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2022 SDI Negative

Neg - Vaccine Research - MSDI 2022

Neg - Vaccine Research - MSDI 2022.docx

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MSDI Vaccine Funding Neg
What’s all this?
https://youtube.com/clip/UgkxnImOvt9q0jkYfqiTYcRbb3P4IkLPQ_NC
Although MSDI’s primary CP focus is US unilateralism (a nice test of the topic’s NATO focus), a lot of the articles cut for this aff have CP potential to solve at least some specific parts of the 1AC. However, the week 1 debates should stick with the US unilateralism as the sole CP. Some of them could be framed as SQ solves.
Solid case turn options include NATO bad and Biotech bad, but recall that the aff is intended to maximize the benefits of biotech while also checking its drawbacks. It may take good analytical arguments and analysis of affirmative evidence to win a link to some biotech bad arguments.
Don’t be afraid to defend that current NATO leadership strategies may be sufficient to solve resilience without the plan. If they do and avoid linking to the DA you go for, it could be a good 2NR.
Biotech
Solvency
No solvency for dual use biotech regulation – information asymmetry turns the aff
Yang Xue 1,2, Hanzhi Yu 3,* and Geng Qin 3, 12-20-2021, 1 Law School, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China; 2 Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China 3 School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China; https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/24/14056/htm, "Towards Good Governance on Dual-Use Biotechnology for Global Sustainable Development," Sustainability Volume 13 Issue 24 10.3390/su132414056 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)
2.1. Predicament 1: The Information Asymmetry Risk of Dual-Use Biotechnology Keeps the
Traditional Self-Governance Model in the Field of Biotechnology from Playing Its Role In contrast to the field of nuclear technology, in the biological sciences, the autonomy of stakeholders is important [30]. The biotechnology industry has a long tradition of self-governance, and there are many historical success stories. However, the information asymmetry risk of dual-use biotechnology has caused problems for the traditional model of industry self-governance.
Dual-use risks of biotechnology show obvious characteristics of information asymmetry. Since the research and development environment and application scenario of dual-use biotechnology are concealed, anonymous and opaque, the public may not be able to ac- quire enough information about the dual-use risk of biotechnology. The two hidden risks of information asymmetry are as follows. The research of scientists who have mastered dual-use biotechnology cannot be monitored effectively by the institutions with which they are affiliated. This could pose risks to national biosafety and public safety. Moreover, is difficult to supervise the application of dual-use biotechnology in the early stages of disease diagnosis and treatment, as well as drug research and development. In response to these information asymmetry risks, professionals in the life sciences have always emphasized enhancing professional internal supervision mechanisms, but this may worsen information asymmetry. Researchers concerned with dual-use biotechnology acquire their professional skills in a closed environment, at scientific conferences, under the guidance of risk or ethics expert committees, and peer review of papers submitted for publication. All of these have formed an enclosed internal supervision mechanism for research, training and practice. These monitoring mechanisms determine that the identification and judgment of dual-use risks of biotechnology depend on the expert group from within the system, which may have some negative effects. For example, the internal standards and operational mechanisms within the scientific community may exclude the concerns, doubts and interventions of the government and the public. Even the judicial system, as a third party with traditional punitive capability, should rely on the judgment standards and operational systems established by the life science community in resolving legal disputes caused by the misuse of dual-use biotechnology.
Furthermore, biotechnology implementers who tend to be self-governing within the industry will resort to information asymmetry to deliberately resist the design of the public power system, which exacerbates the dual-use risks of biotechnology. Some biological scientists reject the top-down public power supervision system, which is most obvious in the field of synthetic biology research. Some technical experts in this field believe that supervision by public authorities can’t keep up with the pace of technological change, and that the bottom-up industry self-regulation is superior to the traditional “hard law” in terms of time cost, and will be less likely to be resisted by practitioners [31]. However, bottom-up industry self-regulation, or other self-regulation modes, have failed to regulate the malicious abuse of the synthetic technology of known pathogenic viruses. It is also difficult for such self-regulation models to accommodate the greater risks caused by the creation of synthetic organisms based on standardized component methods. In addition, excessive reliance on industry self-regulation will easily lead to the public’s misunderstanding of biotechnology development. Thus, the public may tend to believe that biotechnology development will undermine social consensus on biotechnology development and restrict the sustained and rapid progress of biotechnology if scientists assume certain technological risks after taking internal decisions to lift restrictions in some areas of research without having arrived and an informed consensus with the public. The public can do nothing except express doubt in the technology once such risks arise.
