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2022 SDI Negative

Neg - Human Germline Genetic Engineering - MSDI 2022

Neg - Human Germline Genetic Engineering - MSDI 2022.docx

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*Human Germline Genetic Engineering* Negative
Advantage 1 - Ethics
Its Ethical
Banning germline genetic editing is naïve and amounts to ‘biological nonsense’ – their ‘ethical concerns’ are unlikely to ever occur and mystify legitimate implementation benefits
Pinker 15 Pinker, Steven. Steven Pinker is professor of psychology at Harvard University and the author of 10 books, most recently "The Sense of Style: The Thinking Person's Guide to Writing in the 21st Century." “Experts Debate: Are We Playing with Fire When We Edit Human Genes?” STAT, 17 Nov. 2015, www.statnews.com/2015/11/17/gene-editing-embryo-crispr/#Mathews. Accessed 30 June 2022. //DRE
Germline editing should be treated like any other medical procedure, weighing benefits against harms. It should not be banned out of a nebulous terror about tampering with a sacrosanct entity called "the human germline" - a concept which is biological nonsense. We affect the genetic makeup of our offspring, and the species, every time we choose one sex partner over another. And each of us introduces dozens of mutations into our own germlines by exposing ourselves to everyday radiation and chemical mutagens. Genetic editing would be a droplet in the maelstrom of naturally churning genomes. What are the potential benefits? There are several scenarios in which germline editing could benefit parents who carry disease genes. It could be used when both parents are homozygous for the disease, when in vitro fertilization doesn't produce enough viable and unaffected embryos for preimplantation genetic diagnosis, or if future data shows that babies who undergo the procedure have compromised longevity or health. The principal harm of germline editing is the risk of producing a sick or deformed child. Frankly, I suspect that this risk will always be unacceptable, so most of this discussion is moot. But suppose safety could be ensured. Should we fear the prospect of parents genetically enhancing their babies, the outcome the prohibitionists dread? This is highly unlikely - a relic of the early 1990s, when people thought there was "a gene for" this or that talent. We now know that heritable psychological traits, such as intelligence and personality, are the product of hundreds or thousands of genes, each with a tiny effect. And many genes have multiple effects, some of them harmful, such as an increased risk of neurological disease or cancer. With each enhancement providing a trifling benefit and a non-negligible risk, and with the editing process itself imposing risks, it's unlikely that today's morbidly risk-averse helicopter parents will take a chance at enhancing a child. They won't even feed their babies genetically modified applesauce! Add these risks to the expense and tribulation of IVF compared to good old-fashioned sex, and one can conclude that widespread genetic enhancement is too unlikely a possibility to worry about.
Not unethical – all new technologies have unpredictable effects and we don’t ban them. Its key to advancement and innovation.
Savulescu, et.al. 2015 The moral imperative to continue gene editing research on human embryos Julian Savulescu, Jonathan Pugh, Thomas Douglas, Christopher Gyngell Protein Cell 2015, 6(7):476–479 DOI 10.1007/s13238-015-0184-y
However, some in the scientific community are calling a moratorium on gene editing research. Yet, they fail to give a sufficient justification for such a ban. In calling for a moratorium, Lanphier et al. (2015) state: In our view, genome editing in human embryos using current technologies could have unpredictable effects on future generations. This makes it dangerous and ethically unacceptable. Such research could be exploited for non-therapeutic modifications This reasoning is, however, inconsistent with widely accepted practices. Nearly all new technologies have unpredictable effects on future generations. Information technologies like the internet and mobile phones fundamentally change the way people interact and communicate with each other. Their effect on future generations is very hard to predict, and though they could be catastrophic (for example, through cyberterrorism), this does not mean on balance they should be banned. Their expected benefits outweigh their expected harms.
No valid legal human rights restriction on germline editing – ethical because right to health and to benefit from science.
