DA - DIB DA - MSDI 2022
DA - DIB DA - MSDI 2022.docx
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Defense Innovation DA 1NC LAWS 1NC The defense industry is growing and stable now – future purchases enable increased innovation of the defense market Mordor Intelligence, 2022 Mordor Intelligence is a fully revenue-funded organization, since our founding in 2014. To date, we have partnered with 4000+ enterprises across 20+ industries, to deliver precise data and actionable insights in over 6000 projects. Our domain-specific teams of research experts continuously track markets, providing our clients the competitive edge through high-quality market intelligence.(not that Mordor from LOTR)“US Aerospace and Defense Market - Growth, Trends, COVID-19 Impact, and Forecasts (2022 - 2027).” Mordorintelligence.com, 2022, www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/us-aerospace-and-defense-market. The US aerospace and defense market is projected to grow from USD 416.63 billion in 2020 to USD 550.78 billion, registering a CAGR of around 2.37% during the forecast period (2021-2030). The US aerospace and defense sector is undergoing an unprecedented disruption due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the sector is projected to recover in 2021, the recovery is expected to be uneven across the two constituent sectors. For instance, the commercial aerospace sector has been significantly affected by the pandemic, resulting in a drastic reduction in passenger traffic, which, in turn, has negatively affected aircraft demand. As a result, the commercial aerospace sector is expected to recover slowly, as travel demand is projected to normalize to pre-COVID levels by 2023. However, the defense sector is expected to remain stable and even grow as the United States has not reduced its defense budget and remains committed to sustaining its military capabilities. Nevertheless, due to the widespread disruption in the supply chain, some defense programs may face minor cost escalations and delays in the short term. The US aerospace and defense sector is one of the largest, globally, in terms of infrastructure and manufacturing activities. In 2019, the total industry sales revenue left a significant footprint on the American economy, contributing to a combined economic value of USD 396 billion, representing 1.8% of the nation’s GDP. The market is primarily driven by investments in the A&D sector and is supported by the rising demand for the products of the A&D sector by both commercial and military end-users. The market is also bolstered by the presence of leading industry incumbents in the US, whose manufacturing and R&D capabilities support the growth of the industry. Scope of the Report The study provides an in-depth analysis of the aerospace and defense industry in the United States. The scope of the study encompasses the commercial and military applications of all aerial assets. Besides, the study also accounts for the developments in the industry pertaining to critical systems and components of aircraft, UAVs, and satellites. For each segment, the market sizing and forecasts have been done based on value (USD billion). Key Market Trends Enhanced Defense Spending Promoting R&D and Manufacturing The United States is ranked as the world’s leading defense manufacturer and exporter. According to SIPRI, the US defense expenditure grew by 5.3% to amount to USD 732 billion in 2019, which is around 38% of the global defense expenditure. The US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) increased by USD 15 billion to reach USD 83.5 billion during FY2020. Besides, the US is one of the world’s largest FDI investors and the leading beneficiary of FDIs. In 2018, FDIs in the US aerospace industry totaled nearly USD 22 billion. This resulted in a significant upgrade of the manufacturing capabilities of key industry incumbents in the US. For instance, in January 2019, Airbus initiated the construction of its A220 Manufacturing Facility in Alabama. Similarly, in September 2018, Planet Labs Inc. invested around USD 183 million to open a 27,000-square-foot new satellite manufacturing and testing facility in San Francisco. In 2020, Lockheed Martin completed the construction of its USD 350 million satellite manufacturing facility, located at the company's Waterton Canyon campus near Denver. As the US envisions to retain its technological superiority over rival forces in terms of deployed platforms and weaponry in the aerial domain, a significant inflow of monetary resources is anticipated to occur during the upcoming period, thereby driving the US aerospace and defense market. A precautionary LAW ban destroys the private sectors’ ability to innovate AI technologies in all areas Daniel Castro and Michael McLaughlin 02-04-2019 [Daniel Castro is vice president at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) and director of ITIF's Center for Data Innovation; Castro writes and speaks on a variety of issues related to information technology and internet policy, including privacy, security, intellectual property, Internet governance, e-government, and accessibility for people with disabilities; Michael McLaughlin was a research analyst at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation; McLaughlin researched and wrote about a variety of issues related to information technology and Internet policy, including digital platforms, e-government, and artificial intelligence. ;], “Ten Ways the Precautionary Principle Undermines Progress in Artificial Intelligence,” https://itif.org/publications/2019/02/04/ten-ways-precautionary-principle-undermines-progress-artificial-intelligence/ Cut By: m.jam Many groups have started movements to ban lethal autonomous weapons—autonomous robotics systems that can independently identify and engage targets based on programmed constraints—due to fears that they will lead to armed conflict on a scale greater and faster than ever before. For example, 116 founders of mostly small robotics and AI companies, including Elon Musk, signed a letter to the United Nations (UN) in 2017 that urges the body to ban lethal autonomous weapons.36 In 2018, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated that “machines that have the power and the discretion to take human lives are politically unacceptable, are morally repugnant, and should be banned by international law.”37 Also in 2018, members of the European Parliament adopted a resolution asking member states and the European Council for “the start of international negotiations on a legally binding instrument prohibiting lethal autonomous weapons systems.”38 If policymakers enacted such a ban, it would slow research into AI, as historically, at least in the United States, defense