DA - Russia DA - MSDI 2022
DA - Russia DA - MSDI 2022.docx
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MSDI Russia DA 1NC Shell NATO is not encircling Russia now Nato, 1-27-2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/115204.htm, "NATO-Russia: setting the record straight ," NATO (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022) Myth 4: NATO is encircling and trying to contain Russia Fact: NATO is a defensive alliance, whose purpose is to protect our member states. Our exercises and military deployments are not directed against Russia – or any other country. This myth also ignores geography. Only 6% of Russia's land borders touch NATO countries. Russia has land borders with 14 countries. Only five of them are NATO members. Outside NATO territory, the Alliance only has a military presence in Kosovo and Iraq. The KFOR peacekeeping mission is carried out with a United Nations Security Council mandate. NATO's non-combat mission in Iraq contributes to the fight against terrorism and is carried out at the request of the Iraqi government, with full respect for Iraq's sovereignty. In contrast, Russia has military bases and soldiers in three countries – Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine – without the consent of their governments. Russia also has amassed over 100,000 troops on Ukraine's border and is threatening to invade Ukraine. Doing plan through NATO instead of EU provokes Putin Mohammed Cherkaoui, 6-26-2022, GMU professor of Conflict Resolution and Diplomacy at George Mason University in Washington and Joaan Bin Jassim Academy for Defence Studies in Doha. https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/analyses/russia-nato-four-political-variants-under-review, "Russia-NATO: Four Political Variants under Review," Al Jazeera Center for Studies (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022) Historian Timothy Snyder has pointed out the “politics of eternity”, or “the belief in an unchanging historical essence”. (19) Other Russia observers pinpoint how Putin tries to capitalise not only on history, but also on identity politics with Slavic and Orthodox core of the region populations, and revival of Russian nationalism. Jeffery Mankoff of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington recalls that “throughout Putin’s time in office, Moscow has pursued a policy toward Ukraine and Belarus predicated on the assumption that their respective national identities are artificial—and therefore fragile. Putin’s arguments about foreign enemies promoting Ukrainian (and, in a more diffuse way, Belarusian) identity as part of a geopolitical struggle against Russia echo the way many of his predecessors refused to accept the agency of ordinary people seeking autonomy from tsarist or Soviet domination.” (20) These are the layers of Putin’s narratives as he produces and defends his principles of ‘justice’, ‘legitimacy’, ‘truth’ and ‘worldview’ within his own constructivist nuances. However, his rather static interpretation of history seems to collide with the West’s dynamic interpretation, or history dynamics, and the will to Westernisation and Europeanisation, which most of the fifteen former Soviet republics have pursued in the last three decades. Ukraine has, in the midst of a ferocious confrontation with Russian troops, maintained strong hopes it would get rapid admission into the European Union to help ease up Ukraine’s geopolitical vulnerability. As Mankoff put it, “Russian determination to bring Ukraine back into the fold despite the enormous economic price it is paying—not to mention the prospect of a grinding, bloody conflict that it could well lose—suggests that the current crisis goes beyond the question of Ukraine’s relationship with NATO.” (21) In a joint news conference with visiting European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in Kyiv on 11 June 2022, Ukranian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated, “All of Europe is a target for Russia, and Ukraine is just the first stage in this aggression… This is why a positive EU response to the Ukrainian application for membership can be a positive answer to the question of whether the European project has a future at all.” (22) Von der Leyen told him in candid language, “you have done a lot in strengthening the rule of law, but there is still a need for reforms to be implemented, to fight corruption, for example.” Still, EU leaders have accepted Ukraine’s candidacy. Meanwhile, Putin made a rather surprising statement about Ukraine’s leaning towards Brussels during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum on 17 June 2022: "We have nothing against it. It's their sovereign decision to join economic unions or not... It's their business, the business of the Ukrainian people." Such a soft-tone toward Ukraine’s candidacy for the EU membership does not alter Putin’s devotion to his own history and rigid defiance of the NATO’s presence in eastern Europe. The variability of Putin’s tactics vis-à-vis Ukraine’s aspirations