K - Fem IR K - CNDI 2022
K - Fem IR K - CNDI 2022.docx
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Neg 1NCs Generic – Feminist Security Studies Security cooperation with NATO enforces global hegemonic masculinity through recreation of military masculinities and imperial violence Wright 22 Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK. “Challenging civil society perceptions of NATO: Engaging the Women, Peace and Security agenda.” Cooperation and Conflict. April 2022. Pg 3-4. LJS NATO is a political-military alliance built on consensus decision-making. Moving beyond its Cold War origins, the alliance’s remit has expanded significantly beyond a sole focus on collective defence to include crisis management and cooperative security. This has seen NATO’s focus enlarge from a regional one to a global one, with recent engagements in Afghanistan, Libya and Kosovo, for example. Its status as a multilateral institution means it is limited by its members’ priorities and therefore sensitive not to implicate NATO or NATO member states in wrongdoing (Hebert, 2012). In centring NATO as an ‘institution of international hegemonic masculinity’ (Wright et al., 2019), in this analysis, it is possible to shed light on the peculiarities of NATO’s WPS work to date, against which engagement with civil society takes place. This has two co-constituting elements, first, internally, existing gender norms and expectations of masculinity and femininity reflective of a hierarchical military institution are (re)created and (re)enforced through NATO’s engagement with WPS (Wright et al., 2019: 71). For example, men working on WPS at NATO navigate both the trivialisation and the feminisation of such work and must (re)negotiate their own identities. Yet in so doing they reinforce the importance of men speaking to and listening to other men (rather than women) reinforcing the gendered status quo (Wright et al., 2019: 93; see also Hurley, 2018a). Second, externally, as a transnational military alliance, NATO acts as a ‘teaching machine’ in which member and partner states learn the value of WPS as a ‘military tool’ through socialisation with each other (Wright et al., 2019; see also Enloe, 1981). This means perpetuating an understanding of WPS as a means to support operational effectiveness through ‘the role of masculinist protector which reinforces hegemonic4 Cooperation and Conflict 00(0) militaristic, masculine ideals and norms’ (Wright et al., 2019: 34). This patriarchal logic puts ‘women and children, in a subordinate position of dependence and obedience’ to justify the waging of war (Young, 2003: 2), for example, NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan (Wright, 2019). It is reinforced through the stories NATO tells internally about its WPS engagement (Hurley, 2018b) and externally in public diplomacy (Wright, 2019) and to support partnerships with other states but also celebrities (Wright and Bergman Rosamond, 2021) and now civil society. Thus, interrogating civil society perceptions of NATO in this context adds an additional dimension to understanding how NATO seeks to legitimise itself as a WPS actor, further constituting its role as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity. This androcentric world order makes extinction inevitable—war and environmental degradation Nhanenge 2007 [Jytte Masters @ U South Africa, paper submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of master of arts in the subject Development Studies, “ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT”] The androcentric premises also have political consequences. They protect the ideological basis of exploitative relationships. Militarism, colonialism, racism, sexism, capitalism and other pathological ‘isms’ of modernity get legitimacy from the assumption that power relations and hierarchy are inevitably a part of human society, due to man's inherent nature. Because when mankind by nature is autonomous, competitive and violent (i.e. masculine) then coercion and hierarchical structures are necessary to manage conflicts and maintain social order. In this way, the cooperative relationships such as those found among some women and tribal cultures, are by a dualised definition unrealistic and utopian. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This means that power relations are generated by universal scientific truths about human nature, rather than by political and social debate. The consequence is that people cannot challenge the basis of the power structure because they believe it is the scientific truth, so it cannot be otherwise. In this way, militarism is justified as being unavoidable, regardless of its patent irrationality. Likewise, if the scientific "truth" were that humans would always compete for a greater share of resources, then the rational response to the environmental crisis would seem to be "dog-eat-dog" survivalism. This creates a self-fulfilling prophecy in which nature and community simply cannot survive. