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2022 SDI Affirmative

Aff - AI LAWs - MSDI 2022

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Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) Affirmative
1AC
1AC – Inherency
We are at an incredibly dangerous crossroads with the use of artificial intelligence and military weaponry. Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, more commonly referred to as LAWS, are dangerously close to becoming the future of war. This would have devastating consequences that must be stopped.
Trager and Luca (Robert F. Trager is an associate professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles, and a Centre for the Governance of AI representative to the U.N. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons; Laura M. Luca is a graduate student in political science at the University of California, Los Angeles, and a former delegate of Romania to the U.N. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.) “Killer Robots Are Here—and We Need to Regulate Them” May 11, 2022 https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/11/killer-robots-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-ukraine-libya-regulation/
Swarms of robots with the ability to kill humans are no longer only the stuff of science fiction. Lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) are here. In Ukraine, Moscow has allegedly deployed an artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled Kalashnikov ZALA Aero KUB-BLA loitering munition, while Kyiv has used Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones, which have some autonomous capabilities. Although it’s always hard to determine whether a weapon’s autonomous mode is used, these technologies have reportedly been employed in at least one conflict: Last year, a United Nations report suggested Turkey used autonomous firing by its Kargu-2 drones to hunt fleeing soldiers in Libya’s civil war (though the CEO of the Turkish company that produced the drone denies it is capable of this). Unlike traditional drones, these systems have the ability to navigate on their own, and some can select targets. Although a human controller can still decide whether or not to strike, such weapons are acquiring ever more autonomous capabilities. Now that militaries and paramilitaries worldwide have taken note, these technologies are poised to spread widely. The world today stands at the very moment before much more advanced versions of these technologies become ubiquitous. So far, at least Israel, Russia, South Korea, and Turkey have reportedly deployed weapons with autonomous capabilities—though whether this mode was active is disputed—and Australia, Britain, China, and the United States are investing heavily in developing LAWS with an ever-expanding range of sizes and capabilities. Already, some LAWS can loiter in an area to find targets that machine-learning algorithms have trained them to recognize, including enemy radar systems, tanks, ships, and even specific individuals. These weapons can look vastly different: For instance, the Turkish Kargu-2 drone, which was introduced in 2020 and used in Libya’s war, is 2 feet long, weighs around 15 pounds, and can swarm in groups. Autonomous systems can also be much larger, such as unmanned AI-driven fighter jets like the modified L-39 Albatros, and much smaller, such as rudimentary commercial drones repurposed with autonomous software. Once these technologies have spread widely, they will be difficult to control. The world thus urgently needs a new approach to LAWS. So far, the international community has done nothing more than agree that the issue needs to be discussed. But what it really needs to do is take a page from the nuclear playbook and establish a nonproliferation regime for LAWS. Currently, countries at the forefront of LAWS development resist any calls for their ban. The United States has claimed that existing international humanitarian laws are sufficient to govern LAWS; the U.S. Defense Department’s policy is that they must be designed to ensure “appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.” China has remained ambiguous, stating the importance of “full consideration of the applicability of general legal norms” while insisting on a narrow definition of LAWS. Russia, meanwhile, refuses to even consider the issue, using diplomatic procedural tools to stall and reduce the time the United Nations devotes to debating the subject. But most countries have called for a ban on developing and using LAWS—or, at a minimum, regulating them. In 2019, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres said LAWS are “politically unacceptable, morally repugnant, and should be prohibited by international law.” There are many reasons countries, international nongovernmental organizations, scholars, and AI experts worry about LAWS. Although they do not all agree in their predictions of how such weapons could affect society, there’s a growing consensus that their spread could bring substantial and harmful consequences. First, LAWS could facilitate violence on a large scale since they’re not restricted by the number of people available to man them. Second, in combination with facial recognition and other technologies, they can target individuals or groups that fit certain descriptions, which could appeal to violent groups and state militaries committing political assassinations and ethnic cleansing. Third, LAWS may make it easier for those who control them to hide their identities. LAWS thus have the potential to upend political orders and enable tighter authoritarian control. In addition, they can always malfunction, including by mistaking civilians for combatants. So far, the international community has attempted—and failed—to regulate LAWS. In December 2021, after eight years of technical discussions, government and civil society representatives met at the U.N. in Geneva to set an agenda for regulating LAWS for the first time in what was billed as a “historic opportunity.” Most attendees favored legally binding rules that apply equally to all states to govern the development and use of these technologies. Yet, by any standard, the meeting failed. Despite years of preparatory discussions within the framework of the U.N. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)—a forum for restricting the use of weapons considered to cause unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants or to affect civilians indiscriminately—the attendees barely managed to agree on 10 more days of discussion this March and July. This outcome was to be expected given the positions of the major powers and the CCW rules requiring consensus before action is taken. (Disclosure: Both authors have been affiliated with the CCW.) In response, a wide array of actors—from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to some of the states in favor of a LAWS ban, including Argentina and the Philippines—are calling for a process to develop legally binding prohibitions on these weapons outside of the CCW. Alternative approaches to prohibition treaties have had some success in the past, such as when countries agreed to give up land mines through the 1997 Ottawa convention; cluster munitions through the 2008 Oslo Accords; and even nuclear weapons through the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which was the first treaty to completely ban nuclear weapons in line with international humanitarian law and establish pathways for current nuclear weapon states to renounce them. However, while many states signed these treaties, most of the powerful states did not. Unfortunately, even this limited success is likely to be elusive in the case of LAWS. The primary reason is that states are increasingly aware that these non-substitutable technologies may become crucial to their security and are thus unlikely to unilaterally abandon them. If states’ adversaries have them, they will likely believe they need them—and absent the sort of nonproliferation regime that exists for nuclear weapons, their adversaries will, in fact, continue to rapidly develop LAWS without much oversight.
