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2022 MNDI Kritik

K - AI Arms Race K - MNDI 2022 PHA

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1NC – AI “Arms Race” Kritik
There is no AI “Arms Race” – global spending is not enough to warrant the Arms Race title – it is just military modernization
Scharre 2021 – Director of the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Paul, 6/28/21,https://tnsr.org/2021/06/debunking-the-ai-arms-race-theory/, “Debunking the AI Arms Race Theory”, 6/18/22, LND]
The scale of military AI spending, at least at present, is nowhere near large enough to warrant the title of “arms race.” Of course, AI can also be used for weapons. Militaries around the world are actively working to adopt AI to improve their military capabilities. Yet the militarization of AI does not, at present, meet the traditional definition of an arms race, despite the rhetorical urgency of many national leaders. Michael D. Wallace, in his 1979 article “Arms Races and Escalation,” defined an arms race as “involving simultaneous abnormal rates of growth in the military outlays of two or more nations” resulting from “the competitive pressure of the military itself, and not from domestic forces exogenous to this rivalry.” Wallace further stated that the concept of an arms race only applied “between nations whose foreign and defense policies are heavily interdependent” and who have “roughly comparable” capabilities.11 AI is being adopted by many countries around the globe.12 Arguably at least some of the dyads, such as the United States and China, meet Wallace’s definition in terms of being nations with “roughly comparable” capabilities, locked in competition, “whose foreign and defense policies are heavily interdependent.” However, AI fails the arms race test in the critical area of spending. Wallace distinguished arms races from the normal behavior of states to improve their military forces. A state that adopts a new technology and modernizes its military forces is not automatically in an arms race, under Wallace’s definition, even if the modernization is aimed at competition with another country. The decisive factor in qualifying as an arms race, according to Wallace, is the rate of growth in defense spending. Wallace characterized arms races as resulting in abnormally large growth rates in defense spending, beyond the historical average of 4 to 5 percent annual growth (in real dollars). In an arms race, annual growth rates are above 10 percent or even as high as 20 to 25 percent.13 Other scholars define arms races using different quantitative thresholds — and some definitions lack clear quantitative thresholds at all — but the existence of rapid increases in defense spending or military forces above normal levels is a common criterion in the scholarly literature on arms races.14 Arms races result in situations in which two or more countries are locked in spiraling defense spending, grabbing ever-greater shares of national treasure often with little to no net gain in relative advantage over the other. Classic historical examples include the Anglo-German naval arms race prior to World War I and the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race during the Cold War. Military AI spending today clearly does not meet these criteria of abnormally large growth rates in defense spending. AI defense spending is difficult to calculate due to the general-purpose nature of AI technology. Unlike ships or ballistic missiles, AI systems cannot be easily counted. Nevertheless, even crude estimates of defense spending show that military AI investments are nowhere near large enough to constitute an arms race. An independent estimate by Bloomberg Government of U.S. defense spending on AI identified $5 billion in AI-related research and development in fiscal year 2020, or roughly 0.7 percent of the Department of Defense’s over $700 billion budget.15 The scale of military AI spending, at least at present, is nowhere near large enough to warrant the title of “arms race.” (Adding in private sector spending, which constitutes the bulk of AI investment, would lead to larger figures but would further belie the claim of an “arms” race since most private sector AI investment is not in weapons.)
The Affirmative reinforces the Security Dilemma they described in the 1AC – their discourse labelling AI as an “arms race” reinforces the perception of insecurity that they are “losing” a race that doesn’t exist. This increases the risk of conflict – hyperbolic rhetoric escalates rivalries.
