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2022 SDI Negative

Neg - Ban OCOs - MSDI 2022

Neg - Ban OCOs - MSDI 2022.docx

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Ban OCO - Case Neg
1NC---Russia Deterrence DA
Russian reliance on cyberwarfare escalates now---NATO is next
Cattler ’22 [David and Daniel Black; April 6; Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security at NATO; Principal Analyst in the Cyber Threat Analysis Branch at NATO; Foreign Affairs, “The Myth of the Missing Cyberwar: Russia’s Hacking Succeeded in Ukraine—And Poses a Threat Elsewhere, Too,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-04-06/myth-missing-cyberwar/ceng
After Russia invaded Ukraine, many observers initially expected cyberattacks to steal the limelight as a major instrument in Russia’s arsenal. But after a month of fighting, a host of prominent scholars and analysts of cyberconflict have reached the opposite conclusion. Russia’s activities in cyberspace, they claim, have been paltry or even nonexistent. They have dismissed the role of cyber-operations, variously proposing that digital preparations for the invasion in Ukraine never occurred, were haphazard or lacked any real impact, or were mere continuations of Russia’s long-term cyber-activity against Ukraine that fell below the threshold of outright war. This is a dangerous misdiagnosis. All available evidence indicates that Russia has employed a coordinated cyber-campaign intended to provide its forces with an early advantage during its war in Ukraine. The apparent disconnect between these observed incidents, on the one hand, and the public analysis that Russian cyber-operations have been minimal, on the other, is jarring. Preconceived notions of the role of cyberattacks on the battlefield have made it hard for analysts to see cyber-operations in Ukraine for what they are and for the role they play within Russia’s military campaign. Leaning on these preconceptions will only lead to future policy and intelligence failures. Cyberspace is still a nascent domain of operations, and events in Ukraine will have outsized implications not just for any appreciation of Russian cyberpower but for an understanding of the nature of cyberconflict itself. OPENING SALVO The belief that cyber-operations have played no role in Ukraine does not stem from a lack of real-world impact. To the contrary, the magnitude of Moscow’s pre-kinetic destructive cyber-operations was unprecedented. On the day the invasion began, Russian cyber-units successfully deployed more destructive malware—including against conventional military targets such as civilian communications infrastructure and military command and control centers—than the rest of the world’s cyberpowers combined typically use in a given year. The cumulative effects of these attacks were striking. In the hours prior to invasion, Russia hit a range of important targets in Ukraine, rendering the computer systems of multiple government, military, and critical infrastructure sectors inoperable. Forensic analysis by Microsoft, the cybersecurity company Symantec, and the Slovak firm ESET has found that these attacks affected numerous government agencies, military institutions, civil emergency services, and a range of other critical infrastructure sectors such as defense industrial base manufacturers, information technology services, and energy companies directly relevant to Ukraine’s military capacity. Cyber-enabled sabotage also knocked offline the satellite Internet provider KA-SAT, which Ukraine’s military, intelligence, and police units depend on. Victor Zhora, the deputy chief of Ukraine’s State Service of Special Communication and Information Protection, has characterized the satellite outage as “a really huge loss in communications in the very beginning of war.” U.S. defensive cyberspace operations prevented further Russian attacks from disrupting the railway networks that were being used to transport military supplies and help millions of Ukrainian citizens evacuate. Russia continues to draw from its wartime arsenal of cybertools, deploying additional destructive malware on a weekly basis. Cities under siege from Russian shelling, including Kharkiv and Kyiv, have experienced cyber-enabled disruptions to Internet services. Ukraine’s national cyber-authorities continue to expose intrusion attempts by Russian and Belarussian cyber-units. All of this has occurred against the backdrop of a series of website defacements, denial-of-service attacks, and other destabilizing cyber-operations intended to produce chaos and further exhaust Ukraine’s cyberdefenses. If observers see this cyber-offensive as a series of isolated events, its scale and strategic significance get lost in the conventional violence unfolding in Ukraine. But a full accounting of the cyber-operations reveals the proactive and persistent use of cyberattacks to support Russian military objectives. The misperception that Russia has been restrained or ineffective in the prosecution of its cyberwar on Ukraine likely stems from the fact that Russia’s cyber-operations have not had the standalone, debilitating effects that assessments before the war imagined they would have. But those assessments pose an unrealistic test of strategic value. No single domain of operations has an independent, decisive effect on the course of war. Nevertheless, the lack of overwhelming “shock and awe” in cyberspace