K - AI Imperialism - CNDI 2022
K - AI Imperialism - CNDI 2022.docx
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NEG 1nc Digital Democracy US democracy promotion is imperialist, hypocritical and bolsters authoritarian surveillance Klyman 22 Kevin Klyman researches US-China relations and has written data protection policies adopted by the World Health Organization. “Biden’s Campaign for “Digital Democracy” Is Really a Giveaway to Big Tech”, Jacobin. 6/26/22. https://jacobin.com/2022/06/us-tech-companies-government-contracts-data-google-facebook-microsoft-amazon/ --JrH American democracy promotion has been a calamity, to put it lightly. This century alone, the United States has helped violently overthrow the governments of Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Haiti, Bolivia, and Honduras, leaving millions dead and tens of millions more displaced, all in the name of democracy. The irony is potent: at home, the United States responded to 2020’s mass protests against police brutality with yet more police brutality, and 2021 began with an attempted coup galvanized by the outgoing president and his political party. Despite the wreckage and the hypocrisy, democracy promotion remains a centerpiece of US foreign policy, and is mobilized as a justification for American goals, whatever they may be. With respect to technology, US policymakers have called for the promotion of “digital democracy” and opposition to “digital authoritarianism” emanating from China. The narrative of democracy triumphing over high-tech dictatorship obscures America’s real goal, which is to prevent Beijing from displacing Washington as the leader in global surveillance and the owner of much of the world’s internet infrastructure. US technology strategy has the same underlying motivation as many other policies that ostensibly aim to promote democracy: opening up markets so that American firms can sell their products abroad. What the tech industry and policymakers have dubbed “digital democracy” is just a recapitulation of US imperialism with respect to the pursuit of global technology dominance. Promoting digital democracy is dangerous for three reasons. First, the United States and other electoral democracies engage in indiscriminate mass surveillance around the world. Second, the US government foists technology policies on poor countries that largely benefit Big Tech. Third, the narrative that innovative American companies are more righteous than their illiberal Chinese counterparts manufactures consent for US-backed surveillance. Voting for the Panopticon “Digital democracy” is by nature defined against digital authoritarianism. The Brookings Institution — which receives funding from Google, Facebook, and Amazon — defines digital authoritarianism as “the use of digital information technology by authoritarian regimes to surveil, repress, and manipulate domestic and foreign populations.” This raises the question: What about when democracies use the same tactics? The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation — a think tank backed by Apple, Microsoft, and Uber — answers that democracies, unlike authoritarian states, would never abuse technology: “Authoritarian nations will use technology for authoritarian purposes. Democratic nations will use them for legitimate and civil-liberty-protecting purposes.” This kind of black-and-white thinking creates a self-reinforcing logic: when democratic states and their tech companies engage in surveillance, we can assume that it is for the cause of freedom, but when authoritarian states do it, it is for the purpose of social control. Was the NSA listening in on Angela Merkel’s phone calls a triumph of representative government? Are YouTube’s efforts to deplatform Palestinian activists justified by the will of the majority? Is Facebook facilitating genocide in Myanmar and Ethiopia “what democracy looks like”? Apparently so. In truth, spying on people and stealing their data is abhorrent regardless of the nature of the government performing or sanctioning that surveillance. Regrettably, surveillance capitalism has become a driving force in the global economy. Across the world’s democracies, republics, oligarchies, monarchies, theocracies, and dictatorships, accumulating data for profit has become the modus operandi of many companies. US technology strategy has the same underlying motivation as other policies that ostensibly aim to promote democracy: opening up markets so that American firms can sell their products abroad. Surveillance capitalism weaponizes digital technology to control communities and turns democracy promotion – US/Big tech partnership reproduces economic inequality, human rights violation and environmental degradation Hynes 21 Mike Hynes, PhD, is lecturer in Political Science and Sociology at the National University of Ireland Galway, specializing in environmental sociology, Mobilities and sustainability research. (2021). "Digital Democracy: The Winners and Losers", The Social, Cultural and Environmental Costs of