AT - NATO Cohesion DA - MNDI 2022 PHA
AT - NATO Cohesion DA - MNDI 2022 PHA.docx
Indexed text preview
Affirmative DA Unity Answers No NATO Unity / Cohesion Cohesion fraying now --- Turkey and Hungary blocking NATO priorities Bloomberg Editors 22 [June 20, 2022, “Western Unity Is More Essential Than Ever”, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/western-unity-is-more-essential-than-ever/2022/06/10/0c095a50-e8be-11ec-a422-11bbb91db30b_story.html, acc 6/19/22, NB] Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attack on Ukraine has made the West — in this context, NATO and the European Union — more united than it’s been in a long time. Unfortunately, that cohesion is now at risk, as the Russian invasion turns into a grinding war of attrition. To deter Putin from escalating and to keep him from winning, Western leaders must focus on the two weakest links in their alliance: Turkey and Hungary. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the president of Turkey — a member of NATO but not the EU — says he will block the accession of Sweden and Finland to the transatlantic alliance unless he’s given a series of unrelated concessions. If he actually follows through, he would not only leave both countries more vulnerable to Russian aggression, but also render NATO weaker than it should be in defending its Baltic members. Gratuitously, Erdogan is also increasing tensions with Greece, another NATO ally. Then there’s Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. For weeks, he’s been holding up a sanctions package that would embargo Russian oil. EU leaders last week thought they had finally reached a compromise: Only Russian oil delivered by ship would be banned, whereas the sort arriving via pipelines would not. That would give landlocked Hungary, as well as the Czech Republic and Slovakia, more time to adjust their energy infrastructure. In a shocking breach of decorum, Orban then reneged on even that compromise. Bizarrely, he also insisted on keeping the Russian Orthodox Church’s Patriarch Kirill — a staunch backer of Putin and the war — off the new sanctions list. The EU gave in to this demand, too, to get the package passed. The whole ordeal was an embarrassment, and a rare cause for Putin to be optimistic. In every way he can, Orban is signaling that he’s not fully behind the West’s joint effort to support Ukraine and undermine Russia — in effect, that he’s not a reliable ally. So what can be done? A basic design flaw shared by both the EU and NATO is that neither has a mechanism to eject errant members. That means both will need to get creative in reining in rogue leaders. In Erdogan’s case, acceding to blackmail shouldn’t be an option. The US should announce that future arms sales to Turkey will be halted until it comes around on the new accessions. NATO should threaten to suspend Turkish involvement in military planning and exercises. If the situation escalates, revisiting the alliance’s rules to allow for expulsions should be on the table. As for Orban, the EU will need to adopt a similarly hard line. In 2018, the bloc triggered its treaty’s Article 7 against Hungary in a censure of its subversion of democratic institutions, launching a process that could in theory strip Budapest of its voting rights in Brussels. In practice, the measure has been toothless, because it requires unanimous support. Poland, whose populist government is also the target of an Article 7 proceeding, always had Hungary’s back. These days, however, Poland is among the member states that are most hawkishly anti-Putin. And Warsaw is horrified by Orban’s obstructionism. Belatedly, the Poles have come to understand that a strong EU is in their national interest, not against it. They should therefore persuade Orban to join the effort to weaken Putin’s war machine and strengthen Ukraine. If he doesn’t, the other 26 EU countries — including Poland — should strip Hungary of its votes. Holding together the Western alliance has never been easy. Amid a worsening war on its doorstep, it has rarely seemed more necessary. The time for populist political games is over. NATO still facing several obstacles that undermine cohesion --- disagreements over strategic concept and political and military weaknesses Lucas, 22 --- nonresident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (JUNE 7, 2022, 5:31 AM, Edward, “NATO Is Out of Shape and Out of Date; With the bloc’s unity over Ukraine showing cracks, NATO needs an overhaul,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/07/nato-ukraine-russia-war-alliance-reform-geopolitics-military/, JMP) Yet look a little more closely, and the picture is far less rosy. Notwithstanding its apparent unity of purpose since the start of Russia’s war, NATO looks out of shape and out of date. In the run-up to their summit, the allies have been furiously haggling over the language in their new strategic concept, which will frame the alliance’s mission for the coming years and will be unveiled in Madrid. What will it say about Russia? About China? What sacrifices and risks are the member states really willing to accept? Are they willing to pool sovereignty in order to streamline decision-making? Nothing in recent weeks suggests that these questions will get clear answers. For starters, the 30-strong alliance is unwieldy. In military terms, only a handful of members matter—above all, the United States—but in political terms, even little Luxembourg and Iceland get a voice. Worse, the political divides are huge. Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a semi-authoritarian state that flirts with Russia and fumes at what it considers European meddling over human rights. Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orban is taking a different but downward path, fusing wealth and power into a new system of control at home and undermining U.S. and European attempts to put pressure on Russia and China. Macron’s relentless posturing and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s foot-dragging create constant obstacles and distractions. The two leader’s weaknesses, on glorious display since the start of the war, have already enriched the language: Scholzen is a German neologism for “dither,” while makronic in Polish (and its equivalent in Ukrainian) can be roughly translated as “vacuous grandstanding while doing nothing.” Macron and Scholz corrode decision-making with their foibles and thus place a big question mark over the alliance’s credibility and cohesion. Any threat or provocation from Russia is unlikely to be clear or conveniently timed. More likely it will be something deliberately ambiguous, such as a Russian drone that “accidentally” strays onto the territory of a front-line state and hits a target. Some countries would favor a tough response. Others would fear escalation and want dialogue. Still others would take the ambiguity as a convenient excuse to do nothing. Would the 30—soon to be 32—national representatives in the North Atlantic Council, the alliance’s deliberative body, really make a speedy and tough decision on how to react? More likely, some of them would plead for delay, diplomacy, and compromise. Those actually facing the possibility of attack would be far more hawkish, preferring a sharp military confrontation to even the smallest Russian victory. “Not one inch, not one soul,” a senior military figure from one of the Baltic states, speaking anonymously, told me. “We have seen what they did in Ukraine.” The political weaknesses are matched by military ones. By far the most important country in the alliance is the United States. The U.S. security guarantee to Europe—with its threat of devastating conventional and, if necessary, nuclear response to any attack—is the cornerstone of the alliance. “All for one and one for all” sounds fine, but nobody in the Kremlin will tremble at the thought of Spanish, Dutch, or Canadian displeasure. Yet the result of this is a colossal dependence on U.S. capabilities, ranging from ammunition and spare parts (of which European countries’ stockpiles are notoriously skinny) to military transports that move forces quickly and efficiently over long distances. Even if Europe’s new defense spending plans materialize, they will not change the fact that only U.S. armed forces can move with the scale and speed necessary to defend territory from a country like Russia. Conversely, the countries that most need defending—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—are the least able to bear the burden themselves. They need advanced weapons, particularly for air and missile defense, that they cannot afford themselves. The thin neck of land along the Polish-Lithuanian border, the so-called Suwalki Gap, is particularly vulnerable to attack from Russia’s militarized Kaliningrad exclave and Belarus, from which Russia attacked Ukraine. Poland and Lithuania both want a big U.S. military presence—either a permanent base or a persistent rotation of forces—to safeguard this strategic chokepoint. Yet NATO command structures and planning do not fully reflect the imbalance of forces between the United States and Europe. They rely on the fiction that the European allies are more or less equal partners. Even military lightweights need to have important-sounding jobs and installations, making the North Atlantic Council the military version of a parliament dividing out the pork. The resulting command structure is like a tangled pile of spaghetti. In the Baltic region alone, NATO has several multinational headquarters, one divisional headquarterss split between Latvia and Denmark, another divisional headquarters in Poland, and a corps headquarters at a different location in Poland. Overall responsibility for the defense of Europe is divided between three Joint Forces Command headquarters in Naples, Italy; Brunssum, the Netherlands; and Norfolk, Virginia. But the top U.S. military commander in Europe, Air Force Gen. Tod Wolters, is based at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium. A maritime strategy for the Baltic Sea region has yet to be decided—which is just as well, because NATO has yet to create a naval headquarters