has led to the flawed presumption that Russia’s cyber-units are incapable, and even worse, that cyber-operations have offered Russia no strategic value in its invasion of Ukraine. THUNDER RUN Analysts should assess the use of cyberpower in its proper context. Evaluating Russia’s cyber-operations in Ukraine is impossible without accounting for the multiple tactical and strategic errors that have bedeviled other aspects of Moscow’s military campaign. Russian planners expected a swift victory in Ukraine, but their strategy failed for multiple reasons: inadequate coordination and preparation, the underestimation of the strength and resilience of Ukraine’s military, and various intelligence lapses. Russia’s missteps and struggles have almost certainly hurt its ability to fully employ its cyber-program in support of its conventional forces. But even with those limitations, Russian cyber-units successfully attacked a range of targets in accordance with Russia’s war plans. Russian cyberattacks on government and military command and control centers, logistics, emergency services, and other critical services such as border control stations were entirely consistent with a so-called thunder run strategy intended to stoke chaos, confusion, and uncertainty, and ultimately avoid a costly and protracted war in Ukraine. Indeed, Russian cyber-units have demonstrated their ability to succeed without a great deal of advance warning and direction, and despite the overarching difficulties hampering Russia’s military effort. The reason for this relative success lies in the unique nature of competition and conflict in cyberspace. Unlike troop buildups or other forms of military mobilization that are infrequent and highly visible, cyber-operations are the result of operational cycles that occur covertly and continuously through peacetime and wartime. The targeting of sensitive networks during peacetime lets attackers lay the groundwork for malware intended for wartime use. The methods attackers use to establish initial footholds for espionage activities are indistinguishable from those that precede cyberattacks. For cyber-units, war does not fundamentally change the way they prepare or start to fight. Russia’s cyberattacks prior to the invasion suggest methodical preparations, with the attackers likely gaining access to Ukrainian networks months ago. This stands in stark contrast to the evident lack of preparation across Moscow’s other military instruments, including on the ground, in the air, and in its frequently used influence operations through media and social media. Russian cyber-units did not need direct military orders to prepare for the invasion or to generate new capabilities for the war. The operational realities of cyberspace required them to be ready well in advance. Russian cyber-units will probably continue to be in a state of permanent readiness and capable of supporting tactical and strategic objectives on short notice, either in Ukraine or beyond, as the war persists. The emerging consensus that claims Russian cyber-operations were ineffective misses the bigger picture. Russia’s strategy failed to capitalize on the full capabilities and numerous operational successes of its cyber-units. For instance, Russian cyber-units have not yet shut down electricity or Internet connectivity on a massive scale in Ukraine. That does not mean Russia is incapable of such attacks, as some observers have suggested, but that it envisioned a swift victory and did not see the need for such widespread, indiscriminate disruptions. In all likelihood, Russian military units were reliant on Ukrainian civil infrastructure for their planned seizure of Kyiv and could not risk blowback to their own operations. Russia is almost certainly capable of cyberattacks of greater scale and consequence than events in Ukraine would have one believe. Moscow has significantly improved its ability to conduct comprehensive cyber-operations in recent years and has actively invested in its cyber-capabilities, developing new and harder-to-detect variants of its more advanced malware and operational infrastructure. NO RESTRAINT The war in Ukraine is not over. Russia has been forced to change its operational approach, and Western intelligence points to Moscow shifting toward a strategy of attrition. With the likelihood that the conflict will become a protracted war, Russia will probably not exercise restraint in its use of additional disruptive and destructive cyber-actions. Russian President Vladimir Putin is most likely to double down on early cyber-successes and seek to further disrupt and undermine government, military, and civilian infrastructure, as well as defense industrial base enterprises. Russia’s recent attempts to strike the same targets it hit on the day of the invasion with additional destructive malware indicate this new phase of the conflict is well underway. Although less visible than cyberattacks, cyber-enabled espionage—the theft of sensitive information, in this case from Ukrainian networks—is also likely to play a grisly role in the Russian offensive. Russia’s Federal Security Service has allegedly used personal information stolen from Ukrainian federal databases to draw up kill lists of people who could lead a Ukrainian resistance movement in the event of a Russian victory. And as the war carries on, Russia may be increasingly tempted to tap into the latent strategic potential