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2022 SDI Negative

Neg - AI LAWs - MSDI 2022

Neg - AI LAWs - MSDI 2022.docx

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Lethal Autonomous Weapons System – Negative
***Case Answers***
Inherency
LAWS are more efficient and make war more humane. They also reduce civilian casualties which solve terror recruitment
Kyle Hiebert (researcher and analyst formerly based in Cape Town and Johannesburg, South Africa, as deputy editor of the Africa Conflict Monitor) “Are Lethal Autonomous Weapons Inevitable? It Appears So” January 27, 2022 https://www.cigionline.org/articles/are-lethal-autonomous-weapons-inevitable-it-appears-so/
More Just War — or Just More War? Rapid advances in autonomous weapons technologies and an increasingly tense global order have brought added urgency to the debate over the merits and risks of their use. Proponents include Robert Work, a former US deputy secretary of defence under the Obama and Trump administrations, who has argued the United States has a “moral imperative” to pursue autonomous weapons. The chief benefit of LAWS, Work and others say, is that their adoption would make warfare more humane by reducing civilian casualties and accidents through decreasing “target misidentification” that results in what the US Department of Defense labels “unintended engagements.” Put plainly: Autonomous weapons systems may be able to assess a target’s legitimacy and make decisions faster, and with more accuracy and objectivity than fallible human actors could, either on a chaotic battlefield or through the pixelated screen of a remote-control centre thousands of miles away. The outcome would be a more efficient use of lethal force that limits collateral damage and saves innocent lives through a reduction in human error and increased precision of munitions use. Machines also cannot feel stress, fatigue, vindictiveness or hate. If widely adopted, killer robots could, in theory, lessen the opportunistic sexual violence, looting and vengeful razing of property and farmland that often occurs in war — especially in ethnically driven conflicts. These atrocities tend to create deep-seated traumas and smouldering intergenerational resentments that linger well after the shooting stops, destabilizing societies over the long term and inviting more conflict in the future.
Solvency
Solvency – No Modeling/Fails
International coalition fails – LAWS use inevitable.
Kyle Hiebert (researcher and analyst formerly based in Cape Town and Johannesburg, South Africa, as deputy editor of the Africa Conflict Monitor) “Are Lethal Autonomous Weapons Inevitable? It Appears So” January 27, 2022 https://www.cigionline.org/articles/are-lethal-autonomous-weapons-inevitable-it-appears-so/
Other risks are that autonomous weapons technology could fall into the hands of insurgent groups and terrorists. At the peak of its so-called caliphate in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State was launching drone strikes daily. Despotic regimes may impulsively unleash autonomous weapons on their own populations to quell a civilian uprising. Killer robots’ neural networks could also be susceptible to being hacked by an adversary and turned against their owners. Yet, just as the debate intensifies, a realistic assessment of the state of the killer robots being developed confirms what the Swiss ambassador to the CCW feared — technological progress is far outpacing deliberations over containment. But even if it weren’t, amid a splintering international order, plenty of nation-states are readily violating humanitarian laws and treaties anyway, while others are seeking new ways to gain a strategic edge in an increasingly hostile, multipolar geopolitical environment.
