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2022 MNDI Affirmative

Aff - AI TEVV - MNDI 2022 PHA

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TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA
Introductory Page
Thesis of this case:
AI is inevitable. It is a normal part of modernizing our military. Because it is a dual use technology, it will diffuse much more easily, which means there is not a huge military advantage to be the First to develop it. So, we are not in an “Arms Race.”
However, we – along with China and Russia - believe that we are in an arms race. We believe we have to develop it first because if China develops it first, we will be at a huge disadvantage. Not true, but that is what we believe. China believes the same thing about us. This is what is called a “Security Dilemma” – our pursuit of our security undermines another nation’s security, and their reaction is to pursue their security in a way that undermines ours, without a natural stopping point. We “create” a race by believing in it, which is a self-fulfilling prophecy.
So, what is the harm of believing that we are in an arms race? This Arms Race Framing or Arms Race Mentality causes us to deploy AI weapons as fast as we can, which causes us to rush to deploy them before they are tested, evaluated, verified and validated (TEVV). Before they are safe and reliable. If we rush, we cut corners, and put out “brittle” AI, which means AI that collapses in the real world when the real world is different from their testing environment. It’s like when EA pushed out Battlefront II way too early to try to beat other game publishers to the market, and it was full of bugs and malfunctions. Except this time, “bugs” in military AI that controls our nuclear weapons could malfunction in ways that cause nuclear war.
So, the plan enhances testing, evaluation, verification and validation (TEVV) processes with NATO for all our AI weapons. This is also called Assurance. It adopts “life cycle” testing, which just means that you continuously test the AI over its time in use, because it evolves over time, due to machine learning. This will make sure that the weapons we put out work as designed, and don’t break down at inopportune times. There is some pretty good evidence that a large commitment to AI TEVV can build confidence globally, reducing the pressure to “race” to deploy weapons.
The advantages are just the different types of AI systems that could break down due to bugs, malfunctions or premature deployment. Nuclear Systems, Cyber Systems, Brittle Systems, etc. There is an Operator Trust scenario, which just says that soldiers won’t Trust their AI weapons if they are not safe and reliable, and that if soldiers and commanders do not Trust their weapons or systems, that breaks down the entire military readiness of NATO – blah blah blah – Russia/Ukraine/escalation something something nuclear war. You can choose one, two, or three of these scenarios to run. Probably not four, but hey – you do you.
This case is well positioned against security kritiks, because it addresses IR from a largely constructivist viewpoint explicitly in the 1AC. It is also well positioned to kritik the impacts to disads that rely on “You lose the Arms Race” arguments as being threat construction.
Credits:
There are some Very good cards in here, and they were found and cut by Mira A, Mae D, Lucy D, Austin D, Cali F, Shourya H, Balin K, Tucker M, Louis M-S, and Sofia T, and Josh Z. And they did it with me being mostly on the DL, so any mistakes are mine, while all credit goes to them. Good job, excellent self-leadership, and congratulations on a job well done. I don’t know how to put in a “Thumbs Up” emote-i-con, so just pretend that there is one here!
1AC
1AC - Contention One
We are Not in an AI Arms Race. We think that we are, but those claims are overblown – the AI adoption process is routine continuation of modernization
Horowitz and Scharre, 2021 - Director of the Emerging Capabilities Policy Office in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Vice President and Director of Studies at CNAS [Michael, Paul, January 12 2021, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence- Building Measures”, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ai-and-international-stability-risks-and-confidence-building-measures, Acc 6/18/22. M.A.]
AI is a general-purpose technology akin to computers or the internal combustion engine, not a discrete technology like missiles or aircraft. Thus, while concerns of an “AI arms race” are overblown, real risks exist.2 Additionally, despite the rhetoric of many national leaders, military spending on AI is relatively modest to date. Rather than a fervent arms race, militaries’ pursuit of AI looks more like routine adoption of new technologies and a continuation of the multi-decade trend of adoption of computers, networking, and other information technologies. Nevertheless, the incorporation of AI into national security applications and warfare poses genuine risks. Recognizing the risks is not enough, however. Addressing them requires laying out suggestions for practical steps states can take to minimize risks stemming from military AI competition.3 One approach states could take is adopting confidence-building measures (CBMs): unilateral, bilateral, and/or multilateral actions that states can take to build trust and prevent inadvertent military conflict. CBMs generally involve using transparency, notification, and monitoring to attempt to mitigate the risk of conflict.4 There are challenges involved in CBM adoption due to differences in the character of international competition today versus during the Cold War, when CBMs became prominent as a concept. However, considering possibilities for CBMs and exploring ways to shape the dialogue about AI could make the adoption of stability-promoting CBMs more likely.
Unfortunately, Believing you are in an Arms Race is also dangerous - it creates a Security Dilemma where both states are pressured to deploy AI as soon as they can - weapons are deployed before they are tested, safe, and reliable. This disrupts the balance of power and crisis stability.
