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2022 SDI Counterplan

CP - Unilateral CP - MSDI 2022

CP - Unilateral CP - MSDI 2022.docx

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MSDI Unilateral CP + Aff Answers
1NC
Topic
“The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in one or more of the following areas: artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cybersecurity.”
VS AI
The United States federal government should substantially increase its unilateral security measures in the realm of artificial intelligence by [doing the aff]
US-NATO engagement on AI fails
Ulrike Esther Franke, 2021 (Ulrike Esther Franke, 2021, European Council on Foreign Relations, ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE: HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA COULD CLASH OVER AI, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep29123, 6-24-2022) SCade
Obstacles to cooperation Both sides of the Atlantic are already motivated to cooperate with each other on AI. But, despite these shared interests, transatlantic cooperation on AI may not be straightforward. Four trends, in particular, could pose problems: transatlantic estrangement; European digital autonomy efforts; differing views on China; and, potentially, Brexit. Transatlantic estrangement The transatlantic alliance has had a bad four years. The Trump administration’s criticism of the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, the president’s threats to leave NATO, and his active criticism of the EU all made Europeans wonder whether they had lost their most important partner. Moreover, in light of the conflict over 5G, in the minds of many Europeans, technology in particular has become an area that creates conflict in the transatlantic relationship rather than fostering cooperation. Although transatlantic relations are likely to improve under Biden, substantial damage has been done, and it will take some time to mend these ties. But, even if relations improve, it is becoming increasingly obvious that US has a diminishing interest in Europe as a geopolitically important part of the world. This trend was already visible under Trump’s predecessor, Barack Obama. It is, therefore, unsurprising that, on technology cooperation, both sides emphasise the importance of working with other actors as well as each other. The US National Security Commission on AI, for example, recommends that the US Departments of State and Defense “should negotiate formal AI cooperation agreements with Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam”. Its March 2020 report emphasises on several occasions the importance of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. Meanwhile, Europeans are pursuing the idea of an alliance for multilateralism. And, on technology and AI more specifically, they have also begun to reach out to other democratic allies. European digital autonomy The most important aspect of transatlantic estrangement, however, is not the loss of trust between the US and Europe – which they will eventually reverse. Rather, during the four years of the Trump administration, and partly in response to isolationist tendencies in the US, Europeans have become much more comfortable talking about European strategic autonomy or sovereignty. Without encouraging the narrative that these efforts are directed against the US, or were primarily an answer to Trump, Europeans aim to empower Europe as an actor in its own right. In the technological realm, this led to the idea of European digital sovereignty, the aim of which is to build up European technological capabilities. Although European digital sovereignty is not specifically targeted at the US, it has led, among other things, to efforts such as the possible regulation of American technology companies and concerns over American firms acquiring European start-ups. European campaigners and some policymakers believe US tech giants such as Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon are forces to protect against. European thinking on technology partly developed in opposition to the US and US companies. Thus, European efforts to build up digital sovereignty may impede transatlantic cooperation. The EU’s effort to strengthen ethical AI, and to make ‘trustworthy AI’ a unique selling point for Europe, might also end up creating problems for transatlantic cooperation. Many EU policymakers believe that the EU’s insistence on ethical AI will eventually become a location advantage for Europe (much like data privacy): as more people become concerned about unethical AI and data security, they will prefer to use or buy AI ‘made in Europe’ rather than elsewhere. In this respect, two European aims are at odds with each other: on the one hand, Europeans want to ensure that AI is developed and used in an ethical way. Partnering with a powerful player such as the US on this matter should be an obvious way to help them achieve this goal. However, if the EU considers ethical AI not just a goal for humanity but a development that may also create commercial advantages for Europe, then transatlantic cooperation on this issue is counterproductive, as it would undermine Europe’s