Aff - Ban OCOs - MSDI 2022
Aff - Ban OCOs - MSDI 2022.docx
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Ban Offensive Cyber Operations Affirmative 1AC 1AC – Inherency Cyberwarfare has become increasingly important and complex. The United States and NATO are at an important crossroads when it comes to their offensive cyber operations policy. Continuing their offensive cyber operations could make a global conflict inevitable which is why a ban is needed now. Brandon Valeriano and Benjamin Jensen, 19, (Brandon Valeriano and Benjamin Jensen, Brandon Valeriano Senior Fellow, Cato Institute Benjamin Jensen Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Advanced Warfighting at the Marine Corps University, 1-15-2019, Cato Institute, The Myth of the Cyber Offense: The Case for Restraint, https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint#notes, 6-26-2022) SCade The Myth of the Offense Contrary to observed patterns of limited disruption and espionage, Cyber Command sees cyberspace as a domain fraught with increasing risk, where great powers such as China and Russia will undermine American power. The only solution, from this perspective, is to go on the offense. Yet, the benefits of an offensive posture, especially in cyberspace, are mostly illusory to date. Instead, the cyber domain tends to be optimized for defense and deception, not decisive offensive blows. Not only is offense likely the weaker form of competition in cyberspace, it also risks inadvertent escalation. The fear, suspicion, and misperception that characterize interstate rivalries exacerbate the risk of offensive action in cyberspace. Cyber Command’s 2018 persistent-action strategy aims to “expose adversaries’ weaknesses, learn their intentions and capabilities, and counter attacks close to their origins.”44 Put in simple terms, the best defense is a good offense: get on adversary networks and stop cyber operations targeting the United States before they occur. Under this strategy, offensive cyber operations will also be preemptive in that they are designed to “contest dangerous adversary activity before it impairs [U.S.] national power.”45 To use another sports metaphor, come out swinging. Go on the offense first and establish escalation dominance (that is, demonstrating such superior capabilities over the target state that it can’t afford to escalate in response).46 According to Cyber Command, preemptive strikes will “impose . . . strategic costs on our adversaries, compelling them to shift resources to defense and reduce attacks.”47 Whether through punishment, risk, or denial strategies, offensive actions theoretically alter the target’s behavior by increasing the expected costs of targeting U.S. interests.48 Offensive action, according to this thinking, deters future aggression by signaling resolve and establishing escalation dominance. Yet, there are well-established reasons to doubt that offensive options produce the intended results in cyberspace. Defense and Deception The rationale behind persistent action—that the best defense is a good offense—is deeply flawed. In fact, most military and strategic theory holds that the defense is the superior posture.49 For example, Sun Tzu describes controlling an adversary to make their actions more predictable, and hence easy to undermine, by baiting them to attack strong points.50 The stronger form of war is a deception-driven defense: confusing an attacker so that they waste resources attacking strong points that appear weak. This parallels cybersecurity scholars Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay’s claim that cyberspace is not offense dominant, but deception dominant.51 Rather than persistent action and preemptive strikes on adversary networks, the United States needs persistent deception and defensive counterstrikes optimized to undermine adversary planning and capabilities. Fear and the Security Dilemma New policy options proposed by Cyber Command and the Trump administration risk exacerbating fear in other countries and creating a self-reinforcing spiral of tit-for-tat escalations that risk war even though each actor feels he is acting defensively—or, as it is called in the scholarly literature, a security dilemma.52 As shown above, most cyber operations to date have not resulted in escalation. The cyber domain has been a world of spies collecting valuable information and engaging in limited disruptions that substitute for, as well as complement, more conventional options. Shifting to a policy of preemptive offensive cyber warfare risks provoking fear and overreaction in other states and possibly producing conflict spirals. Even limited-objective cyber offensive action defined as “defending forward” can be misinterpreted and lead to inadvertent escalation.53 As the historian Cathal Nolan puts it, “intrusions into a state’s strategically important networks pose serious risks and are therefore inherently threatening.”54 More worryingly, with a more offensive posture, it will be increasingly difficult for states to differentiate between cyber espionage and more damaging degradation operations.55 What the United States calls defending forward, China and Russia will call preemptive strikes. Worse still, this posture will likely lead great powers to assume all network intrusions, including espionage, are preparing the environment for follow-on offensive strikes. According to cybersecurity scholar Ben Buchanan, “in the [aggressor] state’s own view, such moves are clearly defensive, merely ensuring that its military will have the strength and flexibility to meet whatever comes its way. Yet potential adversaries are unlikely to share this perspective.”56 The new strategy risks producing a “forever cyber war” prone to inadvertent escalation because it implies all cyber operations should be interpreted as escalatory by adversaries.57 1AC – Plan Plan: The United States federal government substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the area of cybersecurity by banning offensive cyber operations. 1AC - Advantage – Miscalculation US OCOs commitment encourages preemptive attacks and targeting countries global infrastructure---both cascade and entangle allies into conflict Sophie Arts, 18, (Sophie Arts, Sophie is Program coordinator supporting The German Marshall Fund of the United States’ (GMF) security and defense policy work in Washington DC, German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan, 2018, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, “Offense as the New Defense: New Life for NATO’s Cyber Policy”, https://nato-engages.