The He Jiankui incident of 2018 was an international controversy for two reasons. He violated institutional and international research regulations when he applied CRISPERCas9 gene editing technology to editing human embryos, and he conducted his experiments while claiming to be working on a cure for AIDS. As the public expects diseases to be cured and people to live longer, the internal private domain in life sciences will contradict public opinions on safety risk management and control. In a larger sense, different stakeholders have different understandings of and demands for the risks of dual-use biotechnology among biological scientists, social science experts, industries, media and the public.
mRNA administration is difficult (possible PICs)
Muhammad Yasir Khan , 7-9-2021, King AbdulAziz U – BioScience Dept & King Fahad Medical Research Center (also Mohammed Alsaadi, Khalid Alghamdi and Ishtiaq Qadri) https://biomedres.us/fulltexts/BJSTR.MS.ID.005949.php, "Biotechnology and Its Applications in Vaccine Development," Biomedical Journal of Scientific & Technical Research July, 2021, Volume 37, 1 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)
Messenger RNA Vaccine
The role of messenger RNA (mRNA) in the cell is to synthesize protein (translation). In mRNA vaccine, the strand codes for disease specific proteins and are expressed on surface of cells. After expression of specific disease-causing antigen of cell surface the immune response is generated. mRNA vaccine is novel, safe and less expensive method as compared to conventional vaccines. The administration of mRNA vaccine remains a challenge for scientist because of stability and other pharmacological features.
There are three types of mRNA vaccines i.e,
Non-Replicating mRNA: The mRNA is injected in body where it is taken up by cells and express the antigen.
In-Vitro Dendritic Cell Non-Replicating mRNA Vaccine: Dendritic cells present antigen on its surface for other types of cells could produce immune response. In this type of mRNA vaccine dendrtic cells are extracted from patients and the transfected in vitro with antigen and injected back to patient to stimulate immune response.
In-Vivo Self-Replicating mRNA: In this strategy the pathogen mRNA is packed with additional mRNA to make sure it is copied inside cell [19].
Currently a great deal of research is in progress in filed of mRNA vaccine for cancer as well as infectious diseases. A study by Brazzoli et al describe self-amplifying mRNA vaccine encoding influenza virus Hemagglutinin protein. The vaccine elicits humoral and cellular immune response in mice [19]. The administration of mRNA encoding light and heaving chain of anti-HIV antibody encapsulated in nanoparticles from mice ven being challenged [20].
Normal DNA vaccines ineffective
Muhammad Yasir Khan , 7-9-2021, King AbdulAziz U – BioScience Dept & King Fahad Medical Research Center (also Mohammed Alsaadi, Khalid Alghamdi and Ishtiaq Qadri) https://biomedres.us/fulltexts/BJSTR.MS.ID.005949.php, "Biotechnology and Its Applications in Vaccine Development," Biomedical Journal of Scientific & Technical Research July, 2021, Volume 37, 1 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-8-2022)
Deoxyribonucleic Acid Vaccines
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) vaccines are basically genetically engineered DNA that when injected produce antigen and induce strong immune response. The gene responsible for immunogenic response is identified, cloned and then expressed in host by directly injecting it. DNA vaccines have higher immune response inducing potential as compared to conventional live attenuated or killed vaccine [13]. In 1990 DNA vaccines were coined for the first time when plasmid DNA was injected in muscle or skin and induce immune response against viral along with non-viral antigens. DNA vaccines were thought to hold very promising future [14] but till date no DNA vaccine for humans has been approved by FDA only animal vaccines are available like canine melanoma [15], vaccine for West Nile Virus in horses [16].