uniqueness. Finally, many Europeans have expressed scepticism about the extent to which Europe and the US are indeed aligned on ethical AI principles. For example, the Danish national AI strategy argues for a common ethical and human-centred basis for AI. It describes ethical AI as a particularly European approach: “Europe and Denmark should not copy the US or China. Both countries are investing heavily in artificial intelligence, but with little regard for responsibility, ethical principles and privacy.” Many Europeans feel that the US “has no idea how to regulate” cyberspace and continues to show little enthusiasm for doing so. The EU, however, likes to think of itself as a trailblazer when it comes to digital rights, such as the 2014 “right to be forgotten” or the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation. Differing views on China As noted, only a few European states look at AI through a geopolitical lens, and EU efforts on this matter focus primarily on strengthening the EU as a global player. This means that the American interest in using transatlantic cooperation as a means to curb Chinese power is likely to have only limited traction in Europe. And US companies, rather than Chinese ones, currently remain the primary ‘other’ for Europe to measure itself against. European regulation efforts still concentrate on US companies rather than Chinese firms. In light of recent changes in language on China in both NATO and the EU, which describe the country as a “strategic competitor” and “systemic rival”, European and American views of China may converge eventually. But, at the moment, Europeans do not feel the same urgency as the US when it comes to pushing back against China. Unfortunately for those in the US who favour greater transatlantic cooperation, the European nation that most often thinks in geopolitical terms, France, is among those most sceptical of the US.
VS BioTech
The United States federal government should substantially increase its unilateral security measures in biotechnology by [doing the aff]
That solves – US action alone is sufficient to solve
J. Stephen Morrison and Katherine E. Bliss, 21, (J. Stephen Morrison and Katherine E. Bliss, Senior Vice President and Director, Global Health Policy Center, Katherine is Senior Fellow and Director, Immunizations and Health Systems Resilience, Global Health Policy Center 4-14-2021, Center for Strategic & International Studies, The Time Is Now for U.S. Global Leadership on Covid-19 Vaccines, https://www.csis.org/analysis/time-now-us-global-leadership-covid-19-vaccines, 6-24-2022) SCade
A Pivot Point of U.S. Confidence
The United States should launch a signature global initiative on Covid-19 vaccine supply, delivery, and demand, propelled by high-level U.S. diplomacy and combined with a robust strategy with concrete, quantifiable goals. The Biden administration is on track to reach a pivot point of confidence in managing the domestic epidemic over the course of the summer, and it should seize that opportunity to escalate its international engagement while attending to the ongoing domestic challenges and making the case for U.S. global engagement to the American people. The Biden administration has already taken important steps to support the global vaccination effort but should do more, quickly, to lay the diplomatic and operational groundwork, leveraging the global leadership role of the Office of the President and President Biden’s personal commitment. The administration should signal its intent to begin to scale up the sharing of vaccine doses with lower- and middle-income countries, beginning at the earliest possible moment and accelerating through the fall. It should work with international partners to develop an international coalitional effort to bring greater transparency and accountability to the global vaccine marketplace and to create voluntary incentives for technology transfer to increase regional manufacturing capacity. It should prioritize improving production, quality control, and pricing to ensure equitable access to vaccines. And it should spearhead innovations that will strengthen partner country readiness and increase public trust and confidence in vaccines and vaccine demand. These are fundamentally ethical, economic, and national security matters. Concerted U.S. action internationally will strengthen the protection of Americans at home but also lift the threat posed by the pandemic to the world’s most vulnerable populations, expedite the reopening of the global economy, and enhance U.S. influence in shaping solutions that align with U.S. values and interests. These goals can be advanced while epidemic controls are consolidated at home. And even in the setting of a successful domestic vaccination campaign, failure to adequately address critical vaccine shortages abroad means extended time periods for Covid-19 transmission globally. This longer pandemic window will accentuate human suffering, hamper global economic development, continue to limit international travel for at least the next one to two years, and increase the risk of vaccine-escape variants that can undermine control in the United States and globally.
