AT - Midterms DA - CNDI 2022
AT - Midterms DA - CNDI 2022.docx
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AFF Impact A2 Readiness No impact to readiness George 99 (James L. George, former congressional professional staff member for national security affairs, “Is Military Readiness Overrated?” CATO, 5-27-1999, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/is-military-readiness-overrated) Military readiness promises to be a major issue when Congress marks up a defense bill later this year. Some members of Congress are already using readiness as a reason to increase funding in the emergency spending bill for the war in Yugoslavia. Most experts cite the initial stages of the Korean War and the Hollow Force of the late 1970s as cautionary examples of being ill-prepared. A closer look at both those examples, however, shows that they really had little to do with readiness. Moreover, the current crisis in Yugoslavia illustrates once again why readiness may be overrated and the funds better spent elsewhere. Although often used as a generic term for all military capabilities, readiness—defined as the ability to respond with appropriate force with little or no warning—is only one of four pillars of military preparedness. The other pillars are force structure, modernization and sustainability. Thus, an effective military force depends on much more than just readiness. Interestingly, the two favorite examples cited by readiness alarmists fail to prove their case. The performance of Task Force Smith, an ill-prepared battalion quickly sent to the front and fairly easily routed by the North Koreans during the initial days of the Korean War, is often cited as the worst case. “No More Task Force Smiths” has become a mantra for the Army. However, critics of Task Force Smith fail to point out that U.S. commanders made the most basic of military mistakes—including grossly underestimating the enemy and sending TFS to an exposed position. When such blunders occur, the end result will be the same whether it is an ill-trained Task Force Smith in Korea or well-trained Marines in Beirut or elite Rangers in Somalia. Moreover, critics also fail to mention that barely a month later the United States stabilized the situation in South Korea, and in another month the Marines conducted their famous Inchon Landing. In fact, without the Chinese intervention, the United States would have won the Korean War a few months after it began. Not bad for a U.S. force that was supposedly ill-prepared. Similarly, the Hollow Force of the late 1970s was not primarily a readiness problem but a combination of many factors—including a military characterized by low morale after Vietnam, serious drug and racial problems, the erroneous induction of too many mentally substandard recruits and low pay eroded further by high inflation. At the same time, major structural changes were transforming the U.S. military, including the introduction of women into the regular forces, the switch from a draft to an all-volunteer force and the initiation of the Total Force Concept that placed more reliance on the Reserves. Given all of that turbulence, no wonder we had a Hollow Force. Often overlooked, however, is how quickly those problems were solved. In some cases, solutions were found without spending a dime. For example, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Thomas Hayward instituted his “Not in my Navy” program of zero tolerance for drugs. The drug problem was solved almost overnight. The induction of too many mentally substandard recruits by mistake which had lowered standards, was identified and corrected. That correction solved most other personnel problems (and should be a warning to people who want to lower standards today). Some members of Congress are now using the crisis in Yugoslavia to get more funds for readiness by arguing that the military is now stretched “too thin.” (Congress doubled President Clinton’s request for $6 billion in emergency spending for the war.) In fact, the situation is quite the opposite. Leaving aside the question of whether the United States should even be involved in Yugoslavia, the new Clinton Doctrine, which does not plan to use ground troops ( a position that is supported by many Republicans), limits the stress placed on the military. Those decisions are all deliberate political actions that have absolutely nothing to do with readiness. Under a well-conceived strategy, even a modestly capable force will probably perform well; but under a poorly conceived strategy, even a force with the highest degree of readiness will probably have serious problems. The experiences of Task Force Smith and the Hollow Force, as well as the invocation of a Clinton Doctrine that eschews the use of ground forces, have major implications. More forces, for example, could be placed in the reserves and scarce funds spent elsewhere. In addition, the military could switch to what Sen. John McCain (R- Ariz.) has called “Tiered Readiness:” a few forces would be kept on expensive ready status and be augmented by reserve forces that could be mobilized if a substantial threat to U.S. security arose. Military readiness is certainly important, and no one is suggesting a return to the truly shallow force of the late 1940s or the Hollow Force of the 1970s. But a close look at those forces shows that their difficulties involved much more than just poor readiness. The welfare state is key to sustaining the American military Mittelstadt 18 (2018, Jennifer, Jennifer Mittelstadt is a Professor of History at Rutgers University and is the Harold K. Johnson Chair in Military History at the US Army War College; her work about the relationship between the welfare state and the military has been published by the Harvard University Press, “FOR AMERICA, WELFARE IS ESSENTIAL FOR WARFARE”, War On The Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2018/05/for-america-welfare-is-essential-for-warfare/) In 2015 I published a book called The Rise of the Military Welfare State that chronicled the history of military benefits and social services in the all-volunteer force. For many in the military, the