toward the EU and the NATO and counter tactics of the re-aligned West’s call for a close examination of the decades-long circulating notions of the Cold War, balance of power, new world order, and the fear of what type the next possible war would be. Putin will use Kaliningrad as a weapon – it escalates Murad Jandali, 6-28-2022 Al-Estiklal Staffwriter https://www.alestiklal.net/en/view/14082/will-kaliningrad-ignite-the-spark-of-confrontation-between-nato-and-russia, "Will Kaliningrad Ignite the Spark of Confrontation Between NATO and Russia?," Al-Estiklal Newspaper (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022) In the midst of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war four months ago, the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad has emerged as a burning hotspot between Russia and the West, after Western reports described it as a dagger in the loin of Europe and a Russian geopolitical weapon to encircle Europe. However, tensions recently escalated between Russia and NATO after Lithuania imposed restrictions on the transit of goods by land to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, in compliance with the implementation of European Union sanctions on Russia, which raised fears that NATO would be drawn into a direct confrontation with Moscow. In turn, the governor of the Russian exclave, Anton Alikhanov, published a video in which he says that his neighbor Lithuania has cut off 40-50% of basic goods to his province, which caused a wave of panic among its residents and a hysterical demand for supplies. Observers believe that the reasons that prompted Russia to intervene against Ukraine are not half the reasons that prompted Russia to intervene against Lithuania now, because the issue is dangerous and related to Russian national security, given that Kaliningrad is Russia's most important strategic location in the Baltics and Putin's arm in the face of Europe. UQ NATO Not Encircling now NATO is weakening now post Ukraine – plan uniquely restores dominance Graham E. Fuller, 6-19-2022, former Vice Chair of the National Intelligence Council at CIA with responsibility for global intelligence estimates https://grahamefuller.com/some-hard-thoughts-about-post-ukraine/, "Some hard thoughts about post Ukraine," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022) Contrary to Washington’s triumphalist pronouncements, Russia is winning the war, Ukraine has lost the war. Any longer-term damage to Russia is open to debate. American sanctions against Russia have turned out to be far more devastating to Europe than to Russia. The global economy has slowed and many developing nations face serious food shortages and risk of broad starvation. There are already deep cracks in the European façade of so-called “NATO unity.” Western Europe will increasingly rue the day that it blindly followed the American Pied Piper to war against Russia. Indeed, this is not a Ukrainian-Russian war but an American-Russian war fought by proxy to the last Ukrainian. Contrary to optimistic declarations, NATO may in fact ultimately emerge weakened. Western Europeans will think long and hard about the wisdom and deep costs of provoking deeper long term confrontations with Russia or other “competitors”of the US. Europe will sooner or later return to the purchase of inexpensive Russian energy. Russia lies on the doorstep and a natural economic relationship with Russia will possess overwhelming logic in the end. Senate checks the Thumpers Senate checks the expansion thumpers David Auerswald, 5-17-2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-the-us-senate-could-slow-down-sweden-and-finlands-nato-future/, "How the US Senate could slow down Sweden and Finland’s NATO future," Atlantic Council (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022) With the announcements that Finland and Sweden will apply for NATO membership, attention now turns to the existing members of the Alliance. Adding new members requires amending NATO’s founding treaty, which then needs to be ratified by each of its thirty members. Proponents within the Alliance—to say nothing of the two aspirant countries—will want that process to happen as fast as possible. The longer it drags on, the more opportunities exist for Russia to derail the expansion process by manipulating public opinion, engaging in petro-coercion, or increasing its military threats. But could the US Senate, which must provide its advice and consent for any new or amended treaty, imperil the process? If history is any guide, the Senate will overwhelmingly support adding Finland and Sweden to NATO (certainly by more than the two-thirds required by the Constitution). That was the case in 1998, when senators supported membership for the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland by an 80-19 vote; in 2003, when senators unanimously welcomed Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia by a 96-0 vote; in 2008, when senators admitted Albania and Croatia by voice vote; and in 2017 and 2019, when it