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2022 SDI Affirmative

Aff - Vaccine Research - MSDI 2022

Aff - Vaccine Research - MSDI 2022.docx

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MSDI Vaccine Funding Aff
What’s all this?
https://youtube.com/clip/UgkxnImOvt9q0jkYfqiTYcRbb3P4IkLPQ_NC
Much of the discussion about long term vaccine funding is focused on the CEPI project, which includes a lot of private funding streams, but the NFHS case list recommends it for the 2022-2023 case list. There are lots of cards on NATO cooperation to retain and expand from lessons learned via Covid, some of which at least mention a vaccine element.
As with many other cases, it is important to justify the plan in relation to TWO topic anchors – “Why use NATO?” and “Why biotech (or other area)?” – and this aff focused on each in ways that could work with a variety of other cases.
This aff is also designed to show how a case can be written to defend status quo mechanisms by saying additional action is needed to reach their potential (instead of setting up something entirely new based on a single proposal).
It is also designed to play “whack-a-mole” with the negative by having several layers of solvency concepts such that the 2AR can emphasize whatever concepts they did NOT attack. I recommend playing with different extension cards in practice rounds to achieve this effect. The current version of the plan text is word soup, and there are plenty of other words that could be considered.
Case
Inherency
NATO lack vaccine stockpiles, although its Covid cooperation in other areas could thump DA’s
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization, March 2021, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/3/pdf/2103-factsheet-COVID-19-en.pdf, " NATO’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic" NATO Fact Sheet (ermo/sms, Acc:6-20-2022)
Vaccines
Although NATO does not have a supply of vaccines, the Alliance avails the clearing house mechanism to Allies and partners. Thus far, four nations requested vaccines : Montenegro, North Macedonia, Georgia and Tunisia.
Research and Innovation
NATO is supporting innovation through research and scientific collaboration on COVID-19. For example, the NATO Science & Technology Organization has tapped into its network of 6,000 defence scientists through the NATO Chief Scientist’s Challenge. Launched in April, the Challenge tasked Alliance researchers with identifying solutions to some of the most pressing challenges posed by COVID-19. More than 40 projects are now being taken forward, addressing topics such as understanding and countering pandemic disinformation, as well as improving military training for pandemic relief operations.
Furthermore, the NATO Science & Technology Organization’s Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation directly supported the US state of Connecticut in developing a modelling capability to help forecast the spread of COVID-19.
Through the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme, Italian and Swiss scientists are collaborating on a NATO supported project to develop rapid COVID-19 diagnostics.
Plan
The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in biotechnology through a vaccine research program emphasizing biosafety, resilience, foresight, and experimentalist governance.
Solvency
The plan builds NATO resilience to contain all global threats – Article 3 and current agencies prove they say yes
Jaclyn Levy, 6-10-2021, Millennium Leadership Fellow at the Atlantic Council and the director of public policy at the Infectious Diseases Society of America https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-best-defense-why-nato-should-invest-in-resilience/, "The best defense: Why NATO should invest in resilience," Atlantic Council (ermo/sms, Acc:6-17-2022)
The COVID-19 pandemic has magnified not only the successes and failures of the world’s health systems but also the importance of multilateral partnerships in biosecurity. Preparing for the next pandemic will require adaptation, interconnectivity, and resilience—the capacity to resist and recover quickly from major infrastructure shocks. Intergovernmental alliances like NATO can play a critical role in the relationship- and capacity-building necessary for a healthy global biosecurity sphere, which ensures a more secure world.
There are many lessons from the last fifteen months, but among them is a time-honored proverb: an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Many public-health and security crises are a product of critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, but an expanded focus on resilience in developing a global security strategy can prevent the next crisis. Responding to emergencies such as pandemics is far more expensive than preventing them and creates additional costs such as strained political cohesion and waning support for public institutions. Policies emphasizing resilience should fundamentally aim to minimize damage, restore stability quickly, and generate improved strategies for similar issues. To this end, there are several steps NATO can take to build a preventive, resilience-based approach to emerging global challenges.
Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty includes resilience as a critical element of its mission to achieve collective defense, and the Alliance supports multiple programs to build resilience against non-traditional threats. At its 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO committed to “continue to enhance our resilience against the full spectrum of threats, including hybrid threats, from any direction,” and added that “resilience is an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and effective fulfilment of the Alliance’s core tasks.” In June, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said during an appearance at the Atlantic Council that a critical part of the Alliance’s agenda over the coming decade is to support “resilience technologies.”
The COVID-19 pandemic has made clear NATO’s value in an unpredictable world. In 2020, NATO troops supported civilian efforts to combat the spread of COVID-19 by airlifting patients and medical equipment, building field hospitals, distributing supplies, repatriating civilians, establishing quarantine facilities and triage centers, assisting with decontamination, and sharing medical expertise. After this pandemic recedes, NATO’s proposals for responding to biothreats and other novel challenges should include investments in resilience to help combat “black swan” events, which may turn existing health or environmental emergencies into security crises. “Resilient societies are our first line of defense,” said NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană in December, adding that “we have to put a much greater emphasis on resilience” across government, the private sector, and civil society.
