K - Security Supplement - Michigan Classic 2022 BBE
K - Security Supplement - Michigan Classic 2022 BBE.docx
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Securitization Alt - Forget IR Theory The alternative is to forget---that escapes the vicious circle that gave rise to hegemonic practices. That enables a tabula rasa of the consciousness that offers opportunities to think and act beyond the confines of our desolate present. Bleiker 1997 [Roland Bleiker; “Forget IR Theory” Bleiker teaches international relations, peace studies and political theory at the University of Queensland. Sage Publications, 1997 https://www.jstor.org/stable/40644880 Accessed 7/22/22 //jerry] To forget orthodox IR theory is not to ignore the IR practices that have framed our realities. Countless events of the past, such as the Holocaust, cannot and should not be simply chased out of our collective memory. Nor is it to turn a blind eye toward the violent nature that characterizes present world politics. Forgetting is not only a negative process, a neglecting and overlooking, but also a necessary part of our existence, something we often do without being aware of it. Jeanette Winterson: They say that every snowflake is different. If that were true, how could we go on? How could we ever get up and off our knees? How could we ever recover from the wonder of it? By forgetting. We cannot keep in mind too many things. There is only the present and nothing to remember.5 The task, then, becomes one of turning forgetting from a selective, arbitrary, and unconscious constitution of things past into an active, conscious, and more inclusive process. Instead of perpetuating IR nostalgia, seeking comfort and security in the familiar interpretation of long-gone epochs, even if they are characterized by violence and insecurity, conscious forgetting opens up possibilities for a dialogical understanding of our present and past. It refuses to tie future possibilities to established forms of life. Rather than further entrenching current IR security dilemmas by engaging with the orthodox discourse that continuously gives meaning to them, forgetting tries to escape the vicious circle by which these social practices serve to legitimize and objectivize the very discourses that have given rise to them. Forgetting becomes an instrument of dialogue and inclusion; it reorients our memories, becomes active by turning into forge(t) and for(to)get. From this vantage point, forgetting is a process or remembering, or, seen from Milan Kundera's reversed perspective, "remembering is a form of forgetting." I will draw primarily upon the work of Friedrich Nietzsche to explore the process of forgetting orthodox IR theory. This is not to essentialize Nietzsche or render him heroic but to employ his work as a steppingstone, a source to provoke thought before it, too, has to be forgotten in order not to turn into a new orthodoxy. The process of forgetting, for Nietzsche, is a process of healing: Only now do I believe you healed: for healed is who forgot.7 Nietzsche ended up with this position by dealing with a set of methodological dilemmas similar to those I am trying to address in this article. The need to forget emerges from recognizing the problematic links that are commonly drawn between cause and effect. Such a duality, Nietzsche claims, probably never existed. We merely establish arbitrary links between things that we consider important, isolate a couple of pieces out of a continuum of complex and intertwined events. This is why it is futile to search for a causal origin in this web of human life and to think we could somehow ground a better world on this form of flawed insight. "How foolish it would be," Nietzsche claims, "to suppose that one only needs to point out this origin and this misty shroud of delusion in order to destroy the world that counts for real, so-called "reality. "8 Nietzsche's skepticism toward grounding critique in an investigation of the origins of things is important. It is one of the reasons why some consider his work as the conceptual turning point from modernity to postmodernity.9 Nietzsche's own words may explain best the importance of forgetting for a critique of orthodox IR: Why is it that this thought comes back to me again and again and in ever more varied colours? - that formerly, when investigators of knowledge sought out the origin of things they always believed they would discover something of incalculable significance for all later action and judgment, that they always presupposed, indeed, that the salvation of man must depend on insight into the ongins of things, but . . . The more insight we possess into an ongin the less significant does the ongin appear: while what is nearest to us, what is around us and in us, gradually begins to display colors and beauties and enigmas and riches of significance of which earlier mankind had not an inkling.10 By observing why Nietzsche ended up with this position, I will explore the "riches of significance" that could emerge once we liberate IR theory