title constituted fighting words. I didn’t anticipate this when I chose it. Some commenters asked if I thought soldiers were “welfare queens.” Others assumed I was out to cut their benefits. More than a few were angry enough to wish violence on me. If I had a quarter for every incensed email and suspicious question I’ve received, I’d have pocketed far more money than book sales have generated. The title aroused hostility in part due to the widely held belief that the military is separate from civilian life and especially the civilian welfare state. While military personnel partake of subsidized housing, health care, child care, and many more systems of valuable support, most Americans – and military personnel – consider those programs “not social welfare,” but a taken-for-granted entitlement in return for the perceived sacrifices of military life. The differentiation between military benefits and welfare goes even further than drawing bright lines between similar programs in different settings. The distinction shapes fundamental choices of where the nation invests in national power. The military and welfare are depicted as opposite poles in a Manichean battle of the budget. Too many political leaders and policy makers set up a zero-sum game scenario in which they pit “military spending” against “welfare spending”, claiming the former is more important than the latter. Others assume that social welfare for civilians creates a weak, dependent society that diminishes national power. The nation must therefore provide funds for worthy “troops” and take them from unworthy “welfare recipients.” For some elected officials, every breath supporting men and women in uniform is matched by a blast to social welfare spending. These views reflect distorted understandings of social welfare and defense, and, as I’ve learned in spending the past year at the U.S. Army War College, they’re harmful to American national and military power. My conversations with senior leaders have made plain the central role of social welfare in creating the conditions for both military power and national power. The military and welfare are not opposites, they’re intertwined. Welfare is short-hand for “social welfare,” which itself derives from “the general welfare” of the populace enshrined alongside “the common defense” in the United States Constitution. While Americans in recent decades have used the word “welfare” pejoratively to signify means-tested programs for the poor, historically welfare had a positive connotation and broader definition. The majority of Americans of the 1950s, including the war hero and Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower, for example, approved overwhelmingly of “welfare” and “the welfare state.” Health, education, old age pensions, disability protections, workplace safety, minimum wages and maximum hours – all these were properly considered “welfare.” Even the tax system and subsidized home loans constitute social welfare in the US. Some Americans receive social welfare through the government, some through private charities. Most partake of both even when they don’t know it; since the 1930s the government has subsidized the supposedly “private” employer benefits through tax breaks to large companies, all in an effort to deliver as many social and economic supports to as many Americans as possible. These many types of social welfare have built and continue to sustain military power. Take the military’s most basic requirement – fielding a force. The modern U.S. military has never been able to mobilize for war without adequate welfare for its populace. It was precisely the poor health, nutrition and education of many potential draftees during both World War I and World War II that helped make the case for expanding national social welfare programs. Military and Selective Service officials as well as veterans organizations made the case for social welfare programs for military preparedness. During the Cold War decades, the United States filled out its welfare state, improving public education, creating food and nutrition programs, and fostering physical fitness programs to build “readiness” among youth eligible for the draft. And since the era of the all-volunteer force began in 1973, social welfare has become even more essential. Healthy, able, educated and sound recruits are the sine qua non of the all-volunteer force, and declines in public health and welfare harm the force. Today, standards for military service preclude nearly 70 percent of the youth population who cannot qualify for service – they are too sick, too physically unfit, or too undereducated. It has not been possible – and it will not be possible – to fill the ranks to acceptable standards without basic investments in social welfare. If the military needs strong social welfare programs to fill the force, it also needs them to utilize the force. Military benefits and social services – what I call the military welfare state – have grown hand-in-hand with the volunteer force in order to support readiness in garrison and deployment. Since the 1970s, the military has expanded social and economic benefits and services to all ranks and created vast new programs such as child care and family support services. Dozens of social welfare programs allow military personnel to do the jobs they joined to do, and to do them well. Even with the wrap-around services the military provides, military personnel also continue to rely on the civilian welfare state to fill gaps. Military personnel and their families utilize public schools, child welfare services, and food stamps, to name but a few civilian social welfare programs. The military has not been able to fulfill its missions – and will not in the future – without military and civilian investments in social welfare. Social welfare also contributes to the national power of the United States. Regardless of what one thinks about role of America in the world today, there is no doubt that one of the main sources of its influence has been a healthy, educated, and productive populace. Critics of welfare argue that the populace would be better off