NATO should start advancing resilience by leveraging and strengthening the following policies, programs, and partnerships:
The NATO Science & Technology Organization (STO) develops innovative solutions with global experts to ensure that the Alliance’s technological capacity meets its needs in a quickly changing world. Allied governments contributed approximately 500 million euros to STO last year, forming a pool of already-allocated funding that could support resilience-building efforts. To advance and sustain technological innovation that enhances global resilience, the STO’s Science and Technology Board should push for a sustained allocation of funding specifically for resilience research, biomedical research and development, and ambitious pilot programs focused on sharing pathogen surveillance data between countries and their health systems, developing biomedical research infrastructure, and conducting training simulations for biothreat and public-health emergencies.
The NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme, as defined by the Alliance, promotes dialogue and cooperation “based on scientific research, technological innovation, and knowledge exchange. [It] offers funding, expert advice and support to… security-relevant activities that respond to NATO’s strategic objectives.” During the pandemic, SPS led efforts to advance the development of rapid COVID-19 tests. In the future, SPS should invest in ways to identify and combat swiftly rising global antimicrobial resistance, synthetic biology threats, and agricultural vulnerabilities; it should also invest in assessments and fortifications of medical and biosecurity stockpiles.
The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) has experience supporting responses to infectious-disease outbreaks, which threaten to increase as a consequence of climate change, industrialization, and global migration. EADRCC activities leverage emerging technologies to enhance resilience and build capacities for crisis response. Previous joint exercises with the SPS Program have included testing innovative telemedicine and communications platforms. EADRCC’s successful logistical coordination during the COVID-19 pandemic underscores its unique value; in the future, the EADRCC should expand its role in international cooperation and information-sharing between military medical services and civilian health systems.
The Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defence (JCBRN) Centre of Excellence, a NATO military body focused on CBRN defense advice, education, training, and exercises, can convene member states and partners for training simulations and security activities related to novel threats in the context of regional and global issues. JCBRN should act on this capacity, in coordination with the Crisis Management and Disaster Response Centre of Excellence, to ensure that NATO member countries are prepared to combat future outbreaks and biological events. Strengthening bio-preparedness efforts through modeling and planning will help drive a resilient crisis response.
Established during the pandemic, the NATO Pandemic Response Trust Fund stockpiles medical equipment and supplies for members of the Alliance and partners in need. Beyond the current pandemic, it can help defend against future chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and public-health threats—only if NATO maintains and adapts these stockpiled resources for other critical public-health and infrastructure needs.
Looking ahead, the NATO 2030 initiative aims to elevate democratic leadership around the world, advance biomedical science and global technology, and position NATO and its partners to tackle novel global security challenges through a lens of flexibility and adaptation. Strategic investments in these efforts will establish resilient frameworks for addressing emerging threats, which is critical for successful collective defense.
Realizing the full potential of these and other programs will require additional support from NATO operations, planning, policy, and civilian divisions. Allies and international organizations should also continue working with NATO on the ground to support equipment procurement and regional needs. In today’s unpredictable security environment, successfully responding to threats requires resilience—and NATO is well-positioned to make resilience a reality.
NATO vaccine cooperation is vital to resilience – this approach avoids trade offs with other parts of the core mission
Giovanna De Maio 2020 visiting fellow at GWU George Washington University, former visiting fellow Center for the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/FP_20201028_nato_covid_demaio-1.pdf, "," Brookings Institution (ermo/sms, Acc:6-17-2022)
So far, NATO has set up a Lessons Learned Steering Group (LLSG)66 on COVID-19, which collects inputs by agencies, divisions, and delegations to help the alliance design a strategy for both future waves of this coronavirus and for future pandemics. Stemming from the inputs of the LLSG and from the reflections of officials interviewed for this paper, the following recommendations to the alliance focus on resilience and readiness in crisis management.
● Resilience: NATO must remain vigilant against malign exploitation of crises. Under whatever circumstances may arise, the Atlantic alliance should not shift its focus away from its main objectives of pushing back against adversaries through deterrence and response-readiness.67
○ NATO should have a protocol to follow in case of crises like pandemics to ensure continuity of operations. So far, the alliance has shown impressive adaptability and was able to keep its missions running and continue with training and exercises, even if at a reduced level. However, military activities have been reduced by 33% with 80% fewer personnel participating,68 and the climate of uncertainty surrounding the impact of COVID-19 on NATO missions, training, and exercises could have left gaps for malign actors to exploit, especially in more fragile settings like in Iraq. To prevent future pandemics or similar events from eroding NATO’s readiness capabilities, it is paramount to develop structured plans and protocols that would allow timely adaptation, personnel protection, and resilience against external threats. To further protect core combat capabilities, it would be necessary for NATO personnel employed in quick-response units to receive early access to vaccines; the alliance should also be prepared with contact-tracing capabilities to identify outbreaks quickly.69
○ NATO should increase its counterdisinformation efforts and protect its member states against malign actors exploiting crises to promote their geopolitical and economic interests. Although disinformation has been included among the list of threats to NATO since the 2014 summit in Wales, the alliance has not established a special agency or team to focus on countering disinformation. During COVID-19, when NATO member states were targeted by Chinese “mask diplomacy” and Russia’s claims about the inability of Western countries to deal with COVID-19, the organization resorted to its Public Diplomacy Division — in cooperation with the European Union’s East Stratcom Task Force70 — to increase its public profile and debunk Chinese and Russian fake news. However, this is not yet enough to counter the volume and reach of such propaganda, which requires real-time investigation and fact-checking and outreach to the audience that has been targeted by disinformation, with the possibility of providing training for soldiers and commanders to react to information warfare.71 For this reason, the alliance should consider setting up a dedicated team and establish a framework of coordination with the East Stratcom Task Force to broaden the scope of counterdisinformation efforts and take more targeted actions to strengthen societal resilience across member states.
