Aff - AI Logistics - CNDI 2022
Aff - AI Logistics - CNDI 2022.docx
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AI Projects AFF 1AC 1ac – Inherency NATO established an AI strategic initiative but has yet to implement it – coordination, funding, and demonstration projects are still needed. Soare ’21 (Simona, Research Fellow for Defence and Military Analysis, “Algorithmic power, NATO and artificial intelligence,” MILITARY BALANCE, 19th November 2021, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2021/11/algorithmic-power-nato-and-artificial-intelligence) NATO has formally approved its first Artificial Intelligence (AI) strategy as it seeks a leading position in the adoption of AI for defence, but it may face some critical hurdles ahead in implementing the strategy, according to Simona Soare. NATO defence ministers have formally adopted the Alliance’s first artificial intelligence (AI) strategy. The document lays out six ‘baseline’ principles for ‘responsible’ military use of AI – lawfulness, responsibility and accountability, explainability and traceability, reliability, governability, and bias mitigation. It also provides an insight into key implementation challenges. The strategy is meant to provide a ‘common policy basis’ to support the adoption of AI systems in order to achieve the Alliance’s three core tasks – collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. The strategy is also designed to challenge established Alliance processes for procurement, technology development and wider engagement with the private sector and academia. Only a summary of the strategy has been made public. However, it reveals four critical obstacles to implementation that NATO will face: reconciling the objectives of member nations; securing sufficient political and financial support; bridging any disconnect between the Alliance’s policy and operational units; and managing the transnational bureaucracy that will implement the strategy. Hard questions As well as being a consensus-building policy document, the strategy attempts to position NATO as the leader of AI adoption in defence. It reiterates the allies’ commitment to transatlantic cooperation on the development and use of AI in security and defence, an important element of which is ensuring inter-operability and standardisation. There are still hard questions, however, about how NATO will coordinate different national approaches to managing the development and application of AI in defence, combined with restrictions on technology use, access, sharing and transfer. For countries like the United States, it is a priority that allies agree practical guidelines for the operational use of AI-enabled systems and the necessary data-sharing, a challenge that should not be underestimated. Some allies, meanwhile, are not satisfied with the granularity of the six principles of responsible use, while others consider that overemphasising the normative approach risks ceding technological advantage to peer competitors. Similar tensions are playing out in the European Union. The EU’s proposal for an AI act is more restrictive for high-risk, high-impact applications of AI, though its impact on defence will be indirect, as it do does not apply to the military domain. In the defence realm, the European Defence Agency’s Artificial Intelligence Action Plan for Defence shares more similarities with the NATO strategy. While the plan is not public, it reportedly includes a list of use cases for military applications of AI which member states may consider for collaborative development and principles of responsible development and use. Another question that remains to be answered is the extent of NATO’s ambition to adopt AI. The strategy is meant to be implemented in a phased approach, partly to build political support for AI military projects. Initial ambitions seem modest, reportedly focusing on mission planning and support; smart maintenance and logistics for NATO capabilities; data fusion and analysis; cyber defence; and optimisation of back-office processes. As political acceptance grows and following periodic reviews of the strategy’s implementation, the goal is to also include more complex operational applications. Finally, the AI strategy runs parallel to NATO’s Military Strategy, a military-led process launched in 2019, and its Warfighting Capstone Concept, which examines alliance requirements in future operating environments. However, the AI strategy is a stand-alone document. To avoid creating narrow implementation tracks, meaningful early engagement between NATO’s policy and military communities would be beneficial to cut across any disconnect between threat-based assessments of the impact of AI on military capabilities and politically driven processes for the development and use of AI. Avoiding friction The executive summary of NATO’s AI strategy does not reflect any alignment of the roles and resources of the different NATO and national innovation bodies. It is unclear from the summary how the NATO Innovation Unit, Allied Command Transformation, the Science and Technology Organization and the NATO Communications and Information Agency will coordinate to implement the strategy. The Alliance aims to exploit AI developments in the commercial sector by adopting an open innovation model and deliberately moving away from its present procurement model. However, this will require an effort to map out the relationship between old structures, such as the NATO Industrial Advisory Group, and new engagement channels with the private sector, such as the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic and others created by the AI strategy. While NATO has adopted the AI strategy, there is no dedicated line of funding for it. Finance will depend on a combination of common budget funding and off-budget mechanisms such as the NATO Innovation Fund. Besides the uncertainty over the availability of funding, some Alliance agencies are concerned that their budgets could be cut and redistributed towards the implementation of the AI strategy. The allies have set a USD1 billion target for the NATO Innovation Fund. However, whether this amount is sustainably generated and distributed over the long term, and by what means, is more important for encouraging innovation than the announced figure. The promise of AI for military applications has been clear for some time; less obvious is the route to deliver on it. For all the implementation challenges it faces, the Alliance’s AI strategy represents a step in the right direction. 