1AC – Plan
Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by banning Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems.
1AC – Solvency
Despite current development by nation states, a weapons ban would be effective and guarantee global follow on. The result of the ban is a global ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems
Mary Wareham (advocacy director in the arms division at Human Rights Watch) “Summary: Stopping Killer Robots” August 10, 2020 https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/08/10/stopping-killer-robots/country-positions-banning-fully-autonomous-weapons-and
Their active engagement in the CCW talks on killer robots demonstrates growing awareness of and concerns about removing human control from the use of force. There is widespread acknowledgment that technological developments are enabling militaries to incorporate autonomy into weapons systems. China, Israel, Russia, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States are investing heavily in the development of various autonomous weapons systems, while Australia, Turkey, and other countries are also making investments. Despite this development, the vast majority of countries that have spoken to date regard human decision-making, control, or judgment as critical to the acceptability and legality of weapons systems. There is now widespread agreement about the need to retain some form of human control over the use of force, including over individual attacks. In 2018, Austria, Brazil, and Chile recommended launching negotiations on a legally binding instrument to ensure meaningful human control over the critical functions of weapons systems.[11] Banning fully autonomous weapons means prohibiting weapons systems that lack meaningful human control. Since 2013, 30 countries have called for a ban on such fully autonomous weapons: Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Iraq, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, State of Palestine, Uganda, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. China has called for a treaty to ban the use of lethal autonomous weapons systems, but not their development or production, which is unsurprising given that it is also among the nations most advanced in pursuing such weapons. Several groups of states have endorsed statements calling for a ban on killer robots. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which is comprised of approximately 125 member states, has called for a “legally binding international instrument stipulating prohibitions and regulations on lethal autonomous weapons systems” several times since 2018.[13] Benin spoke in April and August 2018 on behalf of a group of African states to recommend launching negotiations on a legally binding instrument on fully autonomous weapons “at the earliest” as weapons systems “that are not under human control should be banned.”[14] All CCW meetings on killer robots in 2014-2019 saw strong interest or convergence on the importance of retaining human control over weapons systems and the use of force. This is reflected in a principle on human-machine interaction that CCW states agreed to in 2019.[15] Human-machine interaction attracted the greatest interest by far during the virtual Berlin Forum on lethal autonomous weapons systems attended by more than 60 countries on April 1-2, 2020. There was widespread recognition at the Rio Seminar on autonomous weapons on February 20, 2020 that human control is where states should focus their collective work. A legally binding instrument is the optimal framework for dealing with the many serious challenges raised by fully autonomous weapons. A new international ban treaty could lay down explicit rules to ensure appropriate constraints on autonomy in weapons systems and resolve differing views on human control over the use of force. Most importantly, a new treaty would show that states are serious about responding appropriately and with urgency to this existential threat to humanity.
LAWS are not accurate, undermining any positive benefit that could theoretically exist. We cannot allow this unregulated and dangerous technology.
Zachary Kallenborn (research affiliate with the Unconventional Weapons and Technology Division of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, a policy fellow at the Schar School of Policy and Government, and a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command “Mad Scientist.”) “Applying arms control frameworks to autonomous weapons” October 05, 2021 https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/applying-arms-control-frameworks-to-autonomous-weapons/
In an autonomous weapon, the system decides when to engage by processing environmental stimuli. Landmines, for example, use simple pressure sensors—the sensor sensitivity determines whether the heft of a tank or the hands of a child are enough to trigger the explosion. Conversely, an anti-radar loitering munition homes in on radar signals. The risk of error—and by extension the arms control concern—depend on the type of environmental stimuli, how the stimuli is processed, and the type of decisions made. Emerging autonomous weapons using machine learning process stimuli in more complex ways. Machine learning systems rely on large amounts of data to draw conclusions about what the system observes. But the data dependence also makes them brittle. Color differences, tree branches, or foggy days may confound the ability of the system to correctly identify a target. Although some states may adopt robust verification and testing programs to increase reliability, others may not. As autonomous weapons are deployed in larger numbers, arms control advocates fear a higher likelihood of something going horrifyingly wrong.
