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2022 CNDI Counterplan

CP - EU-NATO Coop - CNDI 2022

CP - EU-NATO Coop - CNDI 2022.docx

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EU-NATO Cooperation CP
Notes:
Simple “Agent CP.” It tests the “US Key” warrants of the affirmative and is an easy way to solve the affirmative without linking to US action. The China DA is a clean net-benefit as well as the forthcoming Midterms DA.
There’s also an internal net-benefit, but the perm might solve it and we only found one card. It just says EU leadership is good and that the CP might raise their profile and encourage more cooperation beyond the plan. You could use some of the “European Defence Good” cards from the NATO Bad/Withdrawal file.
The solvency evidence is pretty good. The EU has resources, expertise, and organizations to cooperation and there is a lot of ev about the need for the EU to lay the groundwork for a more integrated European defense network. Remember, you don’t need to solve the entire aff, but could win with “sufficient” solvency.
Final neg note is that you should consider making the CP texts more strategic by adding specific planks describing what the EU would do. Like the Diplomacy CP, the EU can’t do everything the DOD can, BUT it can take a number of actions to address the same harms (coordination, capacity building, data sharing, and development).
The aff has some perm options, not only because you can “do both” but also because NATO includes US as a member already, so “Perm - Do the CP” is an argument. The aff should rely on their US key cards from case and point out that a lot of the neg evidence says that the EU should cooperate more, but that they haven’t and aren’t really prepared to on that scale (the ev is prescriptive, not descriptive).
Thanks Maya & Hope and the rest of the GHS Lab!
1NCs
1nc – Generic
Text: The European Union should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the area of
< insert the plan area or mechanism >
The CP solves coordination, capacity building, data sharing, and development on emerging tech issues – EU-NATO coop reinforces existing programs to create better security.
De Maio ’21 [Giovanna De Maio is a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. “Opportunities to deepen EU-NATO cooperation”. December 2021. Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/FP_20211203_nato_eu_cooperation_demaio.pdf. Accessed 6-24-2022; MJen]
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS In a world marked by COVID-19, deeper social divisions, more vulnerable supply chains, and increased competition in the international arena, the roles of NATO and the EU and their ability to tackle global challenges are constantly being questioned. Moreover, with the proliferation of ad hoc coalitions to tackle specific challenges, the two organizations are constantly fighting for relevance and space to operate. In this context, as this paper has shown, both NATO and the EU have more to gain through joining forces rather than competing with one another. In light of the arguments developed so far, some broad policy recommendations appear relevant: 1. NATO and EU member states should leverage their policy fora to discuss joint initiatives and better employ their assets — NATO’s military capabilities and logistical systems and the EU’s capacity building and financial assistance. This would enable a more coordinated approach to crises based on a division of labor agreed to on a case-by-case basis. Learning from past experiences, the two organizations should work to avoid another “Afghanistan scenario” in areas like the Sahel region. 2. NATO and the EU should increase information sharing and establish protocols in crucial sectors from anti-terrorism cooperation to cybersecurity. The periodic joint exercises performed so far are important steps toward building confidence and fostering regular updates and the sharing of best practices. Yet insufficient information sharing and the lack of protocols in case of a crisis hinder the utility of the exercises conducted. While this recommendation ultimately depends on political will, some smaller channels could be created to streamline limited but vital information, especially in the event of a cyberattack. 3. Regarding disinformation, NATO should take advantage of the EU’s apparatus and support it with its own solid structure for intelligence gathering — instead of having NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division duplicate the work of the EU StratCom task force. Alternatively, because countering disinformation is not the main job of the division, NATO could create a separate disinformation unit to work closely with the EU’s task force. Coordinating efforts to tackle different outlets of disinformation could help reduce the overall burden. In both scenarios, the two organizations should not just seek to counter disinformation but also prevent it as much as possible. 4. NATO and the EU should increase their dialogue on regulations and impediments to military mobility and interoperability. NATO’s deeper expertise on strategic airlifting and military operations could help the EU improve regulations to facilitate military mobility. More broadly, NATO should leverage EU regulatory power in conjunction with its objectives when it comes to capacity building as well as in countering China’s multifaceted influence. 5. To reinforce NATO’s posture in Europe and elsewhere, the EU should boost its military capability (as member states’ militaries contribute to NATO’s single set of forces). Enhanced military capabilities would also enable the EU to intervene independently from the United States in theaters that are no longer security priorities for Washington. European countries will need to assess their defense spending for greater efficiency and assess the advantages of a more integrated procurement system. While doing so, Europeans should consider mechanisms to enable the U.S. defense industry to participate; this could minimize the economic losses, foster technological development and cooperation on a trans-Atlantic level, and reduce dependence on geopolitically risky supplies. 6. NATO and the EU should foster cooperation in procurement and capability development to increase interoperability, including through the establishment of similar standards. This would enhance military mobility and interoperability across Europe and other theaters like the Indo-Pacific, where the engagement of the U.S. and Europe is growing.
