Neg - AI Ethics Supplement - MNDI 2022 PHA
Neg - AI Ethics Supplement - MNDI 2022 PHA.docx
Indexed text preview
Neg Inherency Resps NATO has already adopted ethical principles for cooperation on AI – Recent meetings and strategies prove NATO Press Release, 2021 [Oct 22, “NATO releases first-ever strategy for Artificial Intelligence” https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_187934.htm LMSi] NATO Defence Ministers agreed to NATOs first-ever strategy for Artificial Intelligence (AI). The strategy outlines how AI can be applied to defence and security in a protected and ethical way. As such, it sets standards of responsible use of AI technologies, in accordance with international law and NATOs values. It also addresses the threats posed by the use of AI by adversaries and how to establish trusted cooperation with the innovation community on AI. Artificial Intelligence is one of the seven technological areas which NATO Allies have prioritized for their relevance to defence and security. These include quantum-enabled technologies, data and computing, autonomy, biotechnology and human enhancements, hypersonic technologies, and space. Of all these dual-use technologies, Artificial Intelligence is known to be the most pervasive, especially when combined with others like big data, autonomy, or biotechnology. To address this complex challenge, NATO Defence Ministers also approved NATOs first policy on data exploitation. Individual strategies will be developed for all priority areas, following the same ethical approach as that adopted for Artificial Intelligence. AI Leadership Adv Resps No solvency – DOD bureaucracy, outdated acquisitions and culture all block AI innovation. Nurkin and Konaev, 2022 - senior fellows at the Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council [Tate and Margarita, 5-25-2022, “Eye to eye in AI: Developing artificial intelligence for national security and defense” Atlantic Council https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/eye-to-eye-in-ai/ ARD] To accelerate AI adoption, the Pentagon must confront its demons: a siloed bureaucracy that frustrates efficient data-management efforts and thwarts the technical infrastructure needed to leverage DoD data at scale; antiquated acquisition and contracting processes that inhibit the DoD’s ability to bring in external innovation and transition successful AI technology prototypes to production and deployment; and a risk-averse culture at odds with the type of openness, experimentation, and tolerance for failure known to fuel innovation.8 Several efforts are under way to tackle some of these problems. Reporting directly to the under secretary of defense, the chief data and artificial intelligence officer (CDAO) role was recently announced to consolidate the office of the chief data officer, the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC), and the Defense Digital Service (DDS). This reorganization brings the DoD’s data and AI efforts under one roof to deconflict overlapping authorities that have made it difficult to plan and execute AI projects.9 Expanding use of alternative acquisition methods, organizations like the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) and the Air Force’s AFWERX are bridging the gap with the commercial technology sector, particularly startups and nontraditional vendors. Still, some tech leaders believe these efforts are falling short, warning that “time is running out.”10 No solvency – it is too late to win the AI arms race – China has Already won – experts admit. Faulconbridge, 2021 – Reuters staff writer [Guy Oct 11, Reuters, “China has won AI battle with U.S., Pentagon's ex-software chief says” https://www.reuters.com/technology/united-states-has-lost-ai-battle-china-pentagons-ex-software-chief-says-2021-10-11/, BK] LONDON, Oct 11 (Reuters) - China has won the artificial intelligence battle with the United States and is heading towards global dominance because of its technological advances, the Pentagon's former software chief told the Financial Times. China, the world’s second largest economy, is likely to dominate many of the key emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence, synthetic biology and genetics within a decade or so, according to Western intelligence assessments. Nicolas Chaillan, the Pentagon's first chief software officer who resigned in protest against the slow pace of technological transformation in the U.S. military, said the failure to respond was putting the United States at risk. "We have no competing fighting chance against China in 15 to 20 years. Right now, it’s already a done deal; it is already over in my opinion," he told the newspaper. "Whether it takes a war or not is kind of anecdotal." China was set to dominate the future of the world, controlling everything from media narratives to geopolitics, he said. Chaillan blamed sluggish innovation, the reluctance of U.S. companies such as Google (GOOGL.O) to work with the state on AI and extensive ethical debates over the technology. Google was not