Scharre 2021 – Director of the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Paul, 6/28/21,https://tnsr.org/2021/06/debunking-the-ai-arms-race-theory/, “Debunking the AI Arms Race Theory”, 6/18/22, LND]
Even if military AI spending does not rise to the level of an “arms race,” many nations are nevertheless engaged in a security competition in the adoption of military AI, a competition that does pose risks. The situation that states find themselves in with regard to AI competition is much more accurately described as a security dilemma,16 a more generalized competitive dynamic between states than the more narrowly defined “arms race.” In his 1978 article, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” Robert Jervis defined the security dilemma as follows: “[M]any of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others.”17 As Charles Glaser has pointed out, it is not obvious from this definition why it would be intrinsically bad for an increase in one state’s security to come at the expense of another’s security.18 In fact, decreasing the security of other states could have beneficial effects in enhancing deterrence and reducing the risks of aggression or achieving a favorable balance of power in a region, which could lead to greater political influence. The problem comes in the second- and third-order effects that could develop when another state reacts to having its security reduced. Responses could include counterbalancing with a net effect of no change in security (or worsening security). Glaser argues that there are some situations in which security competition is a rational strategy for a state to pursue even if competitors will arm in response. In other situations, arming may be a suboptimal strategy for a state, which would be better served by restraint or pursuing arms control.19 Security competition could even leave both states worse off than before. This can occur during a traditional arms race if nations expend vast sums of money in an unsuccessful attempt to gain an advantage over one another, with the result that both nations divert funds from non-defense expenditures. If the outcome of a security competition is the same relative military balance as before, the balance of power may not have meaningfully changed, but both nations could face diminished economic and social well-being at home relative to if they had avoided a security competition. Even absent this “guns vs. butter” tradeoff, however, there are other ways in which security competition can lead to a net negative outcome for both states. One way this could occur is if military innovation and the development of new capabilities alter the character of warfare in a manner that is more harmful, more destructive, less stable, or otherwise less desirable than before. In his 1997 article, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” Glaser gave the example of military capabilities that shifted warfare to a more offense-dominant regime.20 There are other ways in which warfare could evolve in a net negative direction as well. For example, in World War I, Germany’s interest in developing and deploying chemical weapons was spurred in part due to fears about France’s developments in poison gas.21 The result was the introduction of a weapon that increased combatant suffering on both sides, without delivering a significant military advantage to either. The same could occur with AI: It could alter the character of warfare in a way that would be a net negative for all participants. One possibility for how AI could alter warfare in a manner that would leave all states worse off would be if it accelerated the tempo of war past the point of human control, making warfare faster, more violent, and less controllable. There are advantages to adding intelligence into machines, but given the limitations of AI systems today, the optimal model for achieving the highest quality decision-making would be a joint human-machine architecture that combines human and machine decision-making. One way in which machines outperform humans, however, is in speed. It is possible to envision a competitive dynamic in which countries feel compelled to automate increasing amounts of their military operations in order to keep pace with adversaries. Then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work summed up the dilemma when he asked, “If our competitors go to Terminators and we are still operating where the machines are helping the humans and it turns out the Terminators are able to make decisions faster, even if they’re bad, how would we respond?”22 This is a classic security dilemma. One state’s pursuit of greater automation and faster reaction times undermines other states’ security and leads them to similarly pursue more automation just to keep up. If states fall victim to this trap, it could lead to all states being less secure, since the pursuit of greater automation would not merely be an evolution in weapons and countermeasures that simply leads to the creation of new weapons in the future warfare could shift to a qualitatively different regime in which humans have less control over lethal force as decisions become more automated and the accelerating tempo of operations pushes humans “out of the loop” of decision-making. Some Chinese scholars have hypothesized about a battlefield “singularity,” in which the pace of combat eclipses human decision-making.23 U.S. scholars have used the term “hyperwar” to refer to a similar scenario.24 While the speed of engagement necessitates automation in some limited areas today, such as immediate localized defense of ships, bases, and vehicles from rocket and missile attack, expanding this zone of machine control into broader areas of war would be a significant development. Less human control over warfare could lead to wars that are less controllable and that escalate more quickly or more widely than humans intend. Similarly, limiting escalation or terminating conflicts could be more challenging if the pace of operations on the battlefield exceeds human decision-making. Political leaders would have a command-and-control problem in which their military forces are operating “inside” (i.e., faster than) their own decision cycle. The net effect of the quite rational desire for nations to gain an edge in speed could lead to an outcome that is worse for all. Yet, competitive dynamics could nevertheless drive such a result. One state’s pursuit of greater automation and faster reaction times undermines other states’ security and leads them to similarly pursue more automation just to keep up. Financial markets provide an example of this dynamic in a non-military competitive environment. Automation introduced into financial markets, especially high-frequency trading in which trades are executed at super-human speeds in milliseconds, has contributed to unstable market conditions that can lead to “flash crashes,” in which prices rapidly and dramatically shift.25 Financial regulators have responded by employing “circuit breakers” that automatically halt trading for a pre-determined period of time if the price moves too quickly.26 Financial markets have the benefit of a regulator who can force cooperative measures on competitors to address suboptimal outcomes. Under conditions of anarchy in the international security environment, any such cooperation would have to come from state v s themselves.
The DOD AI Strategy underfunded reliability testing – it focused on ethics, but not safety.