1nc – Cybersecurity
CP text: The European Union should substantially increase its cybersecurity cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by
establishing a joint taskforce for cyber crisis responses coordination
intensifying joint cyber exercises
creating an information hub to share data
creating a common cyber trust fund
The CP creates an effective European cybersecurity network – solves the aff
Lete ’19 [Bruno Lété currently serves as a transatlantic fellow, security and defense at The German Marshall Fund of the United States in Brussels. He provides analysis and advice on trends in geopolitics and on international security and defense policy. “THE EU AND NATO: the Essential Partners”. 2019. European Union Institute for Security Studies. https://drive.google.com/file/d/18Um8tOva0YQLiUGAjjzkkuUnIIXx-TGZ/view?usp=sharing. Accessed 6-22-2022; MJen]
~ Evolving to a joint model The priority for the EU and NATO is to now find agreement on how to mitigate cyber- security threats which are becoming more frequent and more sophisticated. EU-NATO : cooperation is essential to allow European and transatlantic governments to become better at preventing, detecting, and deterring cyberattacks, as well as to hold those that engage in malicious cyber activities accountable. As such, both organisations must continue to seek new ways of cooperation that deepen and broaden their engagement. The following recommendations are achievable, some immediately and others in the long term. But given the scale of the threat, it is necessary to think ambitiously. Create an EU-NATO cyber threat information hub Joint structures that combine EU and NATO resources or expertise are nothing new. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki is a good example of how, with the necessary good will, the EU and NATO can work together un- der the same roof. The creation of an EU-NATO Cyber Threat Information Hub could be another step in this vein. The mission of such a hub would simply be to improve information sharing by building relations and networks between the EU, NATO, mem- ber states and partners. It could do so first of all by advising technical and operation- al level Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for information exchange between the EU and NATO entities, and identifying how to enable secure lines of communication to share confidential cyber intelligence. In addition, it could assist the EU and NATO in defining what type of information needs to be shared, who needs to receive it, when the information needs to be shared, and making sure the information is released in a timely and appropriate manner. In this regard, the hub could make active recommendations concerning the growing role of automated information sharing in identifying rele- vant information more quickly, but also in automating threat mitigation in real time. Automated sharing of security and threat information could also help the EU and NATO to standardise their threat intelligence. The hub could identify adequate informa- tion-sharing platforms or information-storage clouds that can withstand increasingly complex attacks, based on open industry specifications. Such platforms bring several benefits. They enable rapid communication and peer-based sharing, they reduce cost, and increase the speed of cyber defences by substituting manual responses for auto- mated processes. In this regard, the hub could make active proposals on how to use the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) or the European Defence Fund (EDF) to develop this type of technological capacity. The recent proposal of eight EU member states to develop a ‘Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform’ under PESCO encourages more thinking in this direction. The success of EU- NATO cooperation in preventing, detecting and deterring cyberattacks will ultimately be defined by the ability of the two organisations to share information more effectively. Cautious steps in this direction have already been taken; for instance the EU was grant- ed access to the NATO Malware Information Sharing Platform. But both organisations will need to continue to explore bold initiatives if they are to address today’s informa- tion-sharing gap. Establish an EU-NATO Taskforce for cyber crisis response coordination To efficiently synchronise their cyber crisis response mechanisms the EU and NATO : will need to create additional capacity. The existing structures that allow the EU and - NATO to come together are still limited, ranging from formal and informal meetings ~ between the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC), exchanges at ministerial meetings, cross briefings to respective Committees and i - Councils, and informal staff-to-staff interaction, for instance between the European External Action Service and NATO’s International Staff. These interactions are valu- : able, but they do not represent a solid basis for guaranteeing an efficient and smooth | ~ collective response in the event of a real cyber crisis. A roadmap for collective response is therefore needed. An immediate way to achieve this would be to create a structure — like a joint taskforce — that brings together the EU Cyber Crisis Response Framework ~ and NATO’s Crisis Response System. This taskforce would be convened when a ma- jor cyber incident strikes multiple EU member states and NATO Allies or EU/NATO institutions. To prepare this taskforce for operational duties, in a first stage, its task would be | to map the full spectrum of EU and NATO competencies for cyber defence, to clari- fy responsibilities at national and supranational levels for issues like attribution and countermeasures, and based on this information to create a common template of cyber crisis management phases. Once such a common template is created, in a second stage,% ~ the taskforce could then be convened to respond to cyber incidents. This taskforce! could also be useful in many other ways. For instance, it could make recommenda ~ tions on how to synchronise joint strategic communication among EU and NATO in- stitutions, or make proposals on how to use EU PESCO and NATO structures to supporti countries before, during and after crises. It could also look at creating linkages betweeni the EU ‘Cyber Rapid Response Teams’ currently being developed under PESCO and the! existing NATO Rapid Reaction Team to Fight Cyber Attacks. Finally the taskforce couldi also make suggestions on how to include NATO into the EU Commission ‘Blueprint toi respond to large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises’. The EU and NATO have a§ wide array of crisis management tools at their disposal, but they are disconnected. An% ambitious, but much needed step, would now be to align those different instruments and to create an EU-NATO ‘playbook’ on