Can’t ban; LAWS meet the International Humanitarian Law threshold and therefore are fair game
Ettinger, 20 (Jay Ettinger, 2020, accessed on 6-29-2022, 30 Minn. J. Int'L. 153, "1. NOTE: Overcoming International Inertia: The Creation of War Manual for Lethal Autonomous WeaponsSystems, 30 Minn. J. Int'l L. 153", file:///C:/Users/ncb12/Downloads/Nathan%20Boyle%20Overcoming%20International%20Inertia_%20The%20Creation%20of%20War%20Manual%20for%20Lethal%20Autonomous%20Weapons%20Sy.PDF) (NB)
When developing new military technology, States must evaluate whether the technology can be operated in compliance with core[International Humanitarian Law] IHL principles. Under Article 36 of Geneva Convention Protocol I ("Protocol I"), in order to develop, acquire, or adopt a new "weapon, means or method of warfare," the State must first conduct a review to determine whether the technology would violate IHL in "some or all circumstances." 25The weapons review obligation of Article 36 has likely not reached the status of customary international law. 26Indeed, only a few States currently utilize systematic approaches to weapons review. 27 [*158] However, States are still bound by the underlying IHL obligations of weapons law and targeting law, even if they do not conduct a formal review prior to implementation. 28 The first step is to review whether the weapon is already prohibited or restricted by existing treaty or customary law. 29Next, the state must evaluate whether the weapon can be used in accordance with the core IHL obligations. 30The State is not required to evaluate all possible misuses of the weapon, but rather the evaluation should relate to the "normal or expected use" of the weapon. 31Finally, if no existing treaty or customary law would prevent the weapon's use, the State should evaluate whether its use would violate the 'Martens Clause'. 32The Martens Clause is a catch-all provision that is intended to provide baseline level protections to civilians, requiring States to act from the "principles of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience," even in the absence of positive treaty law. 33According to the ICRC Commentary on Protocol I, the purpose of the Martens Clause is to "prevent[] the assumption that anything which is not explicitly prohibited by the relevant treaties is therefore permitted" and to protect the core principles of IHL "regardless of subsequent developments of types of situation or technology." 34Many have argued that the Martens Clause is particularly important in ensuring adequate protection of civilians when weapons technology has developed faster than IHL can adapt to the technology. 35 In order for a new weapons technology to be compliant with IHL during its Article 36 review, the weapon must meet the obligations of "weapons law" and "targeting law". 36Weapons law [*159] evaluates whether a weapon is per se unlawful. 37Targeting law evaluates whether the weapon can be operated within a military environment in a lawful manner. 38These core IHL obligations are codified in Protocol I and have also been recognized as customary international law. 39 The first obligation of "weapons law" is that a weapon cannot be "of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction." 40To be legal, the weapon must have the capacity to target legitimate military objectives and must not create disproportionate harm to civilians and other noncombatants in at least some battlefield contexts. 41Examples of weapons that fail to meet this standard under customary IHL include incendiary weapons, cluster bombs, and biological weapons. 42The second "weapons law" obligation is that the weapon cannot cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. 43The purpose is to prevent inhumane or needless injuries to combatants. 44The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") has previously defined "unnecessary suffering" as "a harm greater than that unavoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives." 45Historical examples of weapons that violate this obligation include lasers used to blind soldiers and "dum-dum" bullets (bullets that expand on impact causing large and painful wounds) -- as these weapons caused extreme suffering without progressing any legitimate military purpose. After a weapon is found not to be per se illegal under "weapons law", "targeting law" evaluates whether the weapon can be lawfully operated in a specific battlefield context. 47Two key principles of "targeting law" are (1) distinction and (2) proportionality. 48The requirement that actors distinguish between combatants 49and civilians, and between military and civilian objects, is a "cardinal" principle of IHL. 50The goal of distinction does not demand perfect results but instead requires that actors make decisions using reasonable judgment given the military context in which they are operating. 51Changes to the character of warfare, such as the increased presence of non-state insurgent and terrorist groups, have made it increasingly difficult for military actors to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants in real-time combat operations. 52 Next, the principle of proportionality requires that actors balance the extent and risk of collateral harm against the military advantage of the operation or action. 53This is a highly context-specific assessment and has led international courts, military manuals, and others to adopt a "reasonable military commander" standard. 54For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia described its standard for proportionality as follows: "In determining whether an attack was proportionate it is necessary to examine whether a reasonably wellinformed person in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to him or her, could have expected excessive civilian [*161] casualties to result from the attack." 