1ac – Competition Advantage The AI race is on, but the US is failing behind to China – it will determine global balance of power both economically and militarily. Franke ’21 (Ulrike Esther, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). PhD in International Relations from the University of Oxford. "Artificial divide: How Europe and America could clash over AI" – ECFR/367 2, January, https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/Artificial-divide-How-Europe-and-America-could-clash-over-AI.pdf) A Europe-US front on AI against China International competition on technology, such as 5G, has recently attracted significant attention. At the 2020 Munich Security Conference, for example, tech was an important topic – yet the discussion was not really about tech, but about power, as the rivalry over who builds 5G telecommunications infrastructure turned into a US-Chinese competition. This was despite the fact that the leading 5G providers are European and Chinese. There is a growing realisation that the adoption of AI-enabled systems may have geopolitical consequences and eventually affect the global balance of power. In particular, AI may give one actor considerable power over others, be it in the form of an economic boost or an AI-enabled military advantage, or through control over crucial technology components and standards. In the US, there is growing concern over the possibility that China might become too strong an AI actor. The competition over global leadership between the US and China is intensifying, with technology in general, and AI in particular, as battlefields. The US fears that AI may give China a competitive edge. Therefore, countering China’s AI ambitions – as embodied in its attempts to dominate international technology standards bodies, for example – has become an important motive for the US to seek international cooperation. In this context, Joe Biden has proposed an “alliance of liberal democracies” to present an economic and political alternative to China. Artificial divide: How Europe and America could clash over AI – ECFR/367 7 European policymakers have been less vocal about the geopolitical consequences of AI. So far, the debate in Europe has primarily revolved around AI’s economic and social effects. Of the 21 strategies on AI either published or drafted by EU member states, very few touch on the geopolitical implications of AI. The notable exception to this is France, whose national AI strategy was clearly drafted with a geopolitical mindset. It warns that France and Europe need to “avoid becoming just ‘digital colonies’ of the Chinese and American giants”. The strategy’s inclusion of “American giants” is telling and important. It shows that, from a European point of view, the US is the primary ‘other’ that Europe measures itself against on technology – at least for now. This is despite the fact that, in recent years, Chinese acquisitions of European high-tech firms have caused significant concern. NATO is losing its technological edge – action now key to ensure future deterrence and warfighting tactics against adversaries Jankowski ‘21 [Dominik P. Jankowski is a security policy expert, diplomat, think-tanker and social media aficionado. Currently he serves as Head of OSCE and Eastern Security Unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. Previously he served as Chief Specialist for Crisis Management at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014-2016), Expert Analyst and Head of the International Analyses Division at the National Security Bureau of the Republic of Poland (2010-2014), Senior Expert at the J5-Strategic Planning Directorate of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces (2009-2010) as well as foreign policy expert at the President Aleksander Kwasniewski “Amicus Europae” Foundation (2007-2010). NATO in Era of Unpeace: Defending Against Known Unknowns. “NATO and the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Challenge.” Pp 83-84. March 19, 2021. Lublin Publications, https://ies.lublin.pl/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/nato-in-the-era-of-unpeace_calosc-1.pdf#page=82]//PJ Emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) seem simultaneously trendy, powerful, and mysterious. They are often perceived as carrying the potential to revolutionize governmental structures, economies, and life as one knows it. At the same time, scholars and policymakers emphasize that “these technologies may also promote international instability: for instance, by leading to a swift redistribution of wealth around the world; a rapid diffusion of military capabilities or by heightening the risks of military escalation and conflict.”1 For past decades, NATO and its Allies have enjoyed a technological edge, which has underpinned their collective military security – an advantage resulting from their collective economic, industrial, and academic strengths. NATO’s technological edge has always been an essential enabler of its ability to deter and defend against actual and potential adversaries. In October 2019, NATO Defence Ministers expressed concern that this advantage can no longer be taken for granted. In fact, NATO was in danger of losing its technological edge due to a combination of factors, among them a growing determination from peer competitors, especially Russia and China, to drive the future of advanced technologies, including military applications. Availability and knowledge of EDTs, enhanced by rising defence budgets, have provided NATO’s adversaries with capabilities to challenge the Alliance politically, militarily, and technologically. Allowing adversaries to gain competitive advantage in the EDTs area would impede NATO’s ability to win on the battlefield, challenge strategic stability, and change the fundamentals of deterrence. For NATO, EDTs are primarily of interest through their influence on current and future defence capabilities, as well as on deterrence and defence posture. It is clear that EDTs will affect many of the foundations of deterrence strategy. Indeed, new military technologies will play a crucial role in future warfighting and building forces that can decisively operate across domains. At the same time, deeply strategic and practical understanding of the significance of EDTs and their diffusion, as well as extending thinking concerning how science, technology, and international social relations interact to shape and facilitate management of the changing global security landscape, is a pressing need for NATO in the upcoming decade.2 Losing the AI race causes global nuclear war – multiple scenarios for Russia and China conflicts that escalate. Kroenig & Gopalaswamy ‘18 (Matthew Kroenig is Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University and Deputy Director for Strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council; Bharath Gopalaswamy is the director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. He holds a PhD in mechanical engineering with a specialization in numerical acoustics from Trinity College, Dublin; “Will disruptive technology cause nuclear war?