immediately available for comment outside business hours. Chinese companies, Chaillan said, were obliged to work with their government and were making "massive investment" in AI without regard to ethics. He said U.S. cyber defences in some government departments were at "kindergarten level". No solvency – the DOD will not enhance JAIC authority to solve the case – empirically, they have fragmented acquisitions. Tarraf, Shelton, Parker 2019 - Senior Information Scientist, Senior Engineer, and physical Scientist at the RAND Corporation [ Danielle C., William, Edward, et al RAND Cooperation, “The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence”, file:///Users/MiraAgarwal/Downloads/RAND_RR4229%20(2).pdf, Acc 6/18/22, M.A.] What DoD needs to do now is continue on that path by providing the requisite high-level support, visibility, and authorities (including directive and budget authorities) to enable the JAIC to enact change. Doing so would ensure that the JAIC has a chance of succeeding at its mandate of scaling AI and its impact across DoD. It would also ensure that DoD’s intent, messaging, and actions are all consistent. Having said that, we recognize that this option runs counter to DoD history and precedents, particularly because of the recent reform leading to the dissolution of the USD for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and subsequent creation of the USD(R&E) and USD(A&S) 3 The DMAG is the primary civilian-military management forum that supports the Secretary of Defense and addresses top DoD issues that have resource, management, and broad strategic and/or policy implications. The DMAG’s primary mission is to produce advice for the DSD in a collaborative environment and to ensure that the DMAG execution aligns with the Secretary of Defense’s priorities and the planning and programming schedule. The DMAG is cochaired by the DSD and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with secretaries of the military departments, chiefs of the military services, and DoD principal staff assistants holding standing invitations. See U.S. Department of Defense, Chief Management Officer, “Deputy’s Management Action Group (DMAG),” webpage, undated. 68 The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence that took effect in February 2018. By enacting this reform, Congress intentionally weakened the directive authorities that OSD principals had over the services, and devolved significant procurement and acquisition authorities back to the services. We also recognize that it might not be entirely appropriate to compare DoD with a large company but rather to a large conglomerate because of the historical role and independence of the services. No solvency – Alternate causalities – AI acquisition bureaucracy will keep the US behind China and Russia. Knapp, 2018 – Journalist specializing in emerging technologies [Brandon, 10 April, 2018, C4isrNet, “DoD official: US not part of AI arms race,” https://www.c4isrnet.com/it-networks/2018/04/10/dod-official-us-not-part-of-ai-arms-race/, 6/22/22 MD] One of the Pentagon’s top acquisition officials believes that the United States military is currently on the sidelines of an ongoing artificial intelligence arms race between global powers such as Russia and China. “There might be an artificial intelligence arms race, but we’re not yet in it,” Dr. Michael Griffin, the under secretary of defense for research and engineering, said April 9 at the Future Wars conference held in Washington, D.C. “Our adversaries understand very well the possible future utility of machine learning,” Griffin continued. “I think it’s time we did as well.” Griffin’s comments echo some of the language written into the new National Defense Strategy revealed earlier this year. The strategy prioritizes maintaining a military advantage over Russia and China and calls for the Pentagon to increase investment in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence. The National Defense Strategy also calls for reforming the business and acquisition practices within the Defense Department, which Griffin described at the conference as outdated. When the current acquisition system was designed, the United States’ technological advantage was largely uncontested, Griffin said. This allowed the Pentagon to engage in a lengthy acquisition process with no risk of a serious challenge from adversaries. However, those defense acquisition practices now put the country at a serious disadvantage. “If the decision is [between] how can I be fair to everyone rather than [do] what’s best, we’ll always be behind,” Griffin said. “We can either maintain this process or maintain preeminence, but we probably can’t do both.” Fueling these concerns is the fact that China’s government, unconstrained by such bureaucratic processes, has been particularly focused on developing artificial intelligence. The Chinese state council recently issued a well-funded national strategy designed to harness the power of artificial intelligence with the goal of making the nation “the