approved Montenegro and Northern Macedonia, respectively, to join the Alliance with only two dissenting votes each time. The more interesting question is how long it will take the Senate to provide its advice and consent—and here the record does not bode well. The amended treaty is likely to be signed in the next few weeks, perhaps even before the NATO Summit at the end of June. That means the Senate, which is typically in recess during August, would need to hold hearings and vote in June and July, September and October, or wait until a lame duck session after the midterm elections. The fastest enlargement process, in 2003, took a month and a half from the NATO signing ceremony to final Senate passage. Other rounds took much longer: The 1998 round took more than four months, while the 2017 and 2019 enlargements took more than ten and eight months, respectively. The war in Ukraine could certainly speed up the process, but do not be surprised if the Senate process drags into the fall. Another question is whether senators will condition their votes on changes in administration policy. In 1997, for example, Republican Sen. Jesse Helms withheld support for the Chemical Weapons Convention until the Clinton administration agreed to abolish the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the US Information Agency. Senators can also use more subtle means to change policy. In providing treaty advice and consent, senators pass what is called a ratification document that affirms that Washington will abide by the treaty’s terms. Senators can add all sorts of reservations, understandings, and conditions to that document. For example, senators have specified that arms-control treaties do not limit US missile-defense capabilities. No SQ escalation – only increasing the threat risks it IDN, 6-23-2022, InDepthNews offers news analyses and viewpoints on topics that impact the world and its peoples. IDN-InDepthNews serves as flagship of the International Press Syndicate Group, partner of the Global Cooperation Council. https://www.eurasiareview.com/23062022-theres-no-need-for-war-with-russia-oped/, "There’s No Need For War With Russia – OpEd," Eurasia Review (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022) Conflicts have a history of spinning out of control. Trotsky, the one-time close comrade of Lenin, reportedly said, “You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you”. The overwhelming majority of Ukrainians were not interested in war until President Volodymyr Zelensky took his counterproductive stance on NATO membership and President Vladimir Putin subsequently launched his invasion and united most of Ukraine’s people against him. Some observers talk about the war between the West and Russia. Although this could not happen as long as Angela Merkel is around in Germany (she retains a great deal of influence), France remains French and President Joe Biden stays cool, it may be a “damned close-run thing” (as the Duke of Wellington was supposed to have said after the victory over Napoleon at the battle of Waterloo). Putin, I believe, is not interested in territorial aggrandisement but he is interested in Russia not being threatened. Biden knows that many of the US’s top political science and history professors share this interpretation and sympathise with Russia’s predicament, even as they oppose Putin’s use of force. (In a public letter written to President Bill Clinton, these top professors advised him not to expand NATO.) Biden and other NATO leaders have to bite on this truth. Rebalancing now Post-Ukraine will lead to US rebalancing Mohammed Cherkaoui, 6-26-2022, GMU professor of Conflict Resolution and Diplomacy at George Mason University in Washington and Joaan Bin Jassim Academy for Defence Studies in Doha. https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/analyses/russia-nato-four-political-variants-under-review, "Russia-NATO: Four Political Variants under Review," Al Jazeera Center for Studies (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022) In contrast, the Biden administration’s national defence strategy maintains the existence of threats of both Russia and China exist. While delivering the revised classified strategy to Congress on 28 March 2022, the Pentagon pointed out in a public statement that Russia was posing ‘acute threats’, with China remaining “our most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge.” (30) Secretary of State Anthony Blinken asserts that “China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. Beijing’s vision would move us away from the universal values that have sustained so much of the world’s progress over the past 75 years.” (31) He is sceptical about a possible rapprochement, but also determined to pursue further containment of China. He underscores the United States “can’t rely on Beijing to change its trajectory. So, we will shape the strategic environment around Beijing to advance our vision for an open and inclusive international system.” (32) Blinken and other U.S. officials’ discourse