Aff - Cyber Intel Supplement - CNDI 2022
Aff - Cyber Intel Supplement - CNDI 2022.docx
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Cyber Intel AFF Supplement – CNDI 2022 AFF Uniqueness Extensions 2AC --- UQ Russia Cyber Attacks Now --- Ukraine Example Russia cyber attacking Ukraine now – shows capabilities Bannister 22 (Adam Bannister, In recent years Adam has written news, features, and white papers on intrusion detection, video surveillance, and physical-access control, with cybersecurity increasingly to the fore. The history graduate also covered entrepreneurship and, more recently, fire safety before joining The Daily Swig, ‘Russia behind cyber-attack on satellite internet network KA-SAT that disrupted Ukrainian infrastructure – EU’, The Daily Swig, 10 May 2022 at 12:52 UTC, https://portswigger.net/daily-swig/russia-behind-cyber-attack-on-satellite-internet-network-ka-sat-that-disrupted-ukrainian-infrastructure-eu) The EU has blamed Russia for a powerful cyber-attack that disrupted satellite broadband services in Ukraine and “helped facilitate President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of the country”.Thousands of modems were knocked offline by the attack on the KA-SAT network, which took place one hour before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine commenced on February 24.The incident caused communication outages and other disruptions for government websites and banks in Ukraine, and affected several EU Member States that also use the KA-SAT network.The KA-SAT satellite and network is operated by US telecoms giant Viasat, which provides connectivity to military as well as commercial customers. “This unacceptable cyber-attack is yet another example of Russia’s continued pattern of irresponsible behaviour in cyberspace, which also formed an integral part of its illegal and unjustified invasion of Ukraine,” reads a statement issued today (May 10) by the Council of the EU.Cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure “could spill over into other countries and cause systemic effects putting the security of Europe’s citizens at risk”, it warned.“The European Union, working closely with its partners, is considering further steps to prevent, discourage, deter and respond to such malicious behaviour in cyberspace. The European Union will continue to provide coordinated political, financial and material support to Ukraine to strengthen its cyber resilience.”Viasat revealed in a statement issued on March 30 that a “targeted denial of service attack made it difficult for many modems to remain online”, and that an attacker had exploited a misconfiguration in a VPN appliance to gain remote access to the KA-SAT network. 2AC --- UQ --- Hacks Risk of cyber-attacks high Nichols 22 (Shaun Nichols, with 15 years of experience as a reporter, Shaun Nichols has been covering the enterprise technology market since the days when the iPod had a hard drive and phones had actual buttons. He has written for international publications including VNUnet, V3, The Register and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, covering everything from embedded controllers to supercomputers, ‘US warns of 'increased' threats from Russian hacking groups’, TechTarget, April 20, 2022, https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/news/252516169/US-warns-of-increased-threats-from-Russian-hacking-groups) U.S. government agencies are warning the public of an expected increase in cyber-attacks from hackers affiliated with the Russian government. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency joined with the National Security Agency and Department of Justice in an advisory detailing the threats posed by Russian hacking groups -- both state-sponsored advanced persistent threat groups and also private cybercrime gangs that support Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The advisory warned that organizations within Ukraine as well as outside the region, including the U.S., could see "increased malicious cyber activity." "This activity may occur as a response to the unprecedented economic costs imposed on Russia as well as materiel support provided by the United States and U.S. allies and partners," the advisory said. Also signing the joint advisory were the four other members of the Five Eyes intelligence network: the U.K., New Zealand, Australia and Canada. Most notably, the advisory for the first time addressed the issue of private cybercriminal hacking groups either working directly with the Kremlin or acting on its behalf in vigilante-style hacking campaigns, as Russia continues to work on disrupting communications in Ukraine. "Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, some cybercrime groups have independently publicly pledged support for the Russian government or the Russian people and/or threatened to conduct cyber operations to retaliate against perceived attacks against Russia or materiel support for Ukraine," the advisory read. "These Russian-aligned cybercrime groups likely pose a threat to critical infrastructure organizations." 