DA - China Tradeoff - CNDI 2022
DA - China Tradeoff - CNDI 2022.docx
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CHINA TRADEOFF DA Notes Overview: Simple argument that an increased military focus on NATO trades-off with efforts to deter China. Budget, personnel, and time are all finite so investments in security cooperation are “zero-sum.” The “Asian Pivot” has been a priority for a while now because China is revisionist and is the number one threat to US interests. Ukraine complicated that switch, but the US is back to prioritizing China and deterring aggression against Taiwan (and the rest of Asia). The plan both physically and perceptually detracts from US efforts and invites aggression from China. A war over Taiwan goes nuclear and is arguably a bigger threat than anything in Ukraine. Pros: There is a big debate on the necessity for an Asian Pivot and solid link evidence about the inability for the US to fight on two fronts, so the trade-off lit is pretty good. The impacts are comparatively bigger. The risk of escalation in Ukraine is lower now and Russia was exposed as less of a threat than expected. China on the other hand has the same aggressive intentions but more power. There’s ev in the file that actually makes the comparison, so if you win a unique link, you can outweigh. Cons: Weak uniqueness. Ukraine is going to thump a lot of DAs. All the link evidence about the trade-off is descriptive of the status quo (suggesting that Biden is failing by getting too involved in NATO and not enough in Asia). It’s also possible for the military to “chew gum and walk” at the same time. To Do: Specific DOD spending links or Budget Request politics Cards that describe the aff’s policy as labor/resource intensive Uniqueness about US draw down in Europe 1NC Next Off a. Uniqueness: US military is prioritizing China – current budgets and diplomatic efforts are key to maintain deterrence, specially over Taiwan. Benar News ’22 (Staff written, “US not seeking to create ‘Asian NATO,’ defense secretary says,” 2022.06.11, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/thai/singapore-summit-day-1-06112022015249.html)-mikee The U.S. defense secretary emphasized partnership as the main priority for the American security strategy in the Indo-Pacific during a keynote speech in Singapore on Saturday, but stressed that the U.S. was not seeking to create “an Asian NATO.” The United States remains “deeply invested” and committed to a free and open Indo-Pacific, Lloyd Austin said in a 30-minute speech during the first plenary session of the Shangri-La Dialogue security forum here. “We do not seek confrontation and conflict and we do not seek a new Cold War, an Asian NATO or a region split into hostile blocs,” the U.S. defense chief said, referring to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Russian President Vladimir Putin had cited Ukraine’s interest in joining the regional inter-governmental alliance as a reason for launching an invasion of the smaller country next-door in late February. The United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific have recently expressed concern over China’s increasingly assertive military posture in the region, and that the war in Ukraine might encourage Beijing even more. Beijing, for its part, has been complaining about what it sees as attempts by the U.S. and its partners to form a defense alliance in the region. When leaders from the U.S., Japan, India and Australia met last month for a summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, China cried foul. Foreign Minister Wang Yi said Washington was “keen to gang up with ‘small circles’ and change China’s neighborhood environment,” making Asia-Pacific countries serve as “pawns” of the U.S. hegemony. “I think Secretary Austin made it very clear that there’s no appetite for an Asian NATO,” said Blake Herzinger, a Singapore-based defense analyst. “The U.S. values collective partnerships with shared visions and priorities, without the need to form a defense alliance,” he told BenarNews. ‘A region free from coercion and bullying’ The U.S will “continue to stand by our friends as they uphold their rights,” said Austin, adding that the commitment is “especially important as the People’s Republic of China adopts a more coercive and aggressive approach to its territorial claims.” He spoke of the Chinese air force’s almost daily incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and an “alarming” increase in the number of unsafe and unprofessional encounters between Chinese planes and vessels with those of other countries. Most recently, U.S. ally Australia accused China of conducting a “dangerous intercept,” of one of its surveillance aircraft near the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. On Friday, Austin met with his Chinese counterpart, Wei Fenghe, on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue. During the meeting that lasted nearly an hour, the two sides discussed how to better manage their relationship and prevent accidents from happening but did not reach any concrete