seems to capitalise on the original framework of containment designed by George Kennan in his anonymous essay, “X-Article”, formally titled, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", published in Foreign Affairs in July 1947. He called for countering “Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world” through the “adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy.” There is noticeable return to the containment strategy in Washington in dealing with China and Russia. Still, the White House has not shifted away from its priority of maintaining a favourable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. Some analysts wonder whether these rivalries can be “managed in Cold War 2.0 or if it will be more dangerous than its forerunner.” (33) Now, containment is called back again to serve a double-shift task in Biden’s foreign policy and the preservation of the United States’ leadership of the West and standing in world politics. The Ukraine war could be a good opportunity for adjusting and rebalancing Biden’s strategic priorities in Indo-Pacific, Europe, the Gulf and the Middle East. Still, the question lingers whether the reproduction of containment is good enough, or strategically sufficient, to give the Biden administration some leverage to outperform two-rival superpowers with is a common goal: the pursuit of undermining U.S. power and influence in the world, maximising their de-dollarisation efforts and endangering the position of the dollar as the reserve currency. No Horizontal Escalation unless plan Horizontal escalation unlikely now, could happen if Putin is weakened Richard D. Hooker, Jr. 4-21-2022, Fellow Nonresident Senior Fellow Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/managing-escalation-in-ukraine/, "Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond," Atlantic Council (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022) The risk of horizontal escalation Though it presents incredibly high risk, escalating the conflict beyond Ukraine’s borders in the near term is an option Putin could consider if his survival is at stake. A direct attack on NATO territory—perhaps through Lithuania to obtain a land corridor to the Kaliningrad exclave and cut off the Baltic States, should Russian forces find more success in Ukraine—is possible. The powerful Kaliningrad garrison, which includes nuclear-tipped Iskander-M and Kalibr systems, could assist. At sea, a desperate Russian Federation might attack and seize commercial shipping in international waters on the Black Sea and in the Baltic. Broadening the conflict to engage outside powers more directly might stop the flow of support and lethal aid to Ukraine, throw NATO into disarray, create openings for sanctions relief, and rally an increasingly disaffected Russian population. If tactical nuclear weapons are postured for use, or employed in desperation, the risks of uncontrolled escalation will become quite real. Such use is not likely, but cannot be ruled out. Other military options also exist. Belarus has a substantial ground force of four heavy brigades, an airborne brigade, and strong artillery, which remain uncommitted. Putin could, in effect, take over and deploy this force in Ukraine or the Baltics, though its morale appears low. To distract and punish NATO for its support, hybrid operations in the Baltic States using Russian mercenaries, special-operations troops and intelligence paramilitaries from the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) could seize ethnically Russian parts of NATO territory (for example, in the Narva area in Estonia) and declare independence. While substantial Russian regular forces are not available in strength, this move would provoke frantic diplomatic activity in NATO and the EU, and could provide leverage for negotiations and sanctions relief. Horizontal escalation in other regions—such as the Arctic, the Mediterranean, and the Far East—is also possible, but would suffer from the same disability: lack of military resources to achieve any decisive result. To date, Russian naval forces are intact and could be employed, but the Russian navy is not a true blue-water maritime force and, apart from nuisance attacks, could not realistically alter strategic outcomes. The same is true of Russian military aviation and space forces. Apart from generating confusion and a degree of misdirection, it is unlikely that these operations could contribute significantly to the success of the campaign in Ukraine, Putin’s principal goal. On the contrary, such operations could bring other military powers into the conflict against Russia, alienate others such as China and India, and change the correlation of forces decisively against Russia. Links Solidification link – this is a NB for unilateral CP Plan solidifies NATO, creating a double loss situation – CP allows Europe to mediate DA impacts instead of participating as stakeholder – no thumpers because everything pivots on this distinction M
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