agencies have been a source of significant funding for technology advancement, such as the Internet. And much of the research to support autonomous weapons would yield dual-use technology that could be used for commercial purposes. For example, a fully autonomous tank will likely rely on large portions of the same algorithms and data used to develop a fully autonomous military transport vehicle.39 These same algorithms would be relevant to developing autonomous vehicles for civilian use. DIB innovation prevents offshore manufacturing and enables US global leadership Joel S. Yudken 2010 [ is Principal and Founder of High Road Strategies, LLC. He is a nationally known expert on policy issues that relate to manufacturing, energy, technology, workforce and economic development. In a career spanning four decades, Dr. Yudken has held a wide range of professional positions in labor, government, academia, industry, and public interest organizations. His broad background and training in engineering, political, and socio-economic systems enables him to apply a range of qualitative and quantitative research and analytical tools to his work], “AMERICA’S MANUFACTURING CRISIS AND THE EROSION OF THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE,” https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/88136/afl_cio_Manufacturing_Insecurity_report.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Cut By: m.jam The impacts of an eroding domestic manufacturing base on national security largely stem from the military’s growing reliance on commercial cutting-edge technology since the 1980s. There are reasonable doubts that military technology still lags commercial technologies in all areas, as it generally did during the 1980s and 1990s. Starting in those years, and continuing into the present, defense procurement policy has put an emphasis on promoting greater civilian-military integration, and encouraging agencies and their contractors to purchase commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and “dual-use” technology products. The rationale is that drawing on the often more innovative civilian sector not only would yield more up-to-date products but also big cost savings. Many, if not most, “dual-use” contractors and suppliers try to separate their defense and commercial businesses, in large part to avoid the bureaucratic drag of defense procurement requirements on their commercial work. Nevertheless, the ability of a firm to design, innovate, and improve on defense-critical technologies or devices that it produces for defense markets, increasingly depends on its ability to preserve and draw upon the technological edge it has obtained in its commercial business. As military products become more reliant on commercial advanced technologies, technology transfer from commercial technologies into defense-critical products requires a close relationship between the Pentagon or defense contractor customer and the suppliers of these technologies. However, as the commercial base upon which the defense sector relies for most of its components and subsystems globalizes, integrating commercial technology into defense systems becomes more difficult to achieve. That is, the loss of production facilities can lead to the loss of innovation capabilities, which would dangerously undermine the nation’s ability to maintain a strong defense base. Specifically, the migration of manufacturing offshore is associated with the following trends: Weakening innovation capabilities of domestic industrial sectors; The transfer—deliberate and unwitting—of cutting-edge technologies and know-how to economic rivals and potential military adversaries; and 72 HRS/JSY—Manufacturing Insecurity A decline in the United States’ overall technological leadership in the world. Hegemony is empirically the most stable system and deters all conflict – decline causes transition wars Robert Kagan, 17, 2-7-2017, Backing Into World War III, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/06/backing-into-world-war-iii-russia-china-trump-obama/, Robert Kagan, Ph.D. in American History from American University, M.P.P. in Government from Harvard University, AVD Think of two significant trend lines in the world today. One is the increasing ambition and activism of the two great revisionist powers, Russia and China. The other is the declining confidence, capacity, and will of the democratic world, and especially of the United States, to maintain the dominant position it has held in the international system since 1945. As those two lines move closer, as the declining will and capacity of the United States and its allies to maintain the present world order meet the increasing desire and capacity of the revisionist powers to change it, we will reach the moment at which the existing order collapses and the world descends into a phase of brutal anarchy, as it has three times in the past two centuries. The cost of that descent, in lives and treasure, in lost freedoms and lost hope, will be staggering. Americans tend to take the fundamental stability of the international order for granted, even while complaining about the burden the United States carries in preserving that stability. History shows that world orders do collapse, however, and when they do it is often unexpected, rapid, and violent. The late 18th century was the high point of the Enlightenment in Europe, before the continent fell suddenly into the abyss of the Napoleonic Wars. In the first decade of the 20th century, the world’s smartest minds predicted an end to great-power conflict as revolutions in communication and transportation knit economies and people closer together. The most devastating war in history came four years later. The apparent calm of the postwar 1920s became the crisis-ridden 1930s and then another world war. Where exactly we are in this classic scenario today, how close the trend lines are to that intersection point is, as always, impossible to know. Are we three years away from a global crisis, or 15? That we are somewhere on that path, however, is unmistakable. And while it is too soon to know what effect Donald Trump’s presidency will have on these trends, early signs suggest that the new administration is more likely to hasten us toward crisis than slow or reverse these trends. The further accommodation of Russia can only embolden Vladimir Putin, and the tough talk with China will likely lead Beijing to test the new administration’s resolve militarily. Whether the president is ready for such a confrontation is entirely unclear. For the moment, he seems not to have thought much about the future ramifications of his rhetoric and his actions. China and Russia are classic revisionist powers. Although both have never enjoyed greater security from foreign powers than they do today — Russia from its traditional enemies to the west, China from its traditional enemy in the east — they are dissatisfied with the current global configuration of power. Both seek to restore the hegemonic dominance they once enjoyed in their respective regions. For China, that means dominance of East Asia, with countries like Japan, South Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia both acquiescing to Beijing’s will and acting in conformity with China’s strategic, economic, and political preferences. That includes American influence withdrawn to the eastern Pacific, behind the Hawaiian Islands. For Russia, it means hegemonic influence in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which Moscow has traditionally regarded as either part of its empire or part of its sphere of influence. Both Beijing and Moscow seek to redress what they regard as an unfair distribution of power, influence, and honor in the U.S.