Free beta access. 5 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
← Back to archive
2022 CNDI Kritik

K - AI Imperialism Supplement - CNDI 2022

K - AI Imperialism Supplement - CNDI 2022.docx

Download Word file
Indexed text preview
Neg
Links
AI
The AI industry is fueling neocolonialism, especially targeting the Global South
Hao 22 (Karen Hao, senior AI editor at MIT Technology Review, covering the field’s cutting-edge research and its impacts on society, April 19th 2022, “Artificial intelligence is creating a new colonial world order” Mit technology Review, https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/04/19/1049592/artificial-intelligence-colonialism/) – Cayden Mayer
The AI industry does not seek to capture land as the conquistadors of the Caribbean and Latin America did, but the same desire for profit drives it to expand its reach. The more users a company can acquire for its products, the more subjects it can have for its algorithms, and the more resources—data—it can harvest from their activities, their movements, and even their bodies. Neither does the industry still exploit labor through mass-scale slavery, which necessitated the propagation of racist beliefs that dehumanized entire populations. But it has developed new ways of exploiting cheap and precarious labor, often in the Global South, shaped by implicit ideas that such populations don’t need—or are less deserving of—livable wages and economic stability. MIT Technology Review's new AI Colonialism series digs into these and other parallels between AI development and the colonial past by examining communities that have been profoundly changed by the technology. In part one, we head to South Africa, where AI surveillance tools, built on the extraction of people’s behaviors and faces, are re-entrenching racial hierarchies and fueling a digital apartheid. In part two, we head to Venezuela, where AI data-labeling firms found cheap and desperate workers amid a devastating economic crisis, creating a new model of labor exploitation. The series also looks at ways to move away from these dynamics. In part three, we visit ride-hailing drivers in Indonesia who, by building power through community, are learning to resist algorithmic control and fragmentation. In part four, we end in Aotearoa, the Māori name for New Zealand, where an Indigenous couple are wresting back control of their community’s data to revitalize its language. Together, the stories reveal how AI is impoverishing the communities and countries that don’t have a say in its development—the same communities and countries already impoverished by former colonial empires. They also suggest how AI could be so much more—a way for the historically dispossessed to reassert their culture, their voice, and their right to determine their own future.
The 1AC’s shift towards artificial intelligence is a tool of military domination that fuels an endless cycle of warfare
Shaw ’17 (Ian G.R. Shaw, Associate Professor of Global Security Challenges at the School of Politics and International Studies, previous Lecturer in Human Geography at the School of Geographical and Earth Sciences of the University of Glasgow; 9/31/17, “Robot Wars: US Empire and geopolitics in the robotic age”, Sage Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617713157 DOA 6/24/22)//nm
The robotic revolution Robots have disrupted the social and economic spaces of human coexistence for decades. In 1961, General Motors installed the first industrial robotic arm – Unimate – on its assembly lines in New Jersey. Since then, robots have migrated from factories to the social spaces of everyday life. According to one report, there are over 8.4 million robots globally, with a market value in excess of $15 billion (Kadtke and Wells, 2014: 43). And with the exponential leaps in microprocessing power predicted by Moore’s Law, we now stand on the verge of a ‘Cambrian’ explosion of robotic life on planet earth. This has big consequences for the spaces of security and violence. On the ground, in the air, and underwater, military robots are eroding the human monopoly on violence. ‘Today, the world is approaching a robotics revolution in military affairs that may be on par with the introduction of gun-powder, levée en masse, and the advent of nuclear weapons’ (Sukman, 2015: 44). The coming decades will see US soldiers augmented, replaced, and wounded by artificial warriors, which ‘has the potential to change our basic core concepts of defense strategy’ (Work and Brimley, 2014: 6). Yet the robotic revolution must be placed within a longer trajectory of capital-intensive warfare (see Edgerton, 1991). This liberal form of violence aims to use technological superiority to ‘solve’ the problem of ‘uncivilized’ states and actors (Mabee, 2016). Accordingly, the US military continues to project peace through capital, security through technics. In 2014, the USA accounted for just over half of global arms sales in a $70 billion annual industry (Theohary, 2015). Still, robots are disrupting the architectures of capital-intensive warfare. The