Direct “dual use biotech” fails – 22 agents/models are key – aff will miss some
Yang Xue 1,2, Hanzhi Yu 3,* and Geng Qin 3, 12-20-2021, 1 Law School, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China; 2 Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China 3 School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China; https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/24/14056/htm, "Towards Good Governance on Dual-Use Biotechnology for Global Sustainable Development," Sustainability Volume 13 Issue 24 10.3390/su132414056 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)
In the military field, “dual-use” biotechnology refers to both civilian and military technology [1]. In the civilian field, it refers to a legitimate scientific purpose that yields information or technologies that may be misused to pose a threat to public health or other aspects of national security [2]. Dual-use biotechnology has benefits (such as promoting scientific progress or improving public health) but also has the potential for malicious abuse or misuse (such as bioterrorism). At present, internationally recognized dual-use biotechnology consists of technology used for acquiring new types of biological or molecular materials (combinatorial chemistry and high throughput screening, DNA shuffling, and directed evolution), directed design technologies (protein engineering, virus genome synthesis, standardization in synthetic biology), technologies for manipulating biological systems (development of psychoactive drugs, synthesis of peptide bioregulators, immune regulation, personal genomics, RNA interference, transcranial magnetic stimulation), and technologies for the packaging and delivery (chemical micro-processing equipment, gene therapy, aerosol vaccine). Tucker lists three characteristics of dual-use: (1) its technical attributes, including availability, abuse susceptibility and potential harm caused by abuse; (2) its controllability, including concretization (the materialization of technology), maturity, convergence, development speed and international diffusion; and (3) the reducibility to the state, institutional, individual, product and knowledge levels [3]. However, due to its ubiquity, it is difficult to manage the risks of all dual-use biotechnologies. Therefore, NSABB has adopted a strategy of determining a limited scope of knowledge, products or technologies produced by life science research that is most likely to be misused to threaten national biosafety. This part of research is referred to as “dual-use research concerns”, and encompasses 15 key biological agents or toxins and seven types of dual-use research [4].
Panviral can’t solve – profit motives, drugs & testing
Jennifer Kahn 4-21-2020 UC Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism “How Scientists Could Stop the Next Pandemic Before It Starts” New York Times Magazine https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/21/magazine/pandemic-vaccine.html (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)
But for years, Racaniello notes, the real obstacle to making panviral drugs or vaccines has been that no one was willing to pay for their development. For pharmaceutical companies, he points out, panviral vaccines are simply a terrible business proposition: Companies have to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to develop a shot that people will get once a year at most — and not at all in years when no particular disease is ascendant.
Panviral drug treatments are unprofitable for similar reasons. For one, the course of treatment is short, usually just a few weeks; for chronic diseases (diabetes, high blood pressure), patients take regimens of pills daily, often for years. (One person noted that Gilead’s stock price actually dropped after the company produced a revolutionary hepatitis C drug. Because the treatment completely cured patients, the market for it started to shrink, undermining the company’s bottom line.)
The other problem is that there’s currently no way to quickly test for most viruses, which is essential if a doctor wants to establish a diagnosis and prescribe the right drug. As a result, Racaniello says, it’s “a chicken-and-egg situation: No one is developing drugs for these viruses because there’s no way to test for them. And no one is developing tests, because there aren’t any drugs to prescribe.”