Hyper-Connectivity: Sleeping Through the Revolution, Emerald Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 137-153. https://doi.org/10.1108/978-1-83909-976-220211009 --JrH The digital ICT revolution promised much for democratic politics in the twenty-first century but so far has delivered little but disruption. The dawn of the internet age was to bring a decisive shift towards the citizen and information was to become free and limitless, and enlightenment and empowerment would follow. But while digital technologies provide us with the opportunity to accumulate quantities of information that one time may not have been possible, big tech and the state remains much better equipped than any private citizen to take full advantage of this opportunity. In many ways, digital technology has been weaponised against the very system it was purported to support and defend and the citizens it was meant to engage, protect and enlighten. Authoritarian regimes across the world have seized upon the opportunities provided by such technology to increase surveillance and control of their people while simultaneously spreading misinformation and confusion, undermining many of the established Western liberal democracies. It would be rather naïve to think that democratic governments are not also regularly using similar digital surveillance technique under various guises and security apparatuses. And all the while big tech is the real big winner. The pioneers of surveillance capitalism Google were emboldened and benefitted from historical events when a national security apparatus, galvanised by the attacks of 11 September 2001, saw the emergent capabilities and the promise of some certainty in how Google’s storage and use of huge stocks of personal data could be used to shadow and predict the behaviour of individuals.37Zuboff believes that the concepts underpinning surveillance capitalism are facilitating the overthrow of the people’s sovereignty and is a prominent force in the perilous drift towards democratic deconsolidation that now threatens Western liberal democracies themselves. And this is a common complaint in the twenty-first century; democracy itself has lost control of corporate power in the form of big tech companies, who use whatever means possible to hoard vast wealth and influence while fuelling inequality, damaging the planet and avoid paying their fair share of taxes.38Today’s big tech behemoths exist in a political culture that has grown accustomed and accommodating to their every need, and Runciman argues, in the United States, this was further cemented by the Supreme Court decision in the Citizens United case of 2010 to grant corporations the same rights to free speech as individual citizens.39 The ideals and very notion of liberal democracy are now under constant pressure from many angles, and the traditional hierarchy of power is also under increasing danger. The power of modern corporate power, in the form of big tech, has grown exponentially over the past decade to the point where it now has the wherewithal to undermine how democracy itself operates and not be overly worried about the consequences. A major imperative now for every citizen and democratic nation must be to reassess the inequitable influence of big tech corporate power and the internet, particularly as it relates to our personal data, and to question: who owns and controls such power, and what right do they have to use and misuse our personal data to undermine our key democratic institutions? Democracy must be seen to represent the wishes of the people rather than viewed as a system of corporate tyranny. Alternative is democratic digital collective – solves surveillance capitalism, cultivates communal and accessible response to sociotechno exploitation Martell 21 Professor Luke Martell has been a Lecturer, Senior Lecturer, Reader, and Professor of Political Sociology at Sussex. He was Head of the Department of Sociology, Chair of the Social and Political Thought Graduate programme, and President of the University and College Union branch. He is now a part-time Teaching Fellow in the Sociology Department. He teaches modules on 'The Death of Socialism?' and 'Alternative Societies'. His book 'Alternative Societies: For a Pluralist Socialism' will be published by Bristol University Press in 2023. “Surveillance capitalism and digital alternatives”, 8/11/21. https://www.ideology-theory-practice.org/blog/surveillance-capitalism-and-digital-alternatives --JrH So, to recap and clarify key points. Oligopoly and the harvesting and selling of our digital lives has become a norm and a new economic sector of capitalism. State responses, to very different degrees, have been to resist monopolization and ensure modest privacy protections or awareness. Individual responses and those of some organizations have been to use software that blocks tracking and aims to maintain privacy and anonymity. But positive as these methods are, they are in part defensive, limited in what they can achieve against high-level attempts at