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2022 SDI Evidence

Impacts - NATO Solvency - MSDI 2022

Impacts - NATO Solvency - MSDI 2022.docx

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MSDI NATO – Solvency
NATO Fails – Tech Areas
Best 1NC Ev
**Europe won’t cooperate on any of the three topic areas
Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook, Dec 2020, is the Executive Director of the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship and the Future of Diplomacy Project at Harvard Kennedy School David Sanger is an Adjunct Lecturer in Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School and Senior Fellow in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; National Security Correspondent at The New York Timeshttps://www.belfercenter.org/publication/stronger-together-strategy-revitalize-transatlantic-power, "Stronger Together: A Strategy to Revitalize Transatlantic Power," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (ermo/sms, Acc:7-3-2022)
More importantly, the Europeans have largely been unable to bridge policy divides at home—among member states and between NATO and the EU. Rather than cooperate internally, and with the U.S. on how to use an array of new technologies to defend NATO nations, Europeans have been doggedly focused on protecting the privacy of Europeans—highlighting a difference in cultural values across the Atlantic. While a critical concern, it has often replaced a laser-like focus on the competitiveness of Europe’s own civilian technology sector. Meanwhile, Americans have focused intently on limiting China’s technological reach, but have done so unilaterally, without taking the time to bring Europeans along as full partners in the development of a strategy. It has been a bad combination. Late to the realization of the scope and ambition of China’s strategic deployment of technology, surveillance and disinformation, Europe is only now beginning to consider a common strategy to address these interlinked issues.
The results are obvious. Rather than focus on the connections between technology and the risks to liberal democracy, common goals in artificial intelligence, data protection or the proper use and limits on offensive cyber weapons, allies have spent their time arguing about taxes, regulatory differences, antitrust and standard-setting. No structured, strategically organized transatlantic dialogue currently exists to map joint goals in emerging technologies, from artificial intelligence to autonomous vehicles and factories, aerospace, biotechnology or Fifth Generation networks.
Biotech
Biotech discussions lead to strong divisions – aff’s framing increases polarization
Michael Moran, 2012, Professor Emeritus of Government, University of Manchester – Chair, Nuffield Council on Bioethics https://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/assets/pdfs/Emerging_biotechnologies_full_report_web_0.pdf, " Emerging biotechnologies: technology, choice and the public good" Nuffield Council on Bioethics (ermo/sms, Acc:7-3-2022)
Bio-optimism and bio-pessimism
1.4 In all of the fields in which biotechnologies may play a role – climate, food, energy, medicine, and the economy among them – we encounter both utopian and dystopian visions. The emerging field of synthetic biology, for example, has been compared to the ‘green revolution’ in the mid-20th Century and the ‘information revolution’ that followed it. Compared to the physical sciences, scientific understanding in the biosciences during the last few decades has achieved a very great deal in a very short time. On the other hand, useful biotechnologies have, so far, been much slower to appear and less transformative than public, policy makers and investors may have hoped or expected. External investment has moved away from the sector, business models have been thrown into turmoil and theories of innovation have been re-examined.3
1.5 As well as uncertainty about the likely scale (or timescale) of the impacts of prospective biotechnologies, there may also be significant disagreement about the nature and desirability of the impacts. Experience suggests that few benefits are obtained without some cost, and that few achievements are secured without repercussions. This suggests two axes against which attitudes and expectations concerning prospective biotechnologies may be plotted: those of impact (ranging from trivial to transformative) and benefit (beneficial to harmful). As biotechnologies are implemented and diffused, and evidence begins to accumulate, these expectations may be confirmed or confounded and the majority of evaluations may converge on a particular point, although this is by no means necessarily or inevitably the case.
1.6 Ambivalence about prospective biotechnologies may often give way to polarised views when key questions about technology are posed as if what was at stake was a matter of saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to some fixed idea of technological advance, rather than considering alternative directions for progress.4 The biotechnology wager, strong or weak, represents a position taken up in one quadrant of a matrix of possible attitudes to prospective biotechnology. However, it is likely that examples of all these attitudes can be found without too much difficulty in relation to almost any prospective biotechnology.