2AC --- UQ --- Ambiguity Ambiguity of cyber operations will lead to escalation Lonergan and Milo 22 [Erica D. Lonergan is an Assistant Professor in the Army Cyber Institute at West Point and a Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Previously, she served as a Senior Director on the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission. Keren Yarhi-Milo is a political scientist specializing in the study of interstate communication, crisis bargaining, reputation and credibility, and the psychology of leaders and decision makers. “CYBER SIGNALING AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UKRAINE CRISIS”, War on the Rocks, 4-21-22, https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/cyber-signaling-and-nuclear-deterrence-implications-for-the-ukraine-crisis/] SL Policymakers and academics are attuned to the cyber risks to nuclear command and control. The practitioner community has largely focused on U.S. vulnerabilities and how to mitigate them. Scholars, in turn, worry about how cyber operations could have unintended escalatory consequences. But less attention has been paid to another likely scenario: the use of cyber operations for signaling purposes (operations with visible effects that aim to convey a message to another state) in a nuclear context. The ambiguity of cyber operations can sometimes be useful for signaling — but the same ambiguity can be dangerous during a nuclear crisis. The problem is that civilian leaders in particular, distinct from the military, are inclined to see cyber attacks as effective signaling tools. Cyber operations could have nuclear implications, especially because modern nuclear command and control systems, like those in Russia and the United States, are becoming increasingly dependent on digital infrastructure. Nuclear command, control, and communications systems, which include early warning, information collection, and communications capabilities, alert decision-makers to impending nuclear strikes and also enable leaders to control decisions about nuclear use (or non-use). But their digital dependencies are creating opportunities for exploitation using cyber means. In a 2020 report, the Nuclear Threat Initiative found that “almost 9 out of 10 planned nuclear modernization programs involve at least some new digital components or upgrades.” Vulnerabilities inherent in the digital infrastructure that undergird modern nuclear systems provide opportunities for actors to engage in cyber espionage — gaining access to a network or system to steal information — or even conduct cyber attacks. Hypothetically, a cyber power like Russia could conduct a cyber attack against a U.S. early warning satellite to degrade its functionality. This has become an urgent concern for practitioners. U.S. Strategic Command, for instance, is currently working to “operationally harden NC3 systems against cyber threats.” Congress has also gotten involved, requiring the Defense Department to evaluate the cybersecurity of major weapon systems. And the Government Accountability Office has published multiple reports decrying the state of cybersecurity and scope of vulnerabilities of weapon systems, including elements of the nuclear triad. 2AC --- UQ --- Russia Undermines NATO Russian cyberattacks target current NATO rifts Shea 17 [Jamie Shea is NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges. He has been working with NATO since 1980. Positions included Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office of the Secretary General, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for External Relations, Public Diplomacy Division, Director of Information and Press, Spokesman of NATO and Deputy Director of Information and Press, Deputy Head and Senior Planning Officer in the Policy Planning and Multilateral Affairs Section of the Political Directorate as well as Assistant to the Secretary General of NATO for Special Projects. “How is NATO Meeting the Challenge of Cyberspace”, Prism National Defense University, 12-21-17, https://cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/1401835/how-is-nato-meeting-the-challenge-of-cyberspace/] SL Yet it is not the much discussed theme of the economic damage inflicted by cyber crime in the past year that has dominated the debate. It is more the use of cyber as an instrument of state policy, political influence, and manipulation. From being a useful tool of espionage and intellectual property theft, cyber intrusions have evolved into a potent instrument of hybrid warfare and outright political vandalism. Ukraine, for example, has been the victim of an unprecedented and systematic campaign of cyber bullying. It has acknowledged up to 2,000 orchestrated cyberattacks since Russia occupied Crimea in March 2014. It has suffered disruption to its election voting system, train and airline on-line booking, ports, electricity grid, and most recently, the massive elimination of tax and financial accounting data through the NotPetya malware. Initially disguised as a ransomware attack similar to the previous WannaCry, a