from the compulsion to link the search for peace with exploring the origins of present dilemmas in world politics. I will then retrace Nietzsche's next step, an engagement with what he calls "active forgetfulness," a way of thinking that enables "a tabula rasa of the consciousness," makes room for new things, new thoughts, new possibilities.11 My approach to forgetting IR theory will revolve primarily around issues of language: how they constrain and enable, how they are part of a discursive form of domination and, at the same time, offer powerful opportunities to think and act beyond the narrow confines of our present world. In that sense, my article deals with methodological concerns - with what conventionally is considered form rather than substance. Yet, the manner in which we approach, think, conceptualize, and formulate IR has a significant impact on how it is practiced. Language frames politics. Form turns into substance. L - Islamophobia Islamophobia shapes US foreign policy. Notions of western superiority are a critical tool that drum up support for broader militarism Deepa Kumar 13, is an Associate Professor of Media Studies and Middle Eastern Studies at the Rutgers University. She is the author of Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire and Outside the Box: Corporate Media, Globalization, and the UPS Strike being interviewed by Jessica Desvarieux, The Real News Network, “Twelve Years Post 9/11, Islamophobia Still Runs High”, http://truth-out.org/video/item/18759-twelve-years-post-9-11-islamophobia-still-runs-high KUMAR: Absolutely not. I think it is true that larger numbers of conservative voters are racist. They are racist not just in terms of their attitude towards Arabs and South Asians, but also to a whole host of other groups. So it's true that this idea sort of concentrated within those ranks. But in fact Islamophobia is far more systemic than that. That is to say, the idea of a Muslim enemy, the idea of a terrorist enemy is one that actually goes back a couple of decades but was brought to light after 9/11 by the political elite, by our political leaders. So in fact it is built into the system of U.S. foreign policy in this country. And to simply look at the far right and to ignore the fact that it has larger implications in terms of justifying U.S. foreign policy would be really to have only an incomplete picture of what is at work in this form of racism. DESVARIEUX: Okay. Let's talk about the mass media and how they depict Islam since 9/11. Can you describe for us how the mass media has depicted Islam? KUMAR: Well, basically, the trauma of 9/11, the fact that, you know, 3,000 Americans died meant that it enabled the U.S. media to actually draw on stereotypes that have been, you know, propped up by Hollywood, by the news media, and so on for a few decades before that. And that was the idea that these are crazy, irrational people. They are all apparently driven by Islam to violence. And so we should lock them up, we should be suspicious of them, we should detain them at airports, and so on and so forth. And so that's what you saw in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. And this show called 24, which your viewers may know, is--it's about a lot of things [incompr.] that it's about justifying the building of a national security state and justifying practices like torture and so on and so forth. DESVARIEUX: Okay. And also the story of the day, of course, is Syria, and everyone's attention is drawn to Syria. Can you describe for us just how does Islamophobia play a role in any of the arguments for intervention in Syria, really? KUMAR: Okay. It doesn't play a direct role in that. It is--the idea of humanitarianism has a long history in the United States. The idea that there are victims all over the world, that the U.S. government has then got to make war in order to, you know, somehow defend them, this goes back all the way to the Spanish-American war of 1898, which was supposed to be about rescuing Cubans. And similarly, you see these sorts of justifications given. You know, Vietnamese need to be defended. In Iraq, it was babies, apparently, who were being bayoneted in Kuwait, and therefore the U.S. needed to intervene and defeat Iraq in 1991. So this idea of humanitarianism has a long history within the foreign policy establishment. But what makes it particularly potent in this case is that after 9/11 what you see is the Bush administration projecting this idea of clash of civilizations, which is basically the notion that we in the West are democratic, we are rational, we are civilized, we are, you know, all things wonderful, and they in the East are barbaric, they're misogynistic, and so on and so forth, and therefore we have an obligation, what used to be called the white man's burden, to go off and rescue them. And so you see some of that language, which is the idea that Arabs cannot bring democracy by themselves, they cannot make change, and so we need to intervene. So it's a combination both of the victim narrative, which