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Offense-as-the-New-Defense-New-Life-for-NATO%E2%80%99s-Cyber-Policy.pdf, 6-26-2022) SCade Deter, then Defend? NATO’s defenses are only as strong as the sum of those of its members. Like in other domains, alliance cyber assets are not NATO-owned but provided by member states.19 U.S. capabilities in the cyber domain are by far the most sophisticated among the allies. Besides having an edge over most competitors in the field of cyber security,20 the United States tops rankings as a global leader in offensive cyber capabilities.21 The recent announcement that it would contribute its capabilities to NATO operations consequently could help the alliance bolster its deterrence posture against hostile cyber-attacks. Until recently, NATO and member states, including the United States, have relied on strictly defensive cyber tools to protect their infrastructure. However, given that this approach has done little to discourage hostile actors, the strategic value of incorporating offensive cyber operations has long been discussed. In late 2017, Stoltenberg announced that NATO would integrate cyber weapons of its members into military operations to deter and defend against threats, marking the “biggest overall policy shift in decades,” according to officials.22 The U.S. decision to commit offensive and defensive capabilities to NATO follows on the heels of this move. The addition of offensive cyber tools to the defense and deterrence toolbox is not only new for NATO, it also tracks a recent shift in the U.S. posture. The White House authorized the use of offensive cyber weapons to deter foreign adversaries in September following the publication of the Department of Defense’s 2018 Cyber Strategy.23 The strategy also incorporates a new mission of “defending forward” as a means to “disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source, including activity that falls below the level of armed conflict.”24 While defending forward is, as the name suggests, defensive in nature, it entails targeting foreign cyberspace infrastructure to pre-empt incoming attacks through offensive cyber operations. This shift from reactive to preemptive action in cyberspace marks the most significant departure from the previous U.S. cyber strategy, published in 2015, and comes in response to persistent cyber campaigns against the United States directed by Russia and China. Taken individually, these offenses may fall short of provoking an official response, but their cumulative impact over time is a significant concern and needs to be addressed. The new forward-leaning posture of the United States seeks to address this threat preemptively without risking an escalation to conventional military uses of force.25 Superior cyber capabilities will not be a deterrent per se, but they can add to NATO’s resilience against threats.26 Aggressive cyber operations have already become an important element in the hybrid warfare tool kit of many adversaries. Adding offensive cyber capabilities will likely not stop this. That is why it is critical that deterrence against cyber threats not only relies on cyber operations, but also draws on the full spectrum of conventional and unconventional responses, as outlined in the 2018 Brussels summit declaration.27 Defensive and offensive cyber capabilities can reinforce NATO members’ ability to deter and deny cyber-attacks by disincentivizing other actors from developing cyber weapons in the first place, and by convincing those with or without offensive cyber capabilities that attacks will be largely ineffective or come at an equal or greater cost to them. Proactive cyber defense also can help to anticipate and prevent an attack on computers and networks, which requires active monitoring of hostile actors. This is where offensive cyber operations provide the most strategic value. For instance, they could interfere directly with operations of adversaries by manipulating their devices and infrastructure through malware, or by shutting off power and networks from which an attack originates. They can also affect the calculations of hostile actors who may judge that the potential cost of an attack outweighs its strategic gains. On the other hand, countering cyber threats with offensive operations could have a cascading effect that eventually precipitates conventional conflict.28 A more assertive U.S. posture on cyber could thus potentially heighten the risk of an unanticipated crisis in the cyber and conventional domains. This could have serious implications for other NATO allies that might be pulled into a conflict, especially if the lines between NATO and U.S. cyber operations are blurred, based on Mattis’ recent statement. Preemptive cyberwar causes nuclear war and draw-in even if NATO-Russia war does not---independently crushes nuclear deterrence Michael T. Klare, 19, (Michael T. Klare, Michael T. Klare is a professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association. This is the fourth in the “Arms Control Tomorrow” series, in which he considers disruptive emerging technologies and their implications for war-fighting and arms control., 11-1-2019, Arms Control Association, Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#bio, 6-26-2022) SCade Edited for language For the past several years, the U.S. Department of Defense has been exploring how it could employ its own very robust cyberattack capabilities to compromise or destroy enemy missiles from such states as North Korea before they can be fired, a strategy sometimes called “left of launch.”3 Russia and China can assume, on this basis, that their own launch facilities are being probed for such vulnerabilities, presumably leading them to adopt escalatory policies such as those espoused in the 2018 NPR report. Wherever one looks, therefore, the links between cyberwar and nuclear war are growing. The Nuclear-Cyber Connection These links exist because the NC3 systems of the United States and other nuclear-armed states are heavily dependent on computers and other digital processors for virtually every aspect of their operation and because those systems are highly vulnerable to cyberattack. Every nuclear force is composed, most basically, of weapons, early-warning radars, launch facilities, and the top officials, usually presidents or prime ministers, empowered to initiate a nuclear exchange. Connecting them all, however, is an extended network of communications and data-processing systems, all reliant on cyberspace. Warning systems, ground- and space-based, must constantly watch for and analyze possible enemy missile