of hacking collectives aligned with the Kremlin that specialize in ransomware and can unleash chaos at a moment’s notice. Western policymakers should also be prepared for cyber-operations to spread beyond the confines of Ukraine. Several Russian cyber-operations since the invasion have already had spillover effects into NATO countries, affecting critical sectors and civilian Internet connectivity across Europe. Russia knowingly accepted the risk that its cyberattacks would cause collateral damage and has a history of similar reckless behavior. The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s Annual Threat Assessment released in March judged that “Russia is particularly focused on improving its ability to target critical infrastructure … in United States as well as in allied and partner countries.” Active Russian preparations for future cyber-operations indicate that this not an idle threat. Cyber-operations have been Russia’s biggest military success to date in the war in Ukraine. They will continue to provide Moscow a flexible tool capable of hitting a range of targets in Ukraine and beyond. Disregarding their unprecedented use will only leave policymakers and analysts unprepared for what’s next. A clear-eyed view of the role cyberwarfare has played so far in Ukraine and a better understanding of its place in modern warfare are imperatives for NATO’s collective security and for managing the risks of escalation looming in cyberspace.
They’ll target U.S. critical infrastructure---only by advancing cyber mechanisms can Russia be deterred
Aldanova ’22 [Dina; May 30; Master’s Candidate at Georgetown University’s Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies Program; National Interest, “Will Russia Launch a New Cyber Attack on America?,” https://nationalinterest.org/blog/techland-when-great-power-competition-meets-digital-world/will-russia-launch-new-cyber-attack/ceng
International cooperation to this degree is not an asset that Russia benefits from. With the support of NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence’s research and development projects, expertise, and training, U.S. retaliation to a potential Russian cyber attack could be not only detrimental but even more profound as a multilateral response. Based on all this, the fear of retaliation could indeed prevent Putin from engaging in offensive cyber operations against the United States. Finally, Putin has lost the upper hand in launching an attack by surprise. For instance, Russia invaded Georgia during the Olympics Games in Beijing in 2008, and Ukraine during the Sochi Winter Olympics in 2014. When Putin waged war on Ukraine in 2022—incidentally, immediately following the Beijing Winter Olympic Games—the West anticipated it. Putin invaded Ukraine anyway. He is unlikely to act recklessly in this way again, considering the failures the Russian military has experienced since the invasion. Furthermore, knowing that the United States and European allies have shielded up, Putin has no incentive to strike. Nevertheless, would Putin wait for a more favorable moment? Or scale back a potential attack, for instance, by meddling in the U.S. midterm elections in November? It would be misleading, however, to underestimate Russian cyber capabilities or Putin’s mind games and lose vigilance. In 2020, despite denying its involvement, Russia evidently hacked U.S. software company SolarWinds. By installing malware into the company’s updated Orion software program, the attack affected thousands of customers, a hundred companies such as Microsoft and Intel, and some federal agencies like the Treasury Department, the Pentagon, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. Cyber experts acclaimed the code used as phenomenal. More astonishingly, if not for a performance assessment and proper investigation, the attack could have easily gone unnoticed. For over six months, Moscow tracked emails and other traffic of sensitive information. Could there already be a similar malware in U.S. networks? Now, on the brink of a new Cold War, the United States must keep its guard up on cybersecurity. Although there are significant factors that challenge the probability of an imminent Russian cyber-retaliation, the United States should not disregard the potential for malicious activity in the near future. It needs to keep a sober view and not act hastily. Setting priorities for the long run, the United States needs to continue advancing cyber mechanisms that detect sensitive activity like the Solar Winds hack, and invest more in training and education about cyber hygiene for government agencies, private companies, and the public. It should not neglect to regularly test offline backups, run software updates, report incidents, use multifactor authentication, block unusable domain IP addresses, and assess third-party risks. Although Putin’s intentions are far from clear, his decision to pursue a cyberattack on the United States’ critical infrastructure that would instantly shut down electricity or disrupt clean water supply, the offense might come unexpectedly, and soon. Cornered with sanctions and burdened by the bitterness of defeat, Putin might act furiously. The United States and Western allies need to be vigilant and maintain strong lines of communication about any malicious activity. With a strong multilateral front in the West, Russia will have fewer incentives to engage in cyber warfare.