has a long history, combined with this language of clash of civilizations. DESVARIEUX: Okay. And how does this fit into domestic policy? How do they work Islamophobia into domestic policy? KUMAR: Right. I mean, the comparison I make in the book and that I'm actually working on in the next book is that the U.S. government, and U.S. imperialism in particular, always needs an enemy. That is, when there is no humanitarian cause, an enemy is an extremely useful way to justify wars abroad, as well as the policing of dissent at home. So, for instance, during the Cold War we had been menacing enemy of the Soviet Union, against whom both a hot and a Cold War had to be waged. And, of course, this justified, then, McCarthyism, because there's always a reflection of the external enemy inside, and these people have to be rounded up, blacklisted, and so on and so forth. So that's the logic back then, and, of course, it was entirely about a politics of fear. Today we have the same sort of thing. After 9/11, the war on terror comes into being precisely about fighting endless wars. Remember, back in 9/11 the Bush administration was going to start with Afghanistan, go to Iraq, and then Iran, Syria, and so on and so forth. It didn't work out that way. But the idea was to drum up this fear of this menacing terrorist enemy, which justified wars all over the world in order to gain the U.S.'s interest in [incompr.] particularly in the oil-rich region in the Middle East. You asked me about domestic politics. Always there was a reflection of the domestic in terms of the international threat. And so what you've seen is innocent Muslims--and often actually not even Muslims, people from the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia, some of them Sikhs, some some of them Hindus, some of them Christians, and so on, being racially profiled because that is the logic that comes out of this. I have a whole chapter in the book about how the legal system has been reworked so as to justify things like indefinite detention, things like torture, things like deportation. And, frankly, the infiltration of agents into our schools, into my school, into colleges, and so forth. So, you know, it's truly horrific the extent to which Muslim Americans and people who look Muslim have been demonized since 9/11. L - Militarization/Expansionism The 1ac is a politic of territorialization that perpetuates the logic of coloniality—carving out spaces of control and the desire for complete control and visibility is a key tool of statecraft that justifies the basis for continual acts of Islamophobic violence Salman Sayyid 18 School of Sociology and Social Policy University of Leeds, Leeds, UK, Topographies of Hate: Islamophobia in Cyberia, Journal of Cyberspace Studies, Volume 2, Issue 1, Winter and Spring 2018, Pages 55-73 The world we live in is visualised in terms of a geography bequeathed to us by Early Modern and Enlightenment cartography, and established by the exercise of an Euroepan imperium and its construction of a world order of metropolitian nation-states and colonies. In this world system, primary and legitimate actors were European states organized around cultivation of core nationalities (French, British, Dutch…). The dismantling of the European colonial empires meant the idea of nation-states become global, but only few nationalities were considered to be epistemological privileged. These epistemological privileged states became the leading producers of knowledge. As Ramon Grofoguel points out the global cannon is based on work of writers from six European countries. Eurocentrism is simultaneously national, racial and global. Social relations that do not morph around the nation-state are marginal. Thus, a national/nationalist methodology elaborates social relations as being contained within boundaries of basically an Enlightenment cartography. By using the example of Muslims as a globalized population that is not contained within any nation-state, we will explore the continuities and discontinuities between social relations mediated through virtual space and social relations spatialized geographically. The spatial dimension of social relations has historically been conceived in terms of attempts to overcome distance. The range of social relations is contained by the ability to transcend space through the development of transportation and communications. The process of territorialisation describes the way in which organised human endeavour creates a container for the exercise of a myriad of social interactions.[5] The boundaries of this container are determined by the interplay between environment, logistical technologies and strategic awareness. Hunter-gather bands, agrarian villages, cultic associations, polities, trade routes and networks; construct a different form of territorialisation in which activity in the interior is marked as different in the expenditure of resources than activity in the exterior. Thus, space occurs as a void which needs to be overcome through a web of social relations, and this web is borne on an assemblage of technologies of communications and transportation (alphabetic scripts, organised commissariats, ocean-going vessels, railways etc.). Modes of transmission create territories by overcoming space.