how to react to cyber incidents and crises. Develop EU-NATO triggers for a collective response to cyberattacks Talking openly about active and reactive responses in cyberspace is no longer taboo fori EU or NATO member states. And the policy instruments to conduct an offensive strategy or to sanction adversaries are steadily increasing. NATO for instance has already ~ recognised that a serious cyberattack on a member state could be a potential triggeri for Article 5. At its November 2017 defence ministerial the Alliance also agreed to cre ate a Cyber Operations Centre that will facilitate the integration of cyber capabilities with conventional military capabilities. The EU for its part created in 2017 its Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, a framework for a joint EU diplomatic response to malicious cyber activities. In May 2019, EU countries also agreed that individuals and groups conducting cyberattacks from outside the bloc may be hit with potential sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes. These measures have boosted the EU’s and NATO’s individual capacity to hit back at cyber adversaries. But there is today no template on how to synchronise these different EU and NATO tools, nor is there agreement on the conditions that would trig- ger the collective use of these tools. In other words, the circumstances in which the EU and NATO would work together to adopt a responsive or offensive posture are still éambiguous. While NATO and the EU have to an extent consciously embraced ambigu- éity for its strategic value, the absence of a clearer definition of an offensive posture, : and of the circumstances, degree, and manner in which counter-measures can or should be taken if member states perceive a cyber threat or suffer a cyberattack, make 1t more difficult for the EU and NATO to respond collectively. The conditions to use Ethe EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox or the trigger for NATO to launch an offensive cyber : campaign may be clear if a member state faces a large-scale, devastating cyber cri- ésis. However, most cyberattacks fall below the threshold of being perceived as a clear act of aggression. Formulating a proportionate response in this grey zone constitutes the biggest problem. Russian ‘active measures’ in Europe are for instance clearly de- ésigned to exploit these grey zones, and the Kremlin has acquired some sophistication i in avoiding red lines that would trigger a common response from EU or NATO member Estates. Russia is also not the only potential adversary capable of similar tactics. There is thus an acute need to define when and how the EU and NATO must respond against i day-to-day cyber intrusions. The development of a set of EU-NATO basic principles, or (non-binding) guidelines that would trigger a joint response would be a good first step. The Tallinn Manual® published by the NATO Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence could offer inspiration on how the EU and NATO can define these principles while respecting the application of international law. Currently the EU and NATO need to assess each individual cyber threat or cyberattack on a case-by-case basis without the support of standard measurement tools and indicators that can help them formulate a swift and proportionate response. This considerably slows down the decision-making process. However, if the EU and NATO were to dispose of a set of pre-agreed principles, it would significantly improve their joint reactiveness and resilience. Intensify joint cyber exercises, foster a culture of mutual trust Exercising, training and learning together is key to better understand each other’s institutional processes, to develop common responses, and to cultivate a culture of trust. In their history, the EU and NATO have found it difficult to adopt such a mind- ~ set. They held only one joint crisis management exercise in 2003, which prioritised politico-military priorities and did not include cyber assets. The EU and NATO also planned, but failed, to implement more exercises in 2007, 2010, and 2014. The Joint ~ Declarations of 2016 and 2018 have nevertheless turned the tide and today both organi- sations exercise, train and learn together more than ever before. But the rapprochement is in many cases still cautious. A key example are the EU and NATO ‘coordinated and parallel’ crisis management exercises — EU PACE and NATO CMX. Synchronising EU and NATO flagship exercises is a commendable step to develop more interaction but : working in parallel is still a very different concept than a ‘joint exercise’. De facto, EU | PACE and NATO CMX remain independent initiatives, they constitute only one signif- icant occasion per year where the EU and NATO exercise together, and they are not conducted at the same moment in time which represents an important disconnect with a joint crisis response in reality. A more realistic approach to creating a fully-fledged - EU-NATO joint exercise is perhaps to think small-scale. A useful angle in this respect would be to have EU-NATO staffs exercise how to align specific technical cyber inci- i dent information (from computer security incident response teams — CSIRTs) with ~ military intelligence threat assessments. Moreover, exercises must also go hand-in- ~ hand with joint training and education opportunities. The EU and NATO have already opened up their cyber courses to each other’s staffs. As a next step, they could further explore how to integrate NATO cyber defence courses with the recently launched EU - Cyber Education, Training and Exercise platform - an initiative from the European Security and Defence College to harmonise and standardise cyber defence education for - EU member states. Coherent training and joint exercises will be key to create a mutual ~ culture of trust and understanding. Create a common Cyber Trust Fund for partner countries Today the EU and NATO work individually with their partner nations on cybersecuri- ty and defence programmes. But EU and NATO programmes could become more effi- cient if both institutions coordinate their assistance in order to create more synergy and avoid duplication. The EU and NATO could coordinate their assistance for partners around issues like technical cyber capabilities, information networks, and standards. A coordinated approach would also enable partners to more efficiently share with the EU and NATO their firsthand information, expertise, and experience. To complement or bundle the efforts of various EU or NATO assistance providers, an independent Cyber Trust Fund, supported by the EU and NATO, could be created. Access to the Trust Fund could be granted to EU Associated Countries or partner countries of the NATO Euro- Atlantic Partnership, Mediterranean Dialo

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