Boggio and Yotova (2021). Gene editing of human embryos is not contrary to human rights law: A reply to Drabiak. Bioethics. doi:10.1111/bioe.12945
In a recent article in this journal, Katherine Drabiak argues that the genome editing of human embryos is contrary to fundamental human rights law.1 “Such practice,” Drabiak concludes, “would violate what we should recognize as a fundamental human right to inherit a genome without deliberate manipulation.” 2 Her argument is presented in the form of a critique of the analysis and conclusions reached by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics in its 2018 report Genome editing and human reproduction: Social and ethical issues3 and of the background paper, authored by Rumiana Yotova, on The regulation of genome editing and human reproduction under international law, EU law and comparative law. 4 Unfortunately, Drabiak's analysis mischaracterizes both the Nuffield Council's report and international human rights law that pertains to genome editing of human embryos. In this reply, we limit our critique to two main points. First, we challenge her methodological approach used to identify what constitutes “fundamental human rights law.” Her approach fails to include key human rights provisions in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which include the right to health and the right to benefit from science. Second, we challenge the substantive standard invoked by Drabiak (a right to genetic integrity of a future person) and the implications of the concept of human dignity for informing how genome editing of human embryos can be regulated. After further analyzing Drabiak's argument and specifying what her argument does not prove, we conclude by reiterating the position taken by the Nuffield Council in 2018 and Yotova's background paper that: international law does not prohibit genome editing of human embryos and does not recognize a right to genetic integrity for future persons let alone inviolability as clearly evidenced in the text and preparatory works of the 1997 UNESCO Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights.5
Human germline gene editing would actually reduce the risk to a number of unwanted viable embryos.
Savulescu, et.al. 2015 The moral imperative to continue gene editing research on human embryos Julian Savulescu, Jonathan Pugh, Thomas Douglas, Christopher Gyngell Protein Cell 2015, 6(7):476–479 DOI 10.1007/s13238-015-0184-y
In fact, gene-editing technologies might ultimately lead to far fewer embryos being destroyed for reproductive purposes. Currently, if a carrier of a genetic disease wants to have a child that will not be affected by their parent’s condition, the carrier will often choose to undergo IVF and PGD in order to select a non-affected embryo. This practice often involves the creation, and eventual destruction of, a considerable number of surplus unwanted viable embryos. However, this practice would be rendered obsolete by the availability of safe and effective gene-editing technologies; if such technologies became available, carriers of genetic diseases would not have to produce large numbers of surplus embryos which would eventually be destroyed in order to ensure that they could have a child who was not affected by their parent’s genetic disease.
Its ethical – A2 Mosaicism & Autonomy
New studies prove can do editing without genetic instability
Yelena Biberman Dr. Biberman is an associate professor of political science at Skidmore College, a fellow at West Point’s Modern War Institute, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center The Technologies and International Politics of Genetic Warfare STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY FALL 2021 https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-15_Issue-3/Biberman.pdf
Gene editing and synthetic biology research are making strides in overcoming the problem of genetic instability. A study published in 2019 presented a new system, CRISPR-BEST. It created mutations in actinomycetes (bacteria that produce a wide variety of industrially and medically relevant compounds) without creating genetic instability and forcing them to rearrange and even delete large parts of their chromosomes.53 Synthetic biology is also increasingly embracing genetic instability rather than trying to suppress or compensate for it. With improved understanding, it is expected to design devices that incorporate genetic instability as a parameter.54 Such devices would be “a true frontier in biological engineering.”55
Genetic engineering necessary to preserve key aspects of our biology and is ethically justifiable
RUSSELL POWELL Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts 2015 In Genes We Trust: Germline Engineering, Eugenics, and the Future of the Human Genome, USA Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 40 (6):669-695 (2015) https://philpapers.org/rec/POWIGW
Whereas most of the philosophical literature on the ethics of genetic engineering, both skeptical and optimistic, has focused on its ability to enhance human nature and valued biological capacities (see e.g., Savulescu and Bostrom, 2009), my contention is that genetic intervention will be necessary merely to preserve them. The dynamic evolutionary environment may counsel against taking genetic engineering off the table, lest the technology proves useful in tackling unforeseen challenges that arise in the future—but this does not imply that we will need to embark on a genome-wide enterprise of germline modification in order to maintain valued elements of the biological status quo, or to avoid foreseeable reductions in human wellbeing. In this section, I argue that a large-scale program of genetic intervention will be necessary to achieve these goals, regardless of whether the environment changes in the ways contemplated earlier.8
Its ethical – A2 Gene Drive
Human germline editing is an ethical imperative to sustain genetic health