world’s primary AI innovation center” by 2030. No Solvency – The DOD lacks an AI workforce due to slow hiring and low pay Tarraf et. al 2019 - Senior Information Scientist at the RAND Corporation [Danielle with William Shelton, Edward Parker, Brien Alkire, Diana Gehlhaus, Justin Grana, Alexis Levedahl, Jasmin Léveillé, Jared Mondschein, James Ryseff, “The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence: Assessment and Recommendations”, LMSi] DoD struggles to grow and cultivate AI talent. Our interviews suggest a mixed appreciation for what technical AI talent consists of and which AI talent is needed. Several entities we interviewed, such as the service labs, had a clear sense of AI talent needs, but the majority were still in the beginning stages of such considerations and were more likely to emphasize contracting out for technical talent. Moreover, for those that were clear on AI talent needs, it was a challenge to define the exact knowledge, skills, and abilities they perceived that were required. Ultimately, the AI talent needs of DoD (type,38 quantity, and mix) will depend on the broader strategy pursued for scaling AI, and the extent to which scaling AI will rely on the development of products in-house as opposed to through contracting and outsourcing. The skill sets needed for development of products in-house are significantly different from those needed for contracting and outsourcing, though all AI talent (technical or managerial) is difficult to access in the present market. Nonetheless, the consensus is that DoD faces stiff competition for AI skills and expertise, as evidenced by our interviews across academia, industry, and DoD.39 Many of our DoD interviewees discussed the challenges related to attracting and recruiting technical talent more generally, and expressed the belief that AI talent would be no different. In that spirit, we point to a recent RAND study on career paths for data scientists within the Defense Intelligence Agency.40 Interviews across DoD cited intense competition with the private sector, the limited ability to compete on salary, and long hiring processes. At the same ML developers (see section “Industry: Talent” in Appendix C), that approach will not lead to the development of ML experts. 38 Our industry interviews highlighted four types of AI talent: experts, ML developers, application developers, and project or program managers (see section “Industry: Talent” in Appendix C). 39 Reasons for such stiff competition include salaries and inability to hire at competitive speed. Solvency is too late - China will inevitably win the AI arms race – we have already lost Nurkin and Konaev, 2022 - senior fellows at the Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council [Tate and Margarita, 5-25-2022, “Eye to eye in AI: Developing artificial intelligence for national security and defense” Atlantic Council https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/eye-to-eye-in-ai/ ARD] In September 2021, the Air Force’s first chief software officer, Nicolas Chaillan, resigned in protest of the bureaucratic and cultural challenges that have slowed technology adoption and hindered the DoD from moving fast enough to effectively compete with China. In Chaillan’s view, in twenty years, the United States and its allies “will have no chance competing in a world where China has the drastic advantage in population.”41 Later, he added that China has essentially already won, saying, “Right now, it’s already a done deal.”42 Chaillan’s assessment of the United States engaged in a futile competition with China is certainly not shared across the DoD, but it reflects what many see as a lack of urgency within the risk-averse and ponderous culture of the department. US cannot be an AI leader – our most important AI project failed due to data security and interoperability problems Nurkin and Konaev, 2022 - senior fellows at the Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council [Tate and Margarita, 5-25-2022, “Eye to eye in AI: Developing artificial intelligence for national security and defense” Atlantic Council https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/eye-to-eye-in-ai/ ARD] Among the Pentagon’s most important modernization priorities is the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) program, described as a “concept to connect sensors from all the military services…into a single network.”46 According to the Congressional Research Service, “JADC2 intends to enable commanders to make better decisions by collecting data from numerous sensors, processing the data using AI algorithms to identify targets, then recommending the optimal weapon—both kinetic and non-kinetic—to engage the target.”47 If successful, JADC2 holds the potential to eliminate silos between service C2 networks that previously slowed the transfer of relevant information across the force and, as a result, generate more comprehensive situational awareness upon which commanders can make better and faster decisions. Figure 5. The JADC2 Placemat reflects the