DA - NATO Cohesion - MNDI 2022 PHA
DA - NATO Cohesion - MNDI 2022 PHA.docx
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DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP Notes Thanks to other labs for link evidence that we included in this file – including Khirn and Tim Alderete. Thanks to Bennett, Nina, Alex, Dora, Aiman, TJ, Lilian, Hannah, Evelina and Yechen who worked hard to complete this file. You should not read both of these arguments separately in the 1nc because there is a lot of overlap in terms of links and internal links. If you have a specific link that Turkey would oppose the plan, I would recommend reading that version. In either case, the links and internal links from the other could be used to strengthen the overriding thesis that a strong, unified, and expanding NATO is necessary to effectively deter Russia. Time did not permit us to develop this file as fully as we wanted. Here are some suggestions for supplementing it in the future: Expand the link section – this is very important because many affirmatives will utilize their solvency or “say yes” evidence to demonstrate that the plan is popular and possibly improves unity with NATO. Even if all NATO states eventually support the plan, you could develop a link around the diplomatic capital, concessions or horse-trading that the U.S. or other member states would have to do in order to reach consensus Find more reasons why it is good to include Finland and Sweden in NATO outside of deterring Russia. This would give the disad an impact external to many affirmatives. Both arguments could become net benefits to consultation counterplans. 1nc DA NATO Unity Ensuring Russian strategic failure in Ukraine is the U.S. goal BUT it’s not a guarantee and requires full cooperation and unity of allies to make adjustments to strategy and posture McPartland, 22 --- assistant director with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative (May 11, 2022, Connor, “How can the US and NATO help bring about Russia’s ‘strategic failure’ in Ukraine?” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-can-the-us-and-nato-help-bring-about-russias-strategic-failure-in-ukraine/, JMP) With Ukraine having repelled Russian forces near Kyiv, the Kremlin’s war of aggression has entered a new phase: a more limited offensive in eastern Ukraine. As the United States and its transatlantic allies and partners formulate fresh strategies for what will likely be a protracted conflict, there are several factors they must consider, senior officials and experts said at a recent Atlantic Council event. The US objective is Russian “strategic failure”—militarily, politically and economically— US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander said at the May 2 conference, titled “Priorities for the NATO Summit and Security in Europe.” That would involve in the long term “holding the Russian leadership to account in front of its own population and in front of the global stage,” she said. Wallander’s comments expanded on US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s recent statement that the United States “want[s] to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.” What Russian accountability will look like is unclear at this point. However, US Senator Thom Tillis (R-NC), speaking at the conference, argued that the United States has to “look ahead to a regime change before we could ever have anything in the way of a productive working relationship with Russia,” and describing Russian President Vladimir Putin as “not fit to serve.” At the same time, Michael Kofman, research program director at the Russia Studies Program of CNA, cautioned against treating Russia’s comprehensive strategic failure in the war as a foregone conclusion. Indeed, the “trend lines favor Ukraine,” he said. However, changes in Russia’s tactics such as full mobilization could lead to a longer, more drawn-out conflict, Kofman added, addressing the event ahead of the NATO summit scheduled for late June. The United States and NATO must not learn the wrong lessons from the war, he said. The Russian military, despite taking a beating so far, still presents a real threat. “I’m worried that I’m going to have to spend a lot of years now arguing that [the Russian military] isn’t four feet tall,” said Kofman. When it comes to new defense investments, Alliance members should also avoid relying on broad conclusions about the effectiveness of capabilities in Ukraine, warned former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen (Ret.) James Cartwright. The United States and NATO allies need to continue and expand their supply of ammunition and heavier artillery weapons that have been a key part of Ukrainian battlefield success against Russia, according to Kofman. Yet, nations supplying Ukraine must also take care that they do not deplete their own stocks of critical weapons systems too much, with the pipeline to produce and replace advanced weapons sent to Ukraine being “quite narrow” in many cases, as described by Kofman. The United States can play a critical role here as the “arsenal of democracy,” harking back to the role it played in World War II, some speakers suggested. US Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT) said that the United States was “going to have to look at ramping up production… to make sure that all of our allies have what they need” to supply Ukraine while maintaining their own supplies. The Alliance will also need to make major adjustments to its strategy and posture in Eastern Europe, speakers said. Already, allies have shifted significant forces further east, making NATO’s conventional deterrence “the strongest that it has been… in our lifetimes” according to US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities Mara Karlin. Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe Gen (Ret.) Philip M. Breedlove added that NATO has to be ready to “seize the moment” and “move readiness and capability forward” in Europe. More ready and capable forces, including persistent, rotational US deployments to Eastern Europe will help move NATO from a deterrence by punishment posture to deterrence by denial, making it harder for any future Russian attack to take and hold NATO territory. NATO will also move to finalize its new Strategic Concept this summer, the first new guiding strategy for the Alliance since 2010. “The 2022 edition will definitely be the most challenging,” said Alexander Vershbow, Atlantic Council distinguished fellow, former NATO deputy secretary general, and former US ambassador to Russia. Vershbow agreed with Breedlove, saying that the Strategic Concept should revamp NATO’s defense and deterrence posture by shifting more forces forward. Many of these forces, if and when they are deployed, will go to the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—frontline nations that are some of the Alliance’s most vulnerable members. These countries have long been advocates for increased allied presence in the region. Speaking at the conference, Lithuanian Minister of National Defense Arvydas Anušauskas highlighted increased spending by the country on facilities to enable it to host larger numbers of allied forces in the future. Throughout the discussion, panelists emphasized that the conflict and the new strategic circumstances that Russia has created in Europe will shape the security dynamic there for the foreseeable future, and the Untied States and its allies in NATO will need to remain focused and united to adapt to this challenge and ensure Russia meets strategic failure. In the words of Michael Kofman, “Security in Europe is an unfinished business, and to me this conflict reflects that.” This unity is not guaranteed and takes a lot of work and active diplomacy to sustain Wormuth, 22 --- Secretary of the Army, US Department of Defense (June 2, 2022, Christine Wormuth, moderated by Vivian Salama who serves as a national security reporter at The Wall Street Journal “NATO allies must not take their unity on Ukraine for granted, says Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth,” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/transcripts/nato-allies-must-not-take-their-unity-on-ukraine-for-granted-says-secretary-of-the-army-christine-wormuth/, JMP) VIVIAN SALAMA: President Biden has repeatedly made it clear that there are not going to be boots on the ground in this conflict so long as it’s isolated within Ukraine’s borders. Something I heard repeatedly while I was there is that military leaders and the president’s office even are concerned that as this conflict increasingly becomes prolonged, momentum to assist, to keep on fueling them with weapons, with assistance, with other kinds of training, could start to wane and especially when we have our own domestic priorities to worry about. And so how do you see the US sustaining this level of support for Ukraine in a way that could actually make a difference in embattled regions like the Donbas, which is suffering significantly right now? CHRISTINE WORMUTH: I think—you know, I think the administration has done, frankly, an admirable job, you know, helping the alliance come together and have the very, very strong unified position that we’ve had against the Russian invasion, and I think we’ll continue to see that unity, frankly. It will take work. I know from my own experience, you know, back in 2014 and 2015 it takes a lot of active diplomacy to be able to sustain that alliance unity. But I think, you know, all of the NATO countries see what is at stake, frankly, in what’s happening, and that alone, I think, is an incentive for us to maintain unity. I think, you know, in a practical way, we are looking—you know, certainly in the Department of Defense and in the Army—at how—you know, what do we need to be doing to allow us to continue to sustain the kind of lethal assistance that we’re providing to the Ukrainians? And that’s why we’ve signed contracts to replenish our Stingers and replenish our Javelins. You know, we have really leaned into trying to provide, you know, everything that the policymakers deem essential to get to the Ukrainians, and, you know, we have taken some risk to our own readiness, not an unacceptable level of risk at all. But I think we will continue to do that, and I think, you know, again, we can’t take that unity for granted, but I think the NATO countries know what’s at stake. VIVIAN SALAMA: Where does the US draw the line? I mean, we’re hearing a lot these days, and I was hearing it in Ukraine, about multiple-launch rocket systems and other long-range rocket systems that they so desperately need; the US has sort of wavered on this a little bit in recent weeks, and so, you know, a lot of reporting that it’s going to be announced this week. Can you tell us, you know, where the US stands as far as those types of systems getting into the hands of Ukrainian fighters? CHRISTINE WORMUTH: I think where the US stands is, you know, wanting to provide all of the assistance that we can to the Ukrainians without escalating the situation to a point where, you know, the war spills over or, frankly, you know, goes in a terrible direction. I mean, there’s been, you know, discussion about if Putin starts to feel cornered, you know, would he lash out? Would he contemplate using chemical weapons, for example, or even, you know, more horrifically, potentially some sort of a tactical nuclear demonstration? So I think, you know, we in the administration have to very prudently measure those risks, you know, and to think very carefully about, you know, how can we best, again, give the Ukrainian military what they need? We are in, obviously, a grinding artillery battle right now that I think—you know, it’s going to be more challenging, frankly, to sustain the morale of the Ukrainian forces, you know, given the bombardment that they’re being subject to. But again, you know, we cannot allow this war to escalate. Then I think you will see—if you want to talk about concerns to NATO unity, concerns for the American support for this conflict, if it escalates, I think that unity will be much more challenging to sustain. ***Insert Specific Link*** Disagreements spillover and tube cooperation on an entire NATO program Nicholas Burns 19, Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations at Harvard Kennedy School, MA in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and Douglas Lute, Senior Fellow at the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship, Former United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, Holds Degrees from the United States Military Academy at West Point and from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School Report, February 2019, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nato-seventy-alliance-crisis NATO needs to take a hard look at itself. Across twenty-five indicators of democracy rated by Freedom House, the downward trend among NATO allies over the past decade is stark.35 Especially in Central Europe but not exclusively, there are setbacks in the media, the judiciary and the functioning of national democratic institutions. The rate at which democracy is declining in Poland, Hungary and Turkey is particularly alarming. In 2017 and 2018, these three states’ scores represented some of the largest one-year declines in