intrusion, and some of these individualise action. Alongside such state and individual processes, we need a more pro-active and collective approach. This includes stronger regulation and breaking up and taking tech into collective ownership. In the sphere of alternatives, it means expanding and strengthening a parallel sphere, decentralised and federated. And alternatives require putting control in the hands of those affected, so collective democracy with inclusive participation. Then oligopolies are challenged and there is a link between those affected and those in control. But alternatives must be made accessible and more easily understandable to the non-techy and beyond the expert, and do not just have to be an alternative but can be a prefigurative basis for spreading to the way the digital and tech world is more widely. This involves supplementing liberal individual privacy and rights approaches, often defensive within the status quo, with collective democracy and control approaches, more proactive and constructive of alternatives[7]. If there is an erosion of capitalism out of such an approach so there will be also to profit incentives in surveillance capitalism. With an extension of collective control not-for-profit, then motivations for surveillance and data capture are reduced. But this must be done through inclusive democratic control (by workers, users and the community) as much as possible rather than the traditional state, as the latter has its own reasons for surveillance. It should be supplemented by a pluralist, decentralised, federated, digital world to counter oligopoly and power. Democratisation that is inclusive globally is also suited to dealing with differences and divides digitally, e.g. by class or across the Global North and Global South. Taken together this approach implies pluralist democratic socialism as well as liberalism, rather than capitalism or the authoritarian state. 1nc Governance The aff’s AI governance policy is coloniality that locks the global south into an imbalanced power relation to colonial powers Mohamed et al. 20 (Shakir Mohamed is Senior Staff Scientist at DeepMind, Marie Therese, William Isaac, 07-12-20, “Decolonial AI: Decolonial Theory as Sociotechnical Foresight in Artificial Intelligence” https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s13347-020-00405- pp. 669-671)-qcl Power imbalances within the global AI governance discourse encompass issues of data inequality and data infrastructure sovereignty, but also extend beyond this. We must contend with questions of who any AI regulatory norms and standards are protecting, who is empowered to project these norms and the risks posed by a minority continuing to benefit from the centralisation of power and capital through mechanisms of dispossession (Thatcher et al. 2016; Harvey 2004). As Jasanoff and Hurlbut (2018) remind us, we must be mindful of “who sits at the table, what questions and concerns are sidelined and what power asymmetries are shaping the terms of debate”. A review of the global landscape of AI ethics guidelines (Jobin et al. 2019) pointed out the “under-representation of geographic areas such as Africa, South and Central America and Central Asia” in the AI ethics debate. The review observes a power imbalance wherein “more economically developed countries are shaping this debate more than others, which raises concerns about neglecting local knowledge, cultural pluralism and the demands of global fairness”. A similar dynamic is found when we examine the proliferation of national policies on AI in countries across the world (Dutton 2018). In some views, this is a manifestation of a new type of geopolitics amongst “AI superpowers” (Lee 2018), and a rise of “AI nationalism”, where nations wrangle to spread a preferred view of policy, applied approaches and technical services (Hogarth 2018; Edgerton 2007b). We are quickly led to one possible scene of coloniality by Lee (2017): “Unless they [developing countries] wish to plunge their people into poverty, they will be forced to negotiate with whichever country supplies most of their AI software—China or the United States—to essentially become that country’s economic dependent”. It can be argued that the agency of developing countries is in these ways undermined, where they “cannot act unilaterally to forge their own rules”and cannot expect prompt protection of their interests (Pathways for Prosperity 2019). Such concerns were demonstrated at the 2019 G20 summit, where a number of developing countries including India, Indonesia and South Africa refused to sign the Osaka Track, an international declaration on data flows (Kanth 2019), because the interests, concerns and priorities of these countries were not seen to be represented in the document. The undermining of interests and agency of developing countries is also a relevant issue vis a vis the OECD AI Principles (OECD ` 2019). As these guidelines are adopted and enforced by partner countries around the world, we see analogous concerns surfacing around exclusionary