hack that affected more than 200,000 computer networks in 150 countries, it soon became clear that the data encrypted was being destroyed, and that the motive of the attack was not financial gain but rather economic and structural sabotage. Although companies in other countries were also affected by NotPetya, 80 percent of the impact was in Ukraine.1 Intelligence analysts now agree that NotPetya was a state-driven effort. All of these orchestrated cyber campaigns suggest that Ukraine is being used as a laboratory or proving ground to test a range of cyber weapons and assess their impact, with widespread collateral damage elsewhere accepted as a consequence of doing business; or even as a way to cover tracks.2 Given the difficulty of technical attribution and the inability of governments to deter or retaliate against cyberattacks in a manner that demands the attacker’s attention but avoids unwanted escalation, NATO has had to take a hard look at its preparedness, not only to fend off cyberattacks but also to preserve its political and military freedom of navigation in the cyber domain. The revelation in a recent Washington Post article of how the Obama Administration rejected nearly all proposed responses to Russian incursions into the communications of the Democratic National Committee because they were deemed to be ineffective, escalatory, or would compromise long-term U.S. intelligence gathering and prematurely expose U.S. offensive cyber capabilities, caught NATO’s attention.3 There is growing awareness that Russian operational activity built around groups such as APT28 is aimed at inflicting damage to the reputation and cohesiveness of organizations such as NATO.4 Consequently, reducing the strategic cyber threat to the functionality of governments and societies and making cyberspace more stable and transparent has become as important to international peace and order as nuclear arms control or the conventional balance of power. Internal Link Extensions 2AC --- Financial Collapse Internal Link Cyber-attacks will cause the next financial crisis Mee and Schuermann 18 [Paul Mee and Til Schuermann,a partner at consulting firm Oliver Wyman and leads its cyber risk practice, a partner in Oliver Wyman’s financial services practice and was a senior vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York during the financial crisis, September 14, 2018, “How a Cyber Attack could Cause the Next Financial Crisis”, Harvard Business Review, https://hbr.org/2018/09/how-a-cyber-attack-could-cause-the-next-financial-crisis]-Hayer But the next crisis might not come from a financial shock at all. The more likely culprit: a cyber attack that causes disruptions to financial services capabilities, especially payments systems, around the world. Criminals have always sought ways to infiltrate financial technology systems. Now, the financial system faces the added risk of becoming collateral damage in a wider attack on critical national infrastructure. Such an attack could shake confidence in the global financial services system, causing banks, businesses and consumers to be stymied, confused or panicked, which in turn could have a major negative impact on economic activity. Cybercrime alone costs nations more than $1 trillion globally, far more than the record $300 billion of damage due to natural disasters in 2017, according to a recent analysis our firm performed. We ranked cyber attacks as the biggest threat facing the business world today — ahead of terrorism, asset bubbles, and other risks. An attack on a computer processing or communications network could cause $50 billion to $120 billion of economic damage, a loss ranking somewhere between those of Hurricanes Sandy and Katrina, according to recent estimates. Yet a much broader and more debilitating attack isn’t farfetched. Just last month, the Federal Bureau of Investigation issued a warning to banks about a pending large scale attack known as an ATM “cash-out” strike, in which waves of synchronized fraudulent withdrawals drain bank accounts. In July, meanwhile, it was revealed that hackers working for Russia had easily penetrated the control rooms of US electric utilities and could have caused blackouts. How might a financial crisis triggered by a cyber attack unfold? A likely scenario would be an attack by a rogue nation or terrorist group on financial institutions or major infrastructure. Inside North Korea, for example, the Lazarus Group, also known as Hidden Cobra, routinely looks for ways to compromise banks and exploit crypto currencies. An attack on a bank, investment fund, custodian firm, ATM network, the interbank messaging network known as SWIFT, or the Federal Reserve itself would represent a direct hit on the financial services system. Another possibility would be if a so-called hacktivist or “script kiddy” amateur were to use malicious programs to launch a cyber attack without due consideration of the consequences. Such an attack could have a chain reaction, causing damage way beyond the original intent, because rules, battle norms, and principles that