VS Cyber
The United States federal government should substantially increase its unilateral security measures in the realm of cybersecurity by [doing the aff]
The US is miles ahead of the competition – but refuses to use its capabilities – the CP resolves that without involving NATO
Joseph Marks, 21, (Joseph Marks, Anchor of The Cybersecurity 202 newsletter, 6-28-2021, Washington Post, Analysis, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/06/28/cybersecurity-202-united-states-is-still-number-one-cyber-capabilities/, 6-24-2022) SCade
The United States remains by far the world’s most cyber-capable nation with no major competitors for the title. That’s the conclusion from a mammoth 182-page report released today by British think tank the International Institute for Strategic Studies that reviews the cyber capabilities of 15 of the world’s biggest players in hacking and digital defense. The report assesses both government and private-sector capabilities. The report relegates the most troublesome U.S. adversaries, Russia and China, to a second tier of cyber powers. That group also contains the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Israel and France. However, China’s rapid digital development and its growing slate of technology firms make it “the only state currently on a trajectory to join the U.S. in the first tier of cyber powers,” the authors warn. The report marks a major endorsement for U.S. cyber capabilities, which have been called into question by a string of major cyberattacks by Kremlin-linked hackers and Russia-based cybercriminals. It also comes as U.S. officials are struggling to temper the global growth of Chinese tech firms, which they fear could give Beijing a critical edge in cyber competition. “China has made significant progress in bolstering its capabilities since 2014, but nowhere near enough to close the gap with the U.S.,” said IISS Senior Fellow for Cyber, Space and Future Conflict Greg Austin. “The main reason is the relative standing of the two nations’ digital economies, where the U.S. remains far advanced despite China’s digital progress.” Yet all of the U.S. advantages in cyberspace haven’t kept it safe. American companies and government agencies are being pummeled by less capable nations — including not just Russia and China but also Iran and North Korea. And U.S. government hackers are less likely to punch back because they’re trying to follow rules of good behavior in cyberspace that their adversaries ignore, according to the report. “The ways in which the U.S. wields its cyber power appear politically and legally constrained when compared with its main cyber adversaries,” the report notes. It adds that “factors have combined to give the adversaries of the U.S. an edge in the use of unsophisticated cyber techniques that are aimed at subversion but pitched below the legal threshold for an act of aggression that might justify an armed response.” In other words, U.S. officials can't legally justify responding to most adversary hacks by counterpunching with traditional arms or cyberattacks. But more measured responses, such as economic sanctions and indicting hackers, have done little to deter adversaries. IISS places Iran and North Korea in a third tier of cyber capability along with India, Japan, Indonesia and Malaysia.
2NC
2NC---US Leadership Key
Only the US has ethical AI standards – key to set norms globally and counteract bad norms by Russia and China
David H. Freedman, 21, (David H. Freedman, 9-15-2021, Newsweek, The U.S, is the only nation with ethical standard for AI weapons. Should we be afraid?, https://www.newsweek.com/2021/09/24/us-only-nation-ethical-standards-ai-weapons-should-we-afraid-1628986.html, 6-26-2022) SCade
Even if military AI systems work exactly as intended, is it ethical to give machines the authority to destroy and kill? Work, the former defense deputy secretary, insists the U.S. military is strictly committed to keeping a human decision-maker in the "kill chain" so that no weapon will pick a target and fire on its own without an OK. But other nations may not be as careful, he says. "As far as we know, the U.S. military is the only one that has established ethical principles for AI." Twenty-two nations have asked the United Nations to ban automated weapons capable of operating outside human oversight, but so far no agreements have been signed. Human Rights Watch and other advocacy groups have called for similar bans to no avail. If Russia, China and others give AI weapons the authority to choose targets, the U.S. may face a choice: go along or operate at a military disadvantage. That sets up a race-to-the-bottom in which the least ethical or most careless adversary—one that is most aggressive about fielding AI-enabled weaponry, regardless of reliability and safeguards—forces others to follow suit. Nuclear weapons could be placed under the control of flawed AI systems that watch for signs that someone else's AI nukes are about to launch. AI is "increasing the risk of inadvertent or accidental escalation caused by misperception or miscalculation," says James Johnson, a foreign-policy researcher at Ireland's Dublin City University and author of Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare. (Manchester University Press, September 2021).