Roff 2019 – Fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Program [Heather, 4/26/19, https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2019.1604836, “The Frame problem: The Ai ‘Arms Race’ isn’t one’, 6/18/22, LND]
Often,12 one hears the phrase “AI arms race,”13 especially in regard to competition14 between major powers. Yet an AI arms race seems a particularly unfortunate and misleading phrase. Since 1957,15 myriad scholars have attempted to understand arms races, including how one can identify and measure16 them and what the potential effects of one are. While there have certainly been academic and policy disputes over the last 62 years, there is one important consensus to note about arms races: looking at one particular dimension of a state’s behavior is not sufficient. Arms races deal with military build ups, arms expenditures, rivalry, alliances, territorial disputes, economic policies, and more. As yet, however, there has been no coherent or comprehensive discussion about the so-called AI arms race. For example: How is AI by itself a weapon? Or is the “race” merely military modernization efforts that include automation, autonomy, or AI enabled military systems? How would we even begin to find, label and disaggregate the numbers to claim that there is an arms race between rivals regarding only AI? Indeed, the discussion of an AI arms race is reminiscent of the hyperbolic and mislabeled rhetoric surrounding “cyber bombs”17 in the battle again ISIS. Of course, there are quite spectacular claims about AI’s potential benefits and risks. Russian President Vladimir Putin18 fanned that fire when he claimed that “whoever becomes the leader in this space [AI] will become the ruler of the world.” But talking about technological competition – in research, adoption, and deployment – in all sectors of multiple economies and in warfare is not really an arms race. Indeed, to frame this competition in military terms risks the adoption of policies or regulations that could escalate rivalry between states and increase the likelihood of actual conflict. More accurately stated, the current situation is one of AI competition, with variations of technological proliferation and diffusion. In some cases, countries may want to limit the amount and kinds of specific AI systems that proliferate to other countries or non-state actors. In these instances, it will more than likely be particular kinds of components or platforms that are at issue. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, the Australia Group, or the Missile Technology Control Regime are but a few regimes that are meant to deal with such proliferation issues.
This turns the case – the security dilemma pressures states to push out AI before it is safe, which causes it to fail, risking unintentional escalation of conflicts
Horowitz and Kahn, 2021 – Senior and Research Fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations [Michael and Lauren, The Washington Quarterly 3-19-2021 “Leading in Artificial Intelligence through Confidence Building Measures” https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2018794 acc on 6-21-2022 TM]
Risks exist for AI uses across society, in civilian and military sectors alike.7 Survey research shows that many in AI and machine learning (ML) communities worry about whether militaries can be trusted to develop safe and reliable AI.8 Given the current geopolitical context, there is fear that competitive pressures to be first in deploying AI systems could overshadow safety and ethics efforts, incentivizing militaries to take “short cuts” that could increase the risk of lethal accidents, unintentional conflict (conflict between states that results from miscommunication or accidents), and inadvertent escalation (when states commit intentional actions that unintentionally cause escalation by an adversary). The Risk of Accidents First, military applications of AI may not work as intended due to flaws in the algorithms themselves. Inadequate training data, the algorithm’s complexity, biased data, biased coding, or intentional data sabotage or poisoning by adversaries can make accidents more likely when systems are deployed. For example, a malfunctioning AI-enabled targeting system in a conflict could attack friends instead of foes, or friends and foes alike. Or an algorithmic decision aid could derive a flawed estimate of the risk of a particular operational plan, leading to a use of force that either unnecessarily fails or succeeds at a greater cost than required. These risks are amplified when systems are employed outside their design context, which may be more likely due to competitive dynamics.9 The Risk of Unintentional Conflict Second, even if algorithms work as designed, they could unintentionally make conflict more likely. Uncertainty about how algorithms will work on the battlefield could create challenges for signaling adversaries through posture and deployments in a crisis or within a conflict. Actors might be uncertain about how A Ienabled systems deployed by an adversary will behave. They might not believe that AI-enabled autonomous systems are programmed as described because the black-box nature of algorithms could lead to increased skepticism of claims made about the systems. Even if a state is telling the “truth” about a specific system and how it was used, there might not be a way for a third party or another state to validate those claims. Mistrust due to great power competition could exacerbate the situation. There is still substantial uncertainty about the reliability of many AI methods, especially deep learning and related techniques when they generate opaque outputs, meaning there is not an available chain of logic which explains why the algorithm recommended or engaged in a particular action.10 Even with sufficient training data, hedges against biases, and protections from data poisoning and hacking, current DoD systems may not be prepared for testing, evaluation, validation, and verification (TEVV) of algorithmic systems, particularly AI-enabled autonomous systems that will continually learn while operating.11 Furthermore, in operating at machine speed, AI-enabled autonomous systems could cause adversaries in a conflict to fear losing a war so quickly that they feel compelled to escalate.12 For an adversary with nuclear weapons, this could create pressure for launch postures such as pre-delegation and launch on warning that increase the chance of nuclear use.