Grid collapse causes extinction
Friedemann 16 (Alice, transportation expert, founder of EnergySkeptic.com and author of “When Trucks Stop Running, Energy and the Future of Transportation,” worked at American Presidential Lines for 22 years, where she developed computer systems to coordinate the transit of cargo between ships, rail, trucks, and consumers, citing Dr. Peter Vincent Pry. Pry is executive director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security, a Congressional advisory board dedicated to achieving protection of the United States from electromagnetic pulse and other threats. Dr. Pry is also the director of the United States Nuclear Strategy Forum, an advisory body to Congress on policies to counter weapons of mass destruction. Dr. Pry has served on the staffs of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, the Commission to Assess the Threat to the U.S. from an EMP Attack, the House Armed Services Committee, as an intelligence officer with the CIA, and as a verification analyst at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 1-24-16, “Electromagnetic pulse threat to infrastructure (U.S. House hearings)” http://energyskeptic.com/2016/the-scariest-u-s-house-session-ever-electromagnetic-pulse-and-the-fall-of-civilization/)
Modern civilization cannot exist for a protracted period without electricity. Within days of a blackout across the U.S., a blackout that could encompass the entire planet, emergency generators would run out of fuel, telecommunications would cease as would transportation due to gridlock, and eventually no fuel. Cities would have no running water and soon, within a few days, exhaust their food supplies. Police, Fire, Emergency Services and hospitals cannot long operate in a blackout. Government and Industry also need electricity in order to operate. The EMP Commission warns that a natural or nuclear EMP event, given current unpreparedness, would likely result in societal collapse. Terrorists, criminals, and even lone individuals can build a non-nuclear EMP weapon without great trouble or expense, working from Unclassified designs publicly available on the internet, and using parts available at any electronics store. In 2000, the Terrorism Panel of the House Armed Services Committee sponsored an experiment, recruiting a small team of amateur electronics enthusiasts to attempt constructing a radiofrequency weapon, relying only on unclassified design information and parts purchased from Radio Shack. The team, in 1 year, built two radiofrequency weapons of radically different designs. One was designed to fit inside the shipping crate for a Xerox machine, so it could be delivered to the Pentagon mail room where (in those more unguarded days before 9/11) it could slowly fry the Pentagon’s computers. The other radiofrequency weapon was designed to fit inside a small Volkswagon bus, so it could be driven down Wall Street and disrupt computers— and perhaps the National economy. Both designs were demonstrated and tested successfully during a special Congressional hearing for this purpose at the U.S. Army’s Aberdeen Proving Ground. Radiofrequency weapons are not merely a hypothetical threat. Terrorists, criminals, and disgruntled individuals have used home-made radiofrequency weapons. The U.S. military and foreign militaries have a wide variety of such weaponry. Moreover, non-nuclear EMP devices that could be used as radiofrequency weapons are publicly marketed for sale to anyone, usually advertised as ‘‘EMP simulators.’’ For example, one such simulator is advertised for public sale as an ‘‘EMP Suitcase.’’ This EMP simulator is designed to look like a suitcase, can be carried and operated by one person, and is purpose-built with a high energy radiofrequency output to destroy electronics. However, it has only a short radius of e

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