path dependencies and first-mover advantages (Pathways for Prosperity 2019). Additionally, AI governance guidelines risk being replicated across jurisdictions in a way that may be incompatible with the needs, goals and constraints of developing countries, despite best efforts (Pathways for Prosperity 2019). There are clear hierarchies of power within these cases of policy development, which can be analysed using the aforementioned metropole-periphery model. It is 670 S. Mohamed et al. metropoles (be it government or industry) who are empowered to impose normative values and standards, and may do so at the “risk of forestalling alternative visions” (Greene et al. 2019). A metropole-periphery model draws attention to the need to represent values, interests, concerns and priorities of resource-constrained countries in AI governance processes, as well as the historic dynamics that prevent this. Decolonial theory offers AI policy makers a framework to interrogate imbalances of power in AI policy discourse, understand structural dependencies of developing countries, question ownership of critical data infrastructures and assess power imbalances in product design/development/deployment of computational technologies (Irani et al. 2010) as well as the unequal distribution of risks and economic benefits. The alternative is decolonial AI – Critical Technical Practice centers decoloniality to produce ethical research strategies, safety, diversity initiatives and activism and disrupt colonial Sociotechnical discourses that enframe AI research & development Mohamed et al. 20 (Shakir Mohamed is Senior Staff Scientist at DeepMind, Marie Therese, William Isaac, 07-12-20, “Decolonial AI: Decolonial Theory as Sociotechnical Foresight in Artificial Intelligence” https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s13347-020-00405- pp. 669-671 pp. 671)-qcl The basis of decolonial AI rests in a self-reflexive approach to developing and deploying AI that recognises power imbalances and its implicit value systems. It is exactly this type of framework that was developed by Agre (1997), who described a shift towards a Critical Technical Practice of AI (CTP). Critical technical practices take a middle ground between the technical work of developing new AI algorithms and the reflexive work of criticism that uncovers hidden assumptions and alternative ways of working. CTP has been widely influential, having found an important place in human-computer interactions (HCI) and design (Dourish et al. 2004; Sengers et al. 2006). By infusing CTP with decoloniality, we can place a productive pressure on our technical work, moving beyond good-conscience design and impact assessments that are undertaken as secondary tasks, to a way of working that continuously generates provocative questions and assessments of the politically situated nature of AI. The role of practice in this view is broad by necessity. Recent research, in both AI and Science and Technology Studies (STS), highlights the limitations of purely technological approaches to addressing the ethical and social externalities of AI. Yet, technical approaches can meaningfully contribute when they appropriately reflect the values and needs of relevant stakeholders and impacted groups (Selbst et al. 2019). This context-aware technical development that CTP speaks to—which seeks to consider the interplay between social, cultural and technical elements—is often referred to as heterogeneous engineering (Law and et al. 1987). As a result, a heterogeneous-critical practice must encompass multiple approaches for action: in research, organising, testing, policy and activism. We explore five topics constituting such a practice: algorithmic fairness, AI safety, equity and diversity, policy-making, and AI as a decolonising tool. Fairness Research in algorithmic fairness (Nissenbaum 2001; Dwork et al. 2012; Barocas and Selbst 2016) has recognised that efforts to generate a fair classifier can still lead to discriminatory or unethical outcomes for marginalised groups, depending on the underlying dynamics of power; because a “true” definition of fairness is often a function of political and social factors. Quijano (2000) again speaks to us, posing questions of who is protected by mainstream notions of fairness, and to understand the exclusion of certain groups as “continuities and legacies of colonialism embedded in modern structures of power, control, and hegemony”. Such questions speak to a critical practice whose recent efforts, in response, have proposed fairness metrics that attempt to use causality (Chiappa and Isaac 2019; Mitchell et al. 2018; Nabi and Shpitser 2018; Madras et al. 2019) or interactivity (Canetti et al. 2019; Jung et al. 2019) to integrate more contextual awareness of human conceptions of fairness. Safety The area of technical AI safety (Amodei et al. 2016; Raji and Dobbe 2020) is concerned with the design of AI systems that are safe and appropriately align with human values. The
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