2NC---NATO Fails in AI
Too many operational constraints and interoperability challenges for NATO’s AI Adoption
Dr. Sanur Sharma, 22, (Dr. Sanur Sharma, Dr Sanur Sharma is Associate Fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses., 6-26-2022, Eurasia Review, NATO’s AI Push And Military Implications – Analysis, https://www.eurasiareview.com/30052022-natos-ai-push-and-military-implications-analysis/, 6-26-2022) SCade
NATO’s AI Adoption: Challenges and Limitations
The influence of AI on NATO comes with a set of opportunities, challenges and risks. Its adoption process has been incremental and prescriptive. The rising geopolitical conflicts and the use of AI in such conflicts have required the establishment of a dynamic ecosystem to support interoperability. The military adoption of AI requires an innovation ecosystem that is self-sufficient, supports deterrence and resilience, and encompasses the strategic innovation process. NATO’s AI strategy raises many concerns related to the AI-driven autonomous weapon systems, as it does not adequately address the development of such systems, its deployment and governance. The AI strategy mostly talks about the ethical and responsible use of AI and has omitted the challenges related to the use of lethal autonomous weapon systems. For the US, its priorities lie in ensuring responsible use of AI-enabled systems with their allies for operational and data sharing. It remains to be seen if all the 30 NATO states agree on the same rules and would be willing to agree on practical guidelines for the operational use of AI-enabled systems. Another challenge for NATO is to standardise rules for all member states in dealing with AI-enabled autonomous weapon systems. Countries like Turkey are working on autonomous weapons and have developed AI-enabled loitering munitions. Turkey has requested the US for upgraded F-16 fighter jets that are said to be AI-enabled.25 The Biden Administration has asked the Congress to approve the upgrade of Turkey’s F-16 fighter jet fleet.26 Turkey’s armed drones have also been used in the Ukraine conflict. For smooth functioning of such systems, it will be necessary for all NATO members to have standardised rules when it comes to deployment of such systems. Also, there is no transparent allocation of roles for different NATO bodies, and “no dedicated line of funding” for its AI strategy.27 The finances are shared through multiple funding like NATO Innovation Fund and DIANA which manages funding for various other projects leading to uncertainty over availability of funds and budget cuts. This will be a significant challenge for the effective implementation of the AI strategy.28 Some other challenges with the adoption of AI strategy through innovation include fragmented national innovation initiatives, allied technological categorisation and digitisation gaps, speed of adoption and spending levels and the underuse of NATO’s mechanisms to undertake collaborative defence innovation.29 NATO will also have to focus on the vulnerabilities and intrusion issues with the AI-enabled systems and will need to set up dedicated centres for AI development and testing in order to maintain a test-safety regime for systems-of-systems employed using AI. The challenges related to AI use in wars and geopolitical conflicts need to be addressed to generate confidence in the use of such systems. Additionally, testing mechanisms and accuracy standards need to be implemented for system components. Policymakers need to address the operational risks and ethical considerations of employing AI in military systems.
NATO is ill-equipped for AI warfare – ambiguity and lack of norms
Jill Aitoro, 18, (Jill Aitoro, 2-17-2018, Defense News, AI warfare is coming, and some global leaders say NATO isn’t ready, https://www.defensenews.com/smr/munich-security-forum/2018/02/16/ai-warfare-is-coming-and-some-global-leaders-say-nato-isnt-ready/, 6-24-2022) SCade
The future of warfare will involve artificial intelligence systems acting as lethal weapons, and much like cyber a decade ago, NATO allies are ill-equipped to manage the potential threat, said current and former European leaders speaking at the Munich Security Conference. Kersti Kaljulaid, president of Estonia, estimated a 50 percent chance that by the middle of this century we will have an AI system capable of launching a lethal attack. And yet, just as the world was not prepared for a cyberattack when Russia first launched a cyberattack against Estonia in 2007 — bombarding websites of Estonian parliament, ba

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