resolution. Austin used his speech on Saturday to remind Beijing that “big powers carry big responsibilities,” saying “we’ll do our part to manage these tensions responsibly – to prevent conflict, and to pursue peace and prosperity.” The Indo-Pacific is the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DOD) “priority theater,” he noted, adding that his department’s fiscal year 2023 budget request calls for one of the largest investments in history to preserve the region's security. This includes the U.S. $6.1 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative to strengthen multilateral information-sharing and support training and experimentation with partners. The budget also seeks to encourage innovation across all domains, including space and cyberspace, “to develop new capabilities that will allow us to deter aggression even more surely,” he said. The U.S. military is expanding exercises and training programs with regional partners, the defense secretary said. Later in June, the Pentagon will host the 28th Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise with forces from 26 countries, 38 ships and nearly 25,000 personnel. Next year, a Coast Guard cutter will be deployed to Southeast Asia and Oceania, he said, “the first major U.S. Coast Guard cutter permanently stationed in the region.” Protecting Taiwan “Secretary Austin offered a compelling vision, grounded in American resolve to uphold freedom from coercion and oppose the dangerously outmoded concept of aggressively-carved spheres of influence,” said Andrew Erickson, research director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College, speaking in a personal capacity. “The key will be for Washington to match Austin’s rhetoric with requisite resolve and resources long after today’s Dialogue is over,” Erickson said. “It is that follow-through that will determine much in what President Biden rightly calls the ‘Decisive Decade’,” he added. Last month in Tokyo, Biden announced a new Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) that Austin said would provide better access to space-based, maritime domain awareness to countries across the region. The U.S. defense secretary spoke at length about his government’s policy towards Taiwan, saying “we’re determined to uphold the status quo that has served this region so well for so long.” While remaining committed to the longstanding one-China policy, the U.S. categorically opposes “any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side.” “We do not support Taiwan independence. And we stand firmly behind the principle that cross-strait differences must be resolved by peaceful means,” Austin said. The U.S. continues assisting Taiwan in maintaining self-defense capability and this week approved the sale of U.S. $120 million in spare parts and technical assistance for the Taiwanese navy. b. Link: Security cooperation is zero-sum. Focus on Europe trades-off with Asia. The aff escalates US involvement in NATO at the expense of deterring China. Townshend and Corben ’22 (Ashley Townshend is director of foreign policy and defense and Tom Corben is a research associate in the foreign policy and defense program at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. “Op-Ed: War in Ukraine Threatens America's Ability to Counter China,” The Strategist, MAR 16, 2022, https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/op-ed-war-in-ukraine-threatens-america-s-ability-to-counter-china) As the United States slides deeper into a proxy war with Russia, Indo-Pacific countries are increasingly concerned about the long-term implications of the Ukraine crisis for America’s power and position in this part of the world. And so they should be. While President Joe Biden’s initial approach to Ukraine struck the right balance of resolve and restraint—marshalling global allies in support of sanctions against Russia and funnelling military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine—the war is now sapping more and more American attention and defence resources. A dangerous tit for tat is taking hold. Washington’s lethal military aid and economy-breaking sanctions signal an investment in the war that could slip beyond Biden’s original articulation of limited interests. Russia’s nuclear threats and increasingly brutal operations have triggered further US involvement, including the deployment of advanced F-35 fighters and expensive Patriot missile-defence systems to NATO frontlines in Eastern Europe, and a massive $13.6 billion Ukraine emergency bill passed by Congress last week. Calls are getting louder for a ‘limited no-fly zone’ which, though rebuffed so far, may become politically harder to resist. All this is understandable given the humanitarian carnage. But hot on the heels of the release of Biden’s Indo-Pacific strategy, it’s unsettling to watch Washington’s strategic gaze drift, once again, away from a robust "pivot to Asia." As we argue in a new United States Studies Centre report, these developments are especially worrying given that the Biden administration has