Lewis 2019 - project lead for the DOD’s Joint Lessons Learned studies [Larry, “AI Safety: Charting out the High Road”, War on the Rocks Dec 19, https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/ai-safety-charting-out-the-high-road/ LMSi]
Promise 1: Addressing Safety Risks Unique to AI In its AI strategy, the Department of Defense made a promise to address the safety risks unique to AI technology. This is reflective of America’s long record of commitments to safety and adherence to international laws for armed conflict. For example, all military systems are subject to test and evaluation activities to ensure that they are reliable and safe, as well as legal reviews to ensure they are consistent with international humanitarian law (e.g., the Geneva Conventions). It is not surprising, therefore, that safety is prominent in the defense AI strategy. Though a commendable intention, the strategy has not yet resulted in significant institutional steps to promote safety with regard to AI. The U.S. military has been busy supporting the Defense Innovation Board’s development of AI ethics, with the Joint AI Center also emphasizing the critical role ethics plays in AI applications, yet the pursuit of safety — for example, avoiding civilian casualties, friendly fire, and inadvertent escalation — has not received the same sort of attention. I acknowledge a few steps are being taken towards promoting AI safety. For example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has a program working to develop explainable AI, to help address challenges with the use of machine learning as a black box technology. Explainability will enhance AI safety: for example, by being able to explain why an AI application does something amiss in testing or operations and to take corrective actions. But such steps, while important, do not make up a comprehensive approach to identify and then systematically address AI safety risks. To that end, our most recent report draws on a risk management approach to AI safety: identifying risks, analyzing them, and then suggesting concrete actions to begin addressing them.
1AC - Advantage: Brittle AI
The Pressure to deploy AI Rapidly makes accidents inevitable – the technology is brittle
Arnold and Toner, 2021 – Center for Security and Emerging Threats [Zachary and Helen, July, CSET Policy Brief. “AI Accidents: An Emerging Threat What Could Happen and What to Do” https://cset. georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-AI-Accidents-An-Emerging-Threat.pdf Acc 6/7/22 TA]
Despite these problems, AI systems are becoming integrated into the real world at a pace that is only expected to accelerate in the next decade.9 These systems may be fragile, but as companies, governments, and militaries decide when and how to deploy them, their huge potential benefits will often overshadow uncertain risks. Leaders in these organizations also may not be fully aware of these risks, and may face pressure from competitors willing to move quickly.10 To be sure, some industries are already deploying AI much faster than others, and a few sensitive sectors may remain “walled off” for some time.11 But eventually, the powerful incentives driving the spread of AI today are likely to make it pervasive. As our economy, security, and health become more and more dependent on AI systems, these systems’ fragilities will put lives at stake. Today, many are worried about AI being misused intentionally. An adversary could attack with swarms of drones; authoritarian governments are already using AI algorithms to discriminate on the basis of race or ideology. These risks are real, and they deserve attention. But unintended, accidental AI disasters are also an urgent concern. AI-related accidents are already making headlines, from inaccurate facial recognition systems causing false arrests to unexpected racial and gender discrimination by machine learning software.12 This is especially striking since AI has so far mostly been deployed in seemingly lower-stakes settings, such as newsfeed rankings, ad targeting, and speech recognition, with less deployment in higher stakes areas such as autonomous driving. Despite these initial accidents, governments, businesses, and militaries are preparing to use today’s flawed, fragile AI technologies in critical systems around the world. Future versions of AI technology may be less accident-prone, but there is no guarantee—and regardless, if rollout continues as expected, prior versions of the technology may already have been deployed at massive scale. The machine learning models of 2020 could easily still be in use decades in the future, just as airlines, stock exchanges, and federal agencies still rely today on COBOL, a programming language first deployed in 1960.13 In retrospect, even the most extreme technological accidents, from the Challenger disaster to the meltdown at Chernobyl, can seem both predictable and preventable.14 History is full of accidents that seem obvious in retrospect, but “no one could have seen coming” at the time. In other cases, known risks are brushed aside, or obvious fixes go unmade. Unless we act, there is no reason to think that the advent of AI will be any different. In fact, there are reasons to think AI could cause more accidents than other technologies that have caused high-profile disasters. Unlike the space shuttle or nuclear power plants, for example, AI will be pervasive throughout society, creating endless opportunities for things to go awry. What’s more, modern AI is so good at some tasks that even sophisticated users and developers can come to trust it implicitly.15 This degree of trust, placed in pervasive, fallible systems without any common sense, could have terrible consequences.
Premature deployment of AI weapons risks miscalculation and war - they will fail when they operate outside of their prescribed environments.
Goldfarb and Lindsay, 2022 – Chair in AI and health care at the Univ of Toronto, Prof of Cybersecurity at the Georgia Tech [Avi, Jon, 2/25/22, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00425, “Prediction and Judgement: Why Artificial Intelligence Increases the Importance of Humans in War” 6/18/22, LND]
In contrast with chess, the risks of premature automation are more extreme in the military realm (e.g., fratricide and civilian casualties), but the logic is the same. Militaries abound with standard operating procedures and tactical doctrines that guide the use of lethal capabilities (e.g., instructions for the safe operat

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