launches. Data on actual threats must rapidly be communicated to decision-makers, who must then weigh possible responses and communicate chosen outcomes to launch facilities, which in turn must provide attack vectors to delivery systems. All of this involves operations in cyberspace, and it is in this domain that great power rivals seek vulnerabilities to exploit in a constant struggle for advantage. The use of cyberspace to gain an advantage over adversaries takes many forms and is not always aimed at nuclear systems. China has been accused of engaging in widespread cyberespionage to steal technical secrets from U.S. firms for economic and military advantages. Russia has been accused, most extensively in the Robert Mueller report, of exploiting cyberspace to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Nonstate actors, including terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State group, have used the internet for recruiting combatants and spreading fear. Criminal groups, including some thought to be allied with state actors, such as North Korea, have used cyberspace to extort money from banks, municipalities, and individuals.4 Attacks such as these occupy most of the time and attention of civilian and military cybersecurity organizations that attempt to thwart such attacks. Yet for those who worry about strategic stability and the risks of nuclear escalation, it is the threat of cyberattacks on NC3 systems that provokes the greatest concern. Gen. Paul M. Nakasone, commander of U.S. Cyber Command, testifies during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on February 14. He warned that China and Russia are conducting sustained cybercampaigns against the United States. (Photo: Mark Wilson/Getty Images)Gen. Paul M. Nakasone, commander of U.S. Cyber Command, testifies during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on February 14. He warned that China and Russia are conducting sustained cybercampaigns against the United States. (Photo: Mark Wilson/Getty Images)This concern stems from the fact that, despite the immense effort devoted to protecting NC3 systems from cyberattack, no enterprise that relies so extensively on computers and cyberspace can be made 100 percent invulnerable to attack. This is so because such systems employ many devices and operating systems of various origins and vintages, most incorporating numerous software updates and “patches” over time, offering multiple vectors for attack. Electronic components can also be modified by hostile actors during production, transit, or insertion; and the whole system itself is dependent to a considerable degree on the electrical grid, which itself is vulnerable to cyberattack and is far less protected. Experienced “cyberwarriors” of every major power have been working for years to probe for weaknesses in these systems and in many cases have devised cyberweapons, typically, malicious software (malware) and computer viruses, to exploit those weaknesses for military advantage.5 Although activity in cyberspace is much more difficult to detect and track than conventional military operations, enough information has become public to indicate that the major nuclear powers, notably China, Russia, and the United States, along with such secondary powers as Iran and North Korea, have established extensive cyberwarfare capabilities and engage in offensive cyberoperations on a regular basis, often aimed at critical military infrastructure. “Cyberspace is a contested environment where we are in constant contact with adversaries,” General Paul M. Nakasone, commander of the U.S. Cyber Command (Cybercom), told the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2019. “We see near-peer competitors [China and Russia] conducting sustained campaigns below the level of armed conflict to erode American strength and gain strategic advantage.” Although eager to speak of adversary threats to U.S. interests, Nakasone was noticeably but not surprisingly reluctant to say much about U.S. offensive operations in cyberspace. He acknowledged, however, that Cybercom took such action to disrupt possible Russian interference in the 2018 midterm elections. “We created a persistent presence in cyberspace to monitor adversary actions and crafted tools and tactics to frustrate their efforts,” he testified in February. According to press accounts, this included a cyberattack aimed at paralyzing the Internet Research Agency, a “troll farm” in St. Petersburg said to have been deeply involved in generating disruptive propaganda during the 2016 presidential elections.6 Other press investigations have disclosed two other offensive operations undertaken by the United States. One called “Olympic Games” was intended to disrupt Iran’s drive to increase its uranium-enrichment capacity by sabotaging the centrifuges used in the process by infecting them with the so-called Stuxnet virus. Another left of launch effort was intended to cause malfunctions in North Korean missile tests.7 Although not aimed at either of the U.S. principal nuclear adversaries, those two attacks demonstrated a willingness and capacity to conduct cyberattacks on the nuclear infrastructure of other states. Efforts by strategic rivals of the United States to infiltrate and eventually degrade U.S. nuclear infrastructure are far less documented but thought to be no less prevalent. Russia, for example, is believed to have planted malware in the U.S. electrical utility grid, possibly with the intent of cutting off the flow of electricity to critical NC3 facilities in the event of a major crisis.8 Indeed, every major power, including the United States, is believed to have crafted cyberweapons aimed at critical NC3 components and to have implanted malware in enemy systems for potential use in some future confrontation. Pathways to Escalation Knowing that the NC3 systems of the major powers are constantly being probed for weaknesses and probably infested with malware designed to be activated in a crisis, what does this say about the risks of escalation from a nonkinetic battle, that is, one fought without traditional weaponry, to a kinetic one, at first using conventional weapons and then, potentially, nuclear ones? None of this can be predicted in advance, but those analysts who have studied the subject worry about the emergence of dangerous new pathways for escalation. Indeed, several such scenarios have been identified.9 The first and possibly most dangerous path to escalation would arise from the early use of cyberweapons in a great power crisis to paraly
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