Reject their Rhetoric of an “Arms Race” – changing our discourse is necessary to head off constructed insecurity and escalation
Roff 2019 – Fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Program [Heather, 4/26/19, https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2019.1604836, “The Frame problem: The Ai ‘Arms Race’ isn’t one’, 6/18/22, LND]
Diffusion, however, is a different animal. Widely available commercial off the shelf components, a widely available and open source knowledge base, and wide access to large amounts of data make limiting the diffusion of AI knowledge almost impossible. There are necessary ingredients for AI, including access to computing power and sufficient amounts of data. Some actors possess more of these ingredients than others, but that advantage does not preclude individuals, groups, companies, or states from obtaining access to and knowledge about AI. As greater emphasis is placed on the economic and security benefits of using AI systems, AI will become more diffused because the incentive structure rewards diffusion. Managing the risks of proliferation and diffusion of a knowledge base is an entirely different enterprise than restraining an arms race. In the case of artificial intelligence, rather than looking at what sorts of actions are required for deterrence, what balances may affect conflict onset or escalation, world leaders should turn their focus to how to foster responsible competition. Mitigating the risks associated with AI is not a single-shot activity. Certainly there are technological solutions, such as researching new ways of testing, verifying, and validating systems that include the technologies that fall under the AI umbrella. There even may be novel ways of constraining unwanted system behaviors by generating new architectures or safety controls. Ultimately, however, reducing the risks that AI will be abused requires a reframing of the way in which we think, talk, write about, and deploy AI. The problems of AI misuse are human problems; they are problems exhibited by all dual-use technologies, not just AI. Control of artificial intelligence lies with humans, because they are the moral agents responsible for the design, development, and deployment of AI.
Our alternative turns their impacts – only rejecting the “Arms Race” discourse allows global AI collaboration, which is essential its development.
Huang and Scott, 2018 - Chief Executive Officer and Chief Technology Officer at Malong Technologies [Dinglong and Matt July 21 World Economic Forum “Who will win the AI race? If countries work together, then the answer could be all of us” https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/06/ai-arms-race-global-collaboration/, BK]
As an artificial intelligence company with co-founders from China and the United States, we get this question a lot. The premise behind it is straightforward: many believe that China will soon challenge the current leader in AI, the United States. An arms race is imminent, or so the thinking goes, and the smart move is for each national government to fund its own AI programme to make sure its citizens don’t miss out. We recognize we might be shouting into the wind a little bit, but we want to challenge part of that thinking and suggest a way to look beyond competition among nation-states. The AI community is global. We do our best work when we work together across boundaries. It has been like that for a long time. Here are some quick examples: 1. The seminal paper on deep neural nets was published in 2009 by Geoff Hinton, a Brit working at the University of Toronto. One of his co-authors was Li Deng, who is Chinese and was working at Microsoft Research in Redmond. 2. Andrew Ng, who trained computers to recognize cats in videos for a research project at Google, was born in the United Kingdom to parents who were from Hong Kong. He spent much of his childhood in Singapore before studying in the US. 3. Another leading light in AI is Yann LeCun, from France, now working for Facebook and New York University. 4. And Microsoft Research’s Rick Rashid, from Iowa, brought us the first Chinese-English real-time translation demonstration in Tianjin in 2012 thanks to a team of experts from China, the US, the UK and Germany. At Malong Technologies, we’ve tried to reflect and extend that heritage of global collaboration. We’re co-founded by a Chinese national from Shenzhen and an American from New York City. We have offices and teams in China, the US, and Japan, and we have expansion plans that include South America and Europe in the near term. We are active in the Association of Asia-Pacific Universities, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the G20 Young Entrepreneurs Alliance and other multinational groups along with our new membership in the World Economic Forum’s 2018 Technology Pioneers. Being global gives the AI community dynamism, creativity and accountability. It imposes broad obligations to present, share and defend our ideas and techniques against the best in the world. Irrespective of where we’re located, we have to be aware of one another’s work. If anyone tried to wall themselves off from the rest of the global AI community, keeping their work to themselves, their own work would slow down, wither and die. There’s a mutual interdependence based on transparency in pursuit of the best ideas for the field and ultimately, for humanity. That is what drives progress more than any competition among nation-states.