with a much-diminished welfare state replaced by private charities, de-regulation, and self-reliance. Indeed, they believe government welfare programs diminish the economic productivity and personal initiative of Americans. Such a view does not correspond with the historical data on the rise of the United States to the status of a global power and later a superpower, however. As historians have documented, the increasing economic and military might of the United States – and thus its global influence – resulted not from a wildly unregulated free market, but from the better-regulated, well-distributed capitalism of the Progressive and New Deal state, which, along with the World War II regulation and postwar expansions of social welfare like the GI Bill, helped produce the healthiest, best-educated generation in U.S. (and world) history. Indeed, one way the United States exerted its global power was through exporting its New Deal capitalism abroad. For their part, my students at the U.S. Army War College seemed intuitively aware of positive relationships between social welfare and national power. In my “Theory of War and Strategy” course, officers adhered to a broad definition of national power. Among other attributes, they cited key outcomes of social welfare – a productive economy, civic vitality, and social equality and opportunity. Students expressed modesty about the ability to achieve goals through military force alone and insisted on the inter-connected importance of political, economic, and social institutions to address matters of international concern. When we studied the history of the Peloponnesian War, my students expressed doubts about the long-term viability of the highly unequal Spartan society that directed all its national resources to war. And they identified tragedy in the imperial over-reach of Athens, a city-state whose relative equality and social and cultural investments ought to have sustained its flourishing role in the larger Greek world. Similarly, during an exercise ranking the power of the world’s states, military power never functioned as their sole criterion. Education, human development, and resultant economic power topped their lists. It’s no coincidence that eight of the ten most powerful nations they listed feature significant social safety nets, as defined by the World Bank. In large, complex 21st century societies, organized social welfare programs contribute to national power. Maligning welfare and genuflecting to the military are staples of today’s partisan politics, where politicians stoke the worst fears and deepest passions of their electoral bases. But for those who claim to support U.S. national power and military readiness there is little excuse for reductionist thinking about social welfare programs. Yes, meaningful discussion must take place about how to make sure investments in both social welfare and military spending are ethical and sustainable. But no serious reckoning of national security can falsely decouple the two. Pitting military spending against social welfare might be popular for some versions of politics in the United States today, but it’s also dangerously wrong. GOP win means end of support for Ukraine – turns allied commitments Kaonga ’22 ( Gerrad Kaonga is a US news reporter, “Russian TV Suggests GOP Midterm Wins Will Scupper U.S. Support For Ukraine,” Newsweek, https://www.newsweek.com/russian-state-tv-gop-republican-midterms-win-us-support-ukraine-war-russia-1714180, 6/9/2022) A Russian TV host has suggested that if Republicans win the U.S. midterms, support for Ukraine will begin to dwindle. A video of state TV host Vladimir Solovyov making these claims has begun circulating on social media. The video has so far been viewed over 80,000 times after being posted by the Daily Beast's Julia Davis. "This compilation of clips explains why the Russians think they're winning and don't need to negotiate," she tweeted. "We don't need to participate in any negotiations, because time is on our side, the tempo is working in our favor." As the conversation between the host and other political scientists and commentators, Solovyov claimed the support for Ukraine would change in the U.S. after the midterms. "[If the Republicans prevail in November] a lot will change, of course a lot will change, "Solovyov said. "They will calmly say: 'Why do we need to be involved and send so much of our own money?' "Republicans will come and say, 'why the hell do we need a corrupt, Nazi Ukraine?' "They will ask, 'Whom are we supporting? Yes, Russia is bad and the sanctions will stay, but why keep throwing so much money over there [when] our schools lack funding, we have plenty of our own problems. "'Instead of fortifying the border with Mexico, helping our small businesses, we've given that money to corrupt Ukraine and no one knows where it went." Newsweek has contacted Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs for comment. As the Democratic Party prepares for crucial midterm elections, where Republicans could be poised to retake the House of Representatives and the Senate, Joe Biden's approval rating sits at a near-record low. The president's approval rating has shown no sign of significant improvement as the country experiences high inflation with just over six months to go until Americans go to the polls on November 8. Poll tracker FiveThirtyEight assessed Biden's approval rating by analyzing a wide variety of polls and using its own system of pollster ratings. A2 Econ Economic decline doesn’t cause war – stats prove Clary 15 Christopher Clary, Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT, Postdoctoral Fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” April 22, 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597712 Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 1950, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles. No econ impact Walt 20 [Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?”, May 13th, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/] On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuel
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