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 12 2018, https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/will-disruptive-technology-cause-nuclear-war/)//akg Recently, analysts have argued that emerging technologies with military applications may undermine nuclear stability (see here, here, and here), but the logic of these arguments is debatable and overlooks a more straightforward reason why new technology might cause nuclear conflict: by upending the existing balance of power among nuclear-armed states. This latter concern is more probable and dangerous and demands an immediate policy response. For more than 70 years, the world has avoided major power conflict, and many attribute this era of peace to nuclear weapons. In situations of mutually assured destruction (MAD), neither side has an incentive to start a conflict because doing so will only result in its own annihilation. The key to this model of deterrence is the maintenance of secure second-strike capabilities—the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating counterattack. Recently analysts have begun to worry, however, that new strategic military technologies may make it possible for a state to conduct a successful first strike on an enemy. For example, Chinese colleagues have complained to me in Track II dialogues that the United States may decide to launch a sophisticated cyberattack against Chinese nuclear command and control, essentially turning off China’s nuclear forces. Then, Washington will follow up with a massive strike with conventional cruise and hypersonic missiles to destroy China’s nuclear weapons. Finally, if any Chinese forces happen to survive, the United States can simply mop up China’s ragged retaliatory strike with advanced missile defenses. China will be disarmed and US nuclear weapons will still be sitting on the shelf, untouched. If the United States, or any other state acquires such a first-strike capability, then the logic of MAD would be undermined. Washington may be tempted to launch a nuclear first strike. Or China may choose instead to use its nuclear weapons early in a conflict before they can be wiped out—the so-called “use ‘em or lose ‘em” problem. According to this logic, therefore, the appropriate policy response would be to ban outright or control any new weapon systems that might threaten second-strike capabilities. This way of thinking about new technology and stability, however, is open to question. Would any US president truly decide to launch a massive, bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack because he or she thought s/he could get away with it? And why does it make sense for the country in the inferior position, in this case China, to intentionally start a nuclear war that it will almost certainly lose? More important, this conceptualization of how new technology affects stability is too narrow, focused exclusively on how new military technologies might be used against nuclear forces directly. Rather, we should think more broadly about how new technology might affect global politics, and, for this, it is helpful to turn to scholarly international relations theory. The dominant theory of the causes of war in the academy is the “bargaining model of war.” This theory identifies rapid shifts in the balance of power as a primary cause of conflict. International politics often presents states with conflicts that they can settle through peaceful bargaining, but when bargaining breaks down, war results. Shifts in the balance of power are problematic because they undermine effective bargaining. After all, why agree to a deal today if your bargaining position will be stronger tomorrow? And, a clear understanding of the military balance of power can contribute to peace. (Why start a war you are likely to lose?) But shifts in the balance of power muddy understandings of which states have the advantage. You may see where this is going. New technologies threaten to create potentially destabilizing shifts in the balance of power. For decades, stability in Europe and Asia has been supported by US military power. In recent years, however, the balance of power in Asia has begun to shift, as China has increased its military capabilities. Already, Beijing has become more assertive in the region, claiming contested territory in the South China Sea. And the results of Russia’s military modernization have been on full display in its ongoing intervention in Ukraine. Moreover, China may have the lead over the United States in emerging technologies that could be decisive for the future of military acquisitions and warfare, including 3D printing, hypersonic missiles, quantum computing, 5G wireless connectivity, and artificial intelligence (AI). And Russian President Vladimir Putin is building new unmanned vehicles while ominously declaring, “Whoever leads in AI will rule the world.” If China or Russia are able to incorporate new technologies into their militaries before the United States, then this could lead to the kind of rapid shift in the balance of power that often causes war. If Beijing believes emerging technologies provide it with a newfound, local military advantage over the United States, for example, it may be more willing than previously to initiate conflict over Taiwan. And if Putin thinks new tech has strengthened his hand, he may be more tempted to launch a Ukraine-style invasion of a NATO member. Either scenario could bring these nuclear powers into direct conflict with the United States, and once nuclear armed states are at war, there is an inherent risk of nuclear conflict through limited nuclear war strategies, nuclear brinkmanship, or simple accident or inadvertent escalation. This framing of the problem leads to a different set of policy implications. The concern is not simply technologies that threaten to undermine nuclear second-strike capabilities directly, but, rather, any technologies that can result in a meaningful shift in the broader balance of power. And the solution is not to preserve second-strike capabilities, but to preserve prevailing power balances more broadly. When it comes to new technology, this means that the United States should seek to maintain an innovation edge. Washington should also work with other states, including its nuclear-armed rivals, to develop a new set of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and export controls to deny these newer and potentially destabilizing technologies to potentially host
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