Biotech moral judgments leads to impasse
Michael Moran, 2012, Professor Emeritus of Government, University of Manchester – Chair, Nuffield Council on Bioethics https://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/assets/pdfs/Emerging_biotechnologies_full_report_web_0.pdf, " Emerging biotechnologies: technology, choice and the public good" Nuffield Council on Bioethics (ermo/sms, Acc:7-3-2022)
4.12 Different cultures and religions have found ways of ordering living beings so as to express their relative importance but also, significantly, their continuity as a class (i.e. the relatedness, by intermediate steps or degrees of genetic similarity, of all living beings). The ‘great chain of being’ developed in medieval Christianity, for example, with God at its head and other beings arranged in descending degrees of perfection, has its roots in Plato and Aristotle; Darwinian evolution, and modern genetics similarly emphasise both continuity and difference in their theories of descent and inheritance. The distinctive autonomy of living beings is apparent in the often complex ways in which living things interact with and transform themselves and their environment, and by their powers of reproduction, allowing natural purposes – or ‘ends’ – to be imputed to them. Notions of a natural order, harmony and ends are deeply engrained in almost all cultures and bind groups and societies powerfully together. The term ‘the wisdom of repugnance’ has been coined to evoke and enjoin a shared sense of distaste for certain biotechnological practices that appear ‘contrary to nature’ in this sense.260 This notion is close to what, from a less sympathetic perspective, is often referred to as the ‘yuck factor’.261 Where such sentiments are widely shared they can form a powerful basis for moral restraint and, indeed, for positive legislation262; however, where there are moral disagreements, moral arguments can quickly reach an impasse (since my sentiment towards a given action does not logically contradict your different sentiment).
Biotech incentives lead to distrust
Michael Moran, 2012, Professor Emeritus of Government, University of Manchester – Chair, Nuffield Council on Bioethics https://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/assets/pdfs/Emerging_biotechnologies_full_report_web_0.pdf, " Emerging biotechnologies: technology, choice and the public good" Nuffield Council on Bioethics (ermo/sms, Acc:7-3-2022)
Genetic modification and selection of crops traits
2.8 One of the first biotechnology fields to catch the public imagination and galvanise opinions was agricultural biotechnology.63 Despite the commercial failure of the first attempts to market GM tomatoes in the early 1990s,64 take up of the technology in the US has since proceeded rapidly.65 In the UK, by contrast, brief initial success with a similar product (Zeneca’s GM tomato paste) was halted abruptly by poor sales.66 Indeed, concern about the impact of GM crops on human health, the environment and economic wellbeing, has played a significant part in defining the political terrain of biotechnology policy in the UK and continental Europe,67 with levels of distrust and suspicion aggravated by apparently poorly framed attempts on the part of policy makers to engage with them.68
2.9 These controversies have been further compounded, particularly with initiatives to introduce GM crops in developing economies, by concerns about economic and social implications, such as concentration of industrial supply chains, ownership of intellectual property, and selection of products and technologies that prioritise private producer benefits at the expense of public benefits. Although the main firms involved use alternatives such as marker-assisted and genomics-assisted breeding alongside GM (as these different strategies are likely to have different levels of effectiveness depending on the traits of interest), the major bottleneck with all of these technologies remains in identifying the combinations of genes and other conditions responsible for the traits of interest.