RUSSELL POWELL Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts 2015 In Genes We Trust: Germline Engineering, Eugenics, and the Future of the Human Genome, USA Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 40 (6):669-695 (2015) https://philpapers.org/rec/POWIGW
In this article, I explore some of the evolutionary and social risks that attend the other side of the risk equation: namely, the undesirable consequences that are likely to flow from our failure to intervene in the human germline. I argue that even if we do not have moral reasons to genetically “enhance” our children relative to the current status quo of normality (for arguments that we do, see, e.g., Savulescu, 2001; Bostrom and Ord, 2006; Harris, 2007; Savulescu and Persson, 2008; Buchanan, 2011; Powell and Buchanan, 2011), germline intervention still emerges as a pro tanto moral imperative so long as we have good reason to sustain the levels of genetic health that we presently enjoy for future generations—a goal that should appeal to bioliberals, biomoderates, and bioconservatives alike. My aim is to show that merely preserving important genetic and phenotypic aspects of the human species—and perhaps even human dignity—will require that we overcome the remaining technical obstacles and make germline genetic therapies legal and widely available to healthcare consumers.
Takes thousands of years to evaluate changes of genetic code – and can’t change human nature.
Vera Lúcia Raposo 2019 Gene Editing, the Mystic Threat to Human Dignity Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Pty Ltd. 2019 https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11673-019-09906-4
Based on this understanding, Jurgen Habermas (2006) asserted that when people change their genetic code they are altering their human nature and turning themselves into instruments. According to Habermas, our genetic code is the basis of our human nature, as if changing it would make us less human. Kass (2002), for instance, referred to losing one part of being human. This argument can be divided into two sub-arguments: a) genetic homogeneity can become a threat to the survival of the human species; and b) an overall ecological balance should be maintained, which depends on the existence of diverse species. Notwithstanding these assertions, it would take thousands of years and generations for one change to have repercussions for the genetic makeup of humanity as a whole. As McConnell (2010, 420) puts it: [T]here are more than six billion humans on the planet. Absent some kind of magic wand, it is initially difficult to see how any given genetic intervention could change human nature.
Its ethical – A2 Human Dignity
Its ethical – germline editing isn’t contrary to dignity – modifying genomes happens in medical treatments and is consistent with international law.
Boggio and Yotova (2021). Gene editing of human embryos is not contrary to human rights law: A reply to Drabiak. Bioethics. doi:10.1111/bioe.12945
The second rebuttal concerns the argument that clinical interventions based on gene editing of human embryos are contrary to human dignity. The argument takes different forms: gene editing is seen as an alleged violation of human dignity because it (a) leads to considering some human lives (of those carrying good genes) better than others (of those carrying bad genes); (b) violates a purported right to genetic identity; and (c) compromises the human genome, whose unmodified form is allegedly a requisite of human dignity. Drabiak embraces the second and third forms of the argument. Taken to an extreme, the idea of this dignity being grounded on genetic identity or genetic inviolability leads to an indefensible conclusion: persons who have undergone cancer or other serious treatment, which modifies their genome, would have lost, or have suffered a violation of, their human dignity in the process. This conclusion is hard to defend on its face. More moderate accounts are not new to us and have been discussed in Yotova's background paper. After a thorough review of all international and regional instruments applicable to gene editing that mention human dignity, she concludes that “there is a trend of acknowledging that while embryos and foetuses are not generally recognised as holders of human rights, they are becoming increasingly recognised as having human dignity.” 46 The dignity‐ based argument is complex, and a lengthy analysis of this issue exceeds the scope of this paper. Here we want to focus on some critical aspects. First, while embryos may possess human dignity, they are generally not recognized as rightsholders. As Yotova points out, “legally speaking … human rights are protected only after birth, which puts germline editing outside of their temporal scope of protection.” 47 This is the case under international law and also in the majority of domestic laws. The European Court of Human Rights also acknowledged the lack of consensus in Europe about the nature and status of the embryo, rejecting the argument that they are a “person” with “a right to life.” 48 Second, the ICESCR acknowledges human dignity. Nonetheless, it recognizes the right to access treatment to enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health and the right to access clinical applications as benefits of scientific progress compatible with human dignity. These two rights are recognized without reservations. As we have seen, their recognition is not absolute, leaving it up to State Parties to limit the two rights to access provided it is done according to the parameters set in Article 4 of the ICESCR. A State Party may consider the interest of embryos to deserve consideration that trumps the right to access clinical applications of gene editing of human embryos. However, this is a State Party's prerogative, not a duty under the Covenant. Third, the concept of human dignity was considered and discussed extensively during the negotiations of the UNESCO Declaration on the Human Genome but never as an argument against germline interventions. Instead, it was linked to very different legal principles.