--Extend No Arms Race
“Arms Race” claims are exaggerated – the AI adoption process is routine continuation of modernization
Horowitz and Scharre, 2021 - Director of the Emerging Capabilities Policy Office in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Vice President and Director of Studies at CNAS [Michael, Paul, January 12 2021, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence- Building Measures”, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ai-and-international-stability-risks-and-confidence-building-measures, Acc 6/18/22. M.A.]
AI is a general-purpose technology akin to computers or the internal combustion engine, not a discrete technology like missiles or aircraft. Thus, while concerns of an “AI arms race” are overblown, real risks exist.2 Additionally, despite the rhetoric of many national leaders, military spending on AI is relatively modest to date. Rather than a fervent arms race, militaries’ pursuit of AI looks more like routine adoption of new technologies and a continuation of the multi-decade trend of adoption of computers, networking, and other information technologies. Nevertheless, the incorporation of AI into national security applications and warfare poses genuine risks. Recognizing the risks is not enough, however. Addressing them requires laying out suggestions for practical steps states can take to minimize risks stemming from military AI competition.3 One approach states could take is adopting confidence-building measures (CBMs): unilateral, bilateral, and/or multilateral actions that states can take to build trust and prevent inadvertent military conflict. CBMs generally involve using transparency, notification, and monitoring to attempt to mitigate the risk of conflict.4 There are challenges involved in CBM adoption due to differences in the character of international competition today versus during the Cold War, when CBMs became prominent as a concept. However, considering possibilities for CBMs and exploring ways to shape the dialogue about AI could make the adoption of stability-promoting CBMs more likely.
There is no global sprint or arms race – “Arms Race” claims overexaggerate normal military behavior and ignore actual spending.
Perry and Scharre, 2020 - Project Coordinator at the Future of Life Institute and Director of the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Lucas and Paul; March 16 "AI Alignment Podcast: On Lethal Autonomous Weapons with Paul Scharre," https://futureoflife.org/2020/03/16/on-lethal-autonomous-weapons-with-paul-scharre/?cn-reloaded=1 Acc 2/2/21 TA]
Paul Scharre: If there’s an arms race, it’s a very strange one because no one is building the weapons. We see militaries advancing in robotics and autonomy, but we don’t really see sort of this rush to build autonomous weapons. I struggle to point to any programs that I’m aware of in militaries around the globe that are clearly oriented to build fully autonomous weapons. I think there are lots of places where much like these incremental advancements of autonomy in cars, you can see more autonomous features in military vehicles and drones and robotic systems and missiles. They’re adding more autonomy. And one might be violently concerned about where that’s going. But it’s just simply not the case that militaries have declared their intention. We’re going to build autonomous weapons, and here they are, and here’s our program to build them. I 

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