67 See: Gaskell G, Einsiedel E, Priest S et al. (2001) Troubled waters: the Atlantic divide on biotechnology policy, in Biotechnology 1996-2000: the years of controversy, Gaskell G, and Bauer MW (Editors) (London: Science Museum)
Blanket bans fail to regulate biotech
NPA, 7-4-2021, NATO Parliamentary Assembly https://www.nato-pa.int/news/virtual-visit-france-nato-parliamentarians-discuss-space-security-biotech-advances-and-nato-st, "NATO PA," In virtual visit to France, NATO Parliamentarians discuss space security, biotech advances and NATO S&T cooperation | NATO PA (ermo/sms, Acc:7-3-2022)
lisande Nexon, Senior Research Fellow at the French Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS), noted that the international community has witnessed how biotechnology can help address healthcare issues in the context of COVID-19. Similar impacts, she argued, could be seen in areas like agriculture, environmental industries, or the materials industry. Still, she said, the stakes are high, as there are a variety of risks inherent in biotechnology, including laboratory leaks, environmental spill over effects and ethical issues.
Both experts cautioned against a blanket approach to the banning of certain biotechnologies or the prevention of their development as a whole. An appropriate approach would instead be to focus on legislation and multilateral cooperation**,** the Committee was informed. Ms Nexon emphasised that “we need to promote international cooperation and information exchange,” adding that difficulties exist because, “there are significant differences between states – whether national interests, regulations, views on [human rights], and financial resources.” The promotion of information exchanges, emphasis on improved transparency, and a general effort to raise awareness with the public of potential risks inherent in biotechnologies are all valid lines of action, she argued. To that end, NATO Allies should “train, regulate and encourage scientists to adhere to these approaches, and to evaluate risks and threats regularly with academia and scientists. It is important that we are able to recognise whether [an incident related to biotechnology] was accidental or deliberate, and whether we can attribute responsibility to a human actor […].”
LAWS Disputes
NATO faces internal conflict over how to approach LAWS
Melissa Heikkilä, 3-29-2021, "NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.," POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/ (MDUFF/MSDI, Acc: 6-28-2022)
The problem is that NATO's members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking about AI in the military context. The U.S., the world's biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in their national AI strategies. “It’s absolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI strategy," but the Europeans "did it exactly the other way around," said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said: That echoes familiar transatlantic differences — and previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over defense spending, but also highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly. The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate excesses and keeping citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen on defense, sees things differently. There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop, including lethal autonomous weapons systems — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy targets without human control. Powerful NATO members including France, the U.K., and the U.S. have developed these technologies and oppose a treaty on these weapons, while others like Belgium and Germany have expressed serious concerns about the technology. These weapons systems have also faced fierce public opposition from civil society and human rights groups, including from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, who in 2018 called for a ban. Geoană said the alliance has “retained autonomous weapon systems as part of the interests of NATO.” The group hopes that its upcoming recommendations will allow the ethical use of the technology without “stifling innovation.”
Many countries in NATO already support LAWS regulations or ban
Jamie Dettmer, 6-7-2021, "Possible First Use of AI-Armed Drones Triggers Alarm Bells ," VOA, https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_possible-first-use-ai-armed-drones-triggers-alarm-bells/6206728.html (MDUFF/MSDI, Acc: 6-28-2022)
A report by a United Nations panel of experts issued last week that concluded an advanced drone deployed in Libya “hunted down and remotely engaged” soldiers fighting for Libyan general Khalifa Haftar has prompted a frenetic debate among Western security officials and analysts. Governments at the United Nations have been debating for months whether a global pact should be agreed on the use of armed drones, autonomous and otherwise, and what restrictions should be placed on them. The U.N.’s Libya report is adding urgency to the debate. Drone advances have “a lot of implications regionally and globally,” says Ziya Meral of the Britain’s Royal United Services Institute, a defense think tank. “It is time to assess where things are with Turkish drones and advanced warfare technology and what this means for the region and what it means for NATO,” he said at a RUSI-hosted event in London. According to the U.N. report, Turkish-made Kargu-2 lethal autonomous aircraft launched so-called swarm attacks, likely on behalf of Libya’s Government of National Accord, against the warlord Haftar’s militias in March last year, marking the first time AI-equipped drones accomplished a successful attack. Remnants of a Kargu-2 were recovered later. The use of autonomous drones that do not require human operators to guide them remotely once they have been programmed is opposed by many human rights organizations. There were rumors that Turkish-supplied AI drones, alongside remote-guided ones, were used last year by Azerbaijani forces in their clashes with Armenia in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding territories.