complexity and ambition associated with the Department of Defense’s JADC2 Implementation Plan. Source: US Department of Defense. AI is essential to this effort, and the DoD is exploring how best to safely integrate it into the JADC2 program.48 In December 2021, reports emerged that the JADC2 cross-functional team (CTF) would start up an “AI for C2” working group, which will examine how to leverage responsible AI to enhance and accelerate command and control, reinforcing the centrality of responsible AI to the project.49 In March 2022, the DoD released an unclassified version of its JADC2 Implementation Plan, a move that represented, in the words of General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “irreversible momentum toward implementing” JADC2.50 However, observers have highlighted several persistent challenges to implementing JADC2 along the urgent timelines required to maintain (or regain advantage in perception, processing, and cognition, especially vis-à-vis China. Data security and cybersecurity, data-governance and sharing issues, interoperability with allies, and issues associated with integrating the service’s networks have all been cited as challenges with recognizing the ambitious promise of JADC2’s approach. Some have also highlighted that allencompassing ambition as a challenge as well. The Hudson Institute’s Bryan Clark and Dan Patt argue that “the urgency of today’s threats and the opportunities emerging from new technologies demand that Pentagon leaders flip JADC2’s focus from what the US military services want to what warfighters need.”51 The DOD cannot implement an AI policy because there is no precise definition of AI to guide programs. Tarraf, Shelton, Parker 2019 - Senior Information Scientist, Senior Engineer, and physical Scientist at the RAND Corporation [ Danielle C., William, Edward, et al RAND Cooperation, “The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence”, file:///Users/MiraAgarwal/Downloads/RAND_RR4229%20(2).pdf, Acc 6/18/22, M.A.] Currently, it can catalogue these activities, but it is unclear how doing so would help scale AI across DoD. Of course, that assumes that what constitutes an AI activity is known. However, it is not currently clear how the determination of what constitutes an AI initiative or activity is made, by whom, and whether that determination is consistent across DoD.8 The JAIC lacks a five-year strategic road map, and a precise objective allowing it to formulate one. Our industry interviews (see section “Industry: Organization in Appendix C) and relevant literature highlight the need for five-year strategic road maps to execute organizational transformation,9 particularly a transformation of the magnitude envisioned in the DoD AI strategy and that the JAIC has been tasked with executing. In that context, our industry interviews also emphasized the need for an objective articulated in precise-enough terms to enable the formulation of such a strategic road map (see section “Industry: Organization” in Appendix C). DoD experience with technology also highlights the importance of clearly defined, measurable goals in 8 We touched upon this point earlier in Chapter Three while discussing the definition of AI. Although it is not clear that enforcing a DoD-wide definition of AI is either feasible or helpful, the question of how DoD identifies and tracks AI activities or programs remains an important open question. 9 John M. Bryson, Lauren Hamilton Edwards, and David M. Van Slyke, “Getting Strategic About Strategic Planning Research,” Public Management Review, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2018. 48 The Department of Defense Posture for Artificial Intelligence enhancing success (see section “Adoption and Scaling of Unmanned Aircraft Systems” in Appendix D). The JAIC’s mission, which we have distilled to scale AI and its impact across DoD, is too vague to serve as a five-year objective for the purpose of this road map. The JAIC needs a refined objective that is precise, ambitious, and potentially feasible in the time frame, and that can serve to guide the development of an agile, strategic road map to include shorter-term (one-year) goals and metrics to assess progress along these goals. The existence of a five-year strategic road map would also help focus the selection of NMIs and justify their relevance to the overall objective (see “Organization: At OSD Level” in Appendix B). Alternate causality – America’s computer industry refuses to cooperate with the military on AI Scharre, 2019 - Vice President and Director of Studies at CNAS [Paul, May-June, “Killer Apps: The Real Dangers of an AI Arms Race,” https://omnilogos.com/killer-apps-real-dangers-of-ai-arms-race/6/18/22 MD] Equally alarming for U.S. policymakers is the sharp divide between Washington and Silicon Valley over the military use of AI. Employees at Google and Microsoft have objected to their companies' contracts with the Pentagon, leading Google to discontinue work on a proj
Preview shortened. Download the file for the full document.