so far failed to deliver on key defense components of its regional strategy. Senior US officials insist that events in Europe will not see the Indo-Pacific or efforts to balance Chinese power deprioritised. Earlier this month, the White House’s Indo-Pacific coordinator, Kurt Campbell, again promised that Washington was capable of sustaining "deep commitments" in both theaters simultaneously, even at great cost, just as it had in the past. But while America can—and must—continue to buttress European security, it doesn’t enjoy the luxury of riches or unchallenged military primacy required to underwrite an expansive global strategy against two great-power rivals. Matching ends with means in the Indo-Pacific—America’s so-called ‘priority theatre’—requires difficult trade-offs between competing priorities, including in Ukraine. A more sustainable division of US and allied defense responsibilities in Europe and Asia is urgently required. Biden understands this and deserves credit for attempting to match US global interests and commitments in his first year. Poor execution aside, his Afghan withdrawal showed a willingness to make tough, politically unpopular trade-offs. His initially restrained approach to the Ukraine crisis suggested he would keep it in global strategic perspective. But Washington won’t be able to sideline Moscow from its foreign policy agenda the way it had hoped. Delays to the publication of the US national defense strategy and national security strategy suggest that Russia is forcing a hurried reassessment of Biden’s global priorities. In a worst-case scenario for the Indo-Pacific, it’s possible these documents will return US military strategy to an equally weighted focus on Asia and Europe—contradicting hard-fought efforts in recent years to make China the Pentagon’s outright priority. This is not a callous point to make. America simply doesn’t have the military resources required to prosecute an effective multi-theater strategy in an era of great-power rivalry. Nor is it spending enough to change this equation: while the 2018 national defence strategy recommended three to five percent real growth in defense spending annually to keep pace with China and Russia, not a single defense budget since has met these targets. Biden’s budget continues this unsatisfactory trend. And in contrast to the stark warnings from top brass at US Indo-Pacific Command, who see conflict with China as a possibility this decade, the administration’s defense budget prioritizes long-term military modernization in anticipation of high-end conflict in the 2030s - leaving the US underprepared to deal with Chinese military coercion over the next few years. Budget shortfalls are mirrored by slow-moving efforts to realign US forces globally. Efforts to empower US allies are even more important as Washington is once again pulled in conflicting global directions. Indo-Pacific allies should advocate for more. As a priority, Australia should caucus with Japan and other close security partners to push for overdue reforms to US export controls on defense technology. Indo-Pacific allies should also press Washington for greater insight and input into its regional military planning. A credible collective defence strategy requires clarity on when, where and how to address shared defence challenges. Biden’s effort to build support among regional allies for a Taiwan contingency is a step in this direction. But while Taiwan is the Pentagon’s "pacing challenge," regional countries face Chinese military coercion across a far wider range of lower intensity scenarios, as China’s intimidation of an Australian military aircraft in the Arafura Sea last month attests. New strategic planning initiatives must reflect these realities. In the end, however, these initiatives can’t change the strategic physics of the Indo-Pacific. A favorable balance of power with China can only be upheld with unprecedented US support. Alliance modernization is a necessary component of this strategy, but it’s not a substitute for a robust US military posture and presence in the Indo-Pacific. As the conflict in Ukraine grinds on, America’s capacity to deliver an effective defense strategy for the region will depend on its ability to keep its escalating involvement in check and in global strategic perspective. c. Impact: 1. A failed Asian Pivot emboldens China to invade Taiwan. Sacks ‘22 (David, research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, where his work focuses on U.S.-China relations, U.S.