Human dignity is not based on a certain genetic code.
Vera Lúcia Raposo 2019 Gene Editing, the Mystic Threat to Human Dignity Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Pty Ltd. 2019 https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11673-019-09906-4
To conclude that the existence of a non-manipulated genetic code is linked to human dignity, we would have to assume that human dignity is based on a certain genetic code, not any human genetic code but the one every person is born with. If that were true, any change to that code would carry a diminution of dignity. This conclusion is problematic because our genetic code changes during our lifetime. For instance, after a baby is born some fetal cells may be left behind in its mother’s body. They can travel to different organs and be absorbed into the mother’s tissues, changing her genetic composition,3 but no one would say that the mother is less worthy of dignity. In the case of blood transfusions, depending on the amount of white blood cells (the only ones that contain nuclear DNA), some DNA is transferred from the donor to the recipient, even in small amounts, and it can survive for days in his or her body,4 but this does not make the recipient less dignified during that transitory period. Furthermore, some diseases (such as cancer) can lead to acquired genetic mutations, creating the so-called genetic mosaics.5 In addition to being sick, do these people become undignified? The same happens in organ (Olszewski et al. 2005) and bone narrow donations.6 Both involve adding the donor’s DNA to extracts of tissues from the recipient, but none of these situations diminishes the recipient’s dignity. If the above thesis were true and if human dignity resided in a specific (human) genetic code, these examples would lead to the conclusion that some people lose their dignity during their lifetime due to changes (even if reduced and temporary) in their genomes, which obviously does not make any sense. Human dignity cannot be reduced to a certain genetic code, nor the human being reduced to genetic characteristics. This same idea is stated by article 2 of the UDHG: (a) Everyone has a right to respect for their dignity and for their rights regardless of their genetic characteristics. (b) That dignity makes it imperative not to reduce individuals to their genetic characteristics and to respect their uniqueness and diversity. If that is the case, there is no way that a change in the genetic features of a person will undermine his or her dignity.
Gene editing is ethical – does not clash with human dignity
Boggio and Yotova (2021). Gene editing of human embryos is not contrary to human rights law: A reply to Drabiak. Bioethics. doi:10.1111/bioe.12945
Implicit in this interpretation of Article 6 is the fact that the protection of human embryos is not absolute. In fact, quite to the contrary, the HRC states that providing safe abortions is a duty of States under certain circumstances. Although merely hypothetical at this point, clinical applications of gene editing could conceivably remedy non‐viability and alleviate the mental pain or suffering that comes from knowing that the fetus is or may be affected by certain genetic conditions. Here we are not arguing that these interventions will have to be made available to patients as a matter of duty. More modestly, we argue that gene editing of human embryos does not clash with the right of life as codified in Article 6 of the ICCPR. In fact, it may reinforce it.
Genetic engineering does not take away humanness
RUSSELL POWELL Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts 2015 In Genes We Trust: Germline Eng

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