LAWS have been used in active combat situations
Joe Hernandez, 6-1-2021, "A Military Drone With A Mind Of Its Own Was Used In Combat, U.N. Says," NPR.org, https://www.npr.org/2021/06/01/1002196245/a-u-n-report-suggests-libya-saw-the-first-battlefield-killing-by-an-autonomous-d (MDUFF/MSDI, Acc: 6-28-2022)
Military-grade autonomous drones can fly themselves to a specific location, pick their own targets and kill without the assistance of a remote human operator. Such weapons are known to be in development, but until recently there were no reported cases of autonomous drones killing fighters on the battlefield. Now, a United Nations report about a March 2020 skirmish in the military conflict in Libya says such a drone, known as a lethal autonomous weapons system — or LAWS — has made its wartime debut. But the report does not say explicitly that the LAWS killed anyone. "If anyone was killed in an autonomous attack, it would likely represent an historic first known case of artificial intelligence-based autonomous weapons being used to kill," Zachary Kallenborn wrote in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. The assault came during fighting between the U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord and forces aligned with Gen. Khalifa Haftar, according to the report by the U.N. Panel of Experts on Libya. "Logistics convoys and retreating [Haftar-affiliated forces] were subsequently hunted down and remotely engaged by the unmanned combat aerial vehicles or the lethal autonomous weapons systems such as the STM Kargu-2 ... and other loitering munitions," the panel wrote.
NATO lacks a unified response to LAWS, regulation or ban is needed to reconcile differing view between member nations
Brian Michelson, 2-23-2021, "Why NATO Needs Lethal Autonomous Weapon Standards," CEPA, https://cepa.org/why-nato-needs-lethal-autonomous-weapon-standards/ (MDUFF/MSDI, Acc:6-28-2022)
While there is no agreed-upon international definition of lethal autonomous weapons systems, the U.S. Department of Defense defines them as “weapon system[s] that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.“ While these are not Schwarzenegger-style Terminators and still have a degree of human control over them, the technology enabling these systems is maturing rapidly, and military necessity will increasingly demand that these systems gain broader parameters of autonomous action. Yet despite the complexity of these systems and the inevitability of their proliferation, NATO does not currently have a common standard for their use or development. In fact, some NATO countries even have opposing views of how to handle them. NATO standards are designed to ensure compatibility among weapon systems, communication architecture, and a host of other warfighting systems. The 7.62mm small arms round is a good example of this. But what is the 7.62mm equivalent standard for the development and employment of autonomous weapon systems? This opens a host of related questions regarding the employment of these systems: What Identification – Friend – Foe (IFF) capability should ground and air units require to prevent fratricide? What degree of certainty does a lethal autonomous weapon system require before final engagement? What level of collateral damage is acceptable? What degree of compatibility between systems is required? Should all these parameters (and others) be adjustable, and if so, at what command level? The attendant ethics also need to be addressed. NATO’s experience in Afghanistan was a case study in the challenges of coalition warfare. Differing risk tolerances, legal requirements, ethical views, domestic political concerns, and at times simply combat capability, all combined into to complex policy cocktail that impeded the effectiveness of combat operations. While modern militaries have accountability, legal, and ethical systems incorporated into their command structures, they are not uniform and leaders in differing militaries have varying degrees of authority. The key questions hinge on two issues: Who gets to decide to employ an autonomous weapon, and who is responsible should things go wrong? The Kunduz hospital strike in October of 2015 was driven primarily by human error. Responsibility was fixed on the chain of command and 16 leaders were disciplined. Who will be responsible if a member nation conducts a NATO-authorized strike and it goes terribly wro

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