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This type of social and political power structure is kept in place by social policies. It is based on the assumption that if the scientific method is applied to public policy then social planning can be done free from normative values. However, according to Habermas (Reitzes 1993: 40) the scientific method only conceal pre-existing, unreflected social interests and pre-scientific decisions. Consequently, also social scientists apply the scientific characteristics of objectivity, value-freedom, rationality and quantifiability to social life. In this way, they assume they can unveil universal laws about social relations, which will lead to true knowledge. Based on this, correct social policies can be formulated. Thus, social processes are excluded, while scientific objective facts are included. Society is assumed a static entity, where no changes are possible. By promoting a permanent character, social science legitimizes the existing social order, while obscuring the relations of domination and subordination, which is keeping the existing power relations inaccessible to analysis. The frozen order also makes it impossible to develop alternative explanations about social reality. It prevents a historical and political understanding of reality and denies the possibility for social transformation by human agency. The prevailing condition is seen as an unavoidable fact. This implies that human beings are passive and that domination is a natural force, for which no one is responsible. This permits the state freely to implement laws and policies, which are controlling and coercive. These are seen as being correct, because they are based on scientific facts made by scientific experts. One result is that the state, without consulting the public, engages in a pathological pursuit of economic growth. Technology can be used to dominate societies or to enhance them. Thus both science and technology could have developed in a different direction. But due to patriarchal values infiltrated in science the type of technology developed is meant to dominate, oppress, exploit and kill. One reason is that patriarchal societies identify masculinity with conquest. Thus any technical innovation will continue to be a tool for more effective oppression and exploitation. The highest priority seems to be given to technology that destroys life. Modern societies are dominated by masculine institutions and patriarchal ideologies. Their technologies prevailed in Auschwitz, Dresden, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Vietnam, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan and in many other parts of the world. Patriarchal power has brought us acid rain, global warming, military states, poverty and countless cases of suffering. We have seen men whose power has caused them to lose all sense of reality, decency and imagination, and we must fear such power. The ultimate result of unchecked patriarchy will be ecological catastrophe and nuclear holocaust. Such actions are denial of wisdom. It is working against natural harmony and destroying the basis of existence. But as long as ordinary people leave questions of technology to the "experts” we will continue the forward stampede. As long as economics focus on technology and both are the focus of politics, we can leave none of them to experts. Ordinary people are often more capable of taking a wider and more humanistic view than these experts. (Kelly 1990: 112-114; Eisler 1990: 3233; Schumacher 1993: 20, 126, 128, 130). Prioritize a Feminist Security Studies approach to IR – gender analysis represents a crucial and central aspect of conceptualizing war and requires a complete overhaul of how we normatively view IR Sjoberg 13 Sjoberg, British Academy Global Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway University of London. “The (Genderless) Study of War in International Relations,” Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War, Columbia University Press, 2013. What war theorizing shares is a lack of, and a lack of commitment to, gender analysis. This is, of course, a broad and sweeping generalization that is more accurate and applicable to some theorists and paradigms than others, but is generally fair when applied to war studies.320 For example, between 1945 and 2006, the five highest-ranked security journals published articles with gender analysis in them in less than one-quarter of 1 percent of their content.321 Much of the ground-breaking work in critical security studies mentions gender marginally, if at all, and generally fails to adopt gender analysis into its work.322 In Levy and Thompson’s recent (otherwise excellent) book summarizing war theorizing, “gender” makes an appearance twice—in two footnotes.323 The first one problematizes the “over-aggregation” of human nature in first-image analyses of war, given that they treat “the male and female as indistinguishable and neglect any possible impact of gender on the causes of war.”324 The second discusses “demographic trends” such as “surpluses of men” and “youth bulges” as causes of war.325 Neither do serious gender analysis in the terms this book intends to engage. This is not to say that mainstream war studies has never paid any attention to gender, or that gender has been completely absent from critical theorists’ work on war and conflict. It is, instead, to make two distinct (and hopefully more modest) claims. The first is that, to the extent that gender has been taken up in war theorizing, it remains peripheral and has not become a central part of research programs outside feminist security studies considering the nature, constitution, causes, and consequences of war(s).326 The second is that, to the extent that mainstream studies of war have considered gender, they have actually been largely talking about a partial and limited idea of gender that involves women as a biological sex being imbued with characteristics gendered feminine for the purpose of analyzing war.327 This second claim will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2, when I lay out this book’s feminist approaches to studying war ontologically, epistemologically, and methodologically. For now, it is the first claim—that gender theorizing remains absent from (and when not absent from, marginal to) both mainstream and critical war theorizing—that lays the foundation for this book’s work. In the remainder of the text, I seek to analyze and problematize “genderless” war studies. In calling war studies genderless, I am not implying that it is somehow gender neutral or without gender implications. Quite the opposite, I am arguing that it is impossible to think about war well without gender analysis and that doing so obscures the empirical operation of and normative consequences of gender in the nature, causes, performances of, and consequences of war(s). Gender is necessary, conceptually, to understanding the nature of war(s); empirically, to understanding wars’ causes and consequences; ethically, to understanding its implications; and prescriptively, to understanding how to stop wars. Gender does “analytical and normative work” and serves as a “resource for thought” in almost every aspect of how we fight wars and how we read them.328 War, wars, and the study of both are fundamentally (if not unalterably) gendered and, therefore, feminist theorizing about war is not only a part of, but a crucial piece of, the war puzzle.329 Feminist theory “raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics” in war theorizing.330 Also, when I call war studies genderless, I am not arguing that the work I outlined in this chapter does not have a relationship with gender theorizing—I am arguing that its relationship is (normatively and empirically) negative, problematic, and untenable. These relationships between gender theorizing and security or war studies have variously been called “impossible,”331 “awkward,”332 “uneasy”333 “limited,”334 and akin to “exile.”335 While (many in) IR generally and security studies specifically have conceded that feminist scholarship may exist at the margins, gender analysis “does not simply ‘add’ gender to an unchanged object of study, but . . . force[s] a more radical rethinking of what properly constitutes I/international R/relations to begin with, transforming the boundaries and conceptual basis.”336 This work starts with the feminist analysis of and deconstruction of war theorizing. It requires showing the gendered nature of that theorizing, of the meaning, causes, and consequences of war(s) at each level of analysis. The logics, tools, and insights of the approaches to war(s) in this chapter will be used, melded, critiqued, reformulated, called out, and engaged throughout the rest of this book’s theorizing of war through feminist lenses. Engaging the genderless study of war is a crucial part of the project of feminist war theorizing, because, as Kimberly Hutchings argues, “one can hope . . . to loosen the hold of masculinity on meaning and life only once one has first appreciated how much work is accomplished by masculinity’s logical structure.”337 Chapter 2 introduces the feminist theory tools to begin to see, and deconstruct, the influence of masculinity’s logical structures on war theorizing. Links China The 1AC’s portrayal of China as an aggressive masculine threat serves as a reductionist view of Chinese culture to justify U.S. “Just Warrior” saviorism Sjoberg 10 Sjoberg, British Academy Global Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway University of London. “Gendering Power Transition Theory,” Gender and International Security: Feminist Perspectives. 