious, and member states will have few incentives to risk revealing the intelligence sources and methods that underlie attribution decisions. These dynamics are likely to intensify when additional links in the attribution chain are required, such as when a perpetrator is encouraged or sponsored by an adversarial state but lacks direct ties. Attribution is less likely to be politically controversial across the Alliance once a conventional conflict is underway as contextual clues from kinetic attacks can reduce uncertainty. This discussion points to a greater role for deterrence-by-denial. Deterring an adversary by taking measures to deny potential gains does not hinge on attribution and thus possesses a potentially wider scope of application.44 A second and related hurdle for cyber deterrence is determining which actions the Alliance seeks to deter. Much of the activity in cyberspace falls below the physical effects thresholds associated with the disruption, degradation, or destruction of computers and networks. Such considerations complicate decisions to invoke Article 5—specifically, the types of cyberattacks to which Article 5 should apply. Indeed, cyber operations targeting military assets or critical civilian infrastructure can be incredibly costly but may not reach damage levels associated with conventional attacks.45 Moreover, espionage via network exploitation is widespread, varied, and falls well below the threshold of armed conflict.46 Problematically, such exploitation can be nearly indistinguishable from operations that eventually seek to attack computers or networks and produce effects. Network exploitation can even be precursor to conventional military operations.47 Determining how to deter presents a third obstacle to NATO’s cyber deterrence efforts. Threatening conventional military means in response to cyber operations poses dilemmas of proportionality and can risk unintended escalation.48 Retaliation with cyber tools carry their own problems. First, the Alliance faces issues of political reliability, particularly in the context of the SCEPVA framework. Legally, Allies retain different constitutional restraints on offensive cyber operations that can hamper the ability to volunteer sovereign effects. Strategically, states may be hesitant to volunteer their ‘best’ cyber effects for fear of burning an exploit that could have had a greater payoff when used in a national context. Volunteering sovereign effects can also inadvertently give unwanted insight to an adversary regarding an Ally’s techniques, tactics, and procedures. Second, the temporary and transient nature of cyber capabilities makes it incredibly difficult to establish repeatable and predictable effects required of deterrent threats.49 Finally, signaling in cyberspace is generally ambiguous and rarely straightforward.50 For instance, an adversary may not even recognize a signal, believing it instead to be a technical glitch. Even if a costly signal is received, there is no way to ensure that it has interpreted as intended. In addition to deterrence, NATO’s fail-safe cyber defense efforts face political and technical challenges. Because NATO will not undertake any active defense measures, actions to mitigate the effects of a cyberattack are limited to NATO networks or to individual member state networks when requested. This forecloses the possibility of developing an institutional strategy to mitigate the costs of a cyberattack upstream by disrupting the source of an attack, much like US Cyber Command does with its “defend forward” posture.51 More problematically, Allies have and will continue to have different legal, strategic, doctrinal, and threat frameworks for cyberspace that complicate defensive measures for the Alliance. Most immediately this means that Allies will locate resources to different aspects of cyber defense based on individual country circumstances. Different strategic focuses have the potential to intensify disparate threat perceptions, capabilities, and skillsets. This can also exacerbate interoperability problems; for example, during an operation or crisis, some systems will be controlled by NATO while others will be controlled by an ally or a group of allies with different skill and knowledge levels. In the longer term, disparate legal understandings, particularly regarding sovereignty in cyberspace, will become more impactful as a greater number of allied nations develop forward defense strategies and the requisite capabilities for out-of-network operations. An out-of-network operation can in and of itself cause operational friction. However, differing definitions of sovereignty in cyberspace—and what violates it—inevitably create political friction between Allies as some look to operate and produce effects on other Allies’ networks.52 This political friction will contribute to even greater hesitancy over cyber-intelligence sharing and complicate the coordination of defensive mitigation measures across the Alliance. Even if political barriers were removed, there are technical challenges to Allied implementation of fail-safe measures. Although there are conditions that can favor defense, such as the ability to manipulate the environment,53 offensive cyber operations can be both unpredictable and undetectable. Moreover, cyberspace presents a large and complex attack surface, where attacks can have unintended, cross-border effects. Given the sheer quantity of daily network probes experienced by NATO and individual member states, it is unlikely that every intrusion can be successfully countered or even identified. Highly sophisticated cyber operations are also likely to evade most defensive measures. Finally, fail-safe measures cannot effectively mitigate supply chain risks, as computers and systems increasingly rely on 

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