political rights and civil liberties of all 195 countries ranked by Freedom House.36 Poland—with the largest category declines in the forty-year history of the survey—is close to leaving the “consolidated democracy” category.37 Hungary is no longer rated a consolidated democracy. Turkey, whose decline in freedom over the last ten years represents the largest of any country in the world, crossed the threshold from “free” to “not free.”38 While less severe today, nationalist populism movements in other allies represent a broader, more diffuse threat to NATO and can amplify other challenges facing the Alliance. The United States is not immune, with its Freedom House rating declining in 2018 due to “Russian interference in the 2016 election, violations of basic ethical standards by the new administration and a reduction in government transparency.”39 While this slippage in the U.S. is relatively recent and still minor in scale, it nonetheless diminishes America’s standing as a standard-bearer for democracy and further erodes its leadership position within the Alliance. Further, anti-democratic policies among allies open vulnerabilities for interference by competitors outside the Alliance, especially Russia that seeks to divide NATO and the EU politically using hybrid tactics.40 The question for allies is what must the role of the Alliance be in reinforcing its core values when they are under assault from within. NATO is both a political and a military alliance. It is not enough to be bound together by a commitment only to Article 5 collective defense. The values in the Treaty and the adherence of NATO allies to those values is fundamental for Alliance cohesion. That shared commitment to values in turn makes credible the Article 5 commitment. The Washington Treaty is binding for both its political and military commitments.41 Allies cannot ignore the failure to abide by political commitments including values and expect military commitments to be unaffected. In short, NATO allies should not expect that they could violate democratic values without consequences, while resting assured that NATO cohesion is intact and other commitments in the Treaty will be upheld. The Treaty is not a menu of options from which allies can select some obligations while ignoring others. The NATO Treaty has no provision for policing members that drift from common political values, unlike the European Union Treaty’s Chapter 7 that has been invoked recently toward several EU member states with some success.42 While it would be impossible to achieve consensus to impose penalties on wayward allies, given that the ally in question could veto any penalties, a range of escalating political initiatives on the part of the Secretary General and a coalition of the other allies could assert pressure. As a start, the Secretary General should express concern in his bilateral meetings with the anti-democratic governments, with the support of key allies and in partnership with the European Union. To increase awareness within the Alliance and among the public, foreign ministers could review annually indicators of democracy for all twenty-nine allies, perhaps prepared by an informal high-level group of experts drawing on Freedom House data. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly and coalitions of allies can amplify the message.43 To increase pressure, NATO could suspend hosting of visits, official meetings and even military exercises with these nations. In severe cases, NATO infrastructure spending and even access to military schools and information sharing could be affected. An indirect way to express concern among allies is to increase the prominence of core democratic values when considering NATO enlargement decisions in the future.44 None of these steps is without political cost and risk, even if calibrated carefully. But the costs and risks of the gradual erosion of Alliance cohesion as member states drift from the founding values are even greater. NATO cannot expect to remain coherent and relevant and able to address the full range of challenges it faces, if it ignores the internal drift from democracy within some member states. This drift is a fundamental issue for the Alliance.45 Streamlining NATO Decision-Making Finally, the challenges facing NATO today demand more flexibility in executive decision-making. As a core principle in preserving NATO cohesion, consensus decision-making must remain the basis for major NATO actions.46 The Treaty requirements for consensus on collective defense decisions (Article 5) and enlargement decisions (Article 10) remain sensible. Major policy decisions like the Defense Investment Pledge or the creation of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force rapid reaction capabilities require consensus. But today with NATO enlarged to twenty-nine members and facing increasingly diverse and complex challenges, it is time to consider how other, more routine, administrative decisions can be taken more efficiently. But this should be a management function, not derogation from the consensus principle. We recommend strengthening the Secretary General’s role as the chief executive of the Alliance with broader authority to carry out routine business without seeking consensus among the twenty-nine members. For example, the Secretary General should consult allies on matters such as agendas and timings of Ministerial Council meetings, but not be required to seek consensus agreement. Today the agenda and even the dates of a Foreign Minister meeting or a NATO-Russia Council meeting can consume hours of formal Council time seeking consensus at the ambassadorial level, consuming headquarters’ bandwidth and crowding out more substantive and urgent topics, including many outlined in this paper. Further, the Secretary General’s flexibility on international staff personnel changes and NATO budget matters should be increased. Today, for example, the Secretary General is severely constrained from adapting the Alliance to emerging challenges by making meaningful shifts in personnel and budgetary resources.47 While nations will continue to want a critical role in all these decisions, criteria should be developed that will provide for more flexibility while ensuring that all allies gain a fair share of opportunities and allocation of resources. A related problem is the tendency of some allies to bring into the Alliance bilateral issues that impede progress on collective issues of the Alliance. As an example, an ally might hold up agreement on the entire NATO military exercise program because of an unrelated bilateral dispute with
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