1AC – Terrorism Advantage
The use of lethal autonomous weapons systems make terrorism inevitable. The affirmative has four ways they solve terror.
First, hacks.
Lethal Autonomous Weapons systems are susceptible to hacks by terror groups and other nefarious actors. Only banning them solves.
Coley Felt (International Policy Institute Cybersecurity Fellow) “Autonomous Weaponry: Are Killer Robots in Our Future?” February 14, 2020 https://jsis.washington.edu/news/autonomous-weaponry-are-killer-robots-in-our-future/
In respect to the unclear line of accountability as an argument against development, the concept of the war algorithm is a key component to discussing autonomous weapons systems. According to the Harvard Law School, a war algorithm is “any algorithm that is expressed in computer code, that is effectuated through a constructed system, and that is capable of operating in relation to armed conflict” (Lewis, Blum, & Modirzadeh, 2016). When linking the war algorithm to accountability, the line stretches from states and their armed forces, to developers, operators, lawyers, industry bodies and more. As these algorithms continue to advance, they challenge some of the fundamental legal concepts that underpin the regulation of armed conflict. Thus, the development of fully autonomous weapons presents the possibility of “replacing human judgement with algorithmically-derived decisions” on the battlefield (Lewis et al., 2016). Furthermore, there is always a risk of vulnerabilities which raises concern about the potential of a hacker takeover (Lewis et al., 2016). Not only would decisions made by these machines be the product of an algorithm, but ensuring the security and reliability of that algorithm presents a new set of issues. The capabilities that these weapons would attain could be especially attractive to malicious actors, whether it be other states or individuals. These unique characteristics rooted in autonomous weapons systems suggest the need for a specific legal category that can oversee both the design and the behavior of the machines.
Second, the proliferation of autonomous weapons system development makes leaks inevitable. The more people that have the technology, the more likely it is for terrorists to get it.
Jacob Ware (master’s degree in security studies from Georgetown University and an MA (Hons) in international relations and modern history from the University of St Andrews) “TERRORIST GROUPS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AND KILLER DRONES” September 24, 2019 https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/terrorist-groups-artificial-intelligence-and-killer-drones/
Firstly, modern terrorist organizations have advanced scientific and engineering departments, and actively seek out skilled scientists for recruitment. ISIL, for example, has appealed for scientists to trek to the caliphate to work on drone and AI technology. The individual technologies behind swarming killer robots — including unmanned aerial vehicles, facial recognition, and machine-to-machine communication — already exist, and have been adapted by terrorist organizations for other means. According to a French defense industry executive, “the technological challenge of scaling it up to swarms and things like that doesn’t need any inventive step. It’s just a question of time and scale and I think that’s an absolute certainty that we should worry about.” Secondly, autonomous weapons technology will likely proliferate through sales. Because AI research is led by private firms, advanced AI technology will be publicly sold on the open market. As Michael Horowitz argues, “militant groups and less-capable states may already have what they need to produce some simple autonomous weapon systems, and that capability is likely to spread even further for purely commercial reasons.” The current framework controlling high-tech weapons proliferation — the Wassenaar Arrangement and Missile Technology Control Regime — is voluntary, and is constantly tested by great-power weapons development. Given interest in developing AI-guided weapons, this seems unlikely to change. Ultimately, as AI expert Toby Walsh notes, the world’s weapons companies can, and will, “make a killing (pun very much intended) selling autonomous weapons to all sides of every conflict.” Finally, autonomous weapons technology is likely to leak. Innovation in the AI field is led by the private sector, not the military, because of the myriad commercial applications of the technology. This will make it more difficult to contain the technology, and prevent it from proliferating to nonstate actors. Perhaps the starkest warning has been issued by Paul Scharre, a former U.S. defense official: “We are entering a world where the technology to build lethal autonomous weapons is available not only to nation-states but to individuals as well. That world is not in the distant future. It’s already here.”
Third, terror recruitment
Lethal autonomous weapons cause massive radicalization—even a small increase in recruitment would trigger the impact
John Feffer, 5-25-2016, "The Coming Drone Blowback", Institute for Policy Studies, https://ips-dc.org/coming-drone-blowback/ <John Feffer is director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies.>, ke
The U.S. drone campaign isn’t exactly a covert operation, though the CIA has generally refused to acknowledge its role in the attacks (the Pentagon is more open about its use of drones for strikes on more conventional military targets). But critics of drone attacks — myself included — have long argued that all the civilian casualties caused by drone attacks will produce blowback. Drone strikes and the anger they generate effectively serve to recruit people into the Taliban and other extremist organizations. Even those involved in the program have come to the same conclusion. Consider, for instance, this impassioned plea to President Obama from four Air Force veterans who piloted drones. “The innocent civilians we were killing only fueled the feelings of hatred that ignited terrorism and groups like ISIS, while also serving as a fundamental recruitment tool,” they argued in a letter last November. “The administration and its predecessors have built a drone program that is one of the most devastating driving forces for terrorism an

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