-led postwar global order. As autocracies, both feel threatened by the dominant democratic powers in the international system and by the democracies on their borders. Both regard the United States as the principal obstacle to their ambitions, and therefore both seek to weaken the American-led international security order that stands in the way of their achieving what they regard as their rightful destinies. It was good while it lasted Until fairly recently, Russia and China have faced considerable, almost insuperable, obstacles in achieving their objectives. The chief obstacle has been the power and coherence of the international order itself and its principal promoter and defender. The American-led system of political and military alliances, especially in the two critical regions of Europe and East Asia, has presented China and Russia with what Dean Acheson once referred to as “situations of strength” that have required them to pursue their ambitions cautiously and, since the end of the Cold War, to defer serious efforts to disrupt the international system. The system has checked their ambitions in both positive and negative ways. During the era of American primacy, China and Russia have participated in and for the most part been beneficiaries of the open international economic system the United States created and helps sustain; so long as that system functions, they have had more to gain by playing in it than by challenging and overturning it. The political and strategic aspects of the order, however, have worked to their detriment. The growth and vibrancy of democratic government in the two decades following the collapse of Soviet communism posed a continual threat to the ability of rulers in Beijing and Moscow to maintain control, and since the end of the Cold War they have regarded every advance of democratic institutions — especially the geographical advance of liberal democracies close to their borders — as an existential threat. That’s for good reason: Autocratic powers since the days of Klemens von Metternich have always feared the contagion of liberalism. The mere existence of democracies on their borders, the global free flow of information they cannot control, the dangerous connection between free market capitalism and political freedom — all pose a threat to rulers who depend on keeping restive forces in their own countries in check. The continual challenge to the legitimacy of their rule posed by the U.S.-supported democratic order has therefore naturally made them hostile both to that order and to the United States. But, until recently, a preponderance of domestic and international forces has dissuaded them from confronting the order directly. Chinese rulers have had to worry about what an unsuccessful confrontation with the United States might do to their legitimacy at home. Even Putin has pushed only against open doors, as in Syria, where the United States responded passively to his probes. He has been more cautious when confronted by even marginal U.S. and European opposition, as in Ukraine. The greatest check on Chinese and Russian ambitions has been the military and economic power of the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. China, although increasingly powerful, has had to contemplate facing the combined military and economic strength of the world’s superpower and some very formidable regional powers linked by alliance or common strategic interest — including Japan, India, and South Korea, as well as smaller but still potent nations like Vietnam and Australia. Russia has had to face the United States and its NATO allies. When united, these U.S.-led alliances present a daunting challenge to a revisionist power that can call on few allies of its own for assistance. Even were the Chinese to score an early victory in a conflict, such as the military subjection of Taiwan or a naval battle in the South or East China Sea, they would have to contend over time with the combined industrial productive capacities of some of the world’s richest and most technologically advanced nations and the likely cutoff of access to foreign markets on which their own economy depends. A weaker Russia, with its depleted population and oil- and gas-dependent economy, would face an even greater challenge. For decades, the strong global position enjoyed by the United States and its allies has discouraged any serious challenge. So long as the United States was perceived as a dependable ally, Chinese and Russian leaders feared that aggressive moves would backfire and possibly bring their regimes down. This is what the political scientist William Wohlforth once described as the inherent stability of the unipolar order: As dissatisfied regional powers sought to challenge the status quo, their alarmed neighbors turned to the distant American superpower to contain their ambitions. And it worked. The United States stepped up, and Russia and China largely backed down — or were preempted before acting at all. Faced with these obstacles, the best option for the two revisionist great powers has always been to hope for or, if possible, engineer a weakening of the U.S.-supported world order from within, either by separating the United States from its allies or by raising doubts about the U.S. commitment and thereby encouraging would-be allies and partners to forgo the strategic protection of the liberal world order and seek accommodation with its challengers. The present system has therefore depended not only on American power but on coherence and unity at the heart of the democratic world. The United States has had to play its part as the principal guarantor of the order, especially in the military and strategic realm, but the orde
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