55Gross failures to account for the collateral damage of military operations can amount to a war crime. 56A weapon is not IHL compliant if it does not allow an operator to use their judgment when making targeting decisions within the given battlefield context. 57New weapons technology such as LAWS can only be lawfully used if the State can assure through an Article 36 review that the technology can adhere to IHL obligations within the battlefield context in which it is being used. LAWS technology raises a number of complex issues, ranging from the technical feasibility of IHL compliance, to legal and ethical questions over whether non-human intelligence should be allowed to make life-and-death decisions on the battlefield, to the significant public policy implications of wars conducted by robots. 58The novelty of LAWS technology and these complex legal, moral, and practical considerations has resulted in a highly unsettled and contentious international legal status for LAWS development and use. 59 LAWS are not likely to be per se illegal under "weapons law" due to being indiscriminate in their impact or causing unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. 60The evaluation of these factors is based on the nature of the weapon in the uses for which it is designed. 61 LAWS are not likely to be per se illegal [*162] under weapons law because, in theory, the systems can be designed to discriminate and not cause unnecessary suffering. 62LAWS are able to be designed with the ability to strike specific targets. 63This ability to control the impact of the weapon is an important point of distinction as compared to other weapons previously deemed indiscriminate, such as cluster bombs, chemical weapons, incendiary weapons, and anti-personnel landmines. 64And if LAWS use conventional forms of lethal force (e.g. standard bullets or explosives), the presence of autonomous functionality would not likely affect considerations of whether the weapon causes "unnecessary suffering" or "superfluous injury". 65The more significant legal questions are whether LAWS can be designed to comply with IHL "targeting law" and the degree of human involvement that is legally necessary. 66 In order for LAWS to be compliant with IHL "targeting law," "they must be able to reliably and predictably distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, as well as make rapid judgments on the proportionality of an attack against its potential collateral harms. 67First, there is a question as to whether computer algorithms will be able to gauge the complex, context-dependent, and humanistic clues that soldiers must use to distinguish combatants and non-combatants in the modern battlefield where combatants often attempt to conceal their identities. 68Second, even if such a distinction is technically [*163] feasible, there is a question as to whether these systems can reliably make sound decisions given the vast array and often rapidly changing nature of battlefield contexts. 69For example, one potential risk to the system's reliability is the introduction of bias to decision-making originating in the data sets used to train the AI system. 70Even if both of these technical feasibility questions can be adequately addressed, there is a further question as to whether lethal decision-making inherently requires human involvement under IHL. 71And if there is such a requirement, what degree of human involvement is sufficient to meet IHL obligations must also be determined.
Solvency – Fights over Definitions
Plan is ineffective; no clear definition of what LAWS are – aff is unable to solve
Ettinger, 20 (Jay Ettinger, 2020, accessed on 6-29-2022, 30 Minn. J. Int'L. 153, "1. NOTE: Overcoming International Inertia: The Creation of War Manual for Lethal Autonomous WeaponsSystems, 30 Minn. J. Int'l L. 153", file:///C:/Users/ncb12/Downloads/Nathan%20Boyle%20Overcoming%20International%20Inertia_%20The%20Creation%20of%20War%20Manual%20for%20Lethal%20Autonomous%20Weapons%20Sy.PDF) (NB)
There is no universally accepted definition of what qualifies as LAWS. There is even a fundamental debate over whether LAWS should be defined as (1) the broader category of autonomous technology systems, some of which may be legally problematic, or as (2) the problematic subset of a broader category of systems with some autonomous functions. 12As an [*156] example, the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") defines an autonomous weapon system as "[a]ny weapon system with autonomy in its critical functions." 13A weapon system that is able to "select (i.e. search for or, detect, identify, or track) and attack (i.e. use force against, neutralize, damage, or destroy) targets without human intervention." 14The United States Department of Defense formulates its definition for LAWS slightly differently, defining it as "weapon system[s] that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator." 15The degree of autonomy in a system exists on a spectrum that is commonly simplified for clarification into three categories based on the degree of human involvement in the system. 16These categories are: (a) Human in-the-Loop Weapons: robots that can select targets and deliver force only with a human command; (b) Human- on-the-Loop Weapons: robots that can select targets and deliver force under the oversight of a human operator who can override the robots' actions; and (c) Human- out-of-the-Loop Weapons: robots that are capable of selecting targets and delivering force without any human input or interaction.