Readiness: NATO must further enhance its crisis management toolkit. The core lesson COVID-19 taught NATO concerned crisis management capabilities and culture. The alliance adjusted fairly quickly and made an incredibly efficient use of its logistical apparatus; yet, more can be done to enhance NATO readiness to face challenges of this nature.
○ Strengthen the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Relief Coordination Center. As mentioned, over the past few years, the EADRCC staff had been reduced to three people; as COVID-19 hit Europe, NATO was forced to rapidly reallocate military personnel from other departments to support the work of NATO’s clearinghouse for aid requests and delivery. At a time when the impact of global challenges can no longer be ignored, NATO should invest in and expand the EADRCC’s capacity and scope to increase preparedness in preparation for subsequent COVID-19 waves and other future catastrophic events. Along with the EADRCC, the alliance should enhance the flexibility in the NSPA procurement process in order to speed up access to cost-effective airlifting as well as to the procurement of medical equipment. Beyond overseeing the transportation supplies and medical assistance, the EADRCC could also play a role in coordinating NATO’s support to national armed forces in member states, in the event that such forces experience significant losses.
○ Increase knowledge, prediction capabilities, and awareness. Building on existing analytical platforms and programs72 and intelligence sharing between allied nations, NATO should increase its understanding and awareness of how global challenges and threats such as pandemics can affect NATO operations and personnel and increase preparation of tailored contingency plans for suitable responses. Some of these actions may include several aspects of the alliance’s activities, from decisionmaking to technological potential and research through its own laboratory (the Center for Maritime Research and Experimentation located in La Spezia, Italy) and its Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Program.73 Given NATO’s renewed sensitivity to biological risks, intelligence sharing could be crucial to elaborate plans for countering new threats such as bioterrorism.74
○ Coordination with the European Union. NATO’s logistical apparatus was crucial in delivering aid when the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism was under stress, and after initial hesitation, in coordination with the EU mechanism. Moving forward, in the words of Malcom Chalmers, deputy director-general of Britain’s Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the EU-NATO relationship will be crucial “if the West is to survive as a coherent entity.”75 Given that many NATO countries are also EU member states, all that applies to logistics, transportations, and purchases falls under the regulatory umbrella of the European Union. For this reason, a more established framework of cooperation between NATO and the EU will be crucial to ensure a smoother application of crisis protocols and ease the transportation of essential items within alliance territory, similarly to what was envisaged to ensure military mobility for the DEFENDER-Europe 20 drilling. In particular, the EU and NATO should also collaborate to establish permanent stockpiles76 and reduce the alliance’s dependence from global supply chain for crucial medical material, but also to develop cost-effective strategies for the production and distribution of a COVID-19 vaccine. Such coordination should also remain wary of duplicating efforts — as in the case of the NATO pandemic relief trust fund,77 which risks creating overlapping with the Civil Protection Mechanism for the accumulation of medical supplies.
Advantage 1 NATO resilience
Multinational Medical Coordination Centre / European Medical Command (MMCC/EMC ) capacity is key to surge against future pandemics, but vaccine response needs to move from just-in-time focus to long term planning
Rico Maderthoner, 11-21-2021, Commander J.G. (OF-3) Germany Navy, https://military-medicine.com/article/4175-m3-eps-a-surge-capacity-concept-for-pandemics-crises.html, "M3-EPS: A Surge Capacity Concept for Pandemics and Crises," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:6-20-2022)
In late 2019, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 was first identified and has since led to the ongoing global COVID-19 pandemic. This pandemic has highlighted the lack of rapidly deployable reinforcement elements and systems as well as the benefits of stockpiles of medical equipment. A differentiation must be made between non-expendable medical supplies (i.e. medical devices1) and individually issued expendable medical supplies. The need for both expendable and non-expendable medical supplies could not be sufficiently satisfied in all areas as manufacturing nowadays is based on just-in-time practices without contingency stockpiling.
Production losses and market contractions as well as the concentration of production facilities in countries outside of Europe have in recent years frequently led to supply shortages across Europe for various drugs (including antibiotics, cytostatic agents, and vaccines). What is more, the pressure to reduce costs has in recent years led to a considerable reduction in civilian and military stockpiles of medical materials, including non-expendable medical supplies, 

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