for the region. Nor has the alliance drawn up real military plans for the reinforcement and defense of its northeastern members, let alone decided who would actually provide the forces and equipment in order to make them credible. Military mobility is meant to be the responsibility of Joint Support and Enabling Command, headquartered in Ulm, Germany, and originally set up as part of the European Union’s own defense policy. A further problem is exercises: NATO does not conduct fully realistic, large-scale rehearsals of how it would respond to a Russian attack. One problem is that these are costly and disruptive. Another is that they expose the huge weaknesses of some NATO members, which can cope with a carefully scripted exercise but lack the ability to improvise. A third reason is the fear, in some countries, that practicing war-fighting would be provocative. Also lacking are detailed plans for fighting a war against Russia, covering such issues as reinforcing of front-line states, countering a Russian attack, regaining any temporarily occupied territory, and—most of all—dealing with a nuclear or other escalation. As a result, nobody is quite sure how anything would work in a crisis. Instead, another assumption reigns: that in a crisis, the United States would take over and do the heavy lifting on all fronts—logistics, intelligence, and combat. To be fair, NATO is working on these problems, and all of them are fixable. But that does not mean that they are anywhere near being fixed. Wishful thinking remains the alliance’s besetting sin. NATO not united on Ukraine Carpenter 22 – senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute [Ted Galen, MARCH 23, 2022, CATO institute, “Just How United Is NATO (and the World) against Russia?” https://www.cato.org/commentary/just-how-united-nato-world-against-russia Acc 6/24/22 ER] Moscow’s aggression also has triggered a sense of alarm and a more serious attitude in multiple European countries about doing more for NATOs collective defense mission. That shift has been especially evident in Germany, where Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s government approved an emergency fund to boost Berlin’s military budget by 100 billion Euros. The latter move would finally fulfill Germany’s longstanding pledge (along with all other NATO members) to spend at least 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product annually on defense. Berlin had repeatedly procrastinated about carrying out that commitment. A far more militant posture by the Scholz government also was apparent when it stated an intent to ship weapons to Ukraine to bolster that country’s military resistance. Previous German governments would have considered such involvement in a raging war unthinkable. Numerous other NATO members, including the United States, already are pouring weapons into Ukraine. Nevertheless, it is easy to overstate the degree of unity regarding policy toward Russia even among NATO members, much less within the broader international community. Indeed, some cracks already are beginning to form in NATO’s solid front. When Poland’s Vice Premier, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, suggested that the Alliance send an armed peacekeeping force to Ukraine to provide humanitarian aid, the reactions were widely divergent. Estonian Defense Minister Kalle Laanet said that a proposed peacekeeping mission was “one of the possibilities” NATO should consider, but several other governments pushed back. We’re “still in too early stages to talk about that,” said Dutch Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren, adding that such a deployment would need the backing of the United Nations Security Council—a requirement that made the plan a nonstarter, since as a permanent member of the Council, Russia holds veto power. Divisions within NATO are even increasingly evident on the issue of providing weapons to Ukraine. Addressing a massive campaign rally on March 15, Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orban, emphasized that “we must stay out of this war … therefore we will not send any troops or weapons to the battlegrounds.” A few days later, Bulgarian Prime Minister Kiril Petkov stated flatly that his country will not engage in “hostilities” in Ukraine and that no arms will be supplied. While US may support aid to Ukraine, there lack of unity and cohesion globally on strategy Carpenter 22 – senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute [Ted Galen, MARCH 23, 2022, CATO institute, “Just How United Is NATO (and the World) against Russia?” https://www.cato.org/commentary/just-how-united-nato-world-against-russia Acc 6/24/22 ER] Beyond NATO (and longstanding U.S. allies in East Asia), the absence of support for Washington’s strategy of imposing harsh penalties on Russia is glaringly evident. That problem surfaced almost immediately. On March 2, the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and calling for the immediate withdrawal of Russian military forces. 