-Taiwan relations, Chinese foreign policy, cross-Strait relations, and the political thought of Hans Morgenthau, “Don't Pivot From the Pivot to Asia,” Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/blog/dont-pivot-pivot-asia)//BB With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, major war has returned to Europe and with it calls for the United States to prioritize countering the present threat posed by Russia over the threat China could one day pose. But Russia’s ineffectiveness on the battlefield, paired with the increasing investments European nations are making in their defense, gives the United States a better opportunity than ever to finally pivot to Asia and focus on the more formidable challenge China represents. A failure to do so could embolden China and give Beijing an opening to increase its influence, to the detriment of U.S. security and prosperity. Over a decade ago, President Obama announced the “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia in a speech to the Australian Parliament, declaring “the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region.” The president’s speech followed an essay by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton entitled “America’s Pacific Century,” where she argued for a “strategic turn to the region.” All too often, however, the United States has failed to pair this ambitious rhetoric with policies that reflected the region’s importance. Now, Putin’s aggression against Ukraine has led to a growing consensus that the United States needs to view Russia as its primary geopolitical challenge and shift resources to Europe. But such a reorientation of U.S. strategy would again delay the pivot to Asia just when it is both more necessary and more viable than ever. The reasoning may be counterintuitive but holds all the same. The war in Ukraine has revealed Russia’s military is incapable of waging modern warfare and does not have the ability to fundamentally threaten NATO. Russia failed to establish air superiority over Ukraine, its logistics are in shambles, and morale among its soldiers is reportedly dangerously low. The defining image of this war thus far is of a stalled Russian convoy stretching forty miles on a road leading to Kyiv. Overcoming these issues will take years and require a fundamental overhaul of Russia’s military culture and doctrine. Russia will have to undertake these difficult reforms with its military in tatters. While it is difficult to know exactly how many casualties Russia has suffered in Ukraine, it is well into the thousands, and the Russian military will likely suffer far greater losses if it attempts to take Kyiv. Russia has lost some of its most advanced fighter jets, helicopters, tanks, and artillery, while depleting its munitions. It will take a long time for Russia to rebuild its material strength, a prospect that will be even more daunting given the sanctions that are in force. The crisis in Ukraine has also forced European countries to awaken from their slumber, and they are now willing to shoulder a greater burden for their defense. Most consequentially, Germany has announced it will increase its defense spending to 2 percent of GDP and purchase 35 F-35 fighter jets, which will increase interoperability with NATO forces. Sweden is also looking to increase its defense spending to 2 percent of GDP, while support for joining NATO has surged in the country. Denmark has pledged to meet the 2 percent target, while Latvia, Poland, and Romania have signaled they will boost defense spending to exceed that target. A depleted and exhausted Russian military and increased European investments in their defense mean the United States can meet its obligations to its NATO allies while shifting resources to Asia. As such, the Department of Defense should continue to identify China as the pacing challenge given its military might and its regional ambitions. Taiwan should remain the pacing scenario, as it is the most difficult one for the United States to address and therefore if the United States gets that right it will be well-positioned to respond to other regional contingencies. Capabilities most relevant for a Taiwan scenario should be prioritized, in particular long-range missiles and submarines, while the United States should continue to distribute its military presence throughout the region. With NATO’s conventional capabilities set to improve, once this crisis passes the United States should withdraw the seven thousand troops it sent to Europe following Russia’s invasion and review its force posture on the continent, where it currently has ninety thousand service members based. While Putin has upended European security, nothing has occurred since the war in Ukraine began that reduces the challenge that China poses for the United States. China’s military spending shows no sign of slowing down and is projected to increase by over 7 percent this year. It is continuing to invest in capabilities designed to prevent the United States from successfully intervening on behalf of its allies and is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal. China’s economy is set to grow by 5.5 percent this year and it is pulling additional economies into its orbit with the entry into force of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and ongoing Belt and Road Initiative investments. While the United States certainly needs to deal with the urgent threat to European security, it cannot lose sight of the more serious and multidimensional challenge coming from Beijing. Indeed, if the perception takes root
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