are conventional wisdom in most warfare situations but don’t exist in a meaningful way in the digital arena. For example, in 2016 a script kiddie sparked a broad denial-of-service attack impacting Twitter, Spotify, and other well-known internet services as amateurs joined in for mischief purposes. Whether a major cyber attack is deliberate or somewhat accidental, the damage could be substantial. Most of the ATM networks across North America could freeze. Credit card and other payment systems could fail across entire nations, as happened to the VISA network in the UK in June. Online banking could become inaccessible: no cash, no payments, no reliable information about bank accounts. Banks could lose the ability to transact with one another during a critical period of uncertainty. There could be widespread panic, albeit temporary. Such an outcome might not cause the sort of long-simmering financial crisis that sparked the Great Recession, because money would likely be restored to banks and payments providers once systems were back online. At the same time, it isn’t clear how a central bank, the traditional financial crisis firefighter, could respond to this type of crisis on short notice. After the problem is fixed and the crisis halted, a daunting task of recovery would loom. It would be even more difficult if data were corrupted, manipulated or rendered inaccessible. 2AC --- Grids Vulnerability The US’ pipelines and electric grids are vulnerable to cyberattacks. Plumer 21 [Brad, a reporter covering climate change, energy policy and other environmental issues for The New York Times. Previously, he was a senior editor at Vox.com and a reporter at the Washington Post. “Pipeline Hack Points to Growing Cybersecurity Risk for Energy System”, 08 June 2021, The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/13/climate/pipeline-ransomware-hack-energy-grid.html ] -ALP Despite years of warnings, America’s vast network of pipelines, electric grids and power plants remains acutely vulnerable to cyberattacks with the potential to disrupt energy supplies for millions of people. Dealing with those risks, analysts said, will pose a major challenge for the Biden administration as it seeks hundreds of billions of dollars to modernize the nation’s energy infrastructure and transition to cleaner sources of energy to address climate change. Regulators are increasingly poised to step in. On Monday, Richard Glick, the chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, said it was time to establish mandatory cybersecurity standards for the nation’s nearly 3 million miles of oil and gas pipelines, similar to those currently found in the electricity sector. “Simply encouraging pipelines to voluntarily adopt best practices is an inadequate response to the ever-increasing number and sophistication of malevolent cyber actors,” Mr. Glick said in a statement. The risks to the nation’s energy systems are widespread and varied. Many oil and gas pipelines, for instance, rely on decades-old control systems that are not well defended against more sophisticated cyberattacks and can’t be easily updated. And it’s not just pipelines. As electric grid operators harness a growing array of digital technologies to help manage the flow of power and cut planet-warming emissions — such as smart thermostats, or far-flung yet interconnected networks of solar arrays — hackers may find new entry points to exploit. The shutdown on Friday of the Colonial Pipeline, which stretches 5,500 miles from Texas to New Jersey and transports 45 percent of the East Coast’s fuel supplies, illustrates how devastating such attacks can be. On Saturday, Colonial acknowledged that its corporate computer systems had been hit by a ransomware attack, in which criminal groups hold data hostage until the victim pays a ransom. The company said that it had shut down the pipeline as a precaution, apparently for fear that the hackers might have obtained information that would enable them to attack parts of the pipeline itself. Colonial said on Wednesday that it had started to resume pipeline operations, though it would take several days to restore full service. But throughout the Southeast, panicked Americans were racing to stock up on gasoline, causing thousands of gas stations to run out of fuel. While Colonial has yet to explain exactly what triggered the pipeline shutdown, experts said there were plenty of vulnerabilities lurking throughout America’s energy infrastructure. Last year, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency reported a ransomware attack on a natural gas compression facility that caused a shutdown of the facility for two days. In 2018, several natural gas pipeline operators reported that a system that processes customer transactions had been attacked, leading to service disruptions. But bigger risks lurk: In 2016, hackers knocked out large sections of the power grid in Ukraine, which was thought to be the first intentional blackout triggered by a cyberattack. At the time, the Obama a
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