[6] In other words, human communities transform the spatial dimension of power into enclosed spaces (Buzan & Little, 2000). The spatial dimension of human interactions can be analysed not only through the institution of the state, but also through various forms of the spatialization of power, including the bounded experience of hunter-gatherer bands, nomads and other forms of human association. The staging of the political has a spatial dimension. The Spatial Turn This organisation of space, however, is not merely a site for the enactment of social relations but rather a fundamental element in the constitution of "systems of interaction" (Soja, 1980; Giddens, 1984, p. 368). Space, then, is not a description of the physical surface occupied by individuals, families, and communities; it is not just terrain for political struggles: palaces and assemblies, public squares, and sacred ground, containers for the performance of social ontologies, but rather the condition of possibility for the exercise of power. Physical space is experienced through discursive spatialization not simply as a pre-existing immutable reality that is simply a background to human activity. The exercise of power is not limited to the idea of a cyberpolitics in which cyberspace is conceptualized as a new distinctive arena of contestation where the struggle for “who gets what, when, and how”, takes place (Choucri, 2012, p. 4). This paper is concerned not with a cyberpolitics but rather with the political, in which, the exercise of power is constitutive of the social. Space is not natural but historically and culturally contingent, the product of social interactions which restrain and enable behaviour and beliefs. As Massey suggests that we understand space as: “Space” is created out of the vast intricacies, the incredible complexities, of the interlocking and the non-interlocking, and the networks of relations at every scale from local to global… all social (and indeed physical) phenomena/activities/relations have a spatial form and a relative spatial location” (Massey, 1992, p. 80). The spatial turn within the humanities and social sciences abandons the belief in space as a natural container in favour of investigations in the discursive articulation of space (Massey, 1992; Kosmin, 2014, pp. 5-6). The process by which land and sea were spatialized are so deeply sedimented that we can be forgiven experiencing them as part of a natural geological reality. It is for this reason that it is the introduction of the spatialization of the skies after the first world, which provides a useful analogy with the emergence of cyberspace.[7] Airpower and emergence of cyberspace In 1921, Giulio Douhet (2009), an Italian general published The Command of the Air. This book in its various editions, is considered to be the first significant theorisation of the air power. Douhet had served in the First World War with the Italian Army fighting the Austro-Hungarian forces, saw the potential for the use of warplanes as strategic rather than tactical weapons. In other words, he was critical of the way in which air planes had been used until then either for reconnaissance or as ‘flying artillery’ to attack small enemy formations in concert with ground forces (Douhet, 2009, p. 3). Instead, he argued that aeroplanes should be used in large ‘aerial fleets’ to attack enemy cities behind the front lines occupied by land forces (Douhet, 2009, p. 24). This strategic bombing would break the will of the enemy of population and modern war, which needed to mobilise a large percentage of its male citizenry, could not be sustained without popular support. Douhet’s call for independent air forces capable of bombing enemy cities into submission depended on his spatialization of the sky. That is, the sky became a surface of represention for the exercise of military engagement. The sky unlike the land provided a pure geometric plane. In which t aircraft could move in any direction; the sky was an even surface without physical constraints or means for channelling movement across it. Unlike armies, which are dependent on rail and road transport, or fleets which were only able to move through connected bodies of water of sufficient depth and scale, a mass formation of aeroplanes would have no such restrictions. It would be able to attack enemy infrastructure, industry and population centres without topographical hindrance. Douhet realized that the aeroplanes' ability to move across the sky at speed, would lead to the transformation of the battlefield. The distinction between civilians and soldiers would collapse, military action would no longer be restricted to the frontline where rival organised large armed units contend. Total wars would be fought by the total mobili
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