Dual Use Defense
Unilateral and global mechanisms mitigate dual use biotech risks
Yang Xue 1,2, Hanzhi Yu 3,* and Geng Qin 3, 12-20-2021, 1 Law School, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China; 2 Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China 3 School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China; https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/24/14056/htm, "Towards Good Governance on Dual-Use Biotechnology for Global Sustainable Development," Sustainability Volume 13 Issue 24 10.3390/su132414056 (ermo/sms, Acc:6-22-2022)
By the end of the 20th century, all countries had begun to pay attention to the four risks caused by dual-use biotechnology. In “Biotechnology, Weapons, and Humanity” (1999), the British Medical Association, for the first time in its history, expressed concern about the malicious abuse of genetic engineering, biotechnology and other emerging technologies, and suggested that social supervision should be strengthened and moral standards be established within the sciences to prevent the exacerbation of potential risks. In 2002, the Chinese government promulgated the “Regulations on Export Control of Dual-use Biological Products and Related Equipment and Technologies” to restrict the export of dual-use biological products and related equipment and technologies, to prevent them from being used to manufacture biological weapons [16]. In 2003, the National Academy of Sciences of the United States released a report, “Biotechnology Research in the Era of Terrorism” (the Fink Report), a pioneering document of the research into national security risks in the field of life science. The Fink Report identified seven types of biological experiments with dual-use risks, including microbiology and molecular biology experiments, which require safety inspections before project approval and funding [17]. To this end, the U.S. government set up a federal advisory committee under the National Biosafety Scientific Advisory Committee, which took charge of formulating policies and recommendations on dual-use research concerns (DURC) in life science research [2]. In 2004, the World Health Organization (WHO) announced that “every major new technology can be used not only for peaceful purposes, but also for hostile purposes. To tackle the common security challenges to all mankind, we should put the protection of biotechnology from being maliciously used above the security interests of all countries.” In 2009, the European Union passed Regulation No. 428/2009, which listed the controlled goods subject to export restrictions and licenses, including dual-use biological materials and production equipment [18]. In the same year, the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology (FASEB) warned that “scientists who educate their research on potential dual-use shall pay more attention to taking necessary safety control measures” [19].
Since 2011, countries have paid more attention to the dual-use of biotechnology. After the research results on genetic modification of H5N1, the highly pathogenic avian influenza virus published in “Nature” in September 2011 triggered global controversy. The United States issued several regulatory policies concerning dual-use biotechnology, including the “Regulatory Policy on Dual-use Life Science Research of the U.S. Government” (2012) by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), and the “Regulatory Policy of Dual-Purpose Research Institutions in Life Sciences of the U.S. Government” (2013) by Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) [20]. In 2014, NSABB halted research on the Gain of Function of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and middle east respiratory syndrome (MERS) viruses, and required all independent and federal research institutions to strictly abide by the “Dual-use Research of Concern” (DURC) from 24 September 2015, and established a special entity review body, the IRE. In 2015, the U.S. government established the “Institutional Regulatory Policy Concerning Dual-use Research in Life Sciences” [21]. In 2018, the U.S. government issued a “National Biodefense Strategy,” and the National Academy of Sciences of the United States released the report “Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology”, which emphasized the imminent threat of synthetic biotechnology being used as a virus weapon for terrorist activities by biohackers [22]. In 2017, the Chinese government issued “Safety Management Measures for Biotechnology Research and Development” to impose special control measures for biotechnology research and development activities with high risks of causing serious diseases in humans or animals [23].
While strengthening supervision at home, some countries have begun to mitigate the dual-use risks of biotechnology on international governance platforms. In 2016, the United States and Britain submitted Working Papers No. 10, No. 14, and No. 17 to the General Assembly at the Eighth Review Conference of the States Parties to the BWC. Germany submitted ‘Control Measures of Dual-use Materials’ at the preparatory meeting, which emphasized that the dual-use of new biotechnology poses a greater threat of large-scale epidemics and bioterrorism [24–27]. The management of dual-use risks of biotechnology was put on the international agenda and became a hot topic in the field of international arms control. To counter the possible abuse and misuse of biotechnology, Working Paper No. 30, jointly submitted by the Chinese and Pakistani governments, proposed the formulation of a model code of conduct for biological scientists. It would be binding upon all biological scientists worldwide when conducting biological research. In this important meeting, the state parties agreed to “encourage the promotion of a culture of responsibility amongst relevant national professionals and the voluntary development, adoption and promulgation of codes of conduct” [28]. At the international level, UN Security Council Resolu

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