future-oriented 20YY: Preparing for War in the Robotic Age sheds light on the US military’s production of robotic geopolitical futures. Co-authored by Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work, it insists that ‘U.S. defense leaders should begin to prepare … for war in the Robotic Age’ (Work and Brimley, 2014: 5). A similar report by the Pentagon-funded National Defense University explores how evolutions in synthetic life, robotics, and artificial intelligence will transform US dominance (Kadtke and Wells, 2014). At the outset of the invasion of Iraq, the US military had zero ground robots. By the end of 2008, there were 12,000, including iRobot’s PackBot, which was integral to counter–improvised explosive device (IED) missions. Aerial robots continue to disrupt the spaces, subjects, and geopolitics of US conflict (Shaw, 2016). Indeed, what Kate Kindervater (2016) calls ‘lethal surveillance’ has transformed US geopolitics. The Pentagon now stocks a fleet of well over 12,000 aerial drones (US Department of Defense, 2013). Controversially, medium-altitude Predator and Reaper drones have been deployed outside of ‘hot’ battlefields in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia (Shaw and Akhter, 2012). And on a smaller scale, the US Army is researching how to equip its soldiers with tiny pocket-sized drones for ‘over the hill’ surveillance, which could revolutionize infantry tactics. Within the USA, Predators and Reapers are routinely flown by US Customs and Border Patrol along the Mexico and Canadian borderlands. And back on the ground, $55 million has been spent on transferring 1000 military ground robots to police forces across 43 US states (Center for the Study of the Drone, 2016). On 7 July 2016, Dallas Police Department became the first to use an exploding robot to kill an armed suspect. A robot red-letter day. How, then, can we piece together these developments? Former secretary of defense Chuck Hagel unveiled the Defense Innovation Initiative, also known as the ‘third offset strategy’, on 15 November 2014. Underpinned by robotics, cyber warfare, autonomy, 3D printing, electric weapons, miniaturization, and the internet of things, this strategy is designed to sustain US technological dominance in the 21st century. The ‘third offset’ follows precedents in the Cold War. To offset Soviet numerical advantages in the 1950s, the US military invested heavily in nuclear weapons. The second offset strategy of the 1970s was driven by stealth, the Global Positioning System (GPS), and network-centric systems. In both cases, technology was translated into US military dominance. Yet, unlike in the Cold War, the robotic revolution today is sweeping across multiple nations (and non-state actors), not just the US and Soviet militaryindustrial complexes. Thus, US empire confronts a robotizing warscape that is both global and unpredictable. US empire: Towards a proxy army of robots In the preface to the 2015 National Security Strategy, US President Barack Obama declared, ‘We possess a military whose might, technology, and geostrategic reach is unrivalled in human history’ (White House, 2015). Rarely, however, is ‘empire’ used in official parlance. Yet, as Mabee (2004: 1360) suggests, ‘while “lonely superpower”, “unipolar”, and other monikers have been utilized, the US as empire seems to convey a richer understanding and a deeper resonance of America’s contemporary role’. But what exactly is empire? ‘Empires are usually states’, replies Zielonka (2012: 519), ‘but they are states of a peculiar nature.’ Can a statecentric understanding capture the global infrastructures of US military power? For Dalby (2005: 435), ‘If empire is to be of analytical use, it seems that none of the versions of it in circulation are quite adequate to grapple with nuances of the present.’ Accordingly, the concept of empire must connect the geographies of contemporary technics with past materializations. As Parker (2010: 128) concludes, ‘for all its differences from nineteenth- and twentieth-century examples, the geopolitics of empires is likely to be found in the present and in the future’. US history is inscribed by imperialism. For Munro (2014: 1567), ‘continuing to think of US history in imperial terms enables us to see how the present arrives already fundamentally shaped by past economic disparity, racial inequality, hetero-patriarchal oppression and a deep interrelation between the realms of foreign and domestic’. Accordingly, Heumann (2011) argues that the USA has always been an empire-state rather than a nation-state, inheriting the precedents of European empires. Practices of racial domination and expansionism underwrote US state formation and early capitalism, leaving a legacy of segregation. Fast forward to the 19th century, and the so-called Monroe Doctrine of 1823 articulated the belief that the USA was a guardian against European intervention in the ‘New World’. Under President Woodrow Wilson, this moral imperative was reworked into an idealistic vision for spreading democracy across the planet. The grim parade of US proxy wars and black ops during the Cold War – particularly in Latin America – entrenched the idea that the USA was the guardian of western civilization. Despite this history of foreign intervention, the USA has consistently escaped the label of empire (Johnson, 2004a). This did change during the ‘war on terror’, as the Bush administration adopted ‘a new ideological commitment to empire’ (Agnew, 2003: 883). Consider the now infamous boast of White House adviser Karl Rove: ‘We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality’ (originally quoted in Suskind, 2004). Supporters of US empire ranged from liberal interventionists to neoconservative hawks. Under both visions, ‘the US state is thus seen as an imperial state overseeing a global empire which brings benefits to both other Western states and also the inhabitants of war-torn states’ (Stokes, 2005: 219). Or, as Michael Ignatieff (2003) declared, ‘The 21st century imperium is a new invention in the annals of political science, an empire lite, a global hegemony whose grace notes are free markets, human rights and democracy, enforced by the most awesome military power the world has ever known.’ Others find the idea of US empire implausible in an era of global capital (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 384). Empire is viewed instead as a deterritorialized form of capitalist world sovereignty. Yet globalization should not imply a flat and frictionless world of capital. The USA has long been the leader of an uneven world capitalism since the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944. Accordingly, ‘there is a geography of globalisation: one that rests on an imperial centre’ (Mabee, 2004: 1360). Thus, while capitalist logics are vital in explaining geopolitics, so too are the planetary materialities of US empire. Empires entrench their power through technics. No human sovereign is as awe-inspiring as the technical background that secures humanity across the planet. The question then becomes, how will US empire materialize – and maintain – its dominance in an age of global robotics, technological diffusion, and powerful non-state actors? If the third offset strategy is an indication, US empire will reconstitute by shifting to a permanent, robotic proxy war. Since World War II, the practice of total warfare between states has diminished and proxy wars have increased (Kaldor, 2012). One of the most infamous examples in US history was the CIAfunded Afghan mujahedeen in the 1980s. More recently, the Pentagon spent billions on private military contractors in Iraq. But rather than outsource military power to human contractors, US military surrogates of the future could be replaced by robots: private military contractors without flesh, risk, or vulnerability (or healthcare costs). As Mumford (2013: 43) suggests, ‘developments in communications and information technology have the potential to nullify the twentieth-century belief in “boots on the ground” as a proxy-war necessity’. An army of robots can entrench US power without humans on the ground. And, just as importantly, these artificial warriors are profitable commodities (Shaw, 2017). A robotic US empire thus advances proxy warfare – and capitalism – to its most logical conclusion.
The ontological condition of AI is INSEPERABLE from military domination—its autonomy establishes the basis for predicting and sustaining new warscapes
Shaw ’17 (Ian G.R. Shaw, Associate Professor of Global Security Challenges at the School of Politics and International Studies, previous Lecturer in Human Geography at the School of Geographical and Earth Sciences of the University of Glasgow; 9/31/17, “Robot Wars: US Empire and geopolitics in the robotic age”, Sage Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010617713157 DOA 6/24/22)//nm
Autonomous futures Autonomy – and AI more generally – is central to the future of US geopolitics. The Defense Science Board (2016: 3) writes that the ‘ongoing rapid transition of autonomy into warfighting capabilities is vital if the U.S. is to sustain military advantage’. Unlike automation, an autonomous system possesses adaptable intelligence. This enables it to be ‘goal-directed in unpredictable environments and situations’ (US Air Force, 2016: 30). Autonomous weapons are not entirely new: since the 1980s the US Navy has installed autonomous Phalanx CIWS Gatling Guns on many of its battleships. Nonetheless, the contemporary warscape is being transformed by ‘an emerging class of robotic weapons, including drones, mobile sea mines, automated turrets, remote-controlled machine guns, as well as weaponized computer programs’ (Bolton, 2015: 41). Several autonomous drones – the US Navy’s MQ-8 Fire Scout, the UK’s Taranis drones, and the Anglo-French Unmanned Combat Air System – promise to revolutionize air combat. Fearing this geopolitical pathway, 1000 leading scientists called for a ban on autonomous robotics in 2015, citing the existential risks to humanity. Similarly, Human Rights Watch and the International Human Rights Clinic (2016) continue to demand the prohibition of what they term ‘killer robots’. The US military regularly produces roadmaps that imagine autonomous futures: from robots extracting causalities to swarms of drones overwhelming enemies. ‘Autonomy in unmanned systems will be critical to future conflicts that will be fought and won with technology’ (US Department of Defense, 2013: 67). Multiple reasons are given to justify the Pentagon’s quest for autonomy: future threats will be too complex for human reactions, autonomous robots can function if they lose radio contact, and using pilots to oversee multiple robots is more cost-effective. Finally, autonomous systems can analyze huge streams of real-time data ‘in ways that humans cannot by addressing volume, complexity, speed, and continuity’ (Defense Science Board, 2016: 47). Autonomy thus enables robots ‘to make and execute complex decisions’ (US Army, 2010: 65). Future pilots would direct swarms of intelligent drones with a geographic information system (GIS) program: on the loop but not in the loop. ‘The end result would be a revolution in the roles of humans in air warfare’ (US Air Force, 2009: 50). This standard of AI enables future drones to break with the restrictions of existing unmanned systems. ‘Future [unmanned aircraft] will evolve from being robots operated at a distance to independent robots, able to self-actualize to perform a given task’ (US Department of Defense, 2005: 52). This self-actualization enables the evolution from autonomous targeting to the more controversial step of autonomous attacking (US Department of Defense, 2007: 54). Yet, while the US military is a world leader in robotics today, it will face future ‘unknown unknowns’ from other militaries and non-state groups. For example, there is growing concern within the Pentagon that US soldiers are now vulnerable to (swarms of) terrorist drones on the battlefield. Accordingly, the drone-on-drone warfare of the future will produce highly contested airspaces, fueling a robot arms race of offensive and defensive systems. Autonomy, however, is more than just artificial intelligence: it is an ontological condition. Robots, like all technologies, materialize unique techno-geographies and techno-politics (Hecht, 2011). Rather than being slavish instruments of human minds, robots are geopolitical actors that disrupt and reinvent the worldly conditions of state power, installing ontological coordinates – predictable and unpredictable – for future military violence. The epistemological problem of if, or how, we go to war is inseparable from background material conditions. Drones, for example, continue to transform the ethics of targeted killing (see Walters, 2014). ‘Drones enable the (de)politicization of targets by abstracting human life into a techno-political entity that can be captured in clinical terms as data’ (Schwarz, 2016: 61). So, while robots do not straightforwardly determine military operations, they nonetheless recondition their field of possibilities. ‘Robots, then, may not only make it easier to start a war … they may actually change our military and political doctrines and activities’ (Coeckelbergh, 2011: 271). In short, robots always already possess a degree of ontological autonomy because they reconfigure the conditions of a more-than-human warscape.
New harvesting of data in the global south perpetuates the old colonial structures
Adams and Alvarado ’22 (Kimberly Adams, correspondent with Marketplace Tech covering the intersection between politics and the economy, with a special focus on how federal policy affects the bottom line for businesses and individuals. Jesus Alvarado, Assistant Producer at Marketplace by APM, May 10th 2022, “Will the future of AI repeat past injustices?” Marketplace, https://www.marketplace.org/shows/marketplace-tech/will-the-future-of-ai-repeat-past-injustices/)
Artificial intelligence has changed our world in major ways: autonomous vehicles, speech-recognition technology and algorithms that change what we see and hear on social media platforms. But the technology and the data fueling AI is often powered by low-paid workers in developing countries, including many nations in the Global South. Some academics describes this as AI colonialism, suggesting that what goes into artificial intelligence is repeating exploitative colonial history. I spoke with journalist Karen Hao, who recently published a series on AI colonialism in MIT Technology Review. The following is an edited transcript of our conversation. Karen Hao: With artificial intelligence, what we now have is these really wealthy companies that have become the empires of people’s data, of computational resources. And they are going to other communities that don’t have the same financial resources, computational resources, taking their data, their precious voices, or their faces, or their body movements and then turning that into software that powers, essentially, our internet. Kimberly Adams: You write about how deep-learning AI techniques rely on “

Preview shortened. Download the file for the full document.