141 countries voted for the resolution, and U.S. officials gloated that only 5 voted against it. However, a stunning 35 countries decided to abstain, even though a favorable vote to placate the United States and its allies should have been an easy option, since the resolution was purely symbolic, not obligating UN members to take any substantive action. Yet a significant number of countries in Asia, the Greater Middle East, and Sub‐Saharan Africa, opted to snub Washington. When more than 20 percent of the General Assembly’s membership refuses to embrace a purely feel‐good measure Washington wants passed, the U.S.-sponsored global coalition looks fragile indeed. It is especially ominous for U.S. objectives that both China and India have remained firm in their opposition to imposing economic sanctions on Russia—as have numerous other countries outside of Europe and East Asia. Even portions of Latin America have balked at waging an economic war against Russia. Indeed, beyond Washington’s network of traditional allies, the isolation of Russia appears to be significantly exaggerated. Political scientists frequently note that coalitions tend to be a mile wide but only an inch deep. That situation may well apply to NATO unity regarding policy toward Russia. When it comes to the rest of the world, any sense of unity on that issue is not even a half‐inch deep. AT: Consultation Link Consultations have not been effective in strengthening NATO – there is no enforcement or obligation Lorenz, 20 --- international security expert at the Polish Institute of International Affairs [Wojciech, November, 2020, “Strengthening NATO’s cohesion through consultation”, https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/ICDS_Brief_NATO2030_-Series_1_Wojciech_Lorenz_November-2020_cor.pdf, accessed 6/23/22, NB] The strongest norms and most elaborate mechanisms have been developed regarding consultations on collective defence policy. Since this is a primary task of NATO, derived directly from the Washington Treaty, some experts claim that there might be a legal obligation to consult before a NATO member takes a definite action, which could undermine the common defence.4 There is no mechanism to enforce compliance and there are numerous examples of Allies bypassing consultation to take unilateral actions. Nevertheless, most Allies try to respect such a norm as it creates a similar obligation for the US, limiting the risk, for example, of the unexpected or uncoordinated withdrawal of US troops from Europe. There is another important dimension of consultations concerning actions outside the Euro-Atlantic area—since this is not a ‘treaty area’ there is no apparent legal obligation to consult. Nevertheless, the European Allies expected the US to use consultations to inform them about plans that could affect NATO’s security. The US was also interested in such consultations, expecting that they would facilitate coordination of NATO policies in support of American foreign policy goals, but this rarely turned out to be the case. The 1967 Harmel report was an attempt to strengthen this dimension of consultation and thus NATO’s political cohesion, stating that “the North Atlantic Treaty Area cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of the world. Crises and conflicts arising outside the area may impair its security either directly or by affecting the global balance.”5 In 1974, NATO made another attempt to strengthen consultations adopting the Ottawa Declaration, which stressed that “the Allies are firmly resolved to keep each other fully informed and to strengthen the practice of frank and timely consultations by all means which may be appropriate on matters relating to their common interests as members of the Alliance, bearing in mind that these interests can be affected by events in other areas of the world.”6 Such declarations, however, did not solve the structural problems that discouraged states from consulting to coordinate common responses to crises outside the treaty area. Some states blocked such consultations, believing that the Alliance should not deal with problems beyond its ‘treaty area’ and that discussions could lead to new commitments that would undermine collective defence and deterrence policy. Bigger states also wanted to preserve their privileged bilateral relations with the US, which often resulted in informal consultations in smaller formats. The US did not want to share sensitive information with all Allies without guarantees that this would result in coordinated action in support of US foreign policy goals. NATO consultations have not diffused tensions Lorenz, 20 --- international security expert at the Polish Institute of International Affairs [Wojciech, November, 2020, “Strengthening NATO’s cohesion through consultation”, https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/ICDS_Brief_NATO2030_-Series_1_Wojciech_Lorenz_November-2020_cor.pdf, accessed 6/23/22, NB] In recent years, NATO’s mechanisms of consultation have proved lacking in defusing tensions and discouraging unilateral actions, both in th
Preview shortened. Download the file for the full document.