2010. Power transition theorists found that “occupation of a high position in the international hierarchy is associated with war involvement, irrespective of other attributes (ideology, etc.) of the state occupying that position.”88 Even if those states at the top of the international hierarchy are more likely to be involved in wars,89 feminists question the assumption that this is because nations with the capacity to fight wars are necessarily more likely to fight. Feminist reformulation (R1) (see Table 5.1) posits that the content and salience of a state’s hegemonic masculinity will be a factor in its bellicosity. The feminist argument is that the more competitive a state’s hegemonic masculinity, the more likely that state is to make war; this risk is compounded by high salience. In World War II Germany, a competitive form of masculinity was very salient. George Mosse’s study of the ideal German man90 in the 1930s reveals him as: Tall and muscular, he has no fat on his body and no hair anywhere but on his head. His broad, contoured shoulders narrow to a thin waist. He has a fine colorless chiseled face with a strong prominent square jaw. He is the flawless man … , not only did he embody the older aristocratic values of bravery, courage, and chivalry, but mirroring bourgeois values, he was also disciplined, orderly, and restrained … The perfect man, therefore, was committed to sacrifice and heroism, in other words, soldierly values that put the nation ahead of the individual.91 This German masculinity “increasingly came to be linked to ideas about nationalism.”92 This idea of masculinity became increasingly salient as “the nationalist press often portrayed Jewish men as the exact opposite of the manly ideal in looks and behavior … jittery, restless, greedy, selfish, and … ugly—nearly deformed.”93 In the 1930s, “German fascists … took the notion of masculinity to its awful, ghastly, and seemingly logical extreme.”94 Perhaps this can be contrasted with the case of a rising China. Kam Louie, a scholar of Chinese masculinities, explains that while “Western stereotypes of the ‘real man’ have described the Occidental male as forming his notion of male-self within images of toughness, courageousness, and decisiveness, … in the Chinese case, the cerebral male model tends to dominate the macho, brawny male.”95 The Communist Revolution in China has further demilitarized Chinese masculinity,96 since, while “the core meaning of wen-wu97 still revolves around cultural attainment and martial valour … [ideal-types of masculinity have been shaped by] Communist insistence that able-bodied citizens work [which] … has generated idealized images of workers and peasants” rather than soldiers.98 Louie suggests that the current Chinese hegemonic masculinity is less aggressive and militaristic, and that it is both more open and less salient now than it has been previously.99 Given these two examples, the feminist reformulation (R1) would expect bellicosity from 1930s Germany rather than contemporary China. The same empirical evidence that PTT uses could instead support a feminist argument that Germany’s level of interest in aggressive masculinity made Germany a belligerent state, and that a dissatisfied China would have less interest in war than the 1930s Germany. A feminist reinterpretation would expect that Germans’ hypercompetitive hegemonic masculinity in the 1930s would motivate German leaders and citizens to try to subordinate other masculinities, while the Chinese government, following their more cerebral hegemonic masculinity, would place less priority on competition with other states. Continuum of Violence The 1AC’s focus on violence as the event of war recreates everyday forms of violence Wibben 19 Annick T.R., Professor of Gender, Peace & Security at the Swedish Defence University. “Everyday Security, Feminism, and the Continuum of Violence.” Journal of Global Security Studies. 2019. LJS Innovative work on global security issues comes not just from different traditions within security studies (global or not), but by talking across fields of study. This might include engaging peace and conflict studies, geography, anthropology, and more. Feminist security studies (FSS) is a case in point: whereas it is often read as a subfield or particular approach within security studies, it was certainly not conceived as such since “feminist aims and the scope of their concerns explodes its confines at every possible turn” (Wibben 2011, 113; see also Sjoberg and Lobasz 2011; Shepherd 2013; Elias and Roberts 2015; Chisholm and Stachowitsch 2017). From the outset of feminist engagements with global politics, security issues were a key concern—whether in the 1980s when feminist international relations (IR) scholars began to make their mark on the field (see Wibben 2017 for an overview of FSS) or in their much earlier engagements in attempt to first prevent World War I and, later, to mitigate its effects (see, e.g., Confortini 2012; Owens 2018; Tickner and True 2018). Feminist scholars would maintain that gendered (security) relations, while instantiated differently across the globe and over time, could fulfill Jon Western’s (2016, 100) litmus test for being both global in scale, “worldwide in either cause or effect,” and global in reach, though “their impact is usually local or regional.” Henc
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