Solvency - LAWS Inevitable
LAWS are inevitable; in many ways, they’re already here
Ettinger, 20 (Jay Ettinger, 2020, accessed on 6-29-2022, 30 Minn. J. Int'L. 153, "1. NOTE: Overcoming International Inertia: The Creation of War Manual for Lethal Autonomous WeaponsSystems, 30 Minn. J. Int'l L. 153", file:///C:/Users/ncb12/Downloads/Nathan%20Boyle%20Overcoming%20International%20Inertia_%20The%20Creation%20of%20War%20Manual%20for%20Lethal%20Autonomous%20Weapons%20Sy.PDF) (NB)
Systems with some degree of autonomy have been implemented on the battlefield. 18Notable examples include missile defense systems such as Israel's Iron Dome, which uses radar to identify, track, and shoot down incoming missiles, rockets, mortars, and drones, 19and sentry robots used by South Korea in the Demilitarized Zone, which use heat and motion sensors to identify people and can shoot machine gun rounds or [*157] grenade launchers if granted approval by a human operator. 20As of now, "[t]here are no autonomous weapons systems [("AWS")] in use today that directly attack human targets without human authorization." 21However, future developments in AI could enable systems to use image, facial and behavior recognition to independently identify targets and make lethal decisions in real time. 22Some military experts predict that these types of fully autonomous weapons systems could be created in the coming decades. 23The U.S. Air Force anticipates "by 2030 machine capabilities will have increased to the point that humans will have become the weakest component in a wide array of systems and processes."
Solvency - LAWS Safe Now
High bar to deploy LAWS and current policies stop their development – the affirmative is fearmongering about what types of weapons are used
Gregory C. Allen (director of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Governance Project and a senior fellow in the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.) “DOD Is Updating Its Decade-Old Autonomous Weapons Policy, but Confusion Remains Widespread” June 06, 2022 https://www.csis.org/analysis/dod-updating-its-decade-old-autonomous-weapons-policy-confusion-remains-widespread
In general, this is good news. The DOD’s existing policy recognizes that some categories of autonomous weapons, such as cyber weapons and missile defense systems, are already in widespread and broadly accepted use by dozens of militaries worldwide. It also allows for the possibility that future technological progress and changes in the global security landscape, such as Russia’s potential deployment of artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled lethal autonomous weapons in Ukraine, might make new types of autonomous weapons desirable. This requires proposals for such weapons to clear a high procedural and technical bar. In addition to demonstrating compliance with U.S. obligations under domestic and international law, DOD system safety standards, and DOD AI-ethics principles, proposed autonomous weapons systems must clear an additional senior review process where the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, undersecretary of defense for policy; and the undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics certify that the proposed system meets 11 additional requirements, each of which require presenting considerable evidence. Getting the signatures of the U.S. military’s highest-ranking officer and two undersecretaries in a formal senior review is no easy task. Perhaps the strongest proof of the rigor required to surpass such a hurdle is the fact that no DOD organization has even tried.
Status quo solves – regulations on the use of weapons stops escalation
Congressional Research Service “Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems” November 17, 2021 https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11150
Role of human operator. DODD 3000.09 requires that all systems, including LAWS, be designed to “allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.” As noted in an August 2018 U.S. government white paper, “‘appropriate’ is a flexible term that reflects the fact that there is not a fixed, one-size-fits-all level of human judgment that should be applied to every context. What is ‘appropriate’ can differ across weapon systems, domains of warfare, types of warfare, operational contexts, and even across different functions in a weapon system.” Furthermore, “human judgment over the use of force” does not require manual human “control” of the weapon system, as is often reported, but rather broader human involvement in decisions about how, when